Sauro v. Leman

2024 IL App (4th) 220438-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: January 4, 2024
• Docket: 4-22-0438
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE 2024 IL App (4th) 220438-U This Order was filed under FILED Supreme Court Rule 23 and is January 4, 2024 NO. 4-22-0438 Carla Bender not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed 4th District Appellate under Rule 23(e)(1). IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

SERAFINO SAURO, ) Appeal from the Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Circuit Court of v. ) Peoria County JEFFREY S. LEMAN, M.D., Individually and on ) No. 21L87 Behalf of THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE ) UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS COLLEGE OF ) MEDICINE and METHODIST MEDICAL CENTER ) Honorable OF ILLINOIS, ) Michael D. Risinger, Defendants-Appellees. ) Judge Presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Doherty and Lannerd concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The trial court did not err in dismissing plaintiff’s claims against defendants under sections 2-615 and 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-615, 2-619 (West 2020)).

¶2 Plaintiff, Serafino Sauro, filed a seven-count complaint against defendants—

Jeffrey S. Leman, M.D.; the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois College of Medicine

(University); and Methodist Medical Center of Illinois (Methodist)—challenging his dismissal

from a medical residency program. (We note that although plaintiff named the “University of

Illinois College of Medicine” as a defendant in the matter, the proper party to be named in a suit

against the University of Illinois is the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois. See 110

ILCS 305/1 (West 2020)). The trial court dismissed all seven counts on defendants’ motions, and

plaintiff appeals. We affirm. ¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 In April 2021, plaintiff filed the complaint at issue on appeal. Against Dr. Leman

and the University, he raised claims for a common law writ of certiorari for review of the

underlying proceedings that resulted in his dismissal from his residency program (count I), breach

of contract (count II), and tortious interference with an existing business relationship (count IV).

Against solely Dr. Leman, he raised claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress (count

VI) and tortious interference with a prospective business relationship (count VII). Finally, against

Methodist, he asserted claims for breach of contract (count III) and retaliatory discharge (count

V). To his complaint, plaintiff attached the following exhibits: (1) a “House Staff Manual”

approved by the University, (2) a “Residency Agreement” entered into between Methodist and

plaintiff in April 2018, and which covered an employment period from July 1, 2018, to June 30,

2019, (3) a July 2020 notice of plaintiff’s dismissal from his residency program, and (4) written

decisions relating to plaintiff’s appeal of his dismissal from the residency program through the

University’s appeals process.

¶5 Plaintiff’s complaint and its exhibits reflect the following factual background. The

University operates a medical school with medical residency programs. Students enrolled in a

University residency program are hired by Methodist to perform medical services as resident

physicians. Requirements of the residency programs are set forth in the University’s House Staff

Manual. Additionally, as part of their employment, residents enter into a Residency Agreement

with Methodist, which sets forth the details of the employment relationship. The University’s

House Staff Manual is also incorporated into the Residency Agreement.

¶6 Relevant to this appeal, the House Staff Manual provides that the University is

responsible for the educational aspects of its residency programs, while Methodist is responsible

-2- for employing residents and providing a learning environment that allows them to participate in

patient care under the supervision of University faculty. The manual states that to see patients, a

resident must have either a temporary certificate or a permanent license. With only a temporary

certificate, “[i]t is illegal to practice medicine outside of the residency/fellowship-training

program.” Additionally, “to continue their employment by [Methodist] and their enrollment in a

residency/fellowship program, [residents] must remain in good standing with both institutions.”

¶7 Each residency program has a University faculty member appointed as a program

director. The program director has “authority and accountability for the overall program, including

compliance with all applicable program requirements.” The House Staff Manual states that a

program director “must have responsibility, authority, and accountability for” matters including

the selection, evaluation, promotion, discipline, and supervision of residents.

¶8 The House Staff Manual identifies “[p]rofessionalism” as a responsibility of

residents. Lapses in professionalism may subject a resident to action by his or her program director.

In particular, residents must comply with a dress code, violations of which “are considered

infractions of professionalism.” Regarding the appropriate standard of dress for residents, the

House Staff Manual states as follows:

“The House Staff uniform is a blue pinstriped laboratory coat with [University] and

Family Medicine or Psychiatry insignias. Clean clothing consistent with

[Methodist’s] Dress Code Policy and a well-kept house staff uniform coat reflect a

concern for one’s patient as well as one’s self.”

(The substance of Methodist’s dress code policy was not set forth in plaintiff’s complaint or his

exhibits.)

¶9 Disciplinary action for the violation of hospital rules and policies includes

-3- educational intervention, probation, suspension, and dismissal from the residency program. The

House Staff Manual defines probation as “a corrective action that notifies the [resident] of specific

deficiencies that must be corrected in a stated period of time.” A resident may be put on probation

by his or her program director. Each probationary period requires a conference between the

resident and the program director, along with a letter to the resident describing the terms of

probation. At the end of a probationary period, a resident may be removed from probation, placed

on another period of probation, informed that he or she will not be offered a Resident Agreement

after the expiration of their current agreement, or entered into the dismissal process.

¶ 10 The House Staff Manual defines a “dismissal” as “the discharge of a [resident] from

the program even though he/she has signed a [Resident] Agreement.” Grounds for dismissal

include, but are not limited to: (1) a resident’s failure to comply with the law, (2) a resident’s

failure “to meet or advance in any of the competencies,” including professionalism, “at a rate

commensurate with [the resident’s] training level,” and (3) egregious behavior.

¶ 11 From 2018 to 2020, plaintiff was enrolled in the University’s family medicine

residency program. Through that program, he was hired by Methodist to perform medical services

as a resident physician. Dr. Leman was employed by the University and was plaintiff’s program

director.

¶ 12 In March 2020, plaintiff was placed on a period of probation in his residency

program. In June 2020, his probationary period was extended for two months “for ongoing

professionalism concerns.” In July 2020, plaintiff was given a “Formal Notice of Dismissal,”

signed by Dr. Leman, informing him that he was being dismissed from the family medicine

residency based on violations of the terms of his probation extension. The grounds for dismissal

were listed as disruptive behaviors at a patient handoff and dress code violations. Regarding the

-4- latter grounds, the notice stated as follows:

“2) Violation of Dress Code.

a. This was witnessed by me (Dr. Jeffrey Leman) on July 6 and July 7,

2020.

b. On Monday July 6, you were seen in the resident lounge wearing

scrub bottoms and a long sleeved Under Armor T-shirt. Various

faculty had spoken to you in the past about this very same shirt. I

reminded you that this was not appropriate dress code and you

replied that you had an appropriate pullover that you would use if

you were out on the floor seeing patients. You were reminded that

wearing the pullover was essential.

c. The next day, on the morning of Tuesday, July 7, I was in a patient

room *** and you walked in wearing scrubs and a short-sleeved UA

T-shirt, with no lab coat or pullover.

d. When confronted shortly thereafter you said that you had initially

gone to the cafeteria but then went to the patient rooms.

i. It is an expectation that residents will be in dress code

when going to non-clinical areas of the hospital, such

as the cafeteria.

3) The issue of dress code was one that has been repeatedly violated, and while this

does not lead to direct patient harm, seems to demonstrate disregard to

professionalism issues to which you have been warned specifically and on far more

than one occasion.

-5- a. On May 26th, you came to your semi-annual review with the

program director wearing inappropriate footwear while on

probation, which I later addressed this with you.

b. Dr. Andrews has had more than one conversation with you about

dress code.

These are not isolated incidents, nor are they the only violations of the terms of

your probation. You have been afforded ample opportunity to correct your

behavior, and while you have made progress in the areas of communication and

patient care, the professionalism concerns remain and are still happening at an

unacceptable frequency.”

¶ 13 Plaintiff sought review of his dismissal through the University’s three-level appeals

process as set forth in the House Staff Manual. The first level of that process involved a hearing

before a committee, which was required to consist of at least three faculty members from the

resident’s department. The committee must convene within 14 days of the receipt of a resident’s

written request for a hearing and notice of the date, time, and place of the hearing must be given

to the resident no fewer than 72 hours in advance of the hearing. Both the resident and the

department head could attend the hearing and present witnesses and other evidence. The House

Staff Manual states “[e]ach party shall be permitted to review all materials submitted to the

Committee during the hearing.” Additionally, the committee has “the sole right to determine what

information, materials and/or witnesses are relevant to the proceedings” and to “consider only that

which they deem to be relevant.” The matter is decided by a majority vote of the committee, and

the committee must provide both the resident and the department head with a written statement of

its decision. “If written materials are submitted to the Committee, such materials shall be appended

-6- to the Committee’s report.”

¶ 14 Relative to plaintiff’s case, the first-level hearing committee issued a written

decision on August 25, 2020. The decision stated the committee met on August 18, 2020. Plaintiff

appeared at the hearing with counsel, and both he and Dr. Leman presented witnesses and other

evidence. The decision showed that regarding his alleged dress code violations, plaintiff presented

the following arguments:

“[Plaintiff] stated that the residency dress code policy was not well defined nor

universally applied with other residents. In addition, he noted that the dress code

incident in question occurred during a patient care transition period. He felt that Dr.

Leman was both vague and strict in enforcing the terms of his probation, and that

the cited occurrences did not rise to the level of dismissal for violating the terms of

his probation.”

The three-person committee upheld plaintiff’s dismissal. As to the issue of dress code violations,

it stated as follows:

“The dress code issue, while appearing minor, is also relevant. [Plaintiff’s] defense

that he had violated the policy before without getting in trouble (as had others),

doesn’t negate the infraction. Once he was told of the issue, he still broke the policy.

His defense that these infractions did not impact patient care does not excuse the

rule violation, especially in light of his probationary status. The fact that he had

finished his rounds and was going back to check on the patient again indicates he

was still acting in a professional capacity with the patient. The terms of his extended

probation were made very strict by program leadership, in large part because he

had already violated the original probation agreement. He was aware of this when

-7- he signed the extended probation [agreement].”

¶ 15 The second level of the University’s appeal process provided for review of the

first-level committee’s decision with “the Associate Dean for Graduate Medical Education”

(Associate Dean). In particular, the House Staff Manual provides as follows:

“A Resident may appeal the Committee’s decision to the Associate Dean ***

within [10] days of issuance of the Committee’s decision. The Associate Dean shall

review the Committee’s decision and any documentation submitted to the

Committee, and may conduct his/her own investigation of the matter. He/she may,

but need not appoint another Committee, to review and discuss the matter. He/she

shall render his/her decision in writing within a reasonable time, but not later than

[30] days after receipt of the request for appeal.”

¶ 16 On October 1, 2020, the Associate Dean issued a written decision in plaintiff’s case,

which showed a committee had been appointed to review the matter. The second-level committee

upheld plaintiff’s dismissal based solely upon plaintiff’s alleged dress code violations, finding that

due to “the vastly different recollection of events related to the incident of disruptive behavior

during sign-out, [it] felt that it could not effectively determine if [that incident] was grounds for

dismissal.” The committee determined “the dress code was grounds for dismissal based on the

terms of the extension of probation.” It believed “there was sufficient documentation that the dress

code was well established and understood by all parties.”

¶ 17 The third step in the University’s appeals process provided for a “Final Appeal” to

“the Senior Associate Dean for Academic and Educational Affairs of the College of Medicine”

(Senior Associate Dean). The House Staff Manual states as follow:

“The Resident may appeal the Associate Dean’s decision to the Senior Associate

-8- Dean *** within [10] days from the date of issuance of the decision. An appeal to

the Senior Associate Dean is permitted only on procedural grounds and a review of

the record by the Senior Associate Dean for said appeal shall be limited only to

procedural matters. The Senior Associate Dean shall render his/her decision within

[10] days after receipt of the request for appeal and such decision shall be final and

unappealable.”

¶ 18 On October 19, 2020, the Senior Associate Dean issued a written decision, finding

the appeal proceedings were “conducted fairly and appropriately” and “sustaining the prior

decision to terminate [plaintiff] from the residency program.” That decision showed plaintiff raised

several procedural challenges to the first- and second-level committee decisions, which the Senior

Associate Dean determined were “based upon mistaken information,” based upon

“misunderstanding of a valid interpretation of the procedures by the committee(s),” or constituted

“a non-prejudicial variance from the language of the House Staff [Manual].”

¶ 19 The decision indicates plaintiff initially challenged the “[p]rovision of materials

before, during[,] and after the hearings.” The Senior Associate Dean noted that the House Staff

Manual provided that the parties were “ ‘permitted to review all materials submitted to the

Committee during the hearing’ ” and that, in plaintiff’s case, “[b]oth parties submitted a total of

over 350 pages of materials.” He also pointed out that plaintiff did not make a request to review

any of the submitted documents, but that he was provided with electronic access to the documents

prior to the second committee hearing. The Senior Associate Dean also noted that although the

House Staff Manual provided that written materials would be appended to the first-level

committee’s written decision, “attaching over 350 pages of documentation to the report was not

practical.”

-9- ¶ 20 The Senior Associate Dean next addressed a claim by plaintiff pertaining to

“[h]earing agendas, witnesses[,] and time allotted each side.” He stated the agendas for both

hearings allowed each side 30 minutes to present their case; however, plaintiff spent 100 minutes

presenting to the first committee and 62 minutes presenting to the second committee, while Dr.

Leman spent 61 minutes presenting to the first committee and 36 minutes presenting to the second

committee. The Senior Associate Dean also noted that at the second level of the appeal process,

the Associate Dean had discretion not only to appoint a committee, but also had “discretion on

whether that committee may hear witnesses.”

¶ 21 Plaintiff further raised an issue regarding “[e]pisodes of alleged ex parte

communication.” Regarding that claim, the Senior Associate Dean stated as follows:

“This is not a legal proceeding and thus claims of ‘ex parte communication’ and

‘close of evidence’ have no bearing. Follow up questions or requests for further

documentation during a committee’s investigation are not prohibited by the [House

Staff] Manual. The appellate committee continued their investigation by requesting

documentation from both you and the Department regarding the dress code policy

in place prior to July 2020. *** The appellate committee considered these responses

in their continued deliberations.”

¶ 22 The Senior Associate Dean also addressed a claim by plaintiff that pertained to the

relevancy of information provided to the committee. He noted that under the House Staff Manual,

the committees had the sole right to determine what information, materials, and witnesses were

relevant. He stated both committees exercised that discretion in making their determinations.

¶ 23 Finally, the Senior Associate Dean addressed a challenge by plaintiff as to the

composition of the first hearing committee on the basis that it was not solely comprised of members

- 10 - of plaintiff’s department. He noted that the committee was constructed so as to avoid faculty

members who “participated in prior discussions of [plaintiff’s] performance,” which led to plaintiff

being placed on probation. Given the avoidance of those faculty members and the small size of

plaintiff’s department, “there were few other available faculty,” such that the committee could not

be composed entirely of family medicine faculty members.

¶ 24 As stated, in April 2021, plaintiff filed his seven-count complaint against

defendants. In connection with his claims against both Dr. Leman and the University—seeking a

writ of certiorari (count I), alleging breach of contract (count II), and alleging tortious interference

with an existing business relationship (count IV)—plaintiff raised allegations that Dr. Leman,

acting “in the course and scope of his employment,” sought to expel him as a resident from the

University “contrary to the established procedures” set forth in the House Staff Manual. He

complained no basis for his termination existed based upon a dress code violation, asserting the

University failed to produce any specific policy that he had violated and that he had not been “on

duty” at the time of the alleged dress code infractions. Plaintiff also alleged that Dr. Leman and

the University intentionally and unjustifiably interfered with his business relationship with

Methodist by dismissing him from his residency without sufficient cause.

¶ 25 Additionally, plaintiff alleged that there were procedural defects in the University’s

appeal process. In particular, he asserted that the first hearing committee disregarded its own rules

as set forth in the House Staff Manual because (1) only one member of his department served on

the three-person committee, (2) it failed to provide him with any written materials that were relied

upon during the hearing that showed the written policies upon which his dismissal was based, (3) it

considered irrelevant witness testimony, (4) it failed to attach any written materials to its decision,

and (5) it permitted Dr. Leman to exceed the 30-minute time limit for the presentation of evidence.

- 11 - Plaintiff argued the second hearing committee also disregarded its own rules by (1) refusing to

hear witness testimony, (2) failing to provide timely access to materials relied upon by Dr. Leman,

(3) considering materials submitted by Dr. Leman that were untimely, (4) engaging in ex parte

communications with Dr. Leman, and (5) failing to attach written materials to its decision.

¶ 26 Plaintiff’s claims against only Dr. Leman—for intentional infliction of emotional

distress (count VI) and tortious interference with a prospective business relationship (count VII)—

were based on allegations that Dr. Leman acted knowingly and recklessly against plaintiff with

respect to his dismissal from the residency program, causing plaintiff to suffer severe emotional

distress. He also alleged that Dr. Leman unjustifiably interfered with a prospective business

relationship he had with a hospital in Georgia. Plaintiff claimed that after Dr. Leman falsely

inferred that “grounds relating to [plaintiff’s] professionalism” existed in addition to the alleged

dress code violations, the Georgia hospital refused to finalize a contract with plaintiff.

¶ 27 Further, in connection with his breach of contract claim against Methodist (count

III), plaintiff alleged Methodist’s failure to follow the terms of the parties’ Residency Agreement.

Specifically, he alleged that absent egregious conduct on his part, Methodist was required to

provide him with at least four months written notice “if his employment was not being continued

or promoted.” Plaintiff asserted Methodist breached the parties’ agreement because “no such basis

for [his] termination existed” and because Methodist terminated his employment without providing

him with four months’ written notice. With respect to his retaliatory discharge claim against

Methodist (count V), plaintiff alleged he was injured on June 4, 2020, “in the course and scope of

his employment with [Methodist]” and terminated for exercising his rights under the Workers’

Compensation Act (820 ILCS 305/1 et seq. (West 2020)). He asserted Methodist’s purported

ground for his termination, i.e., the dress code violations, “was pretextual.”

- 12 - ¶ 28 In June 2021, Dr. Leman and the University filed a combined motion to dismiss the

counts against them in plaintiff’s complaint under section 2-619.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure

(Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-619.1 (West 2020)), along with a memorandum of law in support of their

motion. Relevant to this appeal, they argued dismissal was appropriate under section 2-619(a)(1)

of the Code (id. § 2-619(a)(1)) because plaintiff’s claims against them were barred by sovereign

immunity and, as a result, the trial court lacked jurisdiction. Defendants argued that because the

University was an arm of the State and Dr. Leman was at all times acting within the scope and

authority of his employment with the University, both were protected by sovereign immunity from

plaintiff’s claims for damages and other relief “related to completed conduct.” Specifically, on the

basis of sovereign immunity, they sought dismissal of plaintiff’s request for a stay in count I and

the dismissal of counts II, III, VI, and VII in their entirety. Also, citing section 2-615 of the Code

(id. § 2-615), defendants argued dismissal was appropriate because plaintiff failed to allege

sufficient facts to support a cause of action for (1) a writ of certiorari, (2) intentional infliction of

emotional distress, and (3) tortious interference with either an existing or prospective economic

relationship.

¶ 29 The same month, Methodist filed a section 2-615 motion to dismiss plaintiff’s

claims against it for breach of contract and retaliatory discharge. It argued plaintiff failed to state

claims upon which relief could be granted because both counts against it were “premised upon the

claim that Methodist improperly terminated Plaintiff from his employment,” but plaintiff’s own

allegations and exhibits showed it was the University, rather than Methodist, that terminated

plaintiff from his residency program. Methodist maintained that plaintiff’s exhibits showed that

termination from his employment with Methodist was “automatic” once plaintiff was dismissed

from the residency program. It also argued that plaintiff’s claim that Methodist was required to

- 13 - give him four months’ notice of his dismissal was “misplaced” as the Residency Agreement only

required four months’ notice to plaintiff in the event he was not continued or promoted, not in the

event that he was terminated.

¶ 30 Further, regarding plaintiff’s retaliatory discharge claim, Methodist argued plaintiff

fatally failed to plead facts showing that he exercised any rights or remedies available to him under

the Workers’ Compensation Act. Again, it also asserted that plaintiff’s pleading showed it was the

University’s decision to terminate plaintiff, and “not Methodist’s independent employment

decision.”

¶ 31 In August 2021, plaintiff filed responses to both motions to dismiss. As to the

motion filed by Dr. Leman and the University, plaintiff first argued his claims were not barred by

sovereign immunity because the “officer suit exception” applied. In particular, plaintiff argued that

Dr. Leman had exceeded the scope of his authority in seeking plaintiff’s dismissal from the

residency program. Plaintiff further responded that he had sufficiently pled causes of action for a

writ of certiorari, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and tortious interference with either

an existing or prospective business relationship. Alternatively, he argued the trial court should

grant him leave to amend his pleading to cure any defects.

¶ 32 Plaintiff filed a memorandum of law in support of his response to the University’s

motion. Attached to his filing was a document entitled “Physician Dress Code”; a document

purportedly setting forth Methodist’s dress code policy; and a document dated June 19, 2020,

which purportedly concerned the extension of plaintiff’s probationary period.

¶ 33 Regarding Methodist’s motion to dismiss, plaintiff argued the Residency

Agreement’s four month notice requirement applied to employment terminations absent egregious

conduct by a resident. Further, he argued Methodist could not “evade responsibility for its role in

- 14 - [his] termination by placing the blame solely on [the] University” where the Residency Agreement

“specifically adopted and incorporated all of the terms and conditions of the University, including

its procedures for termination,” into that agreement. Regarding his retaliatory discharge claim,

plaintiff argued Methodist could not plausibly claim to have received no notice of his workers’

compensation claim prior to his termination in October 2020, because on September 8, 2020, it

“entered its appearance and requested access to his medical records.” Plaintiff asked the trial court

to deny Methodist’s motion to dismiss or, alternatively, to grant him leave to amend his pleading

to cure any defects.

¶ 34 Following additional briefing by defendants, the trial court conducted a hearing on

defendants’ motions to dismiss and took the matter under advisement. On September 10, 2021, the

court entered a written order, dismissing all counts with prejudice. It found sovereign immunity

applied to the counts against Dr. Leman and the University, stating nothing in either the complaint

or its exhibits showed Dr. Leman was performing his duties illegally, unconstitutionally, or

without authority. Regarding plaintiff’s claims against Methodist, the court found that plaintiff’s

dismissal from the residency program and termination from his employment did not stem from

any action taken by Methodist. It stated as follows: “Once [plaintiff] was terminated from the

residency program, he could no longer work at Methodist. One follows the other: there must be

residency before employment, not the other way around.” The court also rejected plaintiff’s

contention that the Residency Agreement required Methodist to give him four months’ notice of

the termination from is employment, stating as follows:

“[Plaintiff] cites section 8 of [the Residency Agreement] to support his claim

against Methodist. However that section clearly refers to actions taken by

Methodist to either not renew, continue[,] or promote a person in residency training

- 15 - as in section 8a, or terminate a resident from employment due to certain types of

behavior as in section 8f. Section 8 requires one to be a resident. Upon [plaintiff’s]

dismissal from the residency program supervised by [defendant] Leman for the

[University], he was no longer a resident and could not be employed.”

¶ 35 In October 2021, plaintiff filed a motion to reconsider the trial court’s decision to

dismiss all counts of his complaint, arguing the court “misapprehended the application of existing

law.” Following the filing of responses by defendants and a hearing, the court denied plaintiff’s

motion.

¶ 36 This appeal followed.

¶ 37 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 38 On appeal, plaintiff challenges the trial court’s dismissal of all seven counts of his

complaint. Specifically, he contends (1) the court erred by finding his claims against Dr. Leman

and the University were barred by sovereign immunity, (2) no controlling authority exists that

writs of certiorari are barred by sovereign immunity, and his complaint set forth sufficient facts

to support his claim for the issuance of a writ, and (3) he pled sufficient facts to state causes of

action for both breach of contract and retaliatory discharge against Methodist. Plaintiff asks this

court to reverse the court’s dismissal of each count of his complaint, as well as the court’s denial

of his motion to reconsider.

¶ 39 A. Motions to Dismiss

¶ 40 A section 2-615 motion to dismiss (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2020)) “challenges

the legal sufficiency of a complaint based on certain defects or defenses apparent on the face of

the complaint.” Walworth Investments-LG, LLC v. Mu Sigma, Inc., 2022 IL 127177, ¶ 39, 215

N.E.3d 843. In ruling on such a motion, a court accepts as true all well-pleaded facts and all

- 16 - reasonable inferences therefrom and determines “whether the complaint’s allegations—construed

in the light most favorable to the plaintiff—are sufficient to establish a cause of action upon which

relief may be granted.” Id. “A court should not dismiss a complaint pursuant to [section 2-615]

unless it is clearly apparent that no set of facts can be proved that would entitle the plaintiff to

recovery.” Rehfield v. Diocese of Joliet, 2021 IL 125656, ¶ 20, 182 N.E.3d 123.

¶ 41 When ruling on a section 2-615 motion, “[t]he only matters to be considered ***

are the allegations of the pleadings themselves.” Illinois Graphics Co. v. Nickum, 159 Ill. 2d 469,

485, 639 N.E.2d 1282, 1289 (1994); see Cwikla v. Sheir, 345 Ill. App. 3d 23, 29, 801 N.E.2d 1103,

1109 (2003) (“In ruling on a section 2-615 motion, the court may not consider affidavits, products

of discovery, documentary evidence not incorporated into the pleadings as exhibits, or other

evidentiary materials.”). A document that is attached to a complaint as an exhibit is “considered to

be part of the pleading, and facts stated in the exhibit are considered as having been alleged in the

complaint.” Tucker v. Soy Capital Bank & Trust Co., 2012 IL App (1st) 103303, ¶ 22, 974 N.E.2d

820. “[M]atters contained in such exhibits which conflict with allegations of the complaint negate

any contrary allegations of the complaint.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. ¶ 23; see

Van Duyn v. Smith, 173 Ill. App. 3d 523, 538, 527 N.E.2d 1005, 1015 (1988) (“Only well pleaded

facts are admitted by a section 2-615 motion to dismiss and it is commonly understood that

attached exhibits supercede any inconsistent allegations of a complaint.”).

¶ 42 A section 2-619 motion to dismiss (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2020)) “admits the

sufficiency of the complaint but asserts a defense outside of the complaint that defeats it.”

O’Connell v. County of Cook, 2022 IL 127527, ¶ 19, 210 N.E.3d 1251. Under section 2-619(a)(1),

a complaint may be involuntarily dismissed if the trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over

the action. 735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(1) (West 2020). Like a section 2-615 motion, a section 2-619

- 17 - motion “admits as true all well-pleaded facts and all reasonable inferences from those facts.”

Cahokia Unit School District No. 187 v. Pritzker, 2021 IL 126212, ¶ 24, 184 N.E.3d 233. Under

both sections, our review is de novo. Id.

¶ 43 B. Plaintiff’s Claims Against Dr. Leman and the University

¶ 44 1. Sovereign Immunity

¶ 45 Initially, plaintiff contends the trial court erred in finding his claims against Dr.

Leman and the University were barred by sovereign immunity. Specifically, he argues that the

officer suit exception to the sovereign immunity doctrine applies because Dr. Leman acted in

excess of his authority to terminate plaintiff for dress code violations by creating “a different policy

to suit his own needs rather than constraining his actions to the scope of his authority.”

¶ 46 The University and Dr. Leman respond by arguing that the trial court properly

dismissed plaintiff’s breach of contract and tort claims against them (counts II, IV, VI, and VII)

on the basis of sovereign immunity. They maintain that the officer suit exception is inapplicable

and that the case authority relied upon by plaintiff is distinguishable from the present case. For the

reasons that follow, we agree with defendants.

¶ 47 “The Illinois Constitution of 1970 abolished the doctrine of sovereign immunity

‘[e]xcept as the General Assembly may provide by law.’ ” PHL, Inc. v. Pullman Bank & Trust

Co., 216 Ill. 2d 250, 259-60, 836 N.E.2d 351, 356 (2005) (quoting Ill. Const. 1970, art. XIII, § 4).

“Pursuant to its constitutional authority, the General Assembly reestablished sovereign immunity

in the State Lawsuit Immunity Act.” Id. at 260 (citing 745 ILCS 5/0.01 et seq. (West 1998)).

Section 1 of the State Lawsuit Immunity Act states as follows:

“Except as provided in the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act, the Court of Claims

Act, the State Officials and Employees Ethics Act, and Section 1.5 of this Act, the

- 18 - State of Illinois shall not be made a defendant or party in any court.” 745 ILCS 5/1

(West 2020).

The Court of Claims Act provides that the court of claims has “exclusive jurisdiction to hear and

determine” various matters, including claims against the State that are founded upon any contract

entered into with the State and claims for damages in cases sounding in tort. 705 ILCS 505/8 (West

2020).

¶ 48 “[O]ur public universities are considered ‘the State’ for the purposes of the [State

Lawsuit] Immunity Act and Court of Claims Act.” Carmody v. Thompson, 2012 IL App (4th)

120202, ¶ 20, 977 N.E.2d 887. Additionally, “[a] suit against a State official in his or her official

capacity is a suit against the official’s office and is therefore no different than a suit against the

State.” Parmar v. Madigan, 2018 IL 122265, ¶ 21, 106 N.E.3d 1004; see Leetaru v. Board of

Trustees of the University of Illinois, 2015 IL 117485, ¶ 44, 32 N.E.3d 583 (“That an action is

nominally one against the servants or agents of the State does not mean that it will not be

considered as one against the State itself.”).

¶ 49 Ultimately, the determination of whether an action is one against the State does not

depend on the formal identification of the parties but “upon the issues involved and the relief

sought.” Parmar, 2018 IL 122265, ¶ 22. An action against a State employee may be considered as

one against the State when (1) there are no allegations that a State agent or employe acted beyond

the scope of his authority through wrongful acts, (2) the duty alleged to have been breached was

not owed to the public generally independent of State employment, and (3) the complained-of

actions involve matters ordinarily within the employee’s normal and official functions of the State.

Carmody, 2012 IL App (4th) 120202, ¶ 22 (citing Healy v. Vaupel, 133 Ill. 2d 295, 309, 549 N.E.2d

1240, 1247 (1990)).

- 19 - ¶ 50 Consistent with the above authorities, a notable exception to sovereign immunity

is the officer suit exception, which our supreme court has described as follows:

“Where *** a plaintiff alleges that the State officer’s conduct violates statutory or

constitutional law or is in excess of his or her authority, such conduct is not regarded

as the conduct of the State. The underlying principle is that conduct taken by a State

officer without legal authority strips the officer of his or her official status.

[Citation.] Thus, a complaint seeking to prospectively enjoin such unlawful conduct

may be brought in the circuit court without offending sovereign immunity

principles. [Citations].” Parmar, 2018 IL 122265, ¶ 22.

¶ 51 Significantly, however, “not every legal wrong committed by an officer of the State

will trigger [the officer suit] exception.” Leetaru, 2015 IL 117485, ¶ 47. The exception will not

apply (1) “where the challenged conduct amounts to simple breach of contract and nothing more”

or (2) when the state official merely “has exercised the authority delegated to him or her

erroneously.” Id. Instead, the exception is aimed “at situations where the official is not doing the

business which the sovereign has empowered him or her to do or is doing it in a way which the

law forbids.” Id.

¶ 52 Here, in finding plaintiff’s claims against Dr. Leman and the University were barred

by sovereign immunity, the trial court relied on this court’s decision in Wozniak v. Conry, 288 Ill.

App. 3d 129, 679 N.E.2d 1255 (1997), which it found presented similar circumstances. In Wozniak,

the plaintiff was an associate professor at the University of Illinois. Id. at 130. Following a

reassignment that removed him from his teaching position, the plaintiff brought a cause of action

against the defendant, who was the head of his department, alleging tortious interference with his

employment contract. Id. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged the defendant “made false accusations

- 20 - about him, knowing they were untrue or acting with reckless disregard for their truth.” Id. 130-31.

The trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint on the defendant’s motion, accepting the

defendant’s argument that plaintiff’s action was one against the State that could only be brought

in the court of claims. Id. at 131.

¶ 53 On review, we agreed that the plaintiff’s claim was barred by sovereign immunity

Id. at 135. In so holding, we “recognized that a suit against a state employee in his individual

capacity constitutes a claim against the state when a judgment for the plaintiff could control the

state’s actions or subject it to liability.” Id. at 133 (citing Currie v. Lao, 148 Ill. 2d 151, 158, 592

N.E.2d 977, 980 (1992)). We stated as follows:

“[W]hen a supervisor for a state department or entity is sued by an employee for

statements regarding the employee’s work-related conduct and pending personnel

decisions, the suit necessarily threatens to control the actions of the state. It does

not matter if, as here, the plaintiff alleges the statements were knowingly false.

[Citation.] Instead, the relevant inquiry is whether the supervisor would be acting

within the scope of his duties by making truthful statements of the general type

alleged.” Id. at 133-34.

¶ 54 We further stated that the rule “that a suit against a state employee constitutes a suit

against the state when a judgment for a plaintiff could control the state’s actions” was not without

limits. Id. at 134. Referencing the officer suit exception, we pointed out that “[w]henever a state

employee performs illegally, unconstitutionally, or without authority, a suit may still be maintained

against the employee in his individual capacity and does not constitute an action against the State

of Illinois.” Id. Regarding the case at issue, we stated as follows:

“To allow [the plaintiff’s] suit against [the defendant] in his individual capacity

- 21 - clearly would limit [the defendant’s] ability to engage in lawful activity on behalf

of the University—namely, to communicate, allocate tasks, and make personnel

and other employment decisions. [The defendant’s] comments, which were within

the scope of his employment, related to the employment relationship between [the

plaintiff] and the University. One comment concerned the Dean’s response to [the

plaintiff’s] alleged misconduct. The rest of [the defendant’s] comments involved

[the plaintiff’s] performance as a teacher and supervisor. A judgment for [the

plaintiff] would directly influence [the defendant’s] ability as a state employee to

handle departmental personnel issues. Accordingly, this suit threatens to control the

actions of the state.” (Emphasis added.) Id.

¶ 55 In this case, like in Wozniak, plaintiff’s claims against Dr. Leman and the

University amount to claims against the State. Plaintiff’s allegations regarding Dr. Leman concern

actions taken within the scope of his authority as the program director of plaintiff’s residency

program. As the program director, Dr. Leman was empowered to supervise, evaluate, and

discipline the residents in his program. In particular, lapses in professionalism by a resident,

including dress code violations, were subject to action by Dr. Leman as plaintiff’s program

director. Permissible disciplinary actions included placing a resident on probation and dismissal

from the residency program. Further, grounds for dismissal included a resident’s failure to meet or

advance in any of the required competencies, including professionalism. All of Dr. Leman’s

alleged actions in the present case related to plaintiff’s enrollment in the residency program, over

which Dr. Leman had supervisory authority.

¶ 56 As noted, plaintiff contends Dr. Leman acted without authority by creating “a

different [dress code] policy to suit his own needs rather than constraining his actions to the scope

- 22 - of his authority.” However, the allegations of his complaint consistently describe Dr. Leman as

acting “in the course and scope of his employment.” Additionally, in his complaint, plaintiff

alleged only that Dr. Leman sought to expel him “contrary to established procedures” and that

there was no basis for his dismissal from the residency program. Such allegations do not reflect

that Dr. Leman was acting outside of or contrary to his authority as program director. Rather, at

most, they show an erroneous exercise of delegated authority. Notably, plaintiff does not raise any

contention that Dr. Leman breached a duty owed to the general public independent of his State

employment or that the complained of actions involved matters not ordinarily within Dr. Leman’s

normal and official functions.

¶ 57 Additionally, the cases plaintiff relies upon are distinguishable. First, plaintiff cites

Fritz v. Johnston, 209 Ill. 2d 302, 807 N.E.2d 461 (2004), arguing that in that case, the “supreme

court acknowledged the limits of Wozniak’s applicability in an instance where two supervisors

attempted to get an employee to quit or face a police investigation as that act of conspiracy could

not reasonably be viewed as an action by the state.” However, in Fritz, the supreme court simply

distinguished Wozniak from the facts before it, stating as follows:

“Wozniak involved a state employee in a supervisory role who merely made

‘work-related statements’ within the context of that supervisory role. The instant

case, by contrast, involves allegedly false reports to an independent agency—the

State Police—in direct violation of criminal law.” Id. at 313.

The present case does not involve allegations that Dr. Leman violated a criminal statute and is,

thus, more similar to the facts presented in Wozniak than in Fritz.

¶ 58 Plaintiff also relies on the supreme court’s decision in Leetaru. There, the plaintiff,

who was a graduate student and former employee of the University of Illinois, brought an action

- 23 - to enjoin the University and one of its vice chancellors from taking further action in an

investigation against him. Leetaru, 2015 IL 117485, ¶ 1. Ultimately, the supreme court rejected an

argument by the defendants that the plaintiff’s claim was barred by sovereign immunity. Id. ¶ 49.

In so holding, the court stated it had “repeatedly reaffirmed the right of plaintiffs to seek injunctive

relief in circuit court to prevent unauthorized or unconstitutional conduct by the State, its agencies,

boards, departments, commissions and agents or to compel their compliance with legal or

constitutional requirements.” (Emphasis added.) Id. ¶ 48.

¶ 59 Regarding the case before it, the supreme court pointed out that the plaintiff alleged

acts and omissions by the defendants that involved “far more than a mere difference of opinion

over how the rules and regulations should be interpreted or applied and are not simply the result

of some inadvertent oversight or de minimis technical violation.” Id. ¶ 49. Instead, they constituted

“a fundamental disregard for core provisions governing academic discipline at the University,

thereby exceeding defendants’ authority and violating [the plaintiff’s] constitutional rights to due

process.” Id. The court also found it significant that the plaintiff’s action did not “seek redress for

some past wrong,” such as damages, but “only to prohibit future conduct (proceeding with the

disciplinary process) undertaken by agents of the State in violation of statutory or constitutional

law or in excess of their authority.” Id. ¶ 51. It stated such claims were “not against the State at all

and do not threaten the State’s sovereign immunity.” Id.

¶ 60 The circumstances in Leetaru differ from those in the present case. First, unlike in

Leetaru, plaintiff’s allegations in this case do reflect “a mere difference of opinion over how the

rules and regulations should be interpreted or applied.” Id. ¶ 49. At the heart of plaintiff’s challenge

is a dispute over whether plaintiff’s conduct violated defendants’ dress code and warranted his

dismissal from the residency program. Second, unlike the plaintiff in Leetaru, plaintiff in this case

- 24 - did not seek to prohibit future conduct in connection with his breach of contract and tort claims.

Rather, he sought redress for a past wrong, his dismissal from the residency program, asking the

trial court to order his full reinstatement and award monetary damages. Such claims do threaten

the State’s sovereign immunity. See Parmar, 2018 IL 122265, ¶ 26 (“Leetaru makes plain that a

complaint seeking damages for a past wrong does not fall within the officer suit exception to

sovereign immunity.”).

¶ 61 Under the circumstances presented, plaintiff has failed to establish that the officer

suit exception to the sovereign immunity doctrine applies to his claims. Accordingly, we find the

trial court committed no error in dismissing plaintiff’s breach of contract and tort claims against

Dr. Leman and the University—as set forth in counts II, IV, VI, and VII of plaintiff’s complaint—

based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. For the same reasons, plaintiff is not entitled to

reversal of the court’s denial of his motion to reconsider.

¶ 62 2. Writ of Certiorari

¶ 63 As stated, plaintiff separately challenges the trial court’s dismissal of count I of his

complaint, in which he raised a claim for a common law writ of certiorari against Dr. Leman and

the University. He contends such a claim is not barred by sovereign immunity and that his

complaint set forth sufficient facts to support his claim for the issuance of the writ.

¶ 64 Initially, defendants agree with plaintiff that sovereign immunity does not bar his

claim. See Applegate v. State of Illinois Department of Transportation, 335 Ill. App. 3d 1056,

1061, 783 N.E.2d 96, 101 (2002) (“Sovereign immunity does not bar a party from seeking judicial

review of an agency’s action by common-law writ of certiorari.”); see also Dusthimer v. Board of

Trustees of the University of Illinois, 368 Ill. App. 3d 159, 164, 857 N.E.2d 343, 349 (2006) (stating

quasi-judicial decisions of the University of Illinois are “reviewable in an action for a writ of

- 25 - certiorari”). However, they contend that dismissal is appropriate under section 2-615 of the Code

because plaintiff failed to state a cause of action for a common law writ of certiorari.

¶ 65 We note that in their combined motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claims against them

and accompanying memorandum of law, defendants sought the dismissal of count I under section

2-615 of the Code, asserting plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts to support a cause of action

for a writ of certiorari. Nevertheless, in its written order, the trial court indicated it was dismissing

plaintiff’s certiorari claim under section 2-619 of the Code on the basis of sovereign immunity.

As defendants point out, the court subsequently commented at the hearing on plaintiff’s motion to

reconsider that it relied on “the briefing done by the Defendants” in finding that plaintiff’s

certiorari argument failed. However, no matter the rationale relied upon by the trial court, this

court may affirm the dismissal of plaintiff’s claim on any grounds supported by the record. See

Carroll v. Community Health Care Clinic, Inc., 2017 IL App (4th) 150847, ¶ 18, 81 N.E.3d 122

(“[T]his court may affirm the circuit court’s granting of a motion to dismiss on any basis or ground

established by the record, regardless of the circuit court’s reasoning.”). Accordingly, on review,

we consider whether plaintiff’s complaint alleged sufficient facts to state a common law claim for

a writ of certiorari.

¶ 66 “The common law writ of certiorari was developed to provide a means whereby a

petitioner who was without avenue of appeal or direct review could obtain limited review over

action by a court or other tribunal exercising quasi-judicial functions.” Stratton v. Wenona

Community Unit District No. 1, 133 Ill. 2d 413, 427, 551 N.E.2d 640, 645 (1990). The purpose of

a writ is “to have the entire record of the inferior tribunal brought before the court to determine,

from the record alone, whether that body proceeded according to the applicable law.” Id.

“Quasi-judicial proceedings are designed to adjudicate disputed facts in a particular case,” and

- 26 - “[q]uasi-judicial hearings concern agency decisions that affect a small number of persons on

individual grounds based on a particular set of disputed facts that have been adjudicated.” East St.

Louis School District No. 189 Board of Education v. East St. Louis School District No. 189

Financial Oversight Panel, 349 Ill. App. 3d 445, 449, 811 N.E.2d 692, 697 (2004).

¶ 67 “Writs of certiorari may be issued by a trial court to inferior tribunals whenever it

can be shown that they have either exceeded their jurisdiction or have proceeded illegally and no

direct appeal or other method of direct review of their proceedings is provided.” (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) City of Kankakee v. Department of Revenue, 2013 IL App (3d) 120599, ¶ 14, 988

N.E.2d 723. A tribunal proceeds illegally where it fails to “follow the essential procedural

requirements applicable to such cases.” C & K Distributors, Inc. v. Hynes, 122 Ill. App. 3d 525,

528, 461 N.E.2d 560, 562 (1984). “The writ should not issue *** in the absence of substantial

injury or injustice to the petitioner.” Stratton, 133 Ill. 2d at 428.

¶ 68 Additionally, “[t]he standards of review under a common law writ of certiorari are

essentially the same as those under the Administrative Review Law.” Hanrahan v. Williams, 174

Ill. 2d 268, 272, 673 N.E.2d 251, 253-54 (1996). “Under the Administrative Review Law, courts

generally do not interfere with an agency’s discretionary authority unless the exercise of that

discretion is arbitrary and capricious [citation] or the agency action is against the manifest weight

of the evidence [citation].” Id. at 272-73; see Torres v. Kane County, Public Aid Committee, 130

Ill. App. 3d 296, 298, 474 N.E.2d 45, 46 (1985) (“[C]ommon law certiorari is available to review

the determination of an administrative agency on the ground that the agency’s finding was against

the manifest weight of the evidence where review under the Administrative Review Act is not

provided”).

¶ 69 Initially, to the extent plaintiff brings his claim for a writ of certiorari against Dr.

- 27 - Leman, his claim must fail. In particular, plaintiff has failed to allege any facts showing that Dr.

Leman exercised judicial or quasi-judicial functions. See Rochon v. Rodriguez, 293 Ill. App. 3d

952, 956, 689 N.E.2d 288, 291 (1997) (finding a police “superintendent’s decisions to discipline

[police officers] were not judicial or quasi-judicial acts”). Rather than adjudicate a particular set

of disputed facts, Dr. Leman, as plaintiff’s program director, made disciplinary decisions that

resulted in plaintiff’s termination from his residency program. Accordingly, plaintiff cannot state

a cause of action against Dr. Leman for a writ of certiorari.

¶ 70 Regarding the University, plaintiff argues he alleged sufficient facts in his

complaint to show that the University exercised quasi-judicial functions through its three-level

appeals process. Additionally, he contends the University “failed to comply with the law” and

“exceeded [its] authority” by failing to follow the policies and procedures set forth in the House

Staff Manual. Plaintiff argues the allegations of his complaint showed he was dismissed based on

dress code violations for “actions which did not violate the dress code,” i.e., failing “to wear an

overcoat while off duty.” Plaintiff maintains such conduct by the University was “arbitrary and

capricious.” He also argues that the University violated various procedural requirements for its

three-level appeals process. He contends such procedural violations denied him a fair hearing and

due process.

¶ 71 We note that in presenting his arguments on appeal, plaintiff references a

“Physician’s Dress Code,” which was attached to his response to defendants’ motion to dismiss

but not as an exhibit to his complaint. As noted, when a section 2-615 motion to dismiss is at issue,

“[t]he only matters to be considered *** are the allegations of the pleadings themselves.” Illinois

Graphics Co. 159 Ill. 2d at 485; see Cwikla, 345 Ill. App. 3d at 29 (“In ruling on a section 2-615

motion, the court may not consider affidavits, products of discovery, documentary evidence not

- 28 - incorporated into the pleadings as exhibits, or other evidentiary materials.”). On review, we

consider only plaintiff’s complaint and its attached exhibits to determine whether he properly

stated a cause of action for a writ of certiorari. Additionally, while the error does not impede our

review, we note plaintiff has also consistently and improperly cited to the appendix of his

appellant’s brief rather than to relevant portions of the appellate record in violation of the Illinois

Supreme Court Rules. See Ill. S. Ct. Rule 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020) (stating the argument section

of an appellant’s brief “shall contain the contentions of the appellant and the reasons therefor, with

citation of the authorities and the pages of the record relied on. Evidence shall not be copied at

length, but reference shall be made to the pages of the record on appeal where evidence may be

found”).

¶ 72 First, regarding the factual basis of his dismissal, plaintiff asserted in his complaint

that he was alleged to have violated the dress code by “failing to wear a pullover or scrub coat over

a short sleeved Under Armor t-shirt while [he] was present in the resident lounge as well as when

following up with a patient while on a lunch break.” Plaintiff’s notice of dismissal, attached to his

complaint as an exhibit, stated plaintiff’s dress code violation stemmed from him walking into a

patient room “wearing scrubs and a short-sleeved UA T-shirt, with no lab coat or pullover.”

Although plaintiff persistently maintains on appeal that the alleged dress code violation occurred

while he was off duty, the factual allegations of his complaint reflect otherwise, showing the

violation occurred while plaintiff was seeing a patient and, thus, acting in his professional capacity.

They also show that the alleged violation occurred during a period when plaintiff was already on

probation in his residency program and subject to dismissal for any dress code violation.

Ultimately, the facts pleaded by plaintiff reflect neither a violation by the University of any policy

or procedure relating to its dress code, nor any arbitrary and capricious conduct.

- 29 - ¶ 73 Second, as noted, plaintiff claims the University violated its own procedures during

its three-level appeals process. Although plaintiff sets forth the alleged procedural violations in his

complaint, he alleged no facts showing that the University failed to follow any “essential

procedural requirements” (C & K Distributors, 122 Ill. App. 3d at 528) or that he suffered any

“substantial injury or injustice” (Stratton, 133 Ill. 2d at 428) as a result. Moreover, none of

plaintiff’s factual allegations were sufficient to show that the alleged procedural defects in the

University’s appeals process violated his due process rights. “Due process entails an orderly

proceeding wherein a person is served with notice, actual or constructive, and has an opportunity

to be heard and to enforce and protect his rights.” Stratton, 133 Ill. 2d at 432. In this instance,

plaintiff failed to allege any facts showing a lack of notice or an opportunity to be heard. Rather,

the exhibits to his complaint reflect plaintiff received notice and an opportunity to be heard at

every stage of the appeals process and that even his alleged procedural violations were raised and

considered during the final stage of that process.

¶ 74 Under the circumstances presented, we find plaintiff’s complaint failed to allege

sufficient facts to state a cause of action for a writ of certiorari. Thus, dismissal of count I was

appropriate under section 2-615 of the Code. For the same reasons, plaintiff has failed to show the

trial court erred by denying his motion to reconsider.

¶ 75 3. Leave to Amend

¶ 76 In his reply brief, plaintiff argues that he should have the opportunity to file an

amended complaint in the event this court finds the dismissal of count I was appropriate under

section 2-615 of the Code. He (1) notes that he requested leave to amend as alternative relief in his

response to defendants’ motion to dismiss, (2) argues he had no previous opportunities to amend

his pleading, and (3) asserts defendants would not be prejudiced by the filing of an amended

- 30 - complaint. However, because plaintiff raised this claim for the first time in his reply brief, it has

been forfeited. See Ill. S. Ct. Rule 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020) (stating points not argued in an

appellant’s brief “are forfeited and shall not be raised in the reply brief, in oral argument, or on

petition for rehearing”); see also Galvan v. Northwestern Memorial Hospital, 382 Ill. App. 3d 259,

262 n.1, 888 N.E.2d 529, 534 n.1 (2008) (finding no need to address the plaintiff’s contention that

they should have been granted leave to amend their complaint where it was raised for the first time

on appeal in the plaintiff’s reply brief).

¶ 77 Additionally, even if we were to set aside plaintiff’s forfeiture based on his failure

to raise his request for leave to amend in his appellant’s brief, we note he has offered no argument

regarding how he could amend his complaint to properly state a cause of action. See Hadley v.

Ryan, 345 Ill. App. 3d 297, 303, 803 N.E.2d 48, 54 (2003) (stating one factor that should be

considered when determining whether to allow an amendment is “whether the amendment would

cure a defect in the pleadings”). Moreover, although plaintiff generally requested leave to amend

with the trial court in his written response to defendants’ motion to dismiss, he never pursued that

request with the court—including in his motion to reconsider the court’s dismissal of his

complaint—nor did he ever submit any proposed amendment to the court. See Firebirds

International, LLC v. Zurich American Insurance Co., 2022 IL App (1st) 210558, ¶ 43, 208 N.E.3d

1187 (“[F]ailure to tender the proposed amendment forfeits the party’s right to review of the trial

court’s denial of a request for leave to amend.”); Sellers v. Rudert, 395 Ill. App. 3d 1041, 1055,

918 N.E.2d 586, 598 (2009) (same). Thus, under the circumstances, we find the issue forfeited and

decline to consider it.

¶ 78 C. Plaintiff’s Claims Against Methodist

¶ 79 1. Breach of Contract

- 31 - ¶ 80 Regarding his claims against Methodist, plaintiff first argues he pled sufficient facts

to state a cause of action for breach of contract. In particular, he contends the trial court erred by

finding the Residency Agreement did not require Methodist to provide him with four months’

written notice before it terminated his employment. Methodist responds, arguing the exhibits to

plaintiff’s complaint negate (1) any allegation that Methodist terminated plaintiff’s employment

and (2) the allegation Methodist was required to provide plaintiff with four months’ written notice.

We agree with Methodist.

¶ 81 “To succeed on a breach of contract claim, a plaintiff must plead and prove (1) the

existence of a valid and enforceable contract, (2) substantial performance by the plaintiff,

(3) breach by the defendant, and (4) damages caused by that breach.” Ivey v. Transunion Rental

Screening Solutions, Inc., 2022 IL 127903, ¶ 28, 215 N.E.3d 871. Additionally, Illinois is a

fact-pleading jurisdiction, which requires “that the plaintiff allege facts sufficient to bring a claim

within a legally recognized cause of action.” Simpkins v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 2012 IL

110662, ¶ 26, 965 N.E.2d 1092. As noted, “matters contained in *** [attached] exhibits which

conflict with allegations of the complaint negate any contrary allegations of the complaint.”

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Tucker, 2012 IL App (1st) 103303, ¶ 23.

¶ 82 Here, in his complaint, plaintiff alleged Methodist breached the Residency

Agreement “by terminating [his] employment.” However, he alleged no facts showing any

employment action taken against him by Methodist. Instead, as argued by Methodist, the exhibits

to plaintiff’s complaint show only that it was the University and Dr. Leman that dismissed plaintiff

from the residency program. Specifically, as an exhibit to his complaint, plaintiff attached the

“Formal Notice of Dismissal” he received in July 2020 from Dr. Leman, as program director for

the University’s family medicine residency program, which informed him that he was “being

- 32 - dismissed from the family medicine residency effective immediately.” He also attached the written

decisions he received following each level of the University’s appeals process, which each upheld

that dismissal.

¶ 83 Additionally, plaintiff alleged in his complaint that both he and Methodist “agreed

to be bound by the terms and conditions” of the Residency Agreement he attached to his complaint,

and he cites specific provisions of that agreement to support his contention that Methodist was

required to give him four months’ notice of any termination. We note, however, that the Residency

Agreement itself states that it covers only the time period from July 1, 2018, to June 30, 2019

(“Unless terminated earlier ***, the term of this Agreement, and accordingly, the employment and

appointment created by this Agreement, shall commence July l, 2018 and end June 30, 2019[.]”).

It further provides that Methodist may offer a resident “re-employment and reappointment” and,

in the event that it does so, the resident and Methodist “shall enter into a new agreement that will

govern the terms and conditions of such re-employment and reappointment.” Accordingly, the

Residency Agreement that plaintiff attached to his complaint did not govern his employment with

Methodist during the relevant time frame in 2020, when plaintiff was dismissed from the residency

program. Thus, it negates the allegations of plaintiff’s complaint, i.e., that its provisions controlled

the parties’ employment relationship.

¶ 84 Given these circumstances, the record reflects plaintiff failed to plead sufficient

facts to state a cause of action for breach of contract against Methodist. Thus, the trial court

properly dismissed that claim under section 2-615 of the Code and committed no error in denying

plaintiff’s motion to reconsider that dismissal.

¶ 85 2. Retaliatory Discharge

¶ 86 Finally, plaintiff also argues the allegations of his complaint were sufficient to state

- 33 - a cause of action or retaliatory discharge. We disagree.

¶ 87 “In Illinois, in order to establish a tort claim for retaliatory discharge, a plaintiff

must show (1) that she has been discharged; (2) in retaliation for her activities; and (3) that the

discharge violates a clear mandate of public policy.” (Internal quotation marks omitted). Rehfield,

2021 IL 125656, ¶ 27.

¶ 88 Here, to support his retaliatory discharge claim, plaintiff alleged in his complaint

that (1) he was employed by Methodist, (2) he was injured in the course and scope of his

employment on June 4, 2020, (3) he was discharged by Methodist on October 19, 2020,

purportedly because he violated its dress code policy, and (4) the reason for his termination was

pretextual because Methodist “had not taken similar action against other employees who had

violated the dress code who did not exercise their respective rights under the Workers’

Compensation Act.” Plaintiff alleged Methodist terminated his employment “due to his exercise

of his rights or remedies granted to him by the Workers’ Compensation Act and at common law.”

¶ 89 Initially, as set forth above, plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts showing any

specific adverse employment actions taken by Methodist against him. Further, the exhibits to his

complaint show only actions by Dr. Leman and the University to discharge him from his residency

program.

¶ 90 Additionally, as Methodist points out, plaintiff failed to plead any facts showing

that (1) he exercised his rights under the Workers’ Compensation Act or common law with respect

to his alleged work-related injury or (2) that Methodist had knowledge of either plaintiff’s alleged

injury or any resulting exercise of his rights. On appeal, plaintiff asserts “Methodist cannot

plausibly claim to have no notice of [his] workers’ compensation claim prior to [his] termination

*** on October 19, 2020” because “Methodist, through counsel[,] had entered its appearance and

- 34 - requested access to his medical records on September 8, 2020.” Ultimately, however plaintiff

failed to plead any such facts in his complaint, resulting in his failure to state a cause of action.

Given these circumstances, plaintiff has filed to show the trial court erred either in its dismissal of

his retaliatory discharge claim or by denying his motion to reconsider that dismissal.

¶ 91 3. Leave to Amend

¶ 92 In his reply brief, plaintiff, again, suggests he should be permitted to amend his

complaint to cure any defects. However, as before, we find this argument forfeited and decline to

consider it. See Ill. S. Ct. Rule 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020) (stating points not argued in an

appellant’s brief “are forfeited and shall not be raised in the reply brief, in oral argument, or on

petition for rehearing”); see also Galvan, 382 Ill. App. 3d at 263 n.1 (finding no need to address

the plaintiff’s contention that they should have been granted leave to amend their complaint where

it was raised for the first time on appeal in the plaintiff’s reply brief). Not only does plaintiff raise

his contention for the first time on appeal in his reply brief, he also failed to properly pursue a

request for leave to amend his complaint with the trial court. See Firebirds International, 2022 IL

App (1st) 210558, ¶ 43 (“[F]ailure to tender the proposed amendment forfeits the party’s right to

review of the trial court’s denial of a request for leave to amend.”); Sellers, 395 Ill. App. 3d at

1055 (same).

¶ 93 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 94 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 95 Affirmed.

- 35 -