Dowse v. Federal Rubber Co.

254 F. 308, 1918 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 739
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Illinois
DecidedDecember 6, 1918
DocketNo. 973
StatusPublished
Cited by23 cases

This text of 254 F. 308 (Dowse v. Federal Rubber Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Dowse v. Federal Rubber Co., 254 F. 308, 1918 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 739 (N.D. Ill. 1918).

Opinion

SANBORN, District Judge.

There are three defendants, the Federal Rubber Manufacturing Company, a Wisconsin corporation, formerly located at Cudahy, Wis., the P'ederal Rubber Company, a Massachusetts corporation, which succeeded to the manufacturing company, and the Federal Rubber Company of Illinois, the selling agent of both the other corporations successively. The latter was the only original defendant; the others being later brought in.

The suit involves both the validity and ownership of patent No. 1,174,238, of March 7, 1916, issued to B. C. Dowse, upon a method of reinforcing automobile tires known as the “double cable base.” The patent was applied for in Dowse’s name, while he was employed by the manufacturing company, and issued to him after he left it. The main question is whether the patent equitably belongs to the corporation, or whether it has merely a shop right. Plaintiff relies on Hapgood v. Hewitt, 119 U. S. 226, 7 Sup. Ct. 193, 30 L. Ed. 369, on the question of ownership, and also contends that the shop right has lapsed because it was incapable of transfer from the manufacturing compány to the rubber company. An assignment from the manufacturing company to the rubber company was made May 12, 1916, purporting to assign all its property, expressly mentioning patents, patent rights, and shop rights. At this date the Dowse patent had been issued to him. Dowse sold his stock and left the manufacturing company December 8, 1915.

The patent relates to the means for retaining the tire upon the wheel rim; also for prevention of tire destruction. It is unnecessary to consider it in detail, because the chief question in tire case is patent ownership, and the equitable claim of the rubber company to an assignment. It may be said, however, that it covers the wire cable imbedded in the base of the tire which holds the tire firmly on the rim. There is a presumption of validity. Cantrell v. Wallick, 117 U. S. 689, 6 Sup. Ct. 970, 29 L. Ed. 1017. The tire has been quite a successful one. The patent has great utility. It should be sustained in both its claims.

[1] The all-important question is Dowse’s relation to the tire-manufacturing business. If he -was only a hired man, taking orders as to his work from another officer or employe, the invention belonged to him, leaving only an implied license or shop right to the corporation, and this right was only personal to it, incapable of being assigned. The Supreme Court thus states the rule:

“An employe, performing all the duties assigned to him in his department of service, may exercise his inventive faculties in any direction he chooses, with the assurance that whatever invention he may thus conceive and perfect is his individual property.” “That which he has been employed and paid to accomplish becomes, when accomplished, the property of his employer. Whatever rights as an individual he may have had in and to his inventive powers, and that which they are able to accomplish, ho has sold in advance to his employer.” Solomons v. U. S., 137 U. S. 342, 11 Sup. Ct. 88, 34 L. Ed. 667.

[310]*310It thus becomes necessary to examine Dowse’s relation to the corporation. He did not expressly contract as a part of his duties to design new tires ; but if he did so agree in substance, and was more than a mere employé, having the main responsibility to make the business successful, then he should be compelled to assign the patent. In this connection Judge Buffington’s statement of the governing rule is pertinent:

“The obligation of an employé to assign to an employer an invention made in the course of his employment does, not arise from the existence of the relation of employé and employer alone, but there must he in addition a contract to assign. Thus, in Dalzell v. Dueber Mfg. Co., 149 U. S. 320, 13 Sup. Ct. 888, 37 L. Ed. 749, it is said: ‘A manufacturing corporation, which has employed a skilled workman, for a stated compensation, to take charge of its works, and to devote his time and services to devising and making improvements in articles there manufactured, is not entitled to a conveyance of patents obtained for inventions made by him while so employed, in the absence of an express agreement to that effect. Hapgood v. Hewitt, 119 U. S. 226, 7 Sup. Ct. 193, 30 L. Ed. 369.’ ” Pressed Steel Car Co. v. Hansen (C. C.) 128 Fed. 444.

[2] So the real test is whether Dowse occupied such a relation to the corporation that he was its alter ego, in such a capacity that it is only consistent with good faith that he should recognize its ownership of the patent issued to him. Can he, without breach of his obligation toward his late employer, insist upon retaining and enforcing against it the patent he took out? Worthington Pumping Engine Co. v. Moore, 19 Times Raw Rep. 84.

The facts from which defendants argue that Dowse was not a mere employé, but the principal and directing officer of the corporation, are as follows:

B. C. Dowse has been engaged for many years past in manufacturing rubber tires. Just prior to 1911 he was president of the G. & J. Tire Company engaged in such manufacture. Before that he had had extensive experience with other tire manufacturers.

J. N. Willys, of Toledo, Ohio, is, and was in 1911, president of the Willys-Overland Company, engaged in automobile manufacturing and selling. Eor a number of years his company had been purchasing tires from concerns with which Dowse was identified. He had known Dowse for over 20 years. He had the fullest confidence in Dowse as an individual and in his knowledge of the tire-manufacturing business. Willys, personally, had had no experience in tire manufacturing in 1911. Early in Í911 these two men decided to become jointly interested in a rubber tire manufacturing enterprise. In Miarch they arrived at a general understanding. An investment of about $1,000,000 was contemplated. A plant would be purchased. Willys was to advance the principal amount of money. Dowse was to be president and general manager of the company to be formed, and to operate it; the running of the business was to be left to him. Willys was to furnish 80 per cent, of the money, and Dowse 20 per cent.; Willys to “carry” Dowse for the latter’s share.

The plan was put in prompt execution. Dowse negotiated the purchase of a plant of the Federal Rubber Company, a Wisconsin corporation, at Cudahy, Wis. The purchase price, plus incidental expenses, [311]*311amounted to about $125,000. Title to the property was taken by James E. Kepperley, as trustee. Kepperley was attorney for Willys. Thereupon, in April, 1911, a new Wisconsin corporation, namely, the Federal Rubber M anulacturing Company, was organized, and the property was turned over to it. The capital stock of this corporation was $1,000,000 (all common), '¡'be property was conveyed to the new company in pay-menl of $250,000, par value, of stock. Ultimately all of the capital stock was disposed of at par; over 90 per cent, of it being taken up on behalf of Willys and Dowse, and the remainder going to a few stockholders, some of whom like Dowse, were “carried” by Willys.

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254 F. 308, 1918 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 739, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dowse-v-federal-rubber-co-ilnd-1918.