Phantom of Clearwater v. Pinellas County

894 So. 2d 1011, 2005 Fla. App. LEXIS 184, 30 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. D 205
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
DecidedJanuary 14, 2005
Docket2D03-5408
StatusPublished
Cited by34 cases

This text of 894 So. 2d 1011 (Phantom of Clearwater v. Pinellas County) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Phantom of Clearwater v. Pinellas County, 894 So. 2d 1011, 2005 Fla. App. LEXIS 184, 30 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. D 205 (Fla. Ct. App. 2005).

Opinion

894 So.2d 1011 (2005)

PHANTOM OF CLEARWATER, INC., d/b/a Phantom Fireworks, Appellant,
v.
PINELLAS COUNTY, Appellee.

No. 2D03-5408.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

January 14, 2005.
Rehearing Denied March 7, 2005.

*1013 Marion Hale and Sharon E. Krick of Johnson, Pope, Bokor, Ruppel & Burns, LLP, Clearwater, for Appellant.

Susan H. Churuti, County Attorney; Robert C. Swain and Michael A. Zas, Senior Assistant County Attorneys; and Suzanne M. Mucklow, Assistant County Attorney, Clearwater, for Appellee.

Steven G. Mason of Steven G. Mason, P.A., Orlando, for Amicus Curiae Galaxy Fireworks, Inc.

ALTENBERND, Chief Judge.

Phantom of Clearwater, Inc., d/b/a Phantom Fireworks, appeals a final judgment that dismissed its action against Pinellas County for a declaratory judgment. Phantom Fireworks sought a judgment declaring Pinellas County Ordinance 03-48 unconstitutional. This ordinance regulates businesses that sell fireworks. Phantom Fireworks maintains that the entire ordinance is unconstitutional because it is expressly or impliedly preempted by chapter 791, Florida Statutes (2003). In the alternative, it maintains that either the entire ordinance or portions thereof are unconstitutional because they facially conflict with provisions of chapter 791. The trial court concluded that the ordinance is not expressly nor impliedly preempted by chapter 791 and that none of the provisions challenged by Phantom Fireworks directly conflict with the provisions of chapter 791. We affirm the judgment with the exception of one sentence of section 2 of the ordinance, which we conclude to be in direct conflict with section 791.06, Florida Statutes (2003). That sentence is severable from the remainder of the ordinance under the ordinance's severability clause.

I. THE LIMITED RECORD ON APPEAL AND THE STIPULATED JUDGMENT

On August 1, 2003, Phantom Fireworks filed a short complaint seeking declaratory relief and an injunction. The only exhibit to the complaint was ordinance 03-48.[1] A copy of the ordinance is also attached to this opinion as appendix A. The complaint alleged that the entire ordinance is unconstitutional because it is preempted by chapter 791, or because it conflicts with that chapter. Paragraph 14 of the complaint alleged five reasons why the ordinance *1014 as a whole conflicts with the state statutes. With the complaint, Phantom Fireworks filed a verified motion for temporary injunction that repeated the content of the complaint under oath.

Pinellas County filed an answer to the complaint. Each side filed a memorandum of law addressing the motion for temporary injunction. Phantom Fireworks' memorandum argued that the ordinance was unconstitutional because the field of fireworks legislation was expressly or impliedly preempted by chapter 791. Alternatively, Phantom Fireworks argued that sections 2, 3, 4, and 5 of the ordinance were in direct conflict with specific provisions of chapter 791.

On September 23, 2003, the trial court entered an order denying the motion for temporary injunction. That order states in its entirety:

THIS CAUSE came before the Court on Plaintiff's Verified Motion for Temporary Injunction, with a certificate of service date of August 25, 2003. The Court has reviewed the Court file and all of the submitted case law. Wherefore, it is
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiff's Verified Motion for Temporary Injunction is DENIED. The Court finds that Pinellas County Ordinance number 03-48 is not pre-empted by, nor does it specifically conflict with the provisions of Chapter 791 of the Florida Statutes, the ordinance is consistent with state law and public policy regulating the sale and use of fireworks and is therefore constitutional.

If a hearing was held to resolve this motion, no transcript exists in our record. Thus, we have no findings of fact or any evidentiary basis to understand how the statute and the ordinance are being enforced in Pinellas County or in other counties. Except for the one-sentence legal conclusion in this order, we have no guidance from the trial court about its decision-making process.

After the trial court entered the order denying the motion for temporary injunction, the parties stipulated to the entry of a final judgment "based upon the Court's earlier order denying plaintiff's verified motion for temporary injunction." The judgment states:

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that a final judgment is entered in favor of the defendant, Pinellas County, and against the plaintiff, Phantom of Clearwater, Inc., d/b/a/ Phantom Fireworks, for the reasons set forth in this Court's order dated September 22, 2003, denying plaintiff's verified motion for temporary injunction. The defendant, Pinellas County, shall go hence without day and the plaintiff's complaint is dismissed with prejudice.

Phantom Fireworks appeals this judgment.

This judgment is procedurally unusual and has made our review more difficult. An order denying a temporary injunction at the inception of a lawsuit is rarely a ruling that justifies a dismissal of the cause with prejudice. A temporary injunction hearing is not the equivalent of a hearing on a motion for summary judgment or a trial.

Under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.610 and the case law interpreting that rule, a temporary injunction is an extraordinary remedy that can only be granted if the movant establishes (1) a likelihood of irreparable harm, (2) unavailability of an adequate legal remedy, (3) substantial likelihood of succeeding on the merits, and (4) support for the injunction within considerations of public interest. See Snibbe v. Napoleonic Soc'y of Am., Inc., 682 So.2d 568, 570 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). Here, the order denying the motion *1015 for temporary injunction did not resolve the issues in accordance with rule 1.610. Instead, it provided the equivalent of a one-sentence declaratory judgment on the merits of the complaint. Of course, a court entertaining a request for a temporary injunction must assess the "substantial likelihood of success on the merits" and may conclude that the movant's failure to show such a substantial likelihood augurs ill for the future of the movant's claims. Nevertheless, a request for a temporary injunction would not normally anticipate nor permit a definitive ruling on the underlying claim.

Phantom Fireworks maintains in its brief that the trial court pressured the parties to agree that the ruling on the motion for temporary injunction would be dispositive of the entire case. Our record does not contain support for this argument. Whatever the reason, after the temporary injunction was denied, Phantom Fireworks entered into a stipulation permitting the entry of the terse final judgment.

Stipulated judgments, if carefully conceived and entered after the trial court has had the opportunity to address the issue presented, can be an efficient method to present an issue to an appellate court. But they can also create problems. Cf. Polk County v. Sofka, 702 So.2d 1243 (Fla.1997) (holding appellate court had no jurisdiction to review defective stipulated judgment). The stipulated judgment in this case is somewhat inconsistent.

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Bluebook (online)
894 So. 2d 1011, 2005 Fla. App. LEXIS 184, 30 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. D 205, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/phantom-of-clearwater-v-pinellas-county-fladistctapp-2005.