NOTICE 2015 IL App (5th) 130465 Decision filed 02/27/15. The text of this decision may be NO. 5-13-0465 changed or corrected prior to the filing of a Petition for Rehearing or the disposition of IN THE the same.
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT ________________________________________________________________________
GENE PETERS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Williamson County. ) v. ) No. 07-L-105 ) HERRIN COMMUNITY UNIT SCHOOL ) DISTRICT NO. 4 and THE BOARD OF ) EDUCATION OF HERRIN COMMUNITY ) SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 4, ) Honorable ) Brad K. Bleyer, Defendants-Appellees. ) Judge, presiding. ________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justices Chapman and Stewart concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 This appeal concerns a personal injury case in which plaintiff, Gene Peters, alleges
he was injured by running into a bumper that was not visible during a high school
summer football camp held on the football field of defendants, Herrin Community Unit
School District No. 4 and the Board of Education of Herrin Community School District
No. 4. After sustaining his injuries, plaintiff filed a complaint alleging defendants
negligently maintained its football facility by failing to cut and mow the weeds where the
bumper was located, which the trial court dismissed with prejudice. 1 ¶2 Plaintiff later filed a two-count third amended complaint alleging the negligence
count described above and a willful and wanton count. The willful and wanton count
alleges plaintiff was injured as a direct and proximate result of defendants' willful and
wanton conduct, that being the grass was not properly cut, the bumper was not visible,
and the coaches of the football team instructed plaintiff to take a particular route when
running from the locker room to the football field causing plaintiff to run into the
bumper.
¶3 Defendants moved to dismiss the first count of plaintiff's third amended complaint
alleging negligence, contending the negligence count was identical to the count alleged in
plaintiff's second amended complaint on which the trial court granted summary judgment
in favor of defendants. Defendants also moved for summary judgment as to the second
count of plaintiff's third amended complaint alleging willful and wanton conduct,
asserting its conduct did not rise to the level of willful and wanton conduct.
¶4 The trial court granted defendants' motion to dismiss on the first negligence count
holding there was no genuine issue of material fact and finding the immunity provision
pursuant to section 3-106 of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort
Immunity Act (Act) (745 ILCS 10/3-106 (West 2012)) applied to the facts of the case.
The trial court also granted defendants' motion for summary judgment as to plaintiff's
second count alleging willful and wanton conduct after finding defendants' conduct failed
to rise to the level of willful and wanton conduct and there was no genuine issue of
material fact.
¶5 Plaintiff now appeals the orders of summary judgment entered in favor of 2 defendants on plaintiff's negligence count and willful and wanton count. Plaintiff
contends the trial court erred by granting defendants' motions for summary judgment,
alleging the high school football camp was not immune from liability because the
football facility is intended for educational rather than recreational purposes. Plaintiff
also alleges defendants' failure to properly maintain the football facility amounted to
willful and wanton conduct, and there existed questions of material facts concerning
whether plaintiff was instructed by coaches to run in a certain direction to the football
field from the locker room.
¶6 Defendants contend this court does not have jurisdiction to hear plaintiff's count
alleging negligence, asserting plaintiff did not file his notice of appeal within the time
period required by Illinois Supreme Court Rule 303 (eff. May 30, 2008). In the
alternative, defendants assert the trial court properly granted defendants' motion for
summary judgment after finding no genuine issue of material fact and holding the
immunity provision of section 3-106 applied to the facts of the case. Regarding plaintiff's
willful and wanton count, defendants assert the trial court properly granted summary
judgment in favor of defendants after finding no evidence of willful and wanton conduct
and no genuine issue of material fact.
¶7 We agree with defendants that this court does not have jurisdiction to hear
plaintiff's negligence count. Plaintiff filed his notice of appeal outside the time period
required by Supreme Court Rule 303. Accordingly, this court does not have jurisdiction.
¶8 Regarding defendants' motion for summary judgment granted by the trial court
concerning the willful and wanton count, we disagree with the trial court's finding of no 3 genuine issue of material fact. There are genuine issues of material fact concerning the
route the football players took from the locker room to the football field and whether
coaches employed by defendants instructed the players to take a particular route. The
route the players took from the locker room to the football field, and whether the players
were instructed by their coaches to take that route, is important for determining whether
immunity pursuant to section 3-106 is applicable and should be considered by the trial
court on remand. For the following reasons, we reverse and remand with directions.
¶9 BACKGROUND
¶ 10 On July 26, 2006, plaintiff, Gene Peters, participated in a summer football camp
sponsored by defendants, Herrin Community Unit School District No. 4 and the Board of
Education of Herrin Community Unit School District No. 4. Plaintiff was an incoming
sophomore at Herrin High School. On said date, plaintiff alleges that while running from
the locker room to the practice football field pursuant to the coach's instruction, he
tripped on a bumper in the shot-put pit area of the field causing him to fall and sustain
injuries. Plaintiff alleges said bumper was located on the route the players were
instructed to take by the coaches. Plaintiff underwent back surgeries and treatment for a
pinched nerve and pulled muscles from the injuries he sustained.
¶ 11 Plaintiff's original complaint alleging a single count of negligence against
defendants was filed on July 24, 2007. This appeal concerns plaintiff's two-count third
amended complaint filed on November 21, 2012, alleging a single count of negligence
and a single count of willful and wanton conduct.
¶ 12 In the negligence count of plaintiff's third amended complaint, plaintiff alleges he 4 was unable to see the bumper because defendants negligently maintained the football
facility by failing to mow the grass and cut the weeds. In the willful and wanton count,
plaintiff alleges defendants' failure to mow the grass was conduct performed "with
reckless disregard for the safety of the plaintiff."
¶ 13 Relative to this appeal, the trial court granted defendants' motion for summary
judgment on plaintiff's second amended complaint alleging a single count of negligence
on May 23, 2012. The trial court found no genuine issue of material fact and held the
immunity provision pursuant to the Act (745 ILCS 10/3-106 (West 2012)) applied to the
facts of the case.
¶ 14 On June 20, 2012, plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file an interlocutory appeal
of the trial court's May 23, 2012, order granting defendants' motion for summary
judgment on plaintiff's second amended complaint. On the same date, plaintiff filed a
motion for leave to file a third amended complaint requesting to add a willful and wanton
count against defendants. On October 23, 2012, plaintiff's motion for interlocutory
appeal and motion for leave to file a third amended complaint were granted by the trial
court.
¶ 15 Plaintiff filed his third amended complaint on November 21, 2012, alleging one
count of negligence and one count of willful and wanton conduct against defendants.
Defendants then moved to dismiss the count of negligence, asserting it was identical to
the negligence count in plaintiff's second amended complaint for which the court granted
summary judgment in favor of defendants. The trial court granted defendants' motion to
dismiss on August 15, 2013. Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal on August 16, 2013. 5 ¶ 16 Defendants also filed a motion for summary judgment as to the second count of
plaintiff's third amended complaint alleging willful and wanton conduct, which the trial
court granted on August 21, 2013. The trial court found the record contained no evidence
plaintiff was instructed by his coaches to run a particular route from the locker room to
the football field causing plaintiff to run into the bumper, and held defendants' conduct
did not rise to the level of willful and wanton conduct.
¶ 17 Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal on September 19, 2013, for the trial court's order
entered on August 21, 2013. On January 9, 2014, plaintiff filed a motion for leave to
amend the record on appeal and an amended notice of appeal. Plaintiff requested from
this court that the leave to amend the record on appeal include an amended notice of
appeal filed in the trial court in an attempt to include the trial court's May 29, 2012, order
granting defendants' motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's negligence count. On
March 5, 2014, this court denied plaintiff's motion for leave to amend the record and
plaintiff's motion for leave to amend the notice of appeal.
¶ 18 ANALYSIS
¶ 19 The two issues we are asked to address on appeal concern the count of negligence
and the count of willful and wanton conduct alleged in plaintiff's third amended
complaint, and whether the trial court erred in granting defendants' motions for summary
judgment.
¶ 20 Plaintiff first asserts defendants were negligent by failing to properly maintain its
football facility. Plaintiff contends this negligence count is reviewable by this court
pursuant to his moving for leave to amend the record with an amended notice of appeal. 6 We disagree, as this court lacks jurisdiction for review of plaintiff's negligence count.
¶ 21 The trial court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's
second amended complaint on May 23, 2012. Said complaint alleged a single count of
negligence against defendants. The trial court found no genuine issue of material fact
and found the immunity provision of section 3-106 applied to the facts of this case.
¶ 22 Illinois Supreme Court Rule 303 requires the filing of a notice of appeal to be
within 30 days of the entry of a final judgment of the circuit court. Ill. S. Ct. R. 303 (eff.
May 30, 2008). A notice of appeal filed more than 30 days after the entry of a circuit
court's final judgment will be insufficient to vest the appellate court with jurisdiction.
Ebert v. Dr. Scholl's Foot Comfort Shops, Inc., 137 Ill. App. 3d 550, 556, 484 N.E.2d
1178, 1183 (1985). However, Rules 303(b)(5) and (d) also provide an additional 30 days
after expiration of the original 30-day filing period for an appellant to file an amended
notice of appeal. Ill. S. Ct. Rs. 303(b)(5), (d) (eff. May 30, 2008). But after expiration of
the additional 30-day safety-valve period, the appellate court lacks jurisdiction to permit
any further amendment of the notice of appeal. Ebert, 137 Ill. App. 3d at 556, 484
N.E.2d at 1183.
¶ 23 Plaintiff filed an amended notice of appeal and a motion for leave to amend the
record on appeal in an attempt to add a negligence count against defendants on January 9,
2014. In the instant case, plaintiff's amended notice of appeal was not filed within Rule
303's 30-day deadline. Plaintiff failed to file a notice of appeal for the trial court's May
29, 2012, or August 15, 2013, orders dismissing plaintiff's negligence count within 30
days. Plaintiff also did not file his motion for leave to amend pursuant to Rule 303(d) 7 within the additional 30 days following expiration of the original 30 days to file the
notice of appeal. In addition, this court has already denied plaintiff's motion for leave to
amend record on appeal and motion to amend notice of appeal.
¶ 24 Accordingly, this court lacks jurisdiction concerning the trial court's entry of
summary judgment in favor of defendants regarding plaintiff's negligence count.
¶ 25 The next issue on appeal concerns the summary judgment entered in favor of
defendants concerning plaintiff's count of willful and wanton conduct. The trial court
found no evidence that plaintiff was instructed by his coaches to run onto the football
field in a certain direction causing him to run into the bumper and found no evidence that
defendants' action amounted to willful and wanton conduct.
¶ 26 Plaintiff alleges the coaches instructed the players to take a specific route when
running from the locker room to the football field, that being through a gate in a
northeasterly direction toward the football field. Plaintiff asserts in order for the players
to abide by the instructed route, they were forced to encounter an area used for discus and
shot-put competitions during the track and field season, and that area was covered with
overgrown weeds and grass.
¶ 27 Plaintiff alleges he was injured after running into the bumper in the discus and
shot-put area because the overgrown weeds and grass obscured the bumper from his
view. Plaintiff also claims the coach who instructed the players to run the route was
standing near the discus and shot-put area when he sustained his injuries.
¶ 28 Plaintiff and defendants disagree whether the football players were directed by the
football coaches to run in a particular path from the locker room to the football field. 8 Defendants assert the football coaches never gave such instruction to the football players,
while plaintiff asserts the football coaches did give such instruction.
¶ 29 Plaintiff asserts the trial court's entry of summary judgment in favor of defendants
was improper because there are unresolved questions of fact concerning whether the
football players were instructed by the football coaches to run a certain direction when
running from the locker room to the football field. Plaintiff also contends defendants are
not immune from liability pursuant to section 3-106 because the area of the football field
in question was intended and permitted for educational purposes rather than recreational
purposes, and that the action of defendants amounted to willful and wanton conduct.
Plaintiff alleges the trial court's entry of summary judgment in favor of defendants should
be overturned and a jury should determine whether defendants are liable for the injuries
sustained by plaintiff.
¶ 30 Defendants assert the trial court properly granted them summary judgment after
finding no evidence of willful and wanton conduct and no genuine issue of material fact,
contending it is immune from liability because the willful and wanton exception to the
immunity provision of section 3-106 does not apply to the facts of the case.
¶ 31 The trial court held there was no genuine issue of material fact and found the
immunity provision of section 3-106 applied to the facts of the case. We disagree. There
is controversy concerning the route taken by the football players when running from the
locker room to the football field, and a genuine issue of material fact existed as to
whether the football players were directed by coaches working for defendants to run in a
particular direction. 9 ¶ 32 A motion for summary judgment should be granted when the pleadings,
depositions, and affidavits reveal there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Williams v. Nagel, 162 Ill. 2d
542, 547, 643 N.E.2d 816, 818 (1994). As defendants note, "If, upon all the evidence
contained in the record, it cannot be established with reasonable certainty that defendant's
acts caused plaintiff's injury, summary judgment is appropriate." (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Chelkova v. Southland Corp., 331 Ill. App. 3d 716, 729, 771 N.E.2d
1100, 1111 (2002). However, if there is a genuine issue of material fact, the trial court
should deny the motion for summary judgment. Stivers v. Bean, 2014 IL App (4th)
130255. As the Illinois Supreme Court has noted, "summary judgment is a drastic
measure and should only be granted if the movant's right to judgment is clear and free
from doubt." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Chatham Foot Specialists, P.C. v.
Health Care Service Corp., 216 Ill. 2d 366, 376, 837 N.E.2d 48, 55 (2005).
¶ 33 The record in this case contains a genuine issue of material fact, as it is not clear
and free from doubt whether the coaches instructed the players to run in a particular area
when running from the locker room to the football field. Because we find a genuine issue
of material fact after review of the record concerning the route players took when running
to the football field and whether the players were directed by the coaches to run in a
particular direction, defendants should not have been entitled to summary judgment.
¶ 34 The direction the players ran and whether the players were directed to run a certain
direction is important for determining whether immunity pursuant to section 3-106 is
applicable. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's finding of no genuine issue of 10 material fact and remand with directions to consider the direction and course taken by the
football players when running from the locker room to the football field, and whether
coaches employed by defendants instructed the players to run in a particular direction.
¶ 35 Also raised on appeal is the issue of immunity pursuant to the Act. 745 ILCS
10/3-106 (West 2012). Defendants assert they are immune from liability under the Act
because the football field was used for recreational purposes rather than educational
purposes. Conversely, plaintiff alleges defendants are not immune from liability under
the Act because the football field was used for educational purposes rather than
recreational purposes. Because of this court's disposition, we need not make a
determination on the issue of immunity as it will be addressed by the trial court on
remand. However, we will briefly address the issue.
¶ 36 Section 3-106 of the Act states the following:
"Neither a local public entity nor a public employee is liable for an injury where
the liability is based on the existence of a condition of any public property
intended or permitted to be used for recreational purposes, including but not
limited to parks, playgrounds, open areas, buildings or other enclosed recreational
facilities, unless such local entity or public employee is guilty of willful and
wanton conduct proximately causing such injury." 745 ILCS 10/3-106 (West
2012).
¶ 37 There are several matters the trial court should consider in determining whether
the summer football camp was educational or recreational.
¶ 38 First, plaintiff alleges there is no Illinois case law distinguishing the term 11 "recreational" from "educational." However, as defendants indicate, there does exist
Illinois case law distinguishing the two terms.
¶ 39 Recreation has been defined as "refreshment of the strength and spirits after toil:
DIVERSION, PLAY." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ozuk v. River Grove Board
of Education, 281 Ill. App. 3d 239, 243, 666 N.E.2d 687, 690 (1996). The court in Ozuk
defined "play" as suggesting an opposition to work, implying activity but emphasizing
the absence of any aim other than amusement, diversion, or enjoyment.
¶ 40 Ozuk involved a case in which the plaintiff was injured after he slipped and fell in
a school gymnasium during gym class. The plaintiff sustained injuries and brought an
action against the city board of education. The circuit court found section 3-106 of the
Act applied to the facts of the case and the board of education was immune from liability.
The circuit court distinguished recreation from physical education, indicating "physical
education and recreation have different aims: whereas the former seeks to instruct, the
latter aspires merely to amuse." Ozuk, 281 Ill. App. 3d at 244, 666 N.E.2d at 690.
¶ 41 The appellate court reversed in Ozuk, finding there was a question of material fact
concerning whether the gymnasium was only used for mandatory physical education, in
which case immunity pursuant to section 3-106 would not apply, or whether the
gymnasium was also permitted or encouraged to be used for recreational activities such
as recess and extracurricular activities, in which case immunity pursuant to section 3-106
would apply. The appellate court remanded the case "for the limited purpose of
developing facts related to the intended or permitted use of the gymnasium." Ozuk, 281
Ill. App. 3d at 244, 666 N.E.2d at 691. 12 ¶ 42 An appropriate issue the trial court should analyze is whether the area in question
falls within the scope of section 3-106 and whether the area is permitted or intended to be
used for recreational activities. Bubb v. Springfield School District 186, 167 Ill. 2d 372,
383, 657 N.E.2d 887, 893 (1995).
¶ 43 Plaintiff alleges section 3-106 of the Act applies when the applicable public
property is intended or permitted to be used for recreational purposes. As plaintiff
indicates, public property may have more than one intended use. Bubb, 167 Ill. 2d at
383, 657 N.E.2d at 893.
¶ 44 Bubb involved a case where a minor plaintiff was injured while riding her bike
from the sidewalk of an elementary school onto an adjacent playground. The court held
the school property at issue was within the statutory immunity provision, finding
recreational immunity applied if the property was intended or permitted to be used for
recreational purposes regardless of its primary purpose.
¶ 45 The court in Bubb suggested that while certain areas of public schools are
comprised of public property intended or permitted to be used for recreational purposes
and therefore are immune from liability, the entire facility itself cannot be immune per se.
Bubb, 167 Ill. 2d at 381, 657 N.E.2d at 892. Accordingly, application of section 3-106
under the Act should be based on a case-by-case examination of the nature of the
property. Adamczyk v. Township High School District 214, 324 Ill. App. 3d 920, 926,
755 N.E.2d 30, 36 (2001).
¶ 46 As the record in this case indicates, plaintiff admitted playing football was an
extracurricular activity that was not mandatory and for which he did not receive school 13 credit. Also, plaintiff paid a fee to participate in the football camp that took place in the
summer months outside of the school calendar year. The trial court should consider these
factors in determining whether the football camp was recreational or educational and
whether the football facility where the camp took place was intended or permitted to be
used for recreational or educational purposes.
¶ 47 Also on remand, the trial court should consider whether defendants' action
amounted to "willful and wanton conduct." Under the Act, a local public entity has the
duty to exercise ordinary care to maintain its property in a reasonably safe condition.
Majewski v. Chicago Park District, 177 Ill. App. 3d 337, 339, 532 N.E.2d 409, 410
(1988).
¶ 48 However, when liability is based on the condition of any public park, playground,
or recreational area, the local public entity is only liable when it is guilty of willful and
wanton misconduct proximately causing the injury. Majewski, 177 Ill. App. 3d at 339,
532 N.E.2d at 410.
¶ 49 A public entity may be found to have engaged in willful and wanton conduct if it
has been informed of a hazardous condition or knew others had been injured because of
that condition. Winfrey v. Chicago Park District, 274 Ill. App. 3d 939, 945, 654 N.E.2d
508, 513 (1995). Willful and wanton misconduct is "far beyond mere inadvertence,
which may constitute ordinary negligence," and requires a conscious disregard for the
safety of others. Majewski, 177 Ill. App. 3d at 340, 532 N.E.2d at 410-11.
¶ 50 The Act defines "willful and wanton conduct" as a "course of action which shows
an actual or deliberate intention to cause harm or which, if not intentional, shows an utter 14 indifference to or conscious disregard for the safety of others or their property. This
definition shall apply in any case where a 'willful and wanton' exception is incorporated
into any immunity under this Act." 745 ILCS 10/1-210 (West 2012).
¶ 51 Plaintiff indicates this court previously found "the allegation that [plaintiff] had
been instructed by the coaching staff to encounter the hazard was sufficient to support a
cause of action for willful and wanton conduct." Peters v. Herrin Community School
District No. 4, 401 Ill. App. 3d 356, 362, 928 N.E.2d 1258, 1263 (2010).
¶ 52 The duty of a local public entity is outlined in section 3-102(a) of the Act (745
ILCS 10/3-102(a) (West 2012)). Section 3-102(a) states the following:
"Except as otherwise provided in this Article, a local public entity has the duty to
exercise ordinary care to maintain its property in a reasonably safe condition for
the use in the exercise of ordinary care of people whom the entity intended and
permitted to use the property in a manner in which and at such times as it was
reasonably foreseeable that it would be used, and shall not be liable for injury
unless it is proven that it has actual or constructive notice of the existence of such
a condition that is not reasonably safe in reasonably adequate time prior to an
injury to have taken measures to remedy or protect against such condition." 745
ILCS 10/3-102(a) (West 2012).
¶ 53 Plaintiff cites to Jarvis v. Herrin City Park District, 6 Ill. App. 3d 516, 285 N.E.2d
564 (1972), which involved an action brought against the park district for injuries
sustained by a minor while on a sliding board-jungle bars combination owned by the park
district. Plaintiff notes the court in Jarvis defined willful and wanton conduct as "such a 15 lack of care for the rights of others as implies either a disregard of consequences or a
willingness to inflict injury, which conduct constitutes wilful negligence, notwithstanding
the absence of the element of ill-will toward the injured plaintiff." (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Jarvis, 6 Ill. App. 3d at 521-22, 285 N.E.2d at 568.
¶ 54 The court in Jarvis ultimately found nothing in the factual allegations sufficient to
show willful and wanton conduct on part of the park district. The court held that mere
negligence of the park district in failing to maintain the concrete under the beam which
fell onto and injured the plaintiff did not amount to willful and wanton conduct.
Specifically, the court stated, "There were no factual allegations in either count of the
complaint to show that defendant had any actual intent to injure plaintiff, or was guilty of
wilful and wanton conduct relating thereto, or exhibited such a conscious or intentional
disregard of the rights of others as to warrant the conclusion that injury was intended."
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Jarvis, 6 Ill. App. 3d at 524, 285 N.E.2d at 570.
¶ 55 Defendants contend the case at issue resembles the Majewski case referenced
above, which involved a plaintiff who brought an action against the Chicago Park District
after falling on broken glass while playing touch football on a football field located in a
park. The plaintiff claimed the park district acted with willful and wanton conduct.
¶ 56 The court in Majewski stated a "wilful or wanton injury must have been intentional
or the act must have been committed under circumstances exhibiting a reckless disregard
for the safety of others, such as a failure, after knowledge of impending danger, to
exercise ordinary care to prevent it or a failure to discover the danger through
recklessness or carelessness when it could have been discovered by the exercise of 16 ordinary care." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Majewski, 177 Ill. App. 3d at 340,
532 N.E.2d at 410. Similar to the court's holding in Jarvis, the court in Majewski found
the plaintiff failed to allege willful and wanton conduct that would entitle the plaintiff to
recovery under the Act.
¶ 57 The trial court should review the record to determine whether the coaches were
informed of the dangerous condition the bumper presented and whether the actions of the
coaches amounted to willful and wanton conduct. The trial court should consider these
courts' findings to help make a determination.
¶ 58 CONCLUSION
¶ 59 For the reasons stated herein, this court lacks jurisdiction to issue an opinion on
plaintiff's negligence count. We reverse the trial court's entry of summary judgment in
favor of defendants and remand with directions.
¶ 60 Reversed and remanded with directions.
17 2015 IL App (5th) 130465 NO. 5-13-0465 IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIFTH DISTRICT
GENE PETERS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Williamson County. ) v. ) No. 07-L-105 ) HERRIN COMMUNITY UNIT SCHOOL ) DISTRICT NO. 4 and THE BOARD OF ) EDUCATION OF HERRIN COMMUNITY ) SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 4, ) Honorable ) Brad K. Bleyer, Defendants-Appellees. ) Judge, presiding. ________________________________________________________________________
Opinion Filed: February 27, 2015 ________________________________________________________________________
Justices: Honorable Richard P. Goldenhersh, J.
Honorable Melissa A. Chapman, J., and Honorable Bruce D. Stewart, J., Concur ________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys John Womick, Chad Orso, Womick Law Firm, Chtd., P.O. Box for 1187, Herrin, IL 62948 Appellant ________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys John J. Kurowski, Candice C. Kusmer, Kurowski Shultz, LLC, 228 for West Pointe Drive, Swansea, IL 62226 Appellees _______________________________________________________________________