Pittsburgh Joint Collective Bargaining Committee v. City of Pittsburgh

391 A.2d 1318, 481 Pa. 66, 1978 Pa. LEXIS 1066, 99 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3278

• Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: October 6, 1978
• Docket: 129
• Status: Published

Opinions

OPINION

NIX, Justice.

The parties to this appeal, the Pittsburgh Joint Collective Bargaining Committee and the City of Pittsburgh, entered into a collective bargaining agreement dated July 25, 1973 which was in full force and effect until December 31, 1975.¹

On August 21, 1973 Frank Parsons, a member of appellant union, was suspended for five days, subject to discharge. On that same day, Mr. Parsons filed a grievance for unjust suspension and, subsequent to his discharge from the Department of Parks and Recreation of the City of Pittsburgh on August 28, 1975, filed a grievance with respect to his discharge. Appellant union, after duly exhausting all steps in the contractual grievance procedure² requested that the City submit the dispute to binding arbitration.³ Upon the City’s refusal to arbitrate the dispute, the union filed a complaint in equity seeking a ruling requiring the City to submit the dispute to arbitration. The chancellor sustained the City’s preliminary objections on the grounds that the discharge was not an arbitrable issue since it was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission of the City of Pittsburgh, and entered a decree dismissing the complaint, which decree was affirmed by the Commonwealth Court. We granted review. The dispositive issue is whether appellee may in this posture assert the defense that the grievance arbitration procedure to which it agreed in 1973 is in conflict with various provisions of the Civil Service Act, 53 P.S. § 23401 et seq. (1957 & Supp.1978-79), such that the implementation of the procedure is prohibited by section 703⁴ of the Public Employee Relations Act of 1970 (Act 195). 43 P.S. § 1101.703 (Supp.1978-79). For the following reasons we conclude that appellee may not in the instant context assert this defense in order to avoid compliance with agreed upon arbitration procedure.⁵

The framework for public employee collective bargaining in this Commonwealth is provided by Act 195. The purpose of Act 195 is to promote orderly and constructive relationships between all public employers and their employees, to provide adequate means for the minimization and resolution of disputes between the public employer and its employees and to facilitate the development of harmonious relationships between the public employer and its employees. Id. § 1101.101. The statutory scheme enacted in this Commonwealth is unusual as compared with other states,⁶ in that it affords certain public employees a limited right to strike after exhaustion of negotiation and remediation procedures, id. § 1101.1001-1003, and in that it provides for mandatory arbitration of “disputes or grievances arising out of the interpretation of the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement.” Id. § 1101.903.

In supporting private sector grievance arbitration, the United States Supreme Court has relied upon evidence of Congressional intent, upon the principle of allocating decision-making power to the more expert tribunal, and upon the assumption that labor peace can best be accomplished through enforced use of dispute resolution machinery established by the parties themselves.⁷ The rule is that, except when the contract clearly and expressly excludes the dispute from arbitration, the process set up in collective bargaining negotiations must prevail.⁸ Even frivolous grievances are to be sent to arbitration because of arbitration’s therapeutic value in providing a safety valve for the ventilation of issues which might spill over in wildcat strikes or job actions.⁹ In comparing our labor policy towards arbitration with that of the federal labor policy we have observed:

“The General Assembly, far from forbidding arbitration of disputes arising out of a collective bargaining agreement, expressly commands it in section 903 of the PERA, which provides, in pertinent part:

‘Arbitration of disputes or grievances arising out of the interpretation of the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement is mandatory . . . . [T]he final step [of the grievance procedure] shall provide for a binding decision by an arbitrator . . . .’

This policy is even stronger than that embodied in federal labor policy. See United Steelworkers v. American Manufacturing Co., 363 U.S. 564, 80 S.Ct. 1343, 4 L.Ed.2d 1403 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 80 S.Ct. 1347, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 80 S.Ct. 1358, 4 L.Ed.2d 1424 (1960). Federal policy merely favors the submission of disputes to arbitration, while the PERA requires it.”

Bd. of Ed. v. Phila. Federation of Teachers, 464 Pa. 92, 99, 346 A.2d 35, 39 (1975).

It would therefore be totally inconsistent for this Court to be less supportive of grievance arbitration than the courts in the federal system. Discussing our view of the importance of grievance arbitration under the labor policy articulated in Act 195, we stated:

“It is not difficult to perceive the reasons for the statutory requirement that grievances be submitted to arbitration. If a dispute arises as to the interpretation or application of the agreement there must be a mechanism for resolving the dispute or the agreement is meaningless. Historically, the primary means of resolving such disputes was the strike, and many agreements in the private sector retain this mechanism for at least some types of dispute. However, resolution of all disputes by resort to economic force is costly to the parties, and more importantly, to the public. The General Assembly therefore chose to make the widely used procedure of labor arbitration mandatory under the PERA. This brings the special expertise of labor arbitrators to bear on the often difficult problems of administering the collective bargaining agreement while assuring parties that their agreement will be effective and guaranteeing both the parties and the public that such disputes will not disrupt peaceful labor relations or interrupt public services.”

Id., 464 Pa. at 100, 346 A.2d at 39 (footnotes omitted).

Where the decision to commit a matter to grievance arbitration arises from the terms of a contract between the parties rather than as a result of statutory mandate, the policy to favor this type of dispute resolution is even stronger. Here the alleged obligation to submit the question to arbitration flows directly from the terms of the collective bargaining agreement and not section 903 of Act 195. The Union’s argument is premised upon the fact that sections 5 and 6 of the agreement provide the procedure for obtaining redress for the asserted grievance.¹⁰ This Court has recognized that alternative dispute resolutions arrived at voluntarily by the parties to a contract is to be fostered:

“Fundamental in our law of contracts is the axiom that parties may write their own contracts, and that it is the function of the courts to interpret those contracts and to enforce them as made. It is now recognized in this Commonwealth that the enforcement of agreements by the parties to submit future disputes, that may arise under their agreement, to a tribunal other than the courts is not against public policy and is consistent with the concept of the courts’ role in dealing with the contractual relationships of individuals. ‘Settlements of disputes by arbitration are no longer deemed contrary to public policy. In fact, our statutes encourage arbitration and with our dockets crowded and in some jurisdictions congested arbitration is favored by the courts.’

In Wyoming Radio v. National Association of Broadcast Employees and Technicians, 398 Pa. 183, 186, 157 A.2d 366, 367 (1960), we stated: ‘Arbitration is not a makeshift or a subterfuge. It is not an excuse for delay or a fan for the cooling off of tempers. It is a solemn and serious undertaking for the attainment of justice, and when parties engaged in a common enterprise agree to settle by arbitration all differences which may arise between them they are bound by their commitment as much as if they had entered into a stipulation in Court’.”

Ambridge Borough Water Authority v. Columbia, 458 Pa. 546, 548-49, 328 A.2d 498 (1974). See also Chester City School Authority v. Aberthaw Construction Co., 460 Pa. 343, 333 A.2d 758 (1975); Flightways Corp. v. Keystone Helicopter Corp., 459 Pa. 660, 331 A.2d 184 (1975).

It has also been recognized that these principles are applicable to contracts pertaining to employment. Ambridge Borough Water v. Columbia, supra. In Ambridge, we held that a party to a contract containing an arbitration clause could not avoid this obligation by subsequently asserting its incapacity to enter the contract in the first instance. Id. We believe that decision is instructive here. In both instances, a governmental unit, as employer, entered into an employment contract containing a clause requiring grievance arbitration. At the heart of each case is the fact that a governmental unit employer attempted to avoid arbitration by asserting its own incapacity. In Ambridge we reasoned as follows in deciding that the employer should not be permitted to avoid arbitration:

“Here, there is no question that there was a mutual agreement to arbitrate future disputes. Equally as clear is that there is no challenge to the capacity of the Authority to enter into an agreement providing for arbitration. Furthermore, the parties operated under this agreement for a period of three and one-half years. In this posture the lower court properly refused to reach the merits of appellant’s claim of lack of capacity.”

Ambridge Borough Water Authority v. Columbia, supra, 458 Pa. at 551, 328 A.2d at 501.

In the instant case the challenge is directed to the capacity of the employer to submit this particular subject to arbitration. This distinction however does not require a different result. The relationship between the public employer and the designated bargaining unit is one which must be sustained for years, during which a number of contract negotiations will occur. To sustain a harmonious relationship it is necessary for each of the parties to be pliable and willing to recognize the other’s position. Nothing could be more disruptive to such a relationship than a demonstration of bad faith bargaining on the part of one of the parties.

We have already stressed the importance of grievance arbitration in facilitating the development and maintenance of harmonious relationships between the public employer and employee. It is even moré supportive of a favorable employment climate where this dispute resolution mechanism arises from the good faith bargaining of the parties rather than being required by statute. To permit an employer to enter into agreements and include terms such as grievance arbitration which raise the expectations of those concerned, and then to subsequently refuse to abide by those provisions on the basis of its lack of capacity would invite discord and distrust and create an atmosphere wherein a harmonious relationship would virtually be impossible to maintain.

Good faith bargaining would require that questions as to the legality of the proposed terms of a collective bargaining agreement should be resolved by the parties to the agreement at the bargaining stage.¹¹ For instance, the section 703 question should have been raised by the City during the 1973 contract negotiations. Cf. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board v. State College Area Sch. Dist., 461 Pa. 494, 337 A.2d 262 (1975) (alleged conflict with Public School Code of 1949 raised in negotiations by alleging a refusal to bargain in good faith).

The City also argues that as a matter of contractual interpretation a dispute over the discharge of an employee is not encompassed by the grievance arbitration procedure of the collective bargaining agreement. See notes 2 & 3 supra. Having expounded upon the value of dispute resolution via arbitration, it would indeed be inappropriate for this Court to reach this question without an arbitrator first having addressed it, and we decline to do so. The question of the scope of the grievance arbitration procedure is for the arbitrator, at least in the first instance. Bd. of Ed. v. Phila. Federation of Teachers, supra, 464 Pa. at 103 n. 13, 346 A.2d at 41 n. 13. Therefore, the order of the Commonwealth Court is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the chancellor with instructions to order appellee to submit the issue to arbitration under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement.

It is so ordered.

Each party to pay own costs.

EAGEN, C. J., concurred in the result. POMEROY, J., filed a dissenting opinion.

1 . Pertinent parts of the agreement will be found in the footnotes to this opinion.

2 . “SECTION 5 — GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE

A. The purpose of this section is: (1) to provide the opportunity for discussion of any request or complaint by an employee; and (2) to establish the procedures for the processing and settlement of grievances. A ‘grievance’ as used in this Agreement is any complaint, dispute, or request by an employee or the Union which involves the interpretation, application of, or compliance with, the provisions of this Agreement. Grievances must be initiated and processed promptly and the time limits observed, provided, however, that any time limit provided in the grievance procedure may be changed by mutual agreement of the parties.”

3 . SECTION 6 — ARBITRATION

“Any grievance that has been processed in accordance with the provisions of the preceding Section of this Agreement, but not satisfactorily settled shall be submitted to arbitration before an impartial arbitrator to be selected by mutual agreement of the parties. If, within twenty (20) work days (or a longer period if mutually agreed upon) after receipt of such written request, the parties are unable to agree upon an arbitrator, the Director of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service shall be requested to submit the names of nine (9) disinterested persons qualified and willing to act as impartial arbitrators. From such list the City shall strike first and the parties shall each alternately strike one name until eight (8) names have been eliminated and the person whose name remains on the list shall be selected to act as the impartial arbitrator. The arbitrator shall submit his decision, in writing, and the decision of the arbitrator so rendered shall be final and binding upon the employee involved and upon the parties to this Agreement except where legislative action is required to implement the arbitrator’s award. Where a dispute relates to the scale of wages or benefits in any way, any decision rendered shall not be retroactive more than ninety (90) days beyond the date on which the dispute was first presented as a grievance in writing. The fees and expenses of the arbitration shall be borne in equal shares by the City and the Union. The arbitrator shall not have the right to add to, subtract from, modify, or disregard any of the terms or provisions of this Agreement.

In arbitration the City will not make use of any records of previous disciplinary action against the employee involved if the action was taken two (2) or more years prior to the event which is the subject of such arbitration.”

4 . Section 703 of Act 195 provides:

The parties to the collective bargaining process shall not effect or implement a provision in a collective bargaining agreement if the implementation of that provision would be in violation of, or inconsistent with, or in conflict with any statute or statutes enacted by the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania or the provisions of municipal home rale charters.

43 P.S. § 1101.703 (Supp.1978-79).

5 . Because of this conclusion, we do not reach the question of whether there is a conflict between the agreement and the Civil Service Act such that the agreement’s implementation would be prohibited by section 703 of Act 195. Id.

6 . See R. Vaughn, Principles of Civil Service Law. § 9.3 to 9.4 (1976).

7 . See United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 80 S.Ct. 1343, 4 L.Ed.2d 1403 (1960) (arbitration of labor disputes under collective bargaining agreements is part and parcel of the collective bargaining process itself); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 80 S.Ct. 1347, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 80 S.Ct. 1358, 4 L.Ed.2d 1424 (1960); Abrams, The Integrity of the Arbitral Process, 76 Mich.L.Rev. 231, 232 (1977).

8 . United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 584-85, 80 S.Ct. 1347, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (1960).

9 . United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568, 80 S.Ct. 1343, 4 L.Ed.2d 1403 (1960).

10 . Whether or not section 903 would require grievance arbitration of this dispute in absence of the language of the collective bargaining agreement is not controlling. The significant fact is that if the Union is correct that the agreement does require arbitration of this issue then the obligation to do so arises from the agreement of the parties.

11 . It should also be noted that persons with the requisite standing who are not parties to a collective bargaining agreement may challenge the effectuation or implementation of the agreement on the grounds that section 703 of Act 195 is offended. See Fischer v. Rzymek, 15 Pa.Cmwlth. 105, 324 A.2d 836 (1974) (legality of agreement challenged by Register of Wills and District Attorney).