Opinion by
Ervin, J.,
This is an annexation proceeding wherein a borough by ordinance annexed an adjacent portion of a second class township pursuant to a petition requesting the annexation signed by a majority in number of all the freeholders of the annexed territory. Sections 425 and 426 of. “The General Borough Act” of May 4, 1927, P. L. 519, as amended and recodified by the Act of July 10, 1947, P. L. 1621, 53 P.S. 12461, 12462. Section 1010 of the Borough Code, as amended, 53 P.S. 12900, provides: “Complaint as to the legality of any ordinance or resolution may be made to the court of quarter sessions, upon entering into recognizance with sufficient security to prosecute the same with effect and for the payment of costs, by any person aggrieved, within thirty days after any ordinance or resolution takes effect, and the determination and order of the court thereon shall he conclusive. In cases of ordinances effecting annexation of territory or laying out streets over private lands, the court shall have jurisdiction to review the propriety as well as the legality of the ordinance.” (Emphasis added) Nothwithstanding the language declaring the determination of the court below conclusive, this Court, in a number of cases, has stated that the appeal is on a broad certiorari, and, in addition to adjudicating the jurisdiction of the court below and the regularity of its proceedings, we have examined the testimony which was made a part of the record by the Act of April 18, 1919, P. L. 72, 12 P.S. 1165, to determine whether the findings and determination of the lower court are supported by competent evidence. In Appeal of Bender, 106 Pa. Superior Ct. 376, 378, 163 A. 47, we said: “The decision below is not conclusive; nor is our jurisdiction bn this appeal limited to a review of the regularity of the proceedings, as was-formerly the rule on-[378]*378a certiorari: Davis v. Crafton Borough, 75 Pa. Superior Ct. 37; Hand’s Case, 266 Pa. 277. Although this appeal is in effect a certiorari the testimony taken in the court below and filed ‘shall be reviewed by the appel late court as part of the record, with like effect as upon an appeal from, a judgment entered upon the verdict of a jury in an action at law, and the appeal so taken shall not have the effect only of a certiorari to review the regularity of the proceedings in the court below’: Act of April 18, 1919, P. L. 72. Prior to the passage of this statute we had authority, when a case was brought to this court by certiorari, to examine the opinion of the court below for the purpose of ascertaining the basis of its action and whether it exceeded its jurisdiction or its proper legal discretion: Independence Party Nomination, 208 Pa. 108; Chester County Republican Nominations, 213 Pa. 64.” See also Warner Bros. Theatres v. Pottstown Boro., 164 Pa. Superior Ct. 91, 93, 63 A. 2d 101, wherein we said: “Under the Act of April 18, 1919, P. L. 72, 12 PS §1165, it is for us to examine the testimony as on an appeal from a judgment entered upon the verdict of a jury in an action at law and to decide the case on its merits.” In Irwin Borough Annexation Case (No. 1), 165 Pa. Superior Ct. 119, 122, 123, 67 A. 2d 757, we said: “However, we do not weigh the evidence, resolve its conflicts, or pass upon the credibility of the witnesses'. The findings of fact by the court below will not be disturbed if our examination of the testimony shows that they are supported by' competent evidence.”
In Derry Township School Dis. Appeal, 168 Pa. Superior Ct. 415, 419, 79 A. 2d 127, we said: “While we are authorized to review the finding of the • court below upon the propriety of the annexation, we reverse only upon a showing of a manifest abuse of the discretion vested in it.” See also Dallas Borough An[379]*379nexation Case, 169 Pa. Superior Ct. 129, 133, 134, 82 A. 2d 676; Salisbury Twp. Annexation Case, 172 Pa. Superior Ct. 262, 270, 94 A. 2d 143; Lemoyne Borough Annexation Case, 176 Pa. Superior Ct. 38, 41, 107 A. 2d 149.
Beview on certiorari has been recently considered and clarified by Mr. Justice (now Chief Justice) Stern in Kaufman Const. Co. v. Holcomb, 357 Pa. 514, 517, 518, 519, 55 A. 2d 534, in the following language: “Where a statute expressly denies the right of appeal to a court from the action of some agency of government, or to an appellate court from the decision of a court of original jurisdiction, to what extent is a disappointed claimant thereby prevented from obtaining a complete judicial review of his claim? After some vacillation by the courts in regard to the proper answer to that question — (as to which see Rimer’s Contested Election. Geary’s Appeal, 316 Pa. 342, 175 A. 544, and McGettigan’s Liquor License Case, 131 Pa. Superior Ct. 280, 200 A. 213)—the law is now reasonably clear, a distinction being made between the effect of a statute which merely fails to provide for a right of appeal and the effect of one which expressly denies that right. This differentiation apparently had its origin in Twenty-first Senatorial District Nomination, 281 Pa. 273, 279, 126 A. 566, 568, in which it was said: Where, in a statutory proceeding, the legislature fails to provide for an appeal, and because of that omission the action of the tribunal involved is, generally speaking, considered final ... a certiorari to inspect the record, in the broadest sense allowed by our cases, may, nevertheless, issue; but where the legislature . . . particularly states that no appeal shall be permitted, then review, beyond determining questions of jurisdiction, cannot be had; and, under circumstances such as those at bar, a certiorari for the lat[380]*380ter purpose cannot be broadened into something more extensive, either by our prior rulings on. the general subject in hand, or by operation of the Act of April 18, 1919, P. L. 72.’1 The distinction thus made has been reiterated and reinforced in a multitude of subsequent cases holding that where a statute expressly provides that there shall be no appeal the scope of appellate review is limited to the question of jurisdiction and the regularity of the proceedings; the merits of the controversy cannot be considered even though the interpretation given to the facts or the law by the governmental agency or the court below may have been erroneous.2 It is only where the statute is silent [381]*381on the question of appeal that a review by certiorari may be had ‘in the broadest sense’ and the court may consider the record, including the testimony, to determine whether the findings are supported by competent evidence and to correct any conclusions of law erroneously made.”3
See also Delaware County Nat. Bank v. Campbell, 378 Pa. 311, 316, 317, 318, 332, 106 A. 2d 416, wherein the majority and minority of the Court clearly recognize the principle that when an appeal is statutorily denied, a review by the appellate court on certiorari is narrowly limited to questions of jurisdiction and regularity of the proceedings.
It might be argued that the legislature, in the case at bar, did not expressly prohibit an appeal. It is difficult to see how it could have chosen language to attain that result more effectively. It said: “. . . and the determination and order of the court thereon shall be conclusive.” In Webster’s New International Dictionary, 2d ed., “conclude” is thus defined: “5. To make a final determination or judgment concerning; . ... 1. To come to a termination; to make an end; to close; end; terminate; ... 2.
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Opinion by
Ervin, J.,
This is an annexation proceeding wherein a borough by ordinance annexed an adjacent portion of a second class township pursuant to a petition requesting the annexation signed by a majority in number of all the freeholders of the annexed territory. Sections 425 and 426 of. “The General Borough Act” of May 4, 1927, P. L. 519, as amended and recodified by the Act of July 10, 1947, P. L. 1621, 53 P.S. 12461, 12462. Section 1010 of the Borough Code, as amended, 53 P.S. 12900, provides: “Complaint as to the legality of any ordinance or resolution may be made to the court of quarter sessions, upon entering into recognizance with sufficient security to prosecute the same with effect and for the payment of costs, by any person aggrieved, within thirty days after any ordinance or resolution takes effect, and the determination and order of the court thereon shall he conclusive. In cases of ordinances effecting annexation of territory or laying out streets over private lands, the court shall have jurisdiction to review the propriety as well as the legality of the ordinance.” (Emphasis added) Nothwithstanding the language declaring the determination of the court below conclusive, this Court, in a number of cases, has stated that the appeal is on a broad certiorari, and, in addition to adjudicating the jurisdiction of the court below and the regularity of its proceedings, we have examined the testimony which was made a part of the record by the Act of April 18, 1919, P. L. 72, 12 P.S. 1165, to determine whether the findings and determination of the lower court are supported by competent evidence. In Appeal of Bender, 106 Pa. Superior Ct. 376, 378, 163 A. 47, we said: “The decision below is not conclusive; nor is our jurisdiction bn this appeal limited to a review of the regularity of the proceedings, as was-formerly the rule on-[378]*378a certiorari: Davis v. Crafton Borough, 75 Pa. Superior Ct. 37; Hand’s Case, 266 Pa. 277. Although this appeal is in effect a certiorari the testimony taken in the court below and filed ‘shall be reviewed by the appel late court as part of the record, with like effect as upon an appeal from, a judgment entered upon the verdict of a jury in an action at law, and the appeal so taken shall not have the effect only of a certiorari to review the regularity of the proceedings in the court below’: Act of April 18, 1919, P. L. 72. Prior to the passage of this statute we had authority, when a case was brought to this court by certiorari, to examine the opinion of the court below for the purpose of ascertaining the basis of its action and whether it exceeded its jurisdiction or its proper legal discretion: Independence Party Nomination, 208 Pa. 108; Chester County Republican Nominations, 213 Pa. 64.” See also Warner Bros. Theatres v. Pottstown Boro., 164 Pa. Superior Ct. 91, 93, 63 A. 2d 101, wherein we said: “Under the Act of April 18, 1919, P. L. 72, 12 PS §1165, it is for us to examine the testimony as on an appeal from a judgment entered upon the verdict of a jury in an action at law and to decide the case on its merits.” In Irwin Borough Annexation Case (No. 1), 165 Pa. Superior Ct. 119, 122, 123, 67 A. 2d 757, we said: “However, we do not weigh the evidence, resolve its conflicts, or pass upon the credibility of the witnesses'. The findings of fact by the court below will not be disturbed if our examination of the testimony shows that they are supported by' competent evidence.”
In Derry Township School Dis. Appeal, 168 Pa. Superior Ct. 415, 419, 79 A. 2d 127, we said: “While we are authorized to review the finding of the • court below upon the propriety of the annexation, we reverse only upon a showing of a manifest abuse of the discretion vested in it.” See also Dallas Borough An[379]*379nexation Case, 169 Pa. Superior Ct. 129, 133, 134, 82 A. 2d 676; Salisbury Twp. Annexation Case, 172 Pa. Superior Ct. 262, 270, 94 A. 2d 143; Lemoyne Borough Annexation Case, 176 Pa. Superior Ct. 38, 41, 107 A. 2d 149.
Beview on certiorari has been recently considered and clarified by Mr. Justice (now Chief Justice) Stern in Kaufman Const. Co. v. Holcomb, 357 Pa. 514, 517, 518, 519, 55 A. 2d 534, in the following language: “Where a statute expressly denies the right of appeal to a court from the action of some agency of government, or to an appellate court from the decision of a court of original jurisdiction, to what extent is a disappointed claimant thereby prevented from obtaining a complete judicial review of his claim? After some vacillation by the courts in regard to the proper answer to that question — (as to which see Rimer’s Contested Election. Geary’s Appeal, 316 Pa. 342, 175 A. 544, and McGettigan’s Liquor License Case, 131 Pa. Superior Ct. 280, 200 A. 213)—the law is now reasonably clear, a distinction being made between the effect of a statute which merely fails to provide for a right of appeal and the effect of one which expressly denies that right. This differentiation apparently had its origin in Twenty-first Senatorial District Nomination, 281 Pa. 273, 279, 126 A. 566, 568, in which it was said: Where, in a statutory proceeding, the legislature fails to provide for an appeal, and because of that omission the action of the tribunal involved is, generally speaking, considered final ... a certiorari to inspect the record, in the broadest sense allowed by our cases, may, nevertheless, issue; but where the legislature . . . particularly states that no appeal shall be permitted, then review, beyond determining questions of jurisdiction, cannot be had; and, under circumstances such as those at bar, a certiorari for the lat[380]*380ter purpose cannot be broadened into something more extensive, either by our prior rulings on. the general subject in hand, or by operation of the Act of April 18, 1919, P. L. 72.’1 The distinction thus made has been reiterated and reinforced in a multitude of subsequent cases holding that where a statute expressly provides that there shall be no appeal the scope of appellate review is limited to the question of jurisdiction and the regularity of the proceedings; the merits of the controversy cannot be considered even though the interpretation given to the facts or the law by the governmental agency or the court below may have been erroneous.2 It is only where the statute is silent [381]*381on the question of appeal that a review by certiorari may be had ‘in the broadest sense’ and the court may consider the record, including the testimony, to determine whether the findings are supported by competent evidence and to correct any conclusions of law erroneously made.”3
See also Delaware County Nat. Bank v. Campbell, 378 Pa. 311, 316, 317, 318, 332, 106 A. 2d 416, wherein the majority and minority of the Court clearly recognize the principle that when an appeal is statutorily denied, a review by the appellate court on certiorari is narrowly limited to questions of jurisdiction and regularity of the proceedings.
It might be argued that the legislature, in the case at bar, did not expressly prohibit an appeal. It is difficult to see how it could have chosen language to attain that result more effectively. It said: “. . . and the determination and order of the court thereon shall be conclusive.” In Webster’s New International Dictionary, 2d ed., “conclude” is thus defined: “5. To make a final determination or judgment concerning; . ... 1. To come to a termination; to make an end; to close; end; terminate; ... 2. to be conclusive . . . 3. to form a final judgment; . . . .” See McGettigan’s Liquor License Case, 131 Pa. Superior Ct. 280, 285, 200 A. 213. The words “final” and “conclusive” as [382]*382used in the statutes are synonymous (Cf. Galbreath v. Colt, 4 Yeates 551, 555; Andrews v. Lee, 3 P. & W. 99; 1 Shorter Oxford English Dictionary 362 (1933 ed.); Saxony Construction Company Appeal, 178 Pa. Superior Ct. 132, 113 A. 2d 342. (Allocatur refused by Supreme Ct. May 24, 1955)).
In Newport Township School District v. State Tax Equalization Board, 366 Pa. 603, 609, 79 A. 2d 641, the Court said: “ ‘. . . the authorities agree that certiorari does not lie to review or annul any judgment or proceeding which is not judicial in its nature, but with respect to various proceedings there is room for great difference of opinion as to whether they are judicial or not. If they are either legislative or executive, they are beyond the reach of this writ.’ ”
The question of whether certain territory should be a part of a township of the second class or a part of a borough is purely legislative in character. All municipalities are agents of the state and the state may provide for their creation or modification by legislation. The state may also delegate this power to the municipalities.
Appellee has cited many cases but a reading of them will show that they were decided before Kaufman Const. Co. v. Holcomb, supra, or that the scope of appellate review was not considered therein.
Inasmuch as we have concluded that our consideration is thus limited, we have no difficulty in determining that the lower court did have jurisdiction and that the proceedings were regular.
Were we not thus limited and should we look, as we heretofore have, through the glass of a broad certiorari, nevertheless we would be obliged to affirm the findings and determination of the lower court. Without going in great detail into the merits of the contro[383]*383versy, we find that it concerned not the question of propriety of the annexation, hut rather such technical questions as whether the description in the ordinance was accurate and whether it would close. Engineers for the township testified one way and engineers for the borough testified another. Judge Duee, in an exhaustive and able opinion, chose to accept the testimony of the borough engineers as the more worthy of belief. A thorough examination of the entire record convinces us that there was ample evidence to justify the lower court’s action and we find no abuse of discretion.
Since we have reached this conclusion it is not necessary for us to consider appellee’s argument that this case should have been heard by the court in banc before coming here. This being a matter of considerable importance to the community and the lower court’s action now assuming the importance that it does in view of our present ruling, we announce that in this type of case it would be better practice to have exceptions to the trial court’s findings and conclusions heard by the court in banc.
The order of the lower court is affirmed at the cost of the appellants.