Pressed Steel Car Co. v. Hansen

128 F. 444, 1904 U.S. App. LEXIS 4683
CourtU.S. Circuit Court for the District of Western Pennsylvania
DecidedFebruary 29, 1904
DocketNo. 13
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 128 F. 444 (Pressed Steel Car Co. v. Hansen) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Western Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Pressed Steel Car Co. v. Hansen, 128 F. 444, 1904 U.S. App. LEXIS 4683 (circtwdpa 1904).

Opinion

BUFFINGTON, District Judge.

This is a hill in equity, brought by the Pressed Steel Car Company against John M. Hansen to compel him to transfer to it six applications, or the patents issued thereon. The complainant is engaged in the manufacture of .steel cars. The respondent was its chief engineer when the inventions in question were made. The allegations upon which the complainant bases its right to the relief sought are, in substance, set forth in its bill as follows: That Hansen was for several years previous to the complainant’s incorporation employed by'the Schoen Manufacturing Company, its successor, the Schoen Pressed Steel Company, and finally became chief engineer of the last-named company; that complainant succeeded to the business and good will of the Schoen Pressed Steel Company, whereupon Hansen “entered your orator’s employ as its chief engineer, under an agreement and understanding to devote his entire time, ability, and skill to your orator’s business and its advancement, and that all inventions and improvements that [445]*445lie might make during the period of his employment, and all letters patent that might be obtained therefor, should be the .sole property of your orator”; that “it was a condition of his employment as chief engineer, and in part consideration of the salary paid him as such, and his employment as such implied, and was upon the express understanding and agreement by him, that all designs, inventions, and improvements that he might make or develop while in your orator’s employ, and all letters patent that might be obtained iherefor, should become and be the sole and exclusive property of 3rour orator, and that for all such designs, inventions, and improvements, if found or regarded as patentable, he would, from time to time, as he made or developed such designs, inventions, or improvements, disclose the same to your orator’s solicitor, and, through him, and at your orator’s expense, make all necessary and proper applications for letters patent, and execute all necessary and proper papers to that end, and that he would, from time to time, as such applications were executed and filed, likewise execute and deliver to your orator, with such applications, properly executed assignments of all such applications, inventions therein specified, and letters patent that might be granted thereon and therefor, with directions to the Commissioner of Patents to issue all such letters patent to himself as assignor to your orator of all his right, title, and interest in and to all such letters patent, which should be the entire right, title, and interest therein; that, such being the terms and conditions of the respondent’s employment by your orator, and in full appreciation and consideration therefor, and of the inventions and improvements that he might make and letters patent that he might obtain therefor, he was paid by your orator a salary at the rate of $4,000 per year to January 1, 1900, at the rate of $5,000 per year to September 1, 1900, at the rate of $6,000 per year to October 1, 1901, and at the rate of $10,000 per year down to January 1, 1902, when he left your orator’s employ”; that thereafter, and while performing his duty a.s chief engineer, he made the inventions in question, and made application for patenting the same; that he subsequently left the employment of complainant, and refused to assign the same. On the part of the respondent it is explicitly denied there was any contract, express or implied, to assign these patents.

The law applicable to this case falls within a narrow compass. The obligation of an employé to assign to an employer an invention made in the course of his employment does not arise from the existence of the relation of employé and employer alone, but there must be in addition a contract to assign. Thus, in Dalzell v. Dueber Mfg. Co., 149 U. S. 320, 13 Sup. Ct. 888, 37 L. Ed. 749, it is said:

“A manufacturing corporation, which has employed a skilled workman, for a stated compensation, to take charge of its works, and to devote his time and services to devising and making improvements in articles there manufactured, is not entitled to a conveyance of patents obtained for inventions made by him while so employed, in the absence of an express agreement to that effect. Hapgood v. Hewitt, 119 U. S. 226 [7 Sup. Ct. 193, 30 L. Ed. 369].”

It will thus be seen that the agreement by the employé inventor to convey is the obligation which compels him to convey.

[446]*446In view of this fundamental, requirement it becomes our duty to 'inquire whether such contract is established by the proofs in this case. That a contract to assign may be by parol, and, if established, will be enforced, is settled. As said in Dalzell v. Dueber, supra,

“An. oral agreement for the sale and assignment of the right to obtain a patent for an invention is not within the statute of frauds, nor within section 4898 of the Revised Statutes [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3387], requiring assignments of patents to be in writing; and may be specifically enforced in equity upon sufficient proofs thereof. Somerby v. Buntin, 118 Mass. 279 [19 Am. Rep. 459]; Gould v. Banks, 8 Wend. 562 [24 Am. Dec. 90]; Burr v. De la Vergne, 102 N. Y. 415 [7 N. E. 366]; Blakeney v. Goode, 30 Ohio St. 350.”

It will be noted, however, that, this being a bill for specific performance, the terms of the contract to be enforced should be clearly proven. Thus, in Colson v. Thompson, 2 Wheat. 336, 4 L. Ed. 253, cited approvingly in the Dalzell v. Dueber Case, it was said:

“The contract which is sought to be specifically executed ought not only to be proved, but the terms of it should be so precise as that neither party could reasonably misunderstand them. If the contract be vague or uncertain, or the evidence to establish it be insufficient, a court of equity will not exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction to enforce it, but will leave the party to his legal remedy.’”

Where it is doubtful whether an agreement has been concluded, and unless the proof is clear and satisfactory both as to the existence of a contract and as to its terms, specific performance will not be enforced. Carr v. Duval, 14 Pet. 79, 10 L. Ed. 361; Nickerson v. Nickerson, 127 U. S. 668, 8 Sup. Ct. 1355, 32 L. Ed. 314; Hennessey v. Woolworth, 128 U. S. 438, 9 Sup. Ct. 109, 32 L. Ed. 500. Turning, then, to the proof, we inquire whether the complainant has met this standard. The answer traverses the allegation of a contract, and the burden is therefore upon the complainant to overcome such denial, and prove the contract by a preponderance of proof. I Dan-iell’s Chancery Pr. and PI. 850. It will be observed that the bill avers the contract sought to be enforced was madq when Hansen entered the employ of the Pressed Steel Car Company. The testimony of Mr. Hoffstot, the principal witness for complainant, is explicit that he has no personal knowledge that such a contract was then made. “1 did not employ Mr. Hansen, when he first came to the Pressed Steel Car Company, as chief engineer, and I was not a director of the Pressed Steel.Car Company at the time he first entered its em-In view of this statement, the denials of Hansen:

“Q. I believe, Mr. Hansen, tbat wliilp jmu were in tbe employ of tlie Pressed Steel Car Company you bad something to do with certain inventions which'

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Bluebook (online)
128 F. 444, 1904 U.S. App. LEXIS 4683, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pressed-steel-car-co-v-hansen-circtwdpa-1904.