WELLFORD, Circuit Judge.
The United States appeals the Magistrate’s judgment awarding Power Equipment Company (PEC) a refund of income taxes paid in 1975 on interest income received from various local Tennessee governmental units in connection with sales to those units of heavy construction equipment. The Magistrate found that PEC was entitled to exclude these interest payments from its gross income under I.R.C. § 103(a)(1) as interest on governmental obligations. The Magistrate decided this action on the following stipulated facts:
“1. Power Equipment Company is a corporation incorporated under the laws of the State of Tennessee and has its principal office and place of business on Alcoa Highway, Knoxville, Knox County, Tennessee.
“2. This Court has jurisdiction and venue pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a)(1) and 1402(a)(1) and (2).
“3. Plaintiff is primarily engaged in the business of sale and maintenance of heavy construction equipment. In the course of its business, plaintiff sells construction equipment to various City, County and State governmental entities. Many of these sales are made on a deferred payment basis, with the governmental entity paying specified interest charges to plaintiff. In connection with these deferred payment sales, during tax years 1975-1978, the governmental entities paid and plaintiff received certain interest payments, and these interest payments were reported on plaintiff’s timely filed corporate income tax returns for each of the tax years as excluded from gross income pursuant to § 103 of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 103, which provides in pertinent part as follows:
(a) General rule. — Gross income does not include interest on—
[1132]*1132(1) the obligations of a State, a Territory, or a possession of the United States, or any political subdivision of any of the foregoing, or of the District of Columbia.
“4. On or about November 2, 1978, defendant, United States of America, acting by and through its Internal Revenue Service, sent a notice of deficiency to plaintiff . . . . That notice asserted that certain amounts ($32,465.00 for 1975 and $25,-085.00 for 1976) received by plaintiff from political subdivisions of the State of Tennessee, which had been excluded by plaintiff as interest under § 103 of the Internal Revenue Code, were not properly excludable and made demand upon plaintiff for the payment of corporate income taxes on such amounts in the total amount of $27,624.28 ($15,583.28 for 1975 and $12,041.00 for 1976).
“5. On or about April 9, 1979, plaintiff paid to the defendant the alleged deficiency for 1975 and 1976 in the amount of $27,-624.48. On or about April 13, 1979, plaintiff filed with the Internal Revenue Center its form 1120X claiming a refund of income taxes paid in the amount of $15,583.28 for 1975 and $12,041.00 for 1976, resulting from the inclusion of amounts received by plaintiff as interest payments from political subdivisions of the State of Tennessee ... By letters dated March 1, 1980, ... plaintiff’s claims for refund were disallowed.
“6. Defendant, by and through its Internal Revenue Service, included in plaintiff’s gross income the sum of $27,762.56 for tax year 1975 and $24,987.64 for tax year 1976 which constituted interest payments from political subdivisions of the State of Tennessee, thereby resulting in taxes assessed against plaintiff in the amount of $13,326.02 for tax year 1975 and $11,994.06 for tax year 1976. A breakdown of the amounts and source of the interest proceeds included as gross income and the taxes which defendant assessed are listed below:
1975 1976
City of Chattanooga, [Tenn.] $10,687.15
Anderson County, [Tenn.] 1,292.36
Houston County, [Tenn.] 691.50
Warren County, [Tenn.] 6,378.84
Lincoln County, [Tenn.] 2,097.45
City of Hendersonville, [Tenn.] $5,031.89
Hamilton County Highway [Dept.] 6,483.23
City of Knoxville, [Tenn.] 621.20 1,708.63
Scott County Highway [Dept.] 4,044.40 3,366.80
City of Lawrenceburg, [Tenn.] 5,084.16
Monroe County Highway [Dept.] 400.46 191.31
Lawrence County Highway [Dept.] 1,002.08
Lincoln County Highway [Dept.] 425.42
Smith County Highway [Dept.] 633.95
Van Burén Highway [Dept.] 121.70 2,487.67
27,762.56 24,987.64
X.48 X.48
Tax $13,326.02 $11,994.06
Total Tax $25,320.08
These transactions and the resulting legal documents attached ... were not approved by the legislative or other governing body of each respective county or city nor by the state director of finance.
“7. On or about September 22, 1981, defendant, United States of America, acting by and through its Internal Revenue Service, sent a notice of deficiency to plaintiff . . . . That notice asserted that certain amounts ($10,513.63 for 1977 and $11,-[1133]*1133815.24 for 1978) received from political subdivisions of the State of Tennessee, which had been excluded by plaintiff as interest under § 103 of the Internal Revenue Code, were not properly excludable and made demand upon plaintiff for the payment of corporate income taxes on such amounts in the total amount of $10,986.76 ($5,316.44 for 1977 and $5,670.32 for 1978).
“8. On or about December 14, 1981, plaintiff paid to defendant the alleged deficiency for 1977 and 1978 in the amount of $10,986.76. On or about December 14, 1981, plaintiff filed with the Internal Revenue Service Center its form 1120X claiming a refund of the income taxes paid in the amount of $5,316.44 for 1977 and $5,670.32 for 1978 resulting from the inclusion of amounts received by plaintiff as interest payments from political subdivisions of the State of Tennessee . . . . By letters dated January 6, 1982 ... plaintiffs claims for a refund were disallowed.
“9. Defendant, by and through its Internal Revenue Service, included in plaintiffs gross income the sum of $11,488.39 for 1977 and $11,181.59 for 1978 which constituted interest payments from political subdivisions of the State of Tennessee, thereby resulting in taxes assessed against plaintiff in the amount of $5,514.43 for 1977 and $5,367.16 for 1978. A breakdown of the amounts and source of the interest proceeds included as gross income and the taxes which defendant assessed are listed below:
1977 1978
Van Burén County, [Tenn.] $ 172.08 $ 288.75
Van Burén County, [Tenn.] 2,186.10 1,894.62
Scott County, [Tenn.] 3,030.12 1,271.69
City of Lawrenceburg, [Tenn.] 4,519.20 6,213.90
Giles County, [Tenn.] 171.00 85.50
Knoxville City Zoo, [Tenn.] 621.32
Lincoln County Highway [Dept.] 158.57 1,427.13
Polk County Highway [Dept.] 630.00
$11,488.39 $11,181.59
X.48 X.48
Tax $ 5,514.43 $ 5,367.16
Total Tax $10,881.59
These transactions and the resulting legal documents ... were not approved by the legislative or other governing body of each respective county or city nor by the state director of finance.”
The Magistrate first reviewed and rejected the government’s contention that the sales transactions between PEC and the state entities violated various Tennessee statutes and therefore were not “obligations” of the entities within the meaning of I.R.C. § 103(a)(1) because they were not issued “by constituted authorities empowered to issue such obligations,” as required by Treas.Reg. § 1.103-l(b) (1954 Code) (emphasis added). Although the Magistrate found that PEC had conceded that the transactions at issue violated Tennessee law, particularly that the “county purchasing agents entering the sales contracts violated the prohibition against commiting [sic] the county beyond the fiscal year in question [Tenn.Code Ann. § 5-14-108(m) (1980)], and that they entered purchase contracts which exceeded $500.00 without prior approval of the county legislative bodies [Tenn.Code Ann. § 54-8-107 (1980)],” he concluded:
While it may be true that at some point these contracts might have been voided by the cities and counties involved [because they violated Tennessee law], they are now wholly executory. The equipment has been delivered and fully paid for, with interest. There is no suggestion of fraud. Where contracts are fully [1134]*1134executed, and no fraud exists, the rights of the parties which have been established by the contracts will be given effect.
The Magistrate then noted that the Tennessee state courts had historically “found various estoppel or implied promise theories to preserve the effects of otherwise legitimate contracts entered improperly [citations omitted]” and, that therefore it was “probable that the plaintiffs contracts with the various Tennessee counties and cities would be upheld by Tennessee courts.” Accordingly, the Magistrate, granting summary judgment against the government, held that I.R.C. § 103(a)(1) entitled PEC to exclude from its gross income the interest payments paid to it by the various state entities.
In reaching its holding, the Magistrate relied primarily on Newlin Machinery Corp. v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 837 (1957). In Newlin, the Tax Court held that petitioner-taxpayer was entitled to exclude interest payments from various state entities as interest on governmental obligations, pursuant to I.R.C. § 22(b)(4) (1939 Code) (predecessor to I.R.C. § 103(a)(1) (1954 Code). In reaching this holding, the court noted that the government had not introduced specific evidence showing that the transactions between the petitioner-taxpayer and the governmental entities violated applicable state law. The Tax Court then applied a presumption in taxpayer’s favor that the transactions complied with the state law; thus, the court made no determination as to whether these transactions actually violated that law, noting:
Furthermore, the position of this Court has consistently been that where contracts are fully executed, and no fraud exists, the rights of the parties which have been established by the contracts will be given effect.
Newlin, 28 T.C. at 844. It was on this latter language that the Magistrate relied in reaching its holding in the case at bar.
PEC contends that this court should affirm the Magistrate’s decision because the government acquiesced in Newlin and therefore is precluded from arguing against its application on this appeal. Prefacing the Commissioner’s acquiescence in the Newlin decision, 1958-1 C.B. 5, is a discussion of the general effect of acquiescence:
Notice that the Commissioner has acquiesced or non-acquiesced in a decision of The Tax Court relates only to the issue or issues decided adversely to the Government. Actions of aequiescences in adverse decisions should be relied on by Revenue officers and others concerned as conclusions of the Service only to the application of the law to the facts in the particular case. Caution should be exercised in extending the application of the decision to a similar case unless the facts and circumstances are substantially the same, and consideration should be given to the effect of new legislation, regulations, and rulings as well as subsequent court decisions and actions thereon. Acquiescence in a decision.means acceptance by the Service of the conclusion reached, and does not necessarily mean acceptance and approval of any or all of the reasons assigned by the Court for its conclusions.
1958-1 C.B. 3 (emphasis added).
We note initially that the particular portion of the Newlin opinion relied on by the Magistrate is essentially dicta since the Tax Court held that the contracts at issue in that case were presumptively valid under state law; here, the Magistrate found that PEC had conceded that the contracts in question violated Tennessee law. Thus, the facts and circumstances of the instant case are distinguishable from those in Newlin. In addition, the Commissioner’s acquiescence in Newlin does not necessarily mean that the Commissioner accepted and approved that language relied on by the Magistrate in this case since this language embodied an additional rationale for the Tax Court’s decision. Further, the court in Newlin did not discuss the Treasury Regulation to I.R.C. § 22(b)(1) (1939 Code) (similar to § 103(a)(1) (1954 Code)) in effect at [1135]*1135the time it rendered its decision, which is substantially similar in language1 to Treas. Reg. § 1.103-l(b), at issue on this appeal. For these reasons, we hold that the government’s acquiescence in Newlin does not preclude the government’s opposing the application of Newlin to the instant case by relying on Treas.Reg. § 1.103-1 (b) as support for its contention that the requirement of that regulation “is that the obligations be properly authorized, not that they be enforceable [under an implied contract theory] even if not authorized.” (Government’s Brief at 13-14.)
It is not relevant to our determination whether the Tennessee courts would enforce the contracts at issue including the interest provision, since we agree with the government that the issue on this appeal is whether Treas.Reg. 1.103-l(b) requires that governmental obligations be properly authorized to merit exclusion from gross income under I.R.C. § 103(a)(1). This regulation cannot be ignored simply because of a finding that Tennessee courts would likely enforce the contracts at issue. This court is aware of no decision wherein a similar holding was reached in applying the interest exclusion.
The dissent cites a number of Tennessee cases as supporting the proposition that when a municipal contract, which was not properly approved, has been fully performed by the non-municipal party, there is an agreement implied in law enforceable under the exact terms of the original agreement. The dissent further claims that recovery is not limited to the benefit conferred, but is granted according to the contractual terms, including interest.
A careful reading of the Tennessee authority indicates, however, that when municipal contracts are invalid yet fully performed by one party, recovery is based on a theory of quantum meruit. See, e.g., Keenan v. City of Trenton, 130 Tenn. 71, 83, 168 S.W. 1053, 1056 (1914); London & N.Y. Land Co. v. Jellico, 103 Tenn. 320, 323, 52 S.W. 995, 996 (1899); Trull v. City of Lobelville, 554 S.W.2d 638, 643 (Tenn.Ct.App.1976); Carter County v. Williams, 28 Tenn.App. 352, 364, 190 S.W.2d 311, 316 (1945). Thus recovery is limited to the benefit conferred to the city, although this benefit may be measured by the contractual terms if otherwise fair and reasonable.
In Trull v. City of Lobelville, 554 S.W.2d 638 (Tenn.Ct.App.1976), the trial court had awarded a monetary judgment plus the legal rate of interest, but the court of appeals reversed. See id. 640, 643. In Trull, there was no contractual interest provision, such as that in the instant case, and the court of appeals refused to award any interest. It is not apparent that PEC could have enforced the contracts beyond a quantum meruit recovery; thus, it is not clear that the interest provisions were enforceable.
Although the court in Newlin, as noted earlier, stated that a fully executed contract would be given effect where no fraud exists, this statement can only be viewed as dicta since the court applied a presumption that the contracts at issue in that case were valid. Accordingly, we find that the Magistrate erred in basing its judgment for PEC on an implied contract theory.
Section 103(a)(1) provides:
(a) General Rule —Gross income does not include interest on—
(1) the obligations of a State ... or any political subdivision [thereof] ____
Treas.Reg. § 1.103-l(b) defines obligation:
1. Interest upon obligations of a State ____
(b) Obligations issued by or on behalf of any State or local governmental unit [1136]*1136by constituted authorities empowered to issue such obligations are the obligations of such a unit.
This regulation or its substantial equivalent has been in existence since 1918. See Treas.Reg. 45, Art. 74 (1920 ed.). Because this regulation defines “obligation” as that word is used in I.R.C. § 103(a)(1), it is an interpretative regulation. In dealing with the validity of an interpretative treasury regulation, the Supreme Court has held: “[I]t is fundamental, of course, that as ‘contemporaneous construction by those charged with administration of the Code, the Regulations ‘must be sustained unless unreasonable and plainly inconsistent with the revenue statutes,’ and ‘should not be overruled except for weighty reasons.’” Bingler v. Johnson, 394 U.S. 741, 749-50, 89 S.Ct. 1439, 1444-45, 22 L.Ed.2d 695 (1969) (quoting Commissioner v. South Texas Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 496, 501, 68 S.Ct. 695, 698, 92 L.Ed. 831 (1948)). Accord, Long v. United States, 652 F.2d 675, 678 n. 7 (6th Cir.1981). The court in Bingler also noted:
[W]e do not sit as a committee of revision to perfect the administration of the tax laws . . . . In this area of limitless factual variations, “it is the province of Congress and the Commissioner, not the courts, to make the appropriate adjustments.”
Id. 394 U.S. at 750-51, 89 S.Ct. at 1445 (quoting United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 306-07, 88 S.Ct. 445, 449-50, 19 L.Ed.2d 537 (1967)).
Whether this regulation precludes interest exclusion under Section 103(a)(1) when transactions were not authorized under state law is a question of first impression. The regulation, however, clearly requires that state authorities have the power under state law to issue obligations. It follows then that if that power is not exercised in accordance with applicable state law, an unauthorized exercise of the state’s borrowing power results, which in our view violates the plain terms of the regulation that obligations be issued by “constituted authorities empowered to issue such obligations.” (emphasis added.) Such an interpretation of the regulation is consistent with the purpose of I.R.C. § 103(a)(1). In Helvering v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 293 U.S. 84, 55 S.Ct. 50, 79 L.Ed. 211 (1934), the Supreme Court discussed the purpose of excluding interest on governmental obligations from gross income:
It is clear from a consideration of the entire section and of the subject matter that the purpose of Congress, in thus excluding from gross income interest upon such obligations, was to aid the borrowing power of the federal government by making its interest-bearing bonds [or notes] more attractive to investors . . . . The scope of the word “obligations” as there employed must be narrowed accordingly, and not extended to include interest upon indebtedness not incurred under the borrowing power
Id. at 87, 55 S.Ct. at 51 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
The court in Fox v. United States, 397 F.2d 119, 122 (8th Cir.1968) (emphasis added), specifically discussed the purpose of § 103(a):
[The exclusion under § 103(a) ] reflects a fundamental long-standing policy of Congress that the federal government shall not impose any restraint on the' borrowing power of the states or their political subdivisions for public use or benefit. The legislative history clearly indicates that the purpose of the exclusion is to permit state and local governments to obtain capital at a low rate of interest. Intrinsic to the statutory exclusion of interest on governmental obligations is the requirement that the obligation be incurred in the exercise of the state’s (or political subdivision) borrowing power.
Although the Magistrate found that the purpose behind the § 103(a) exclusion was well served in the instant case, it is clear from these cases discussing the purpose of that exclusion that the courts have recognized as an initial matter that the interest must be incurred through the exercise of [1137]*1137state’s borrowing power. Unauthorized exercise of such power would not invoke the Section 103(a)(1) exemption even when there is a reasonable probability that unauthorized contracts would be upheld by a state court on an implied contract theory. To adopt PEC’s argument would strain the meaning of “borrowing power” and the regulation requiring that constituted authorities be empowered to issue obligations. Moreover, this court has recognized that “[t]he statute does not exempt interest paid on every type of contract or legal liability incurred by a municipal corporation . . . .” Holley v. United States, 124 F.2d 909, 911 (6th Cir.) cert. denied, 316 U.S. 685, 62 S.Ct. 1276, 86 L.Ed. 1757 (1942). See also Fox, 397 F.2d at 122 (The word “obligations” was not intended to extend to every obligation including the payment of interest but only to those obligations that were created in the exercise of the state’s borrowing power.) In United States Trust Co. v. Anderson, 65 F.2d 575 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 683, 54 S.Ct. 120, 78 L.Ed. 589 (1933), the court further explained:
There is no doubt that the clause exempting from taxation “obligations of a State ... or any political subdivision thereof” may be so interpreted as to embrace almost anything which a state or municipality is bound to pay and may thus exempt income which is within the, taxing power of the United States. The question is how broadly the word “obligations” is to be construed and just what income is covered by the exemption.
In determining the scope of the word we must bear in mind the settled rule of construction that “tax exemptions are never lightly to be inferred” (Heiner v. Colonial Trust Co., 275 U.S. [232] at page 235 [48 S.Ct. 65 at page 66, 72 L.Ed. 256] ...) and will not be applied to a particular case unless granted in the statute in plain terms [citations omitted].
* * * * * *
It seems manifest, not only because of the objects sought to be obtained by the exemptions, but also from the use of the term “issued” ... that the obligations referred to in [the statute] were only such as might be “issued” in the exercise of the borrowing power of the states.
* ¡- * * * •}:
The decision in Hibernia Savings & Loan Surety v. San Francisco, 200 U.S. 310, 26 S.Ct. 265, 266, 50 L.Ed. 495, 4 Ann.Cas. 934, is significant. There the validity of a tax imposed by the state of California as applied to checks or orders signed by the Treasurer of the United States was in question. Section 3701 of the Revised Statutes (31 USCA § 742) exempted “stocks, bonds, Treasury notes, and other obligations of the United States ... from taxation by or under State ... authority.” While the Supreme Court held that such checks were “obligations of the United States,” it determined that they did not come within the exemption. Though the decision does not govern the present case, it shows that the word “obligations” in an exemption clause is to be construed in the light of the general purposes of the exemption and is not necessarily all-embracing.
Id. at 577, 578, 579.
Under the foregoing authority, and giving appropriate meaning to Treas.Reg. 1.103-l(b), we hold that the Section 103(a)(1) exclusion is not applicable to obligations of a state that may be enforceable but that were not properly authorized under state law. Therefore, the decision of the Magistrate to the contrary is REVERSED.
Our inquiry is not ended, however, with this determination since there is a dispute between the parties as to whether PEC in fact conceded that the transactions at issue violated Tennessee law.
Although PEC stipulated that these transactions “were not approved by the legislative or- other governing body of each respective county or city nor by the state director of finance,” it did not stipulate that these transactions required the approval of these governing bodies.
[1138]*1138The government on appeal recognizes that Tenn.Code Ann. § 5-14-108(m) is applicable to a particular county only after approval by the county governing body or by the voters, see Tenn.Code Ann. § 5-14-102 (1980), and that § 54-8-107 is applicable only in a county that creates a county highway department. The government also recognizes, as it must in light of Newlin, supra, that it has the burden of proving that the transactions between PEC and the governmental entities were violative of applicable Tennessee law and concedes that it offered no proof at trial on whether the statutes at issue were applicable to the instant action. We conclude that PEC did not concede the illegality of the contracts at issue, and therefore a remand for determination of this factual issue would ordinarily be warranted. PEC, however, argues that this case should not be remanded because “the trial court’s decision on cross-motions for summary judgment, based on a stipulated record, should be treated as a decision after a trial; and there is no basis to reopen the evidence to allow the government a second bite at the apple.” (Letter Brief at 5.)
The cases relied upon by PEC in support of this contention, see, e.g., Starsky v. Williams, 512 F.2d 109 (9th Cir.1975) and Vet-ter v. Frosch, 599 F.2d 630 (5th Cir.1979), however, are inapposite because they dealt with a situation where sufficient evidence had been submitted to the trial court for it to rule on an issue of fact; thus, the cases were actually treated on the merits rather than under summary judgment. In essence, these cases stand for the proposition that a trial judge can decide disputed issues of fact even when the case is styled as one under summary judgment. In the instant case, the record contains insufficient evidence to determine whether the contracts at issue violated Tennessee law, and the government has the burden of proving such violations.
The situation here presented is similar to that in Blum v. Schuyler Packing Co., 508 F.2d 881 (8th Cir.1974), where the parties submitted stipulated facts to the district court for determination of “[t]he legality under the provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 of paying employees on'a computed gang time basis rather than on the basis of the time on their individual time cards . . . .” Id. at 882. The district court sua sponte rendered summary judgment for defendants on the basis that plaintiffs had not met their burden of proof under the Act.
On appeal, the court noted that the parties had made the following stipulation:
Because of their inability to reach agreement on certain factual details, the parties have purposely left ambiguities in this Stipulation of Facts to enable each party to argue its version of those factual details in its brief. However, the parties will supply the court with such additional information as it shall request.
Id. at 882-83.
The court then held:
This is not a case where there is no genuine issue of material fact. Therefore, rendering summary judgment on the record, which consisted of an incomplete stipulation, was error.
This Court is of the opinion that the record is insufficient to grant the requested relief to plaintiffs or to defendants. The parties should be given the opportunity to present evidence on the facts which have not been agreed upon or to present additional stipulations. Williams v. Chick, 373 F.2d 330 (8th Cir.1967).
It is apparent that the parties sought by the submission of the stipulation to have the district court rule that a “gang time” method of computing compensable time was either valid or invalid, per se, under the Act. The district court properly held, in its memorandum opinion, that such a ruling could not be made. The court should have stopped there and required the parties to submit evidence or additional stipulations on the question of whether the “gang time” method, as used in this particular case, was in violation of the Act. However, the court went on to rule against the plaintiffs on [1139]*1139the burden of proof issue. This, in effect, resulted in a holding that, since the plaintiffs were unable to get the defendants to stipulate to certain facts at issue in the case, they failed to carry their burden of proof. The stipulation did not contain enough facts for the district court to grant summary judgment in this case; therefore, it was error to do so.
Id. at 883. See also Bank of America Trust & Savings Assn. v. United States, 317 F.2d 859 (9th Cir.1963), where the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded a case that had been decided by the district court in the government’s favor on stipulated facts. On appeal, the court found that the stipulations did not show the “exact nature of Edmondson’s [defendant-bank customer’s] liability to the bank under the conditional sales contracts . . . .” Id. at 861. The court concluded, “[We are] of the opinion that the stipulation just does not tell enough ‘who, what, when, where and how’ for the trial court or this court to make a definitive ruling.” Id. It therefore remanded for proceedings on this issue.
As this court noted in United States v. Articles of Device, 527 F.2d 1008, 1011 (6th Cir.1976): “The function of a motion for summary judgment is not to permit the court to decide issues of fact, but solely to determine whether there is an issue of fact to be tried.” In this action, the Magistrate was in error in finding that there was no material issue of fact on the question of the legality of the contracts. We find that the parties in this action should be given the opportunity to present evidence on the question: Were the contracts in violation of state law or undertaken without the appropriate approval of constituted authorities empowered to issue such obligations?
We also find that the Magistrate correctly denied PEC’s application for attorney’s fees, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), which provides:
Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a court shall award to a prevailing party other than the United States fees and other expenses ... incurred by that party in any civil action ... brought by or against the United States in any court having jurisdiction of that action, unless the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust.
• The Magistrate denied PEC’s application on the following basis:
[E]arlier cases [dealing with I.R.C. § 103(a)(1)] were resolved without a finding of unlawful act on the part of the political subdivisions involved, and the possibility was left open that, had the transactions been found illegal, the taxpayer might not have been entitled to the tax credit.
The instant action, in which certain irregularities on the part of the various political subdivisions were stipulated, provided an ideal vehicle for reaching a decision on what was still an open question. For this reason, even though the government may have been unlikely to prevail, it was substantially justified in defending the action.
Although we have held that the Magistrate erred in finding that PEC had stipulated to the illegality of the contracts at issue, the possibility was still left open that the Magistrate would have independently found the contracts illegal and denied PEC the tax credit. For this reason, we find that the government was substantially justified in defending the action. Moreover, Section 2412(d)(1)(A) provides that a court shall award fees only to a “prevailing party.” PEC is no longer the prevailing party in light of our decision to reverse and remand the Magistrate’s judgment. See Estate of Curry v. United States, 706 F.2d 1424, 1433 (7th Cir.1983).
Accordingly, we hereby REVERSE and REMAND this action to the Magistrate for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. ■'