Philip Morris, Inc. v. Emerson

368 S.E.2d 268, 235 Va. 380, 4 Va. Law Rep. 2568, 1988 Va. LEXIS 46
CourtSupreme Court of Virginia
DecidedApril 22, 1988
DocketRecord Nos. 841374, 841385, 841405, 841549, 841560 and 841564
StatusPublished
Cited by161 cases

This text of 368 S.E.2d 268 (Philip Morris, Inc. v. Emerson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Philip Morris, Inc. v. Emerson, 368 S.E.2d 268, 235 Va. 380, 4 Va. Law Rep. 2568, 1988 Va. LEXIS 46 (Va. 1988).

Opinions

WHITING, J.,

delivered the opinion of the Court.

I. FACTS

From the early 1960’s to 1969, Texaco, Inc. (Texaco) conducted experiments on rocket fuels and filaments in a laboratory [388]*388facility it owned in Richmond, using a liquid known as pentaborane. Pentaborane is highly toxic to humans; a pharmacologist who had investigated the characteristics and effects of pentaborane for the United States Air Force, described it as a “supertoxic” chemical. Brief exposure to five parts of pentaborane to a billion parts of air is fatal. Pentaborane is 2,000 times as deadly as hydrogen cyanide, the gas commonly used for execution in gas chambers. A dose of pentaborane sufficient to cause death is scarcely more than a dose which causes no harm. Indeed, if the odor of the compound is sufficiently strong to be detected by humans, minimal exposure to the gas is fatal.

Pentaborane is highly reactive to oxygen and will ignite when it reaches a concentration of about 2% in air. Both the liquid and the vapors from pentaborane cause serious bodily injury. Any person working with pentaborane gas should either use chemical hoods capable of isolating the pentaborane gas or wear a self-contained breathing apparatus. Taking special precautions, the United States government and its contractors have used and disposed of large quantities of pentaborane in its space rocket program without injury.

Texaco obtained pentaborane in small, pressurized cylinders approximately eight to 12 inches long and two to three inches in diameter. When pentaborane is under pressure, special care must be taken to contain the liquid chemical to prevent it from vaporizing rapidly into the atmosphere. Texaco buried chemicals in 19 pressurized cylinders, at least three of which contained pentaborane, with a number of other chemicals in a pit near one of its Richmond laboratory buildings. Burial of such cylinders is considered a dangerous practice because there is a risk that the cylinders will deteriorate and leak, allowing the contents to escape, and because the cylinders later may be dug up and the contents accidentally released by persons attempting to dispose of them.

Texaco sold its Richmond facility to Philip Morris Incorporated (Philip Morris) in 1978, but failed to disclose to Philip Morris that it had buried chemicals in a number of pits on the property. Some time later, Texaco advised Philip Morris of the chemical burials, but did not reveal that the pits contained pressurized cylinders.

In August of 1980, when Philip Morris began constructing another building on the property, its excavating contractor uncov[389]*389ered chemical waste, including the 19 cylinders, in the burial pits. After the cylinders were removed from the pits, they were taken to the laboratories of Environmental Laboratories, Inc. (ELI) at another location in the Richmond area. When the cylinders were cleaned, many of them were found to be corroded. Thirteen cylinders had no labels identifying the contents, but six were marked as follows: two were labeled B5H9 (the chemical formula for pentaborane), two were labeled BCL3 (the chemical formula for borane trichloride), one was labeled l-defluoro-2, 2-dichloro-ethylene, and one was labeled fluorine. The cylinders were assumed to contain chemicals under pressure. All chemical experts in these cases agreed that a cylinder with unknown contents should be treated as if it contained the most dangerous chemicals known.

When Philip Morris contacted Texaco for assistance in identifying and disposing of these cylinders, Texaco researched its files and gave Philip Morris the minimal information it found, but refused to assist further unless Philip Morris would execute “a hold-harmless agreement and give recognition that Texaco [was] not legally obligated to perform such service.” Philip Morris did not execute such an agreement. Except for giving some subsequent information on the contents of some of the cylinders to one of Philip Morris’ contractors who was attempting to deal with the cylinders, Texaco did nothing further to assist in identifying or disposing of the chemicals. Texaco never notified Philip Morris, or any of its contractors, that any cylinder contained pentaborane.

For 15 months after their discovery, the cylinders remained at ELI while Philip Morris and two of the companies it hired to remove the chemicals from its premises unsuccessfully attempted to find a contractor willing to dispose of them. None of the disposal firms would accept the job without knowing the contents of the cylinders because federal safety regulations require the disposal firms to obtain this information before transporting toxic chemicals to another location for disposal. The contents of the pressurized cylinders could not be ascertained without extracting a small sample from each cylinder under controlled conditions for testing. Because the valves on many of the cylinders were corroded, it was feared that the valves would not close after they had been opened for sampling.

To avoid transporting the cylinders, a member of one of the waste disposal firms suggested disposal by exploding the contents [390]*390on the premises of Philip Morris. Although this is an accepted method of disposal, Philip Morris rejected the proposal because it considered its property to be an unsatisfactory location for exploding the cylinders. Philip Morris continued to seek to have the chemicals neutralized at a location off its premises.

Browning-Ferris Industries (BFI), a large waste disposal firm, ultimately gave William Saddington, the chemical engineer at Philip Morris in charge of the disposal of the chemicals, the names of two companies that might be able to assist Philip Morris. BFI made no representations concerning those companies’ capabilities or experience, assuming Philip Morris would make the appropriate investigation.

Saddington contacted A-Line Industries (A-Line), one of the two firms whose names BFI had furnished, and James Kachur, one of the two owners of A-Line, came to Richmond to confer with Saddington. After looking at the cylinders and measuring them, Kachur gave Saddington a brochure describing A-Line’s previous activities and experience and told Saddington be had developed a device for the opening and sampling of the contents of deteriorated cylinders, prior to their neutralization and disposal.

The device was a heavy duty pipe 12 inches in diameter with a heavy duty flange welded into the top, which contained a removable top equipped with a valve and pressure gauge. A half-ball with a valve in it was welded to the bottom of the pipe. Another flange was inserted in the side of the pipe, which permitted a hydraulic plunger to be inserted into the pipe. When the top was sealed and all valves were closed, the pipe became an air-tight chamber. The small cylinders were to be placed in cradles designed to adapt to their various sizes (with the valve positioned opposite the hydraulic plunger) and inserted into the chamber. The hydraulic plunger or ram would then sever the valves of the cylinders and allow their contents to escape into the sealed chamber. The contents of the sealed chamber could be sampled by releasing a small amount of the chemical into a container through a valve at the bottom of the chamber. There was no integral mechanism for isolating the contents from the air after the sample came through the valve.

The chamber was intended to be a diagnostic tool for determining the contents of each cylinder.

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Bluebook (online)
368 S.E.2d 268, 235 Va. 380, 4 Va. Law Rep. 2568, 1988 Va. LEXIS 46, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/philip-morris-inc-v-emerson-va-1988.