OPINION
FARRIS, Circuit Judge:
OVERVIEW
The Arizona Department of Corrections appeals an order granting partial summary judgment in favor of a certified plaintiff class of Arizona state prisoners and enjoining the Department from (a) prohibiting contact vis[1518]*1518its between inmates and their attorneys, and (b) denying food-service jobs to HIV-positive1 inmates. The inmates brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988). We vacate the injunction. On the issue of attorney-inmate contact visitation, we reverse the grant of summary judgment for the inmate class and order summary judgment in favor of the Arizona Department of Corrections. With respect to the section 504 claim, we remand with instructions to dismiss for lack of standing.
JURISDICTION
The district court exercised original jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(a)(3), and 2201. The Department of Corrections contends that the plaintiff class lacks standing under Article III of the United States Constitution to assert its claims under the Constitution and under section 504. We address the standing issue for these two claims separately. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).
BACKGROUND
This class action was filed by twenty-two named plaintiffs on January 12, 1990. The certified class is composed of all adult persons who are now, or who will be, in the custody of the Arizona Department of Corrections. A subclass consists of all prisoners who are handicapped individuals within the custody of the ADOC or who will in the future be in ADOC custody. Defendants are agents, officials, or employees of the Arizona Department of Corrections.
The prisoners allege that certain policies and practices of the ADOC violate their fourteenth amendment rights of access to the courts. They also claim that HIV-positive inmates are discriminated against in violation of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The right of access claim is based on the Department’s policy prohibiting attorney-client contact visitation to inmates at certain correctional facilities. The section 504 claim is based on the ADOC policy denying food-service employment to seropositive inmates.
On August 31, 1991, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff class. On September 6, 1991, the court filed an amended memorandum and order. Casey v. Lewis, 773 F.Supp. 1365 (D.Ariz.1991). The order enjoined the Arizona Department of Corrections from prohibiting contact visits between inmates and their attorneys in all facilities of the Arizona State Prison system, except for good cause. It also enjoined the Department from denying food-service employment to HIV-positive inmates, in the absence of a written finding that: (1) the inmate is not “otherwise qualified,” and (2) the ADOC cannot reasonably accommodate the inmate’s “handicap”. On October 1,1991, we denied the Department’s petition for an emergency stay of the district court’s order.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Standing is a question of law reviewed de novo. United Union of Roofers, Waterproofers, and Allied Trades No. 40 v. Insurance Corp. of Am., 919 F.2d 1398, 1399 (9th Cir.1990); Bruce v. United States, 759 F.2d 755, 758 (9th Cir.1985).
Summary judgment also is reviewed de novo. Jones v. Union Pac. R.R., 968 F.2d 937, 940 (9th Cir.1992); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 629 (9th Cir.1987). The inquiry is whether, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there remain genuine issues of material fact, and whether the district court correctly applied the relevant substantive law. FDIC v. O’Melveny & Meyers, 969 F.2d 744, 747 (9th Cir.1992).
DISCUSSION
I. ATTORNEY-INMATE VISITATION
A. The ADOC Policy.
The Arizona Department of Corrections policy forbidding attorney contact visitation [1519]*1519applies to: (1) inmates housed at the Alhambra Reception Center and awaiting classification; (2) inmates at Cell Block 6 of ASPC-Florence; (8) inmates housed in the Special Management Unit at the Florence facility; and (4) inmates in lock-down units at other ADOC facilities. The nature and extent of permitted visitation depends upon the location of the prisoner and his classification.
Many inmates at Alhambra are allowed contact visitation; those who are not are recent arrivals from county jail who have not yet been classified. They temporarily are considered Level 5, the highest possible security risk.
Cell Block 6 houses more than 100 inmates, roughly one-half of whom have been sentenced to death. The other inmates at CB6 are classified at Level 3. Inmates seeking contact visitation at CB6 are placed, unshackled, in a caged area measuring approximately seven feet high, four feet wide, and" three feet deep. A mail slot permits the passage of documents between attorney and inmate.
The vast majority of the prisoners housed at the Special Management Unit are classified as Level 5 security risks. An SMU inmate sits on one side of a cinder-block and glass partition, while his attorney sits on the opposite side. Each side of the partition is equipped with a telephone through which the inmate and attorney converse. Documents are transferred between inmate and attorney in accordance with strict procedures to ensure the privacy of those documents.
B. Standing.
Article III limits the judicial power of the federal courts to “cases” and “controversies.” Federal courts are presumed to lack jurisdiction, “unless the contrary appears affirmatively from the record.” Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 546, 106 S.Ct. 1326, 1334, 89 L.Ed.2d 501 (1986) (internal quotation omitted). “On every writ of error or appeal, the first and fundamental question is that of jurisdiction, first, of this court, and then of the court from which the record comes.” Mansfield C. & L.M. Ry. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382, 4 S.Ct. 510, 511, 28 L.Ed. 462 (1884).
“[A]t an irreducible minimum, Art. Ill requires the party who invokes the court’s authority to ‘show that he personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant’----” Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472, 102 S.Ct. 752, 758, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982) (quoting Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99, 99 S.Ct. 1601, 1608, 60 L.Ed.2d 66 (1979)). This is the “actual injury” component of the standing doctrine; it requires an injury to be “real and immediate,” not merely “conjectural” or “hypothetical.” See O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494, 94 S.Ct. 669, 675, 38 L.Ed.2d 674 (1973); Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103, 109-110, 89 S.Ct. 956, 960-61, 22 L.Ed.2d 113 (1969).
At least one named plaintiff must satisfy the actual injury component of standing in order to seek relief on behalf of himself or the class. O’Shea, 414 U.S. at 494-95, 94 S.Ct. at 675-76. The inquiry is whether any named plaintiff has demonstrated that he has sustained or is imminently in danger of sustaining a direct injury as the result of the challenged conduct. Id.
The prisoners allege, and the district court found, that the ADOC policy denying attorney-inmate contact visitation violates the inmates’ fourteenth amendment rights of meaningful áccess to the courts. The prisoners must demonstrate that a named prisoner either sustained or was in imminent danger of sustaining a direct injury as a result of the policy.
The record convinces us that the prisoners have met this burden.2 They have estab[1520]*1520lished a sufficient “personal stake” in the outcome of this action to “assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.” See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204, 82 S.Ct. 691, 703, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962). Their injuries, past and threatened, are sufficiently “real and immediate” to confer standing upon the class.
C. Merits.
In granting summary judgment, the district court held unconstitutional the ADOC policy denying attorney-client contact visitation to prisoners housed in Alhambra, CB6, SMU, and other lock-down units.
A prison inmate is entitled to meaningful access to the courts under the fourteenth amendment. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 822, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 1495, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977). Historically, this right “require[d] prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law.” Id. at 828, 97 S.Ct. at 1498. The main concern was “ ‘protecting the ability of an inmate to prepare a petition or complaint.’ ” Id. at 828 n. 17, 97 S.Ct. at 1498 n. 17 (quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 576, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2984, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974)).
In Ching v. Lewis, 895 F.2d 608, 610 (9th Cir.1990), we held that the right of access to the courts includes contact attorney visitation. The inclusion of contact visitation within the right to meaningful access, however, is merely the beginning of our present inquiry; whether such visitation has been denied unnecessarily remains to be determined. Ching does not supply the answer to this question.
Any infringement on prisoners’ constitutional rights must be reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 2261, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987). This relaxed standard “is necessary if ‘prison administra-tors ..., and not the courts, are to make the difficult judgments concerning institutional operations.’” Id. (quoting Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners’ Union, 433 U.S. 119, 128, 97 S.Ct. 2532, 2539, 53 L.Ed.2d 629 (1977)).
Turner identifies four factors relevant in determining the reasonableness of prison policies: (1) whether there is a valid, rational connection between the prison policy and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it; (2) whether there are alternative means of exercising the right; (3) the impact that accommodation of the constitutional right will have on guards, on other inmates, or on the allocation of prison resources; and (4) whether the regulation or policy is an “exaggerated response” to prison concerns. 482 U.S. at 89-90, 107 S.Ct. at 2262. The burden is on the inmates to show that the challenged regulation is unreasonable under Turner. Covino v. Patrissi, 967 F.2d 73 (2d Cir.1992); Abdullah v. Gunter, 949 F.2d 1032 (8th Cir.1991), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1995, 118 L.Ed.2d 591 (1992).
1. Rational Connection.
The Department of Corrections asserts several justifications‘for its non-contact policy. It argues that the policy serves “the important public interest in protecting inmates, prison staff and the general public from the possibility of assault, hostage-taking and escape.” It also contends that the policy is designed to reduce the introduction of contraband.
The district court erroneously found that the record precluded it from determining whether the asserted justifications&emdash;pre-vention of escape, assault, hostage-taking, and the introduction of contraband&emdash;were the actual reasons behind the implementation of the policy. Casey v. Lewis, 773 F.Supp. 1365, 1368-69 (D.Ariz.1991).
Prison officials need merely “ ‘put forward’ ” a legitimate government interest, Walker v. Sumner, 917 F.2d 382, 385 (9th Cir.1990) (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 89, [1521]*1521107 S.Ct. at 2261-62), and provide some evidence that the interest put forward is the actual reason for the regulation. See Swift v. Lewis, 901 F.2d 730, 732 (9th Cir.1990). The ADOC provided sufficient evidence under Walker and Smith that the policy was implemented as a prophylactic security measure. The affidavits of Deputy Warden McFadden and Assistant Director Keeney, as well as the deposition testimony of Warden Crist, support this conclusion.
The district court also found no rational connection between.the asserted penological, interests and the policy. Casey, 773 F.Supp. at 1368-69. This finding was based primarily on the ADOC’s failure to cite any incident of assault, hostage-taking, or escape that occurred as a result of contact visitation between attorneys and prisoners.
The district court placed an unduly onerous burden on the Department of Corrections. A prison official’s concern for prison security is entitled to significant deference. Harper v. Wallingford, 877 F.2d 728, 733 (9th Cir.1989). In Harper, we held that a prison superintendent’s affidavit, which stated that certain regulated material, if not censored, “could lead to violence constituted a sufficient showing of a threat to prison security. Id. We required no proof that such materials ever had been the cause of violence. In Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 417, 109 S.Ct. 1874, 1883, 104 L.Ed.2d 459 (1989), the Supreme Court found rational certain regulations designed to avoid situations that “although not necessarily ‘likely’ to lead to violence, [were] determined by the warden to create an intolerable risk of disorder.”
We recently decided another case where ADOC officials justified a prison regulation on the basis of anticipated security problems. In Friedman v. State of Arizona, 912 F.2d 328, 332 (9th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1100, 111 S.Ct. 996, 112 L.Ed.2d 1079 (1991), we said:
Here, unlike Swift, the ADOC has provided evidence through its expert witness, Kenney, to support its no beard policy. Although Kenney’s testimony largely justifies the regulation on'the basis of anticipated security problems, we find Kenney’s testimony sufficient. Swift might be read as requiring concrete evidence to support the regulation — e.g. in the past, the ADOC had a problem in recapturing a prisoner because he shaved his beard. However, such a reading of •Swift would create a conflict with Turner. Turner requires that coiirts allow prison officials “to anticipate‘security problems and to adopt innovative solutions to the intractable problems of prison administration.” 482 U.S. at 89, 107 S.Ct. [at] 2262 (emphasis added).
The .testimony of' Warden Crist demonstrates his belief that contact visits between inmates and their attorneys creates an intolerable risk of a security breach. That belief is not unreasonable.
The ADOC’s failure to specify a past event wherein a contact visit resulted in assault, escape, or hostage-taking, does not render irrational the adoption and implementation of a non-contact policy. See Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 417, 109 S.Ct. at 1883-84; Friedman, 912 F.2d at 332-33. Nor does the fact that the policy allows'some inmates 'to have contact visits with family members undermine the rationality of the ban on attorney-inmate contact visits. The inquiry is whether the-justifications “invoked” for the policy are served by the policy, see id. at 332; Friend v. Kolodzieczak, 923 F.2d 126, 127-(9th Cir.1991), not whether a policy banning all contact visits would better serve the' asserted security interests. We find a rational relationship between the. Department of Corrections’ policy and its legitimate penological concerns.
2. Alternative Avenues.
“Where other avenues remain available for the exercise of the asserted right, courts should be particularly conscious of the measure of judicial deference owed to corrections officials.” Turner, 482 U.S. at 90, 107 S.Ct. at 2262 (citation and internal quotation omitted).3 The “asserted right” here is the right [1522]*1522of meaningful access to the courts, which includes contact visitation with an attorney. See Ching, 895 F.2d at 609-10.
In O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 352, 107 S.Ct. 2400, 2406, 96 L.Ed.2d 282 (1987), the Supreme Court stated: “In Turner, we did not look to see whether prisoners had other means of communicating with fellow inmates, but instead examined whether the inmates were deprived- of ‘all means of expression.’ ” (Citation omitted). In Friedman, 912 F.2d at -332, we applied the O’Lone reasoning to a prison policy prohibiting inmates from growing beards. The inmates in Friedman had no alternative religious practice to substitute for wearing beards. Nevertheless, we concluded that the inmates were not “denied all means of expression of their religion” because “they could participate in other aspects of their religion,” such as eating Kosher food. Id. (internal quotation omitted).
Here, the inmates were not denied “all means of expression” of their-rights of meaningful access. Those rights are. satisfied if prisoners are provided with “adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law.” Bounds, 430 U.S. at 828, 97 S.Ct. at 1498. Meaningful access was not completely denied by the prison policy. As the Court said in Bounds, “a legal access program need not include any particular element ... [but] must be evaluated as a whole to ascertain its compliance with constitutional standards.” 482 U.S. at 832, 97 S.Ct. at 1500. Just as Friedman could express his religion without growing a beard, these inmates can “express” their rights to meaningful access without attorney contact visitation.
At most, a triable issue may remain as to whether the inmates’ rights of access weresatisfied by adequate libraries or other assistance. We need not remand for trial, however, because resolution of this factor in favor of the inmates would not alter our ultimate legal conclusion — that the Turner test of reasonableness is satisfied.
3. Impact- on Others.
The ADOC contends that providing contact visitation in areas affected by its non-contact policy will jeopardize the safety of its staff members and of visitors and will lead to an increase in the amount of contraband in its prisons. The inmates argue that the ADOC has not demonstrated that this is so and that, contrary to the affidavit of Deputy Warden McFadden, there is adequate secure space and personnel for contact visits, at least at SMU.
' The district court found that contact visits would not significantly affect other inmates, the prison staff, or prison resources. Casey, 773 F.Supp. at 1369. In doing so, the court resolved a disputed issue of fact with regard to the impact of accommodation at SMU. Even worse, the court ruled in .favor of the inmates though they produced no evidence concerning the impact of accommodation on the other areas affected by -the policy.
The district court justified its finding on this factor as follows: “Defendants’ claim that contact visits at SMU would require the expenditure of additional resources is insufficient since the ‘cost of protecting a constitutional right cannot justify its total denial.’ ” Casey, 773 F.Supp. at 1369 (quoting Bounds, 430 U.S. at 825, 97 S.Ct. at 1496-97). The district court mischaracterized the constitutional right at issue: the constitutional right of meaningful access was not necessarily denied in its entirety, even though the inmates were denied contact visitation.
The inmates failed to demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of fact concerning this factor, except perhaps as regards SMU. We need not remand for trial on the question of the impact of accommodation at SMU, however, because the resolution of this factual dispute in favor of the prisoners would not weigh heavily in our analysis. Cf. Scott v. Mississippi Dept. of Corrections, 961 F.2d 77, 81 (5th Cir.1992) (“Neither Turner nor O’Lone, however, require a court to weigh evenly, or even consider, each of these factors.”).
[1523]*15234. Exaggerated Response.
Under Turner, the existence of obvious, easy alternatives to a prison policy restricting constitutional rights may be evidence that the policy is not reasonable, but is an “exaggerated response” to prison concerns. 482 U.S. at 90-91, 107 S.Ct. at 2262; Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 418, 109 S.Ct. at 1884. “[W]hen prison officials are able to demonstrate that they have rejected a less restrictive alternative because of reasonably founded fears that it will lead to greater harm, they succeed in demonstrating that, the alternative they in fact selected was not an ‘exaggerated response’ under Turner.” Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 419, 109 S.Ct. at 1884-85 (emphasis added).
The inmates suggest that an- acceptable alternative to the non-contact policy is for prison guards to: (1) search the prisoner before and after each contact visit, and (2) observe each visit. While this proposal may suffice to stem the flow of contraband, it fails adequately to address the potential- problems of hostage-taking and injury, to staff and visiting attorneys. Cf. Friend, 923 F.2d at 126 (inmates’ proposed alternative inadequate where it satisfied some, but not all, of the prison officials’ security concerns).
It is incumbent upon the prisoners to point to an alternative that accommodates their 'rights at de minimis cost to security interests. Turner, 482 U.S. at 91, 107 S.Ct. at 2262-63. They have not done so. The non-contact policy is not an exaggerated response.
5. Conclusion: Reasonableness.
We find that the non-contact regulation is rationally related to legitimate penological interests'; that a triable issue may remain as to whether alternative avenues exist for exercising the right to meaningful access and as to the institutional impact of accommodating that right at SMU; and that the regulation is not an exaggerated response to prison concerns.
That said, we must answer the ultimate question: is the regulation reasonably related to the Arizona Department of Corrections’ legitimate penological concerns? Turner, 482 U.S. at 89, 107 S.Ct. at 2261-62. We hold that it is.
Contact visitation with an attorney is merely one aspect of the broad and fundamental right of meaningful access to the courts. The prisoners have-not been denied access to the courts as that right traditionally has been described by the Supreme Court. See Bounds, 430 U.S. at 828, 97 S.Ct. at 1498. Inmates are not denied assistance “in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers” as that phrase is interpreted in Bounds. See id. (holding that such assistance requires-only the provision of adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from “persons, trained in the. law”).
The ADOC policy is a reasonable response to the- legitimate institutional concerns posed by full contact visitation: prevention of escape, assault, hostageftaking, and the introduction of contraband. This is not to say that expansion of this policy to all facilities within the Arizona State Prison system would be reasonable. The facilities affected by the current policy house -primarily prisoners who have been'classified as high security risks or who are awaiting classification and therefore prudently assumed high risk. Cf. Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328, 333 (9th Cir.1988) (“The fact that Unit 7 houses the state’s most difficult prisoners gives rise to a legitimate governmental security interest in procedures that might be unreasonable elsewhere.”).
Nothing in Ching is to the contrary. We failed to discuss Turner in our decision in Ching. We did, however, emphasize that the defendants in Ching failed to offer any justification whatsoever for their denial of contact visitation, and we referred to their policy as “arbitrary.” 895 F.2d at 610. Had we applied the Turner test, we no doubt would have found that the first factor of the analysis, the “rational connection,” was missing. Our holding in Ching demonstrates merely that where an arbitrary and irrational prison regulation impinges upon, the constitutional rights of prison inmates', it is invalid as a matter of law. In other words, Ching teaches that satisfaction of the rational relation-ship factor is necessary, though not necessarily sufficient, to sustain a prison policy [1524]*1524abridging constitutional rights. Cf. Walker, 917 F.2d at 385 (rational relationship is the “sine qua non ” of the Turner test); Scott, 961 F.2d at 81 (second, third, and fourth Turner factors merely help court resolve the controlling question, which is whether the regulation has a logical connection to legitimate governmental interests).
II. FOOD-SERVICE POLICY
A. Standing.
The Arizona Department of Corrections has adopted a policy prohibiting HIV-positive individuals from obtaining employment in its food-service department. The inmates argue they have standing to challenge the validity of this policy because a named inmate is now HIV-positive and because this inmate would have been denied had she applied for such employment.
We reject this argument. The HIV-positive inmate did not demonstrate any injury in fact; she was not identified as HIV-positive until three months after the issuance of the district court’s injunctive order, and she neither applied for a food-service position nor demonstrated that she intended to do so.
We must address standing even though the issue was not presented to the district court. Mansfield, 111 U.S. at 382, 4 S.Ct. at 511-12. We first determine our own jurisdiction and then whether the district court had jurisdiction when it entered the injunctive order. See id. The fact that an inmate is now HIV-positive is not dispositive. “An asserted right to have the Government act-in accordance with law is not sufficient, standing alone, to confer jurisdiction on a federal court.” Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 754, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 3326, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984). The complaining party must demonstrate an injury in fact. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 473, 102 S.Ct. at 759; Nevada v. Burford, 918 F.2d 854, 856 (9th Cir.1990), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 2052, 114 L.Ed.2d 458 (1991). At the time the district court entered its order, the record did not establish that any named plaintiff was seropositive. The class therefore lacked standing, see O’Shea, 414 U.S. at 494-95, 94 S.Ct. at 675-76, and the district court lacked the power to enter the injunction. ■ ■
Even if a named inmate had been identified HIV-positive as early as the pleading stage, the inmates still failed to demonstrate an actual injury. The inmates rely on a footnote in Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 6 n. 7, 97 S.Ct. 2120, 2124 n. 7, 53 L.Ed.2d 63 (1977), to argue that even though no named seropositive plaintiff ever applied for or otherwise expressed an interest in a food-service job, they nonetheless have standing to challenge the validity of the ADOC policy. Ny-quist does not control. The plaintiff in Ny-quist submitted an unrebutted affidavit showing that he might need the benefits denied him under the defendant’s policy, and the Nyquist defendants conceded that any application by the plaintiff for those benefits would be denied summarily. Id. Moreover, the plaintiff had already applied for and been denied similar benefits, by the defendants under the same policy. Id.
No named plaintiff has ever stated that he or she is interested in a food-service job. None applied for one. There is reason to believe that an HIV-positive inmate would never seek such a position. The unrebutted affidavit of Frank Terry, Chief of Security at the Central Unit in the Florence facility, indicates that whenever inmates discover another inmate is HIV-positive, which according to Terry occurs despite stringent confidentiality efforts by ADOC staff members, threats are made against that inmate’s life. According to Terry, an HIV-positive inmate whose seropositive status is discovered by the general inmate population would be in a life threatening situation.
No named plaintiff has been subject personally to the alleged unlawful policy. The district court lacked jurisdiction to enter the injunction prohibiting the application of the policy..
CONCLUSION
The district court erred in entering partial summary judgment for the prisoners and in enjoining the Arizona Department of Corrections from enforcing its non-contact visitation policy and its food-service policy. We VA[1525]*1525CATE.the injunction. With respect to the visitation policy, we REVERSE the grant of summary judgment for the inmate class and ORDER summary judgment in favor of the Defendants-Appellants.' With respect to the food-service policy, we REMAND to the district court with instructions to DISMISS for lack of standing. Each side is to bear its own costs. ■