M.D. v. Reykdal

District Court, W.D. Washington·Decided April 11, 2023·No. 2:22-cv-01621·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE N.D., et al., CASE NO. 2:22-cv-01621-LK Plaintiffs, ORDER GRANTING LEAVE TO v. AMEND AND CONTINUING DEADLINES CHRIS REYKDAL, et al., Defendants.

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint. Dkt. No. 22. Plaintiffs seek to add an additional named plaintiff, E.A., by and through his parents, id. at 1, in this putative class action under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., (“IDEA”), Dkt. No. 2-1 at 1. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants the motion and extends the deadlines to complete discovery on class certification and to file a motion for class certification to mitigate any potential prejudice to Defendants. Plaintiff N.D. is an individual with a disability who turned 21 years old in the summer of 2022. Id. at 2. Seattle Public Schools provided him a free appropriate public education (“FAPE”) under IDEA until the extended school year period ended on August 31, 2022. Id. At that time, he had not graduated from high school with a regular high school diploma. Id. at 4. On November 11, 2022, he filed suit in this Court alleging that he was denied his right to a continued FAPE until his 22nd birthday as required by the IDEA “solely because he had

exceeded the age cutoff the State of Washington has established at Wash. Admin. Code § 392.172A.02000(2)(c) pursuant to Wash. Rev. Code § 28A.155.020.” Id. at 2.1 He seeks to represent the following putative class: All individuals who turned 21 within two years before the filing of this action or will turn 21 during the pendency of this action who are provided or were provided a FAPE under the IDEA by any school district in Washington and who but for their turning 21 would otherwise qualify or would have qualified for a FAPE because they have not or had not yet graduated from high school with a “regular high school diploma” as defined at 34 C.F.R. § 300.102(a)(3)(iv) (“the Plaintiff Class”). Dkt. No. 2-1 at 9–10. After receiving a joint status report from the parties, Dkt. No. 16, the Court issued a scheduling order setting an April 10, 2023 deadline to complete discovery on class certification and a May 10, 2023 deadline for Plaintiffs to file a motion for class certification, Dkt. No. 17 at 2. Plaintiffs’ counsel emailed Defendants’ counsel on January 20, 2023 to determine if Defendants would oppose Plaintiffs’ filing of an amended complaint. Dkt. No. 24 at 1–2, 6. Defendants’ counsel responded the same day and informed Plaintiffs’ counsel that Defendants would first need to see a redline version of the proposed amended complaint. Id. at 2, 8. Plaintiffs’ counsel provided Defendants with a redline version of the proposed amended complaint on February 10, 2023, and identified the proposed plaintiff, E.A., on February 13, 2023. Id. at 2. Defendants responded that they “would be willing to agree to Plaintiffs’ motion to amend their 1 The regulation provides that an eligible student “whose twenty-first birthday occurs on or before August 31 w[ill] no longer be eligible for special education services.” Wash. Admin. Code § 392-172A-02000(2)(c). complaint if Plaintiffs agreed to a motion to extend the discovery and briefing schedule by two months to accommodate the need for additional discovery related to the new putative class representative.” Id. The parties were unable to agree. On March 2, 2023, Plaintiffs filed this motion to amend their complaint to add E.A. as a

named Plaintiff. Dkt. No. 22 at 1. Plaintiffs allege that “E.A. is 21 years old and currently enrolled in the Selah School District where he receives special education services pursuant to an Individualized Education Program (IEP).” Id. at 2. At the end of the 2022-2023 school year, the Selah School District “will stop serving E.A. solely due to the age cutoff regulation at issue in this case, Wash. Admin. Code § 392.172A.02000(2)(c).” Id. Plaintiffs further allege that “E.A.’s legal position is related to but distinct from N.D.’s legal position” because N.D. has already “‘aged out’ of his district. As such, the two named plaintiffs represent two distinct subclasses – those that have already been exited from school, and those still enrolled at school but facing the threat of exit at the end of the school year.” Id.

The general rule is that leave to amend should be “freely give[n] . . . when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Nevertheless, the Court may deny leave to amend after considering “the presence of any of four factors: bad faith, undue delay, prejudice to the opposing party, and/or futility.” Owens v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d 708, 712 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Griggs v. Pace Am. Grp., Inc., 170 F.3d 877, 880 (9th Cir. 1999)). Moreover, “it is the consideration of prejudice to the opposing party that carries the greatest weight.” Eminence Cap., LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) (per curiam). And “[a] need to reopen discovery and therefore delay the proceedings supports a district court’s finding of prejudice from a delayed motion to amend the complaint.” Lockheed Martin

Corp. v. Network Sols., Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 986 (9th Cir. 1999). Defendants contend that Plaintiffs’ proposed amendment would prejudice them if they are not provided additional time to conduct discovery related to E.A. Dkt. No. 23 at 1–2. They do “not oppose the amendment if provided two additional months for class certification discovery, but absent such extension Plaintiffs’ motion to file an amended complaint should be denied for

prejudice and undue delay.” Id. Plaintiffs argue that no class-related discovery regarding E.A. is necessary because an existing Ninth Circuit case controls, Dkt. No. 25 at 1, but at this point, prior to the completion of discovery and class certification briefing, it is not clear that there is no need for such discovery. Instead, it appears that some discovery regarding E.A., his claims, and the Rule 23 factors is warranted because E.A. seeks to represent a “distinct subclass[]” of putative Plaintiffs. Dkt. No. 22 at 2. Defendants also seek to conduct discovery regarding “whether, and if so, why and when, E.A. will exit the district.” Dkt. No. 23 at 4. Defendants are likely to suffer prejudice if they are unable to conduct any such discovery now that the April 10, 2023 deadline to do so has passed. Dkt. No. 17 at 2. While Plaintiffs argue that they can supplement their existing discovery responses, Dkt. No. 25 at 1–2, Defendants should not have to forego third-party discovery about

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