CHIEF JUSTICE McMORROW
delivered the opinion of the court:
Section 8(b) of the Court of Claims Act provides that the Court of Claims shall have exclusive jurisdiction over “[a]ll claims against the State founded upon any contract entered into with the State of Illinois.” 705 ILCS 505/ 8(b) (West 2000). At issue in this case is whether plaintiffs’ claim for breach of contract, which was brought against the Treasurer of the State of Illinois, constitutes an action “against the State” so as to come within this provision. The appellate court concluded that it did not. No. 5 — 00—0206 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). For the reasons that follow, we reverse.
BACKGROUND
In 1982, the State of Illinois established the Illinois Insured Mortgage Pilot Program (Mortgage Program) in an effort to stimulate economic development within the state. Although the workings of the Mortgage Program are somewhat complicated, it may be said, in general, that the program was implemented through the creation of a trust, funded with state money, from which loans were made to various commercial enterprises that had difficulty obtaining conventional financing.1
The details of the Mortgage Program, including the terms governing the creation of the trust and the manner in which loans were to be made by the trustee, were embodied in a purchase agreement, a trust indenture and a servicing agreement (collectively, the Trust Agreement). The Trust Agreement was executed on July 14, 1982, by the State of Illinois, acting through Treasurer Jerome Cosen tino, with the concurrence of Governor James Thompson, and American National Bank and Trust Company of Chicago, both individually and as trustee. Under the terms of the Trust Agreement, the state is the sole owner of the trust estate and, through the Treasurer, directs the trust’s activities.
In November 1982, in connection with the Mortgage Program, a first mortgage loan in the amount of $13.4 million was made to an Illinois limited partnership known as the Collinsville Hotel Venture. The funds from the loan were used by the partnership to finance a hotel in Collinsville, Illinois, which is now known as the Collinsville Holiday Inn. In December 1983, a first mortgage loan was made to another limited partnership, known as the President Lincoln Hotel Venture, in the amount of $15.5 million. The funds from this loan were used to finance the construction of a hotel in Springfield, Illinois, which is now known as the Springfield Renaissance Hotel.
Throughout the 1980s, both hotel ventures had difficulties meeting their obligations under the Mortgage Program loans. As a result, both loans were restructured on at least two occasions. In 1992, a dispute arose between the hotel ventures and then-Treasurer Patrick Quinn regarding a term of the restructured loan agreements which required each hotel venture to provide the Mortgage Program trustee with a yearly “reliance letter.” The trustee and Treasurer threatened to declare the loans in default because they believed that the reliance letters they had received were inadequate. In response, the hotel ventures filed suit against the Treasurer and trustee to enjoin the declaration of default.
The circuit court of Cook County dismissed the hotel ventures’ action based on the doctrine of sovereign immunity. In October 1994, the appellate court affirmed. See President Lincoln Hotel Venture v. Bank One, 271 Ill. App. 3d 1048 (1994). The hotel ventures’ request for rehearing in the appellate court was denied on May 5, 1995. Thereafter, the hotel ventures filed a petition for leave to appeal in this court, which remained pending until October 1995.
In November 1994, defendant Judy Baar Topinka was elected Treasurer of the State of Illinois. After assuming office, Treasurer Topinka installed defendant Pullman Bank and Trust Company (Pullman Bank) as trustee of the Mortgage Program trust.
Beginning in December 1994, and continuing through the first part of 1995, the hotel ventures engaged in discussions with Treasurer Topinka about the possibility of purchasing the hotel venture loans from the state. The terms of sale which were discussed included the settlement of the reliance letter litigation, which was still ongoing at that time. As a result of these discussions, the plaintiffs in this case, which are two entities described in the record as having a “business relationship” with the hotel ventures, agreed to purchase the hotel venture loans. Plaintiff PHL, Inc., agreed to buy the first mortgage loan relating to the Collinsville Holiday Inn for $6.3 million, while plaintiff The President Lincoln Hotel Corporation agreed to pay $3.7 million to acquire the first mortgage loan relating to the Springfield Renaissance Hotel.
On April 19, 1995, plaintiffs entered into separate buy-sell agreements with Pullman Bank, as trustee of the Mortgage Program trust, to purchase the hotel venture loans. The agreements were identical, except for the name of the buyer and the purchase price. Joinders to the agreements were signed by the hotel ventures and Treasurer Topinka. Both buy-sell agreements expressly stated that they were being entered into, in part, to settle the reliance letter litigation and both agreements contained provisions in which the state agreed not to pursue any claims against the hotel ventures in relation to the loans. Closing on the buy-sell agreements was set for June 1995.
After the Treasurer and trustee signed the buy-sell agreements, Attorney General Jim Ryan publicly stated that he would review the terms of the agreements. In July 1995, the Attorney General announced that he would not approve the buy-sell agreements.
The Attorney General’s decision to withhold approval of the agreements rested on two grounds, the first of which was financial. In a report prepared by a group of University of Illinois professors, the combined value of the two hotel venture loans was estimated at approximately $18 million to $19 million. Thus, because the state was to receive a total of only $10 million under the buy-sell agreements, the Attorney General concluded that the consideration the state was to receive for the hotel venture loans and the settlement of the reliance letter litigation was inadequate.
The second reason the Attorney General gave for withholding approval of the buy-sell agreements was found in an opinion letter issued by the Attorney General on July 10, 1995. See 1995 Ill. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 95— 003. In this opinion, the Attorney General observed that the Trust Agreement, as it then existed, did not authorize the Mortgage Program trustee to settle mortgage loans for an amount less than their full value. The buy-sell agreements, however, did so. Therefore, the Attorney General concluded, unless the Trust Agreement was amended, at the direction of the state, the trustee would have no authority to surrender or execute the documents necessary to close on the buy-sell agreements.
The Attorney General’s opinion further observed that the Trust Agreement did not specify who may execute the consent to amend the Trust Agreement on behalf of the state, nor the form the consent should take. The Attorney General noted, however, that the Governor’s involvement was “indispensable to the creation and ongoing operation” (1995 Ill. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 95 — 003, at 7) of the Mortgage Program and, further, “that in 1992, when a similar outstanding loan was settled, the Governor’s signature was affixed to the direction authorizing the Trustee to execute the instruments necessary to accept the settlement.” 1995 Ill. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 95— 003, at 7-8. Moreover, according to the Attorney General, the Trust Agreement itself provides “that the parties to the Agreement include the Trustee and the State of Illinois, which is described as ‘acting by and through its Treasurer ***, with the consent of its Governor ***.’ ” 1995 Ill. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 95 — 003, at 8. From this, the Attorney General concluded that
“it was clearly contemplated by the parties that the representatives of the State, for purposes of acting under the Trust Agreement, are the Treasurer and the Governor, and that the concurrence of both the Governor and the Treasurer is necessary to validate actions taken on hehalf of the State thereunder. Consequently, it is my opinion that both the Governor and the Treasurer must authorize the amendment of the Trust Agreement and give their consent to the proposed transaction in order to effectuate it.” 1995 Ill. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 95 — 003, at 9.
Because the Governor had not authorized any amendment of the Trust Agreement or consented to the buy-sell agreements, the Attorney General concluded that the agreements were invalid.
After the Attorney General made his views on the buy-sell agreements known, Treasurer Topinka publicly indicated that she disagreed with the Attorney General’s financial assessment of the agreements. The Treasurer stated that, in her view, the buy-sell agreements represented the best financial deal that could be made by the state with respect to the hotel venture loans. Nevertheless, based on the legal opinion of the Attorney General, and because the Governor had not consented to the buy-sell agreements, the Treasurer declined to close on the agreements.
In October 1995, the hotel ventures, the Treasurer, Pullman Bank as the Mortgage Program trustee, and the Attorney General executed an agreement settling the reliance letter litigation. Plaintiffs in the case at bar were not parties to this settlement, which did not reference the buy-sell agreement or any sale of the hotel venture loans. The same day that the settlement agreement was reached, the hotel ventures withdrew their petition for leave to appeal in the reliance letter litigation which was pending before this court. See President Lincoln Hotel Venture v. Pullman Bank & Trust Co., 163 Ill. 2d 586 (1995) (petition for leave to appeal withdrawn).
Approximately two months after the settlement of the reliance letter litigation, on December 29, 1995, plaintiffs filed the present action in the circuit court of Madison County against the Treasurer and Pullman Bank. In their complaint, plaintiffs alleged that the Treasurer possessed the “unqualified constitutional authority” to approve the sale of the hotel venture loans without the concurrence of the Governor. Plaintiffs further alleged that, by adhering to the Attorney General’s legal opinion and failing to close on the buy-sell agreements, the Treasurer was “acting in derogation of her constitutional duties and in abuse of her discretion and authority.” Plaintiffs requested the circuit court to “[o]rder the Treasurer to perform her constitutional duties” and to enforce the provisions of the buy-sell agreements calling for the state to sell the hotel venture loans.
The litigation which followed the filing of plaintiffs’ suit was lengthy and involved. It is recounted here only as necessary to address the issues presented in this appeal.
After plaintiffs filed their complaint, both the Treasurer and Pullman Bank filed motions to dismiss, in which they argued that plaintiffs’ cause of action was barred by sovereign immunity. Defendants maintained that, although plaintiffs’ suit for breach of contract was brought against the Treasurer in her individual capacity, the state was in fact the real party in interest because a judgment in favor of plaintiffs would require the state to divest itself of the hotel ventures loans. In addition, because Pullman Bank was merely the agent of the state and could only act at the direction of the Treasurer with respect to the trust estate, defendants maintained that any action against Pullman Bank was also against the state. Defendants further noted that, under section 8(b) of the Court of Claims Act (705 ILCS 505/8(b) (West 2000)), the Court of Claims has exclusive jurisdiction over claims brought against the state for breach of contract. Thus, defendants argued that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to hear plaintiffs’ complaint and that the suit properly belonged in the Court of Claims. The circuit court denied defendants’ motions to dismiss.
Thereafter, the Treasurer filed a motion for summary judgment in which she argued that the buy-sell agreements were unenforceable as a matter of law both because the Governor had not consented to them and because they lacked the Attorney General’s approval. This latter argument was based on the fact that the buy-sell agreements were not simply contracts, but also settlement agreements which conclusively resolved the then-pending reliance letter litigation. Citing to Gust K. Newberg, Inc. v. Illinois State Toll Highway Authority, 98 Ill. 2d 58 (1983), the Treasurer maintained that it is the prerogative of the Attorney General to settle pending litigation in which the state is involved. Thus, according to the Treasurer, because the Attorney General had not consented to the settlement portions of the buy-sell agreements, the settlement was invalid. And, the Treasurer argued, because the settlement of the reliance litigation was a material covenant to the buy-sell agreements, the agreements themselves never became valid contracts and were therefore unenforceable. Pullman Bank also filed a motion for summary judgment which raised similar arguments.
In response to defendants’ motions, plaintiffs filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, in which they argued that the Treasurer had the exclusive authority to close on the buy-sell agreements and that the Attorney General’s approval of the buy-sell agreements was unnecessary. Plaintiffs did not dispute defendants’ contention that, in general, it is the prerogative of the Attorney General to settle state litigation. However, plaintiffs argued that, in this case, the settlement of the reliance letter litigation in October 1995, although separate from the buy-sell agreements, nevertheless rendered the settlement portions of the buy-sell agreements irrelevant. Accordingly, because the settlement portions of the buy-sell agreements were no longer at issue, plaintiffs maintained that the Attorney General’s approval was not needed and that the court could order specific performance of the buy-sell agreements.
After hearing argument, the circuit court denied defendants’ motions for summary judgment and granted plaintiffs’ cross-motion. In so ruling, the circuit court held that consent of neither the Governor nor the Attorney General was necessary to render the buy-sell agreements enforceable. In a subsequent order, the court held that plaintiffs had been ready, willing and able to fulfill their obligations under the buy-sell agreements in June 1995. Finally, on March 13, 2000, the circuit court entered judgment in favor of plaintiffs. The court ordered the Treasurer and Pullman Bank, as trustee of the Mortgage Program trust, to specifically perform the buy-sell agreements. Defendants appealed.
In a divided opinion, the appellate court affirmed. No. 5 — 00—0206 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). The appellate court rejected defendants’ contention that plaintiff’s suit was barred by sovereign immunity. In so holding, the appellate court observed that an exception to the doctrine of sovereign immunity applies when the state officer who is the subject of the complaint acts in excess of his or her authority. The appellate court reasoned that this exception was applicable in the case at bar because the Treasurer had “back[ed] out of an obligation based on an opinion of the Attorney General” and, in so doing, had improperly “relegat[ed]” her constitutional authority as Treasurer to the Attorney General.
Both defendants filed separate petitions for leave to appeal in this court. The petitions were allowed and defendants’ appeals were consolidated.
ANALYSIS
The Illinois Constitution of 1970 abolished the doctrine of sovereign immunity “[ejxcept as the General Assembly may provide by law.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. XIII, § 4. Pursuant to its constitutional authority, the General Assembly reestablished sovereign immunity in the State Lawsuit Immunity Act. 745 ILCS 5/0.01 et seq. (West 1998); City of Springfield v. Allphin, 74 Ill. 2d 117, 123 (1978). Section 1 of that enactment states that “[e]xcept as provided in [an act] to create the Court of Claims *** the State of Illinois shall not be made a defendant or party in any court.” 745 ILCS 5/1 (West 1998). The Court of Claims Act, in turn, provides that the Court of Claims shall have exclusive jurisdiction over “[a] 11 claims against the State founded upon any contract entered into with the State of Illinois.” 705 ILCS 505/8(b) (West 2000).
As they did in the courts below, defendants maintain that plaintiffs’ complaint is barred from the circuit court by section 8(b) of the Court of Claims Act. Defendants contend that plaintiffs’ complaint is one for breach of contract; that Pullman Bank may act only at the direction of the Treasurer and, therefore, the Treasurer’s actions are the relevant focus of inquiry in this case; that the complaint against the Treasurer is, in fact, against the state because a judgment in plaintiffs’ favor would “operate to control the actions of the State” (emphasis omitted) (Currie v. Lao, 148 Ill. 2d 151, 158 (1992)) by forcing the state to sell the hotel venture loans; and, therefore, that plaintiffs’ complaint must be heard in the Court of Claims.
Plaintiffs, in response, do not dispute that their complaint alleges a breach of contract, that the Treasurer’s actions should be the focus of this appeal, or that an adjudication in their favor would cause the state to sell the hotel venture loans. Nevertheless, plaintiffs contend that section 8(b) is not controlling in the case at bar because an exception to the doctrine of sovereign immunity, often referred to as the “officer suit” exception, is applicable here.
In Illinois, the leading historical expression of the officer suit exception is found in Schwing v. Miles, 367 Ill. 436 (1937):
“where the action at law or suit in equity is maintained against a State officer or the director of a department on the ground that, while claiming to act for the State, he violates or invades the personal and property rights of the plaintiff under an unconstitutional act, or under an assumption of authority which he does not have, such suit is not against the State. (Noorman v. Department of Public Works and Buildings, supra; Fitts v. McGhee, 172 U.S. 516; United States v. Lee, 106 id. 196; White Eagle Oil and Refining Co. v. Gunderson, 205 N.W. (S. Dak.) 614; 43 A.L.R. 397.) The presumption obtains that the State, or a department thereof, will not, and does not, violate the constitution and laws of the State, but that such violation, if it occurs, is by a State officer or the head of a department of the State, and such officer or head may be restrained by proper action instituted by a citizen.” Schwing, 367 Ill. at 441-42.
Stated otherwise, it is said that when an action of a state officer is undertaken without legal authority, such an action “strips a State officer of his official status *** [and] his conduct is not then regarded as the conduct of the State, nor is the action against him considered an action against the State.” Moline Tool Co. v. Department of Revenue, 410 Ill. 35, 37 (1951).
The officer suit exception has a long and complex history, with its origination in the federal courts. See Schwing, 367 Ill. at 441, citing Fitts v. McGhee, 172 U.S. 516, 43 L. Ed. 535, 19 S. Ct. 269 (1899); United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 27 L. Ed. 171, 1 S. Ct. 240 (1882); see also Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 52 L. Ed. 714, 28 S. Ct. 441 (1908). In Illinois, the officer suit exception has been described as a means of protecting the rights of plaintiffs:
“[W]here the defendant officer act[s] in excess of his statutory authority, the rights of the plaintiffs to be free from the consequences of his action outweigh the interest of the State which is served by the sovereign immunity doctrine.” Senn Park Nursing Center v. Miller, 104 Ill. 2d 169, 188 (1984).
See also Moline Tool Co., 410 Ill. at 37 (not all suits against state officers are barred because “[s]uch a holding would have blunted the effectiveness of many constitutional guaranties by preventing their judicial enforcement”).
In Smith v. Jones, 113 Ill. 2d 126 (1986), this court held that the officer suit exception may be raised, as a general matter, in breach of contract cases which would otherwise fall under section 8(b) of the Court of Claims Act. Smith, 113 Ill. 2d at 131-32. However, this court also held that the exception does not apply when the action which the plaintiff alleges was taken in excess of authority is simply a breach of contract and nothing more. Smith, 113 Ill. 2d at 132-33 (“The plaintiffs!’] complaint, thus, alleges only that the Director exceeded his authority by breaching a contract. Such an allegation does not deprive the defendants of the protection of the bar of sovereign immunity”). In the case at bar, defendants cite to Smith and contend that plaintiffs’ cause of action is merely a breach of contract case and, therefore, that the officer suit exception is inapplicable.
Plaintiffs, however, maintain that the present case is unlike Smith. According to plaintiffs, in this case, the Treasurer did not simply breach a contract, she also acted in excess of her legal authority, specifically, the authority given her under article V, section 18, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970. That provision states:
“The Treasurer, in accordance with law, shall be responsible for the safekeeping and investment of monies and securities deposited with him, and for their disbursement upon order of the Comptroller.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. y §18.
Plaintiffs allege in their complaint that the Treasurer acted “in derogation of her constitutional duties” under article V, section 18, by “adhering to the Attorney General’s financial analysis and legal opinion.” Thus, plaintiffs contend, the officer suit exception applies and their complaint properly belongs in the circuit court.
Initially, we note that the Treasurer did not, in fact, adhere to the Attorney General’s financial analysis of the buy-sell agreements. Indeed, there has never been any question in this case that, after the Attorney General announced the findings from the report prepared by the University of Illinois professors, the Treasurer publicly stated that, in her view, the buy-sell agreements were the best financial deal that could be made for the state with respect to the hotel venture loans. The circuit court, in its order on the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment, stated as an “undisputed fact” that “[t]he parties never closed on the Buy-Sell Agreements or the related Settlement Agreements because, on advice of the Attorney General, the Treasurer refused to do so.” On appeal, the appellate court agreed, stating that “[ajfter entering into the Agreements, the Treasurer declined to act, based upon the advice contained in an opinion letter.” No. 5 — 00—0206 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). The lower courts’ statements of the facts are not contested by the parties on appeal. Thus, with respect to whether the Treasurer acted “in derogation of her constitutional duties,” the question we must decide is whether the Treasurer’s decision to “adher[e] to the Attorney General’s *** legal opinion” violated article V, section 18, of the Illinois Constitution. The answer to this question is no.
Article V, section 18, is a general grant of authority. Nothing in that provision forbids the Treasurer from receiving or following the advice of the Attorney General on a legal matter relating to the proper interpretation of trust documents. Accordingly, the fact that the Treasurer, in this case, chose to adopt the Attorney General’s legal opinion interpreting the Trust Agreement as her own does not mean that she acted outside the authority given to her under the constitution.2
Plaintiffs nevertheless express concern that a holding in this case that the Treasurer did not violate the constitution would mean that the Attorney General would have “veto authority over the Treasurer’s right to enter into contracts to sell state investments.” We disagree. As noted, in July 1995, the Attorney General issued an opinion letter in which he reasoned that the buy-sell agreements were invalid because, in order for those agreements to take effect, an amendment to the Trust Agreement was required and such an amendment could not be made, under the terms of the Trust Agreement itself, without the consent of the Governor. From the Treasurer’s perspective, the Attorney General’s opinion was persuasive authority but it was not legally binding. See President Lincoln Hotel Venture, 271 Ill. App. 3d at 1056; Bonaguro v. County Officers Electoral Board, 158 Ill. 2d 391, 399 (1994). The opinion did not, in a legal sense, stop or block the Treasurer from taking any action she wished with respect to the buy-sell agreements. The Treasurer, of her own volition, decided to follow the legal advice of the Attorney General and forgo closing on the buy-sell agreements. Nothing in our decision in this case forces the Treasurer to adopt the advice of the Attorney General or gives the Attorney General the authority to unilaterally invalidate contracts entered into by the Treasurer. Our holding is simply that when, as in this case, the Treasurer chooses to follow the legal advice of the Attorney General regarding the proper interpretation of trust documents, the Treasurer does not violate article V, section 18.3
In addition, we note that were we to hold that the officer suit exception applies in this case, it would follow that every time the Treasurer decided to adopt any legal advice she would risk violating the constitution. Indeed, counsel for plaintiffs essentially conceded this point during oral argument before this court. Explaining why plaintiffs believe the Treasurer acted improperly in this case, counsel stated that “the Treasurer had a responsibility not to allow the Attorney General to dissuade her from her contract.” But this assertion is unreasonable. The Treasurer should not be placed in the position of having to refuse to hear legal advice in order to avoid violating the constitution. Important decisions affecting the finances of this state should not have to be made in a legal vacuum.
The appellate court below, in discussing whether the Treasurer had exceeded her constitutional authority, concluded that the Treasurer’s argument that the buy-sell agreements were ineffective without the Governor’s consent was incorrect, as was her contention that the Attorney General’s approval was necessary because the buy-sell agreements settled the reliance letter litigation. Based on these conclusions, the appellate court determined that the Treasurer had exceeded her constitutional authority because, as the appellate court stated, she had no authority not to execute the buy-sell agreements. Again, we disagree.
It is well settled that a state officer’s erroneous exercise of a broad grant of delegated authority does not constitute an ultra vires act. As the United States Supreme Court has stated:
“[W]here the officer’s powers are limited by statute, his actions beyond those limitations are considered individual and not sovereign actions. The officer is not doing the business which the sovereign has empowered him to do or he is doing it in a way which the sovereign has forbidden. His actions are ulta vires his authority and therefore may be made the object of specific relief. It is important to note that in such cases the relief can be granted, without impleading the sovereign, only because of the officer’s lack of delegated power. A claim of error in the exercise of that power is therefore not sufficient.” (Emphasis added.) Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 689-90, 93 L. Ed. 1628, 1636, 69 S. Ct. 1457, 1461 (1949). In the case at bar, we express no opinion on whether
the Governor’s consent was, in fact, required to effectuate the buy-sell agreements or whether the Attorney General’s approval of the agreements was needed because the agreements settled litigation in which the state was involved. We note, however, that even accepting the appellate court’s holdings on these issues as correct, the most that can be said with respect to the Treasurer’s actions is that (1) she misread the terms of the Trust Agreement as requiring the Governor’s consent for an amendment to that agreement when such consent was not, in fact, required and (2) she incorrectly believed that the settlement provisions contained in the buy-sell agreements were material covenants to those agreements when, in fact, the provisions were rendered irrelevant by the settlement of the reliance letter litigation in October 1995. These are errors of contract and trust interpretation. They are not actions forbidden under article V, section 18, and, hence, they are not ultra vires acts.
The parties also contest whether plaintiffs’ cause of action is one which seeks prospective relief within the meaning of this court’s decision in Bio-Medical Laboratories, Inc. v. Trainor, 68 Ill. 2d 540 (1977). As this court has noted, Bio-Medical Laboratories “stands for the proposition that if a plaintiff is not attempting to enforce a present claim against the State, but rather seeks to enjoin a State officer from taking future actions in excess of his delegated authority, then the immunity prohibition does not pertain.” Ellis v. Board of Governors of State Colleges & Universities, 102 Ill. 2d 387, 395 (1984); see also Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 39 L. Ed. 2d 662, 94 S. Ct. 1347 (1974) (drawing a distinction between prospective and retrospective relief in the context of sovereign immunity). Plaintiffs contend that their cause of action is not a present claim because they seek only to compel the Treasurer to take future action, i.e., to close on the buy-sell agreements. Defendants, however, maintain that because plaintiffs’ action is one for breach of contract, it necessarily seeks to enforce current or existing agreements. Thus, according to defendants, plaintiffs’ cause of action cannot be viewed as simply seeking prospective relief.
The rule stated in Bio-Medical Laboratories is that sovereign immunity will not bar a cause of action in the circuit court where the plaintiff seeks to bar “a State officer from taking future actions in excess of his delegated authority” (Emphasis added.) Ellis, 102 Ill. 2d at 395. Because we have determined that, in this case, the Treasurer did not take any action in excess of her delegated, constitutional authority, we need not consider whether plaintiffs’ cause of action is a present claim or one which seeks prospective relief.
Finally, the dissent states that it is troubled by this court’s approach to the question of “whether the Court of Claims can provide the remedy of specific performance.” 216 Ill. 2d at 282 (Freeman, J., dissenting). The dissent states that “[i]t would appear from the conclusion reached by this court that the implicit answer to that question is yes.” 216 Ill. 2d at 282 (Freeman, J., dissenting). This statement is incorrect. Nowhere in this opinion has this court made any determination, either explicit or implicit, as to whether the remedy of specific performance is available in the Court of Claims. Our decision in this case is limited solely to the question of whether the circuit court had jurisdiction to consider plaintiffs’ complaint and, specifically, whether the officer suit exception is applicable in this case. The parties have not briefed the issue of whether the remedy of specific performance is available in the Court of Claims, and it is not necessary to decide that issue in order to resolve this case.
CONCLUSION
The officer suit exception to the doctrine of sovereign immunity is inapplicable under the facts of this case. Thus, section 8(b) of the Court of Claims Act is controlling, and the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to hear plaintiffs’ complaint. Accordingly, the judgments of the circuit and appellate courts are reversed. The cause is remanded to the circuit court with directions to dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint.
Nos. 96250, 96294 — Appellate court judgment reversed;
circuit court judgment reversed; cause remanded with directions.
JUSTICES GARMAN and KARMEIER took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.