OPINION
WOZNIAK, Chief Judge.
This appeal was taken from the dismissal of appellants’ lawsuit for failure to post a $30 million surety bond pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 562.02 (1990). Appellants argue the statute does not apply to their constitutional challenge to the validity of 1991 Minn. Laws ch. 350. In the alternative, appellants argue that the trial court abused its [300]*300discretion by requiring a bond and in establishing the amount of the bond. We affirm.
FACTS
1991 Minn.Laws ch. 350 was signed into law on May 30, 1991. The act authorizes bonds to finance construction of aircraft maintenance and repair facilities and to provide substantial financial assistance designed “to encourage and facilitate the retention and expansion of airline corporations’ facilities, operations, and services in [Minnesota].” 1991 Minn.Laws ch. 350, art. 2, § 2. Although the act does not name a particular airline, all parties agree the purpose is to benefit Northwest Airlines, which is based in Minnesota and has many employees here.
The act authorized numerous transactions, but specific negotiations were required to arrive at terms to implement the provisions of the act. Article 3 of the act established
an interagency task force to coordinate the financial transactions authorized by [the] act, including bonds, financial assistance, and loan, lease, and other revenue agreements.
Id., art. 3, § 1, subd. 1. The interagency task force held numerous public meetings on the details of the various transactions. Negotiations continued between Northwest and state officials throughout 1991.
Proposed terms were presented to the legislative commission on planning and fiscal policy in November 1991 for it to make an advisory recommendation to the commissioner of finance. The legislative commission held hearings on the proposals in November and December 1991. Until the day of its vote, there was speculation as to whether or not the commission would approve implementation of chapter 350 and, if approved, on what terms. The commission modified the Metropolitan Airport Commission’s proposal to include six terms not required by chapter 350, and it reached a “clear understanding” with all parties that a certain portion of the $270,000,000 proceeds from bonds to be issued by the Metropolitan Airports Commission could be used to prepay leveraged buy-out debt and for other (unspecified) preexisting debt and business purposes. The thrust of the agreements implementing chapter 350 was not known with certainty by appellants or others until March 29, 1992, when the final contracts were signed by Northwest, the state, and the Metropolitan Airports Commission. Bonds were to be issued on April 14, 1992, and proceeds were to be delivered to Northwest.
Appellants brought suit on April 2, 1992, four days after the contracts were signed. They allege that 1991 Minn.Laws ch. 350 is unconstitutional on its face because 1) it is a special law benefitting one corporation; 2) it does not serve a public purpose; 3) it constitutes a loan of the state’s credit; 4) it includes an impermissible delegation of legislative powers to a commission; and 5) its tax credit and sales tax exemption provisions violate the state constitution’s uniformity of taxation clause. In addition to these constitutional challenges, appellants also raise challenges arising from the contract terms, the commercial context, and the facts upon which the agreement was premised. Specifically, appellants allege respondents failed to comply with the statutory prerequisites for the issuance of bonds and that there is no credible evidence supporting the findings required by the statute regarding 1) the adequacy of security; 2) the likelihood that future revenues will be sufficient to pay all obligations; and 3) the fair market value of properties and international routes.
The complaint seeks a declaratory judgment that the statute is unconstitutional and a permanent injunction to prevent 1) the issuance of any bonds authorized by chapter 350; 2) the expenditure of bond proceeds for anything but repayment of principal; 3) the use of tax revenues to pay principal or interest on the bonds; 4) the allowance of tax credits and exemptions permitted by the statute; and 5) loans from the Metropolitan Airports Commission’s “special construction fund.”
On April 10, 1992, respondents moved the trial court, pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 562.02, for an order requiring appellants [301]*301to post a surety bond of $819 million. After a hearing, appellants were ordered to post a $30 million bond by April 14, when the first bonds authorized by chapter 350 were due to be issued. Appellants moved for reconsideration, submitting evidence that it would take at least one month to procure a bond in that amount, but they did not indicate that they would be able to provide a bond even if they were given additional time. On April 14,1992, the trial court refused to extend the deadline and ordered that the action be dismissed with prejudice for appellants’ failure to post the bond.
Appellants filed this appeal from the judgment of dismissal on April 16, 1992. We ordered expedited briefing and oral argument.
The Metropolitan Airports Commission bonds ($270 million) were sold prior to oral argument held before this court on May 6, 1992. We have not been informed of the disbursement of the proceeds, nor how the opinion of bond counsel addressed the challenge then before this court.
ISSUES
1. Does Minn.Stat. § 562.02 (1990) apply to this action?
2. Must the trial court exercise discretion in ordering the bond under Minn.Stat. § 562.02 (1990)?
3. Does a dismissal with prejudice of this action bar a similar suit by another taxpayer?
4. Did the trial court, under the facts of this case, abuse its discretion in ordering appellants to post a bond as a condition of continuing their suit?
5. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in setting the amount of the bond and the deadline for posting?
ANALYSIS
1. Application of Minn.Stat. § 562.02 (1990).
Our supreme court has held that taxpayers who allege an illegal expenditure of tax money which “will likely have the effect of increasing the over-all tax burden of the community” may bring a declaratory judgment action to challenge the constitutionality of the underlying statute. Arens v. Village of Rogers, 240 Minn. 386, 391-92, 61 N.W.2d 508, 513-14 (1953), appeal dismissed, 347 U.S. 949, 74 S.Ct. 680, 98 L.Ed. 1096 (1954); see also St. Paul Area Chamber of Commerce v. Marzitelli, 258 N.W.2d 585, 588 (Minn.1977) (no question that taxpayers may sue to .enjoin waste or illegal use of public funds); Almquist v. City of Biwabik, 224 Minn. 503, 505, 28 N.W.2d 744, 745 (1947) (taxpayer directly affected by assessment).1 However, the legislature and courts have recognized that such suits may cause costly delays in public projects. The right to sue is not unfettered, and Minn.Stat. § 562.02 (1990) may pose a significant barrier to some taxpayer suits.
“Section 562.02 was adopted in 1957 for the apparent purpose of discouraging vexatious lawsuits by irresponsible litigants.” Village of Elbow Lake v. Otter Tail Power Co., 281 Minn. 43, 46, 160 N.W.2d 571, 574 (1968). The statute protects taxpayers against inordinate delays in the implementation of legislative decisions by encouraging those who wish to challenge the decision of a governmental body “to commence their actions before any substantial damage will result from a delay in the prosecution of the project.” Gram v. Village of Shoreview, 259 Minn. 145, 154, 106 N.W.2d 553, 559 (1960).
The statute at issue reads:
[302]*302Whenever any action at law or in equity is brought in any court in this state questioning directly or indirectly the existence of any condition or thing precedent to, or the validity of any action taken or proposed to be taken, by any public body * * * in the course of the authorization or sale * * * of bonds [or] the making of a contract for [a] public improvement * * *, such public body may move the court for an order requiring the party * * * bringing such action to file a surety bond. * * * If the court determines that loss or damage to the public or taxpayers may result from the pendency of the action or proceeding, the court may require such party, or parties, to file a surety bond, which shall be approved by the court, in such amount as the court may determine. Such bond shall be conditioned for payment to the public body of any loss or damage which may be caused to the public body or taxpayers by such delay, to the extent of the penal sum of such bond, if such party, or parties, shall not prevail therein. If such surety bond is not filed within a reasonable time allowed therefor by the court, the action shall be dismissed with prejudice.
Minn.Stat. § 562.02 (emphasis added). This court has paraphrased the statute:
If an action is brought in any court to challenge the validity of a condition precedent to an act, or the act itself, of a public body in the course of authorizing, issuing, or selling bonds, or in contracting for a public improvement, the public body may seek an order requiring the party bringing the action to file a surety bond.
In re Winona County Mun. Solid Waste Incinerator, 439 N.W.2d 56, 57 (Minn.App. 1989).
The plain language of the statute applies to this case. Appellants’ suit is an “action at law or in equity” which questions “directly” the enabling legislation and the evidence supporting the findings which are conditions “precedent to” public bodies (the state and the Metropolitan Airports Commission) issuing bonds. Appellants do not allege that Minn.Stat. § 562.02 is unconstitutional. See Gram, 259 Minn, at 154, 106 N.W.2d at 559 (explicitly holding statute is constitutional). They urge this court to carve out an exception for constitutional challenges to enabling legislation.2
In Gram, public meetings were held before the city council agreed to proceed with a sewer project. After contracts were signed, but before bonds were issued, taxpayers brought a declaratory judgment action. The supreme court affirmed the application of Minn.Stat. § 562.02, although the bond requirement had the effect of foreclosing judicial review. In light of Gram, and the appellants’ failure to cite any supporting language in Minn.Stat. § 562.02, case law, or legislative history supporting an exception for constitutional challenges, we cannot ignore the legislature’s decision to draft the statute broadly to embrace all actions, regardless of their substantive nature. Minn.Stat. § 645.16 (1990) (“When the words of a law in their application to an existing situation are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of the law shall not be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing the spirit.”); see also Gariup v. Stern, 254 Ind. 563, 567, 261 N.E.2d 578, 582 (1970) (similar statute applicable to taxpayer suits raising constitutional questions).
The legislative objective of curbing vexatious suits and costly delays applies notwithstanding that the plaintiffs base their complaint on constitutional challenges.3 [303]*303The trial court properly concluded that Minn.Stat. § 562.02 applies to this action.
2. Must the trial court exercise its discretion in ordering or not ordering a bond?
In holding that Minn.Stat. § 562.02 is constitutional, the supreme court in Gram noted specifically that the potentially onerous implications of the bond requirement under Minn.Stat. § 562.02 are greatly reduced because the statute is discretionary. Gram, 259 Minn, at 153, 106 N.W.2d at 559. The trial court’s decision to require a substantial bond “shall not be overturned except for a clear abuse of discretion.” Kilowatt Org. (TKO), Inc. v. Department of Energy, Planning & Dev., 336 N.W.2d 529, 533 (Minn.1983) (affirming $6 million surety bond and holding litigants not denied due process, although judicial review foreclosed).
In exercising its discretion, the trial court should consider the consequences of not answering the question posed in the litigation. There will be occasions on which the public will be served by having a question raised in litigation answered at once. In this case, however, the respondents, advocates of the proposal, preferred to dispose of the pending litigation without obtaining an answer; they asserted the requirement of a bond under Minn.Stat. § 562.02 and asked that the appellants’ action be dismissed. In doing so, they passed up the opportunity to get a prompt answer from the courts as to whether the appellants’ challenge to chapter 350 has merit. The respondents chose to take the chance that the failure to have that answer would leave legal uncertainty as an obstacle to the issuance of bonds to implement chapter 350. In any event, the likelihood that legal uncertainty might make the bonds unsalable is no greater now than it would have been had the appellants not brought this action. And, because no decision has been made on the merits, the risk should be no less.
The surety bond requirement of Minn. Stat. § 562.02 is analogous to the bond requirement in injunction cases. Gram, 259 Minn, at 153-54, 106 N.W.2d at 559. Even if plaintiffs in a particular case do not seek temporary injunctive relief,
the effect of the action, for all practical purposes, is the same as if a temporary injunction had been procured. The bonds * * * cannot be sold until the litigation is at an end.
Id. In this case, the pendency of the suit in the district court delayed the issuance of bonds until after the suit was dismissed. Although appellants did not seek temporary injunctive relief, the pendency of their suit resulted in a de facto injunction, and they have not established that the trial court abused its discretion under Minn. Stat. § 562.02 by requiring them to post security for the damages which may result from delay.
The injunctive effect may occur even if litigants bring suit at the earliest opportunity. See TKO, 336 N.W.2d at 532 (action brought in district court within 30 days of challenged agency decision). The focus of the statutory language is on the suit’s effect upon the bond issue or public project.
If the court determines that loss or damage to the public or taxpayers may result from the pendency of the action or proceeding, the court may require such party, or parties, to file a surety bond. * * * Such bond shall be conditioned for payment to the public body of any loss or damage which may be caused to the public body or taxpayers by such delay.
Minn.Stat. § 562.02. The statute does not require a finding of bad faith or fault by the litigants. Its harsh effect is to foreclose judicial review if the issues cannot be resolved on the merits before the public suffers “any substantial damage” from the delay of a project. Gram, 259 Minn, at 154, 106 N.W.2d at 559; see also TKO, 336 N.W.2d at 533 (judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act “conditioned upon the provisions of section 562.02”).
[304]*304Because the risk of damage to the public interest is the reason for a court to order a bond under section 562.02, the court must balance the hazard of project delay, on one hand, against the risk of going forward with an illegal project on the other. Balancing the alternative risks requires the court to look at the context of the transaction at issue. To look at the context requires a decision as to the effect dismissal under section 562.02 has in foreclosing an action that might subsequently be brought by another taxpayer challenging the legality of the bonds issued under chapter 350 and their enforceability against the state and its subdivisions.
3. Does dismissal of this action with prejudice bar a subsequent suit by another taxpayer asserting the same challenges?
Although our affirmance of the bond requirement has the effect of foreclosing judicial review of the constitutional claims presented by these appellants, all counsel agreed at oral argument that the dismissal would not bar a similar suit by another taxpayer, since the claims have not been adjudicated on the merits. We agree, and so hold. This determination is essential to our affirmance and, therefore, is not dicta as the concurrence would suggest.
Were the option of a later taxpayer suit not available, the discretionary decision of the trial court here would implicate a serious constitutional concern. We need not, however, face the constitutional question of foreclosing a taxpayer challenge to chapter 350 and the legality of its implementation because the ability to bring that challenge at some later time resides in other taxpayers.
The opportunity for other taxpayers to challenge the implementation of chapter 350 is necessary because the constitution must stand between the citizens and the legislature to restrain acts in excess of legislative authority. Citizens must be, and are entitled to be, protected by our courts. Our democracy rests upon the separation of powers, which depends upon the independence of the courts for its vitality, and is nothing less than the source of our nation’s strength and protection of our citizens. Taxpayers must be protected:
In determining whether an act of the state constitutes a performance of a governmental function or a public purpose which will justify the expenditure of public money, a legislative declaration of public purpose is not always controlling. The determination of what is and what is not a public purpose, or the performance of a governmental function, initially is for the legislature, but in the final analysis it must rest with the courts.
R.E. Short Co. v. City of Minneapolis, 269 N.W.2d 331, 337 (Minn.1978) (emphasis added) (citing Visina v. Freeman, 252 Minn. 177, 184, 89 N.W.2d 635, 643). We must not create a class of cases in which the constitutionality of statutes and the actions taken under them are not subject to judicial review. Such a result would be contrary to everything we have understood about judicial review and our tripartite system of government since Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803).
We are guided by article I, section 8, of our constitution, which reads:
Every person is entitled to a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries or wrongs which he may receive to his person, property or character, and to obtain justice freely and without purchase, completely and without denial, promptly and without delay, conformable to the laws.
We thus conclude that a subsequent taxpayer suit brought by another taxpayer would not be barred by the dismissal of this action.
4. Did the trial court, under the facts of this case, abuse its discretion in ordering appellants to post a bond as a condition of continuing their suit?
If it is possible to minimize potential damage to the public, the trial court should exercise discretion to deny any motion to require a surety bond under Minn.Stat. § 562.02. Here, however, the potential of damage to the public interest from this action cannot be avoided.
[305]*305Thus, the conclusion above that other taxpayers may assert the rights now asserted by appellants is decisive in evaluating the decision of the trial court to impose on the plaintiffs in this action the obligation of bonding. If appellants fail at this time to get a decision on their challenge to chapter 350, little damage is done to concerned taxpayers. Taxpayer interests are subject to later vindication, if meritorious, by giving other taxpayers their day in court. In contrast, there is great potential harm if appellants’ claims are without merit and if their action serves as a de facto injunction. Thus, requiring a high, preclu-sive bond, that in other circumstances would be an abuse of discretion, is here reasonable. We therefore hold that, because of the right of taxpayers to bring a later action, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by requiring a bond in this case.
We now consider other factors relevant to the trial court’s exercise of discretion.
As noted, the practical injunctive effect of appellants’ suit gave rise to the application of Minn.Stat. § 562.02. However, the trial court also criticized appellants for “waiting” until nearly one year after adoption of chapter 350 to challenge its facial validity, indicating that the claims should have been brought earlier. In this eourt, appellants argue that their claims were not justiciable until the final contracts were signed, and they allege that the trial court erred in finding that the suit could have been brought earlier. Appellants’ argument is credible.
Even if appellants’ claims were justicia-ble before the action was brought, there is no requirement for citizens to decide they are offended by a government project, and to sue, until that project is complete in its shape and size. There is certainly no bar of laches in this case, although that is what the concurrence attempts to construct.4 Any implication of laches assumes that the sole basis for the suit was an attack on the facial validity of chapter 350 which could have been brought the day after enactment. In fact, the suit also challenges the findings and contracts which did not exist until shortly before the suit was brought. In the total context of the situation, it may be appropriate to impose an obligation of bond on litigants who do not bring suit at the earliest opportunity, but absent laches, they need not be held to have forfeited their access to judicial relief.
If a litigant sues as soon as the issues are justiciable, the suit may not cause substantial delay of the public project, and no bond should be required. Thus, Minn.Stat. § 562.02 may have “the salutary effect” of encouraging litigants to sue “before any substantial damage will result from a delay in the prosecution of the project.” Gram, 259 Minn, at 154, 106 N.W.2d at 559; see also Adelman v. Onischuk, 271 Minn. 216, 231, 135 N.W.2d 670, 680 (1965) (person who believes that his constitutional rights are affected by statute must “raise the objection at the earliest available opportunity and exhaust the remedies which may have been provided * * * before he will be permitted to make an attack on the constitutionality of the statute”), cert, denied, 382 U.S. 108, 86 S.Ct. 257, 15 L.Ed.2d 192 (1965). However, assuming (without so holding) that appellants brought suit as soon as the issues were justiciablé, there was ample evidence in the record that their suit was causing damages and a delay in the issuance of the bonds. Gram, 259 Minn, at 154, 106 N.W.2d at 559. Accordingly, Minn.Stat. § 562.02 applied.
Appellants argue that most of the claimed damages from delay could have been avoided if their proposed schedule for expedited discovery and a trial on the merits had been adopted. See Minnesota Vikings Football Club, Inc. v. Metropolitan Council, 289 N.W.2d 426, 429 (Minn.1979) (trial court denied motion to require surety bond under Minn.Stat. § 562.02, “presumably taking into consideration the parties’ agreement to expedite the action and appeal, if any”). We agree that accelerating review on the merits could minimize the [306]*306delay and attendant potential damages in some cases, while affording an opportunity for judicial review.
We are skeptical that the myriad constitutional and factually complex claims presented in appellants’ 15-page complaint could have been prepared and tried in one month, as appellants proposed. However, not even the appellants suggested that discovery, trial, and a decision on the merits could have been obtained before April 14, 1992, when the suit would have delayed the issuance of bonds. The expedited schedule proposed by the appellants, without a bond, would not have avoided the “substantial damage” which is the focus of Minn.Stat. § 562.02. Gram, 259 Minn, at 154, 106 N.W.2d at 559.
The supreme court has sometimes emphasized the “vexatious” nature of a suit when affirming the requirement of security under Minn.Stat. § 562.02. See, e.g., TKO, 386 N.W.2d at 532. Presumably, a suit may be characterized as vexatious if it lacks colorable merit.
Despite the noted similarities between a motion under Minn.Stat. § 562.02 and a motion for temporary injunctive relief, Minn.Stat. § 562.02 does not require the trial court to make findings on the likelihood that plaintiffs will prevail on the merits. A plaintiffs inability to establish, pri- or to discovery, that he or she is certain to prevail on the merits does not require a finding that a suit is vexatious within the meaning of the statute. We note for the record that we do not share the trial court’s confidence that appellants’ suit lacks merit. Appellants have raised several important and complex issues of first impression in Minnesota, inter alia.5 While it is premature to gauge their chances of success, we cannot agree with respondents’ characterization that the complaint is clearly without merit.6
Even if a suit has merit and a litigant is not “irresponsible” in bringing an action, a suit may be characterized as vexatious if it is duplicative of earlier review proceedings. In TKO, the supreme court concluded that plaintiff’s suit in district court was vexatious and needlessly duplicative because it raised the same issues which had been explored “throughout” 70 days of public hearings in which the plaintiff was “intimately and steadfastly involved,” and the court agreed that the policy objectives of Minn.Stat. § 562.02 were served by requiring a substantial bond. Id. at 531-32. In this case, there was no prior proceeding in which appellants could have raised their constitutional claims.
On the record below, the trial court expressed its opinion that the issues raised by appellants’ suit had “been well ventilated in the public forums of the state.” However, reliance upon the extensive legislative scrutiny which preceded adoption of chapter 350 overlooks the essential distinctions in the functions of the courts and the legislature. The legislature is the proper forum for political debate and the formulation of [307]*307public policy, while the courts are charged with responsibility for interpreting the laws and deciding constitutional challenges. See R.E. Short Co., 269 N.W.2d at 337-38 (court defers to legislature on policy issues).
While appellants’ motives may be rooted in objections to the public policy underlying chapter 350, their complaint is framed in terms of constitutional claims. Jurisdiction to review a constitutional claim is vested in the courts. Judicial review is limited and will not duplicate the policy debates which have occurred in the legislature. See Visina, 252 Minn, at 184, 89 N.W.2d at 643. Review is not foreclosed, however, merely because the legislature engaged in debate before adopting a statute which is allegedly unconstitutional. We do not find that a suit is “vexatious” or needlessly duplicative merely because it challenges a statute on which public hearings were held. TKO should not be read so broadly. Therefore, we do not uphold the bond here on the basis of vexatiousness or duplicativeness.
We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in requiring appellants to post security because their suit, brought on the eve of the bond issue, resulted in a de facto injunction which posed a risk of damages to the public and governmental entities involved.
In this case, the trial court’s determination that appellants’ suit would delay the issuance of bonds and construction of public improvements has assumed primary importance on appeal, and we affirm on that ground. There are no counterbalancing risks to the appellants in this circumstance because their concerns as taxpayers can be vindicated, if valid, in a suit challenging the legality and enforceability of the bonds brought after they are issued.
5. The amount of the bond and deadline for posting.
Finally, appellants challenge the amount of the bond and the time allowed by the trial court to obtain the bond. However, they failed to submit evidence that they could post a bond in a lesser amount or if afforded more time.7 The trial court must allow “a reasonable time” for the bond to be filed. Minn.Stat. § 562.02. Here, the deadline for posting was the anticipated date of the first bond issue. Under our previous reasoning, we find the trial court acted reasonably.
The court must consider the unrecoverable loss or damage which may be caused to the public body or taxpayers by the delay necessary to determine the merits. Specific record evidence and findings on the impact of delay upon the public improvement is essential. Anderson v. Pearson, 400 N.W.2d 210, 213 (Minn.App.1987); see also Ashenbrenner v. City of E. Grand Forks, 257 Minn. 368, 371-72, 102 N.W.2d 28, 30 (1960) (potential loss of specific federal funding for project formed basis of bond requirement). A litigant is not responsible for speculative damages alleged to result from delay. Village of Elbow Lake, 281 Minn, at 46, 160 N.W.2d at 574. The court took evidence on the damages claimed by respondents, and appellants failed to submit counter affidavits or expert opinion challenging the estimates contained in respondents’ affidavits. On appeal, appellants have not identified any specific error in the court’s finding that the costs of delay would “exceed $30 million.”
As we have previously noted, Minn.Stat. § 562.02, while extremely severe in its application, has been declared constitutional by our supreme court and we cannot ignore the legislative enactment which is clear and free from all ambiguity. We do, however, suggest that the legislature revisit and reexamine the intent and consequences of the statute as written.8
[308]*308If we are in error as to the right to a subsequent taxpayer challenge, we err in our decision. Belief in that right is decisive to our holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in requiring a bond. That being so, our ruling on that question is not dicta.
We recognize the importance of retaining major employers in Minnesota. The legislature has a crucial role in the process of preserving a strong state economy. However, review does not end with the legislature. This case involves nearly $800 million of Minnesota taxpayers’ cash and credit. The jobs and paychecks of thousands of citizens will be affected, directly or secondarily. As an intermediate court, we realize that the supreme court may extend further review to this matter and provide further guidance on the legal principles applied here, but we cannot avoid our responsibility to identify fully the issues presented and to encourage reasoned discussion on a case of this magnitude.
We heed the clear enunciation by our supreme court in Davis v. Pierse, 7 Minn. 13, 16, 7 Gil. 1, 4 (1862):
If the state of governmental affairs were always peaceful and quiet, and legislation never attended with undue excitement, many of the restrictions imposed by constitutional governments upon legislative power might be dispensed with as unnecessary; but it is precisely because emergencies will arise, which, for the time, seem to demand or justify a resort to radical and extreme measures, that these various inhibitions are declared in the fundamental law; and, as extraordinary acts of legislation are seldom resorted to, except when the public exigencies seem to demand them, it may truly be said that these provisions are inserted in constitutions for the very purpose of meeting this plea of necessity. Hence the greater the seeming necessity, or popular demand for such legislation, the greater the danger to be apprehended from yielding to it, and the more imperative the obligation on the part of the courts to square it rigorously by the constitution; as no act in conflict with that instrument can ever become a law, however just abstractly considered, its provisions may be; or however great and immediate the apparent necessity for such an enactment.
(Emphasis added.)
DECISION
The trial court correctly held that Minn. Stat. § 562.02 applies to appellants’ suit and did not abuse its discretion in ordering that appellants post a bond in the amount of $30 million and failing that, dismissing the suit with prejudice.
The dismissal with prejudice of this suit does not bar a similar suit by another taxpayer, since the claims have not been adjudicated on the merits..
Affirmed.