NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
2025 IL App (3d) 240433-U
Order filed December 30, 2025 ____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ILLINOIS, ) of the 21st Judicial Circuit, ) Kankakee County, Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) Appeal No. 3-24-0433 v. ) Circuit No. 22-CF-569 ) JOHN MAGEE, JR., ) Honorable ) Kathy S. Bradshaw-Elliott, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding. ____________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE BERTANI delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Davenport and Anderson concurred in the judgment. ____________________________________________________________________________
ORDER
¶1 Held: (1) Defendant’s notice of appeal adequately vests this court with jurisdiction to consider the trial errors identified on appeal; and (2) defendant’s trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance when stipulating to the admission of a nontestifying witness’s videotaped police interview that implicated defendant without benefiting the defense.
¶2 Following a jury trial, defendant John Magee Jr. was convicted of first-degree murder for
the fatal shooting of DeArrion Harris and sentenced to 45 years’ imprisonment. On appeal,
defendant argues that he was denied effective assistance of counsel when his trial counsel (1) waived his sixth amendment right to confrontation by stipulating to the admission of a
nontestifying witness’s videotaped police interview that identified defendant as the individual who
shot and killed the victim and forwent impeachment of that witness with his numerous felony
convictions, (2) failed to object to the foundation of the State’s firearms identification expert’s
testimony linking bullet shell casings recovered from the crime scene to a recovered firearm
connected to defendant, and (3) failed to cross-examine the firearms identification expert on the
reliability of his discipline. Defendant also asserts the circuit court’s evidentiary ruling denying
his request to admit a report from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF)
related to the recovered firearm denied his right to a fair trial.
¶3 Before reaching the merits of the appeal, we consider the jurisdictional issue raised by
defendant’s motion for leave to file a late notice of appeal that was taken with the case. In sum,
contrary to the motion’s title, defendant requests to perfect a timely-filed notice pursuant to Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 606(c) (eff. April 15, 2024). For the reasons that follow, we deny defendant’s
motion but hold that the notice of appeal vests this court with jurisdiction and conclude that
defendant was rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. We reverse his conviction, vacate the
sentence entered on the judgment, and remand for a new trial.
¶4 I. BACKGROUND
¶5 In the early afternoon of November 13, 2014, Harris was shot and killed at his apartment
near the intersection of East Birch Street and North Harrison Avenue in Kankakee, Illinois. He
was 26 years old.
¶6 On September 23, 2022, defendant was indicted on two counts of first-degree murder (720
ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 2022)), and one count of aggravated battery (720 ILCS 5/12-
3.05(e)(1) (West 2022)), for the alleged shooting of Harris. The record indicates that the
2 aggravated battery count was dismissed before the cause proceeded to a five-day jury trial on the
first-degree murder counts in late February and early March 2024.
¶7 A. Trial
¶8 In its opening statement, the State presented Harris’s murder as the result of a drug turf
war. It forewarned the jury that many of the witnesses set to testify had disreputable pasts,
specifically identifying Jerry Bledson, a close associate of defendant, as someone that the jury
would dislike based on his extensive criminal background. However, the State underscored the
importance of Bledson’s testimony as “an eyewitness to the entire crime.”
¶9 Dr. Valerie Arangelovich, a forensic pathologist, performed Harris’s autopsy on November
14, 2014. She testified that Harris had three gunshot wounds, two of which fatally struck his heart
and lungs. His wounds indicated that he had not been shot at close range.
¶ 10 Felicia Wilson resided on North Harrison Avenue and was defendant’s neighbor in
November 2014. She testified that on the day of the shooting, she walked to defendant’s house to
assist with his newborn child around 11:30 a.m. Defendant’s girlfriend and her friend were present
in the apartment at that time. Defendant arrived about 10 minutes later and told his girlfriend he
“was finna do something crazy.” Suspecting potential danger, Wilson immediately returned home,
kept her children indoors, smoked marijuana, and surveilled her neighborhood. She heard sirens
and witnessed paramedics removing Harris’s body on a stretcher a short time later.
¶ 11 Bledson testified that he had known defendant all his life as a family friend who was a bit
older than him and thought of him as somewhat of a mentor. After Bledson was paroled in 2014,
he resided with defendant until defendant moved to his Harrison Avenue residence. Together they
sold drugs from defendant’s apartment. Harris, who resided next door, sold drugs in the same
vicinity, which created tension between Harris and defendant.
3 ¶ 12 Earlier on the day of the shooting, Bledson witnessed Harris verbally confront defendant
near their apartments concerning their competing drug operations. Bledson left before returning in
his car later in the day. He positioned himself in the alleyway behind the residence to sell drugs.
Defendant was in a nearby parked vehicle at that time. About 10 to 15 minutes after Bledson
arrived, defendant, in a tan coat and black pants, approached Bledson and stated that he was “finna
go holler at” Harris. Defendant walked over to Harris’s apartment, knocked on his door, and Harris
stepped outside. An “aggressive” argument ensued. Bledson then saw defendant, with his right
hand, pull a black 9-millimeter, Hi-Point handgun from his coat pocket and shoot multiple times
at Harris. Bledson had seen defendant with that gun before. Defendant and Harris were 10 to 15
feet apart. Harris was unarmed. Bledson immediately fled the scene in his car.
¶ 13 He had a phone conversation with defendant a day or two later during which defendant
revealed he was hiding out in Minnesota and that he had thrown the murder weapon “in the creek
or something by the Reed’s Rent All.” Bledson was not questioned by police until approximately
eight months after Harris’s death when Bledson was in police custody for an unrelated offense.
Bledson identified defendant as the shooter in a photo array. He also identified the weapon and
conveyed the information from his phone call with defendant. He was cross-examined on his
extensive criminal history and was serving a seven-year sentence in federal prison for extortion at
the time of trial. He did not receive consideration for his testimony.
¶ 14 Duquan Walton, a friend of Harris’s, testified that on the day of the shooting, he was
“chilling” with Harris and others outside of an apartment on Harrison and Birch. He then left for
the corner store several blocks away. As he returned, Walton heard gunshots and came upon Harris
on the floor bleeding. Walton testified to seeing a man carrying a gun running from the scene of
the crime but equivocated on details. About a month after the incident, police interviewed Walton,
4 and he identified defendant as the shooter when presented with a photo array. Walton could not
recall the details of this interview at trial, attributing his lapse of memory to the passage of time
and drug use. He had been charged with a Class X felony in 2014 or early 2015 that was reduced
to a Class 1 felony. He did not receive consideration for his testimony.
¶ 15 Justin Larusso was a customer of Harris’s who testified that he saw Harris twice on the day
of the shooting. When approaching Harris’s apartment door that morning to purchase drugs,
someone from behind him yelled, “Hey, come here. Check it out,” apparently trying to attract his
business. He then witnessed Harris in a verbal altercation with the beckoning man. Harris retrieved
a baseball bat from his apartment and returned outside where a “bunch of voices yell[ed] over each
other.” The argument eventually deescalated. Larusso purchased his drugs and left. He returned
about three or four hours later to purchase more drugs. He knocked on the door and someone
behind the door responded, “Is he gone, or something like that.” The door was opened and Larusso
saw Harris’s body lying on the floor.
¶ 16 The police interviewed Larusso the day after the shooting and a video of the interview was
admitted and played in court. 725 ILCS 5/115-10.1(c)(2)(C) (West 2024). During the interview,
he told the police that the man who initially approached him had gotten out of a car and wore a tan
and brown leather coat with “money signs” on it. He identified defendant as this individual and
the one who argued with Harris when presented with a photo array. However, at trial he asserted
a lapse in memory, did not recall identifying defendant in the photo array, claimed to have only
identified defendant in the brown coat because other “people” informed him of that fact, and
asserted that he did not look behind him during the verbal altercation on the morning of the
shooting. He acknowledged a litany of prior convictions for criminal offenses.
5 ¶ 17 Quincy Campbell was scheduled to testify during the third day of trial. On the morning of
his scheduled testimony, Campbell’s counsel informed the State and defendant’s counsel that his
client was “going to potentially” invoke his fifth amendment right against self-incrimination.
Prompted by the court’s questioning, the State conveyed this information to the court and indicated
it would not be offering Campbell immunity in exchange for his testimony.
¶ 18 That afternoon, the State read a stipulation into the record before playing a videotaped
interview Campbell gave to Kankakee Police detectives, with a minor redaction. The stipulation
noted that the interview was conducted on October 26, 2018, pursuant to a signed proffer
agreement. The parties stipulated to its foundation and had no objection to its admission and
publication to the jury. The court did not directly inquire whether defendant himself consented to
the stipulation. The record is devoid of the reason defense counsel entered into the stipulation.
¶ 19 The video depicts Campbell in an orange jumpsuit and handcuffed. He affirmed that he
spoke to the police on November 20, 2014, and told them that he did not see the individual who
shot Harris. He acknowledged that this statement was untruthful. He lied due to fear of becoming
involved in the case and being caught up in the “ripple effects” of a murder but had in fact seen
what transpired.
¶ 20 According to Campbell, he set out on the day of the shooting to visit his grandmother who
resided on East Birch near Harris’s apartment. After parking, he saw a friend across the street.
They greeted each other and after a brief conversation, walked into Harris’s apartment together.
Harris was seated at a table in the company of several other individuals. Campbell went to the
bathroom and while washing his hands, overheard Harris say, “Bro, this guy is talking pistol talk.”
Those in Harris’s apartment then went outside while Campbell watched from near the apartment
doorway. From his view, he saw Harris ask defendant to fight, while defendant stood silent with
6 his hands inside his coat pockets. Bledson was standing next to defendant. Defendant then removed
an “automatic *** black” handgun from his coat pocket and started shooting at Harris. Defendant
was the only individual present with a gun. Campbell witnessed defendant shoot twice before
quickly turning back into the apartment and barricading himself inside a bedroom. After hearing
additional shots, he exited the bedroom and saw Harris on the floor, bleeding from the mouth.
Concerned because he had been recently paroled, he left soon after the police arrived. He estimated
that he had arrived at the scene only 5 to 10 minutes before the shooting. Campbell also identified
defendant in a photo array during the interview and in the accompanying questionnaire recognized
him as the “guy who killed” Harris. Campbell signed both the photo array and questionnaire, which
the State published the documents to the jury after his videotaped interview concluded.
¶ 21 Several members of the Kankakee Police Department testified to their encounters with
defendant or their investigation into Harris’s death.
¶ 22 Officer Tracy Monferdini testified that at 12:30 p.m. on November 13, 2024, she left the
Kankakee police station and headed home for lunch. During her drive, she saw a black man with
a white stocking cap and a “tan and brown and white kind of patchwork-looking jacket” running
north on Harrison Avenue. As she drove past, she saw his face and affirmatively identified
defendant as the man in court. She did not observe defendant carrying a firearm. When she returned
to the police station from lunch, defendant was being interviewed at the station.
¶ 23 Officer Shane Finley was on patrol in a squad car seven or eight blocks from the scene
when he received a call at about 12:30 p.m. that there were shots fired at 500 Birch. While driving
to the scene, Finley saw a man out of breath in an alleyway wearing a “brown coat, maybe tan”
with a white stocking cap. Once the man saw Finley, he stopped. The man then started to run again.
Finley apprehended him and brought him to the police station for questioning. He identified this
7 man as defendant. Finley later retraced his steps to where he initially saw defendant and located a
handgun near a creek on Willow Street, the same street as the business “Reeds Rental All,” and in
about “the same vicinity” of their first encounter. Finley never saw defendant with a gun.
¶ 24 Detective Steven Hunter conducted a crime scene investigation shortly after the shooting.
He located a fired bullet lodged in the ground outside of the back of the apartment complex which
he sent off for analysis. He did not find any shell casings during his preliminary review of the
scene. He then took photographs of the area where the gun was found. He placed the firearm in a
bag and took it to the police station for further inspection by the evidence technician, Detective
Scott Monferdini. There were two bullets in the magazine and one in the chamber of the weapon
when recovered. The recovered bullets were not processed for DNA or fingerprints. He returned
to the apartment complex at 5:30 p.m. and found five shell casings in the grass behind the building.
They were also submitted for analysis.
¶ 25 Detective Monferdini testified that he swabbed the gun and magazine the day after the
shooting and transported the evidence to a crime lab for analysis within a week of the shooting.
Christopher Webb, an Illinois State Police forensic scientist specializing in forensic biology,
analyzed those swabs and detected no human DNA. During cross-examination, Detective
Monferdini briefly testified to the protocol of tracing a gun’s history by receiving a report from
the ATF to see who purchased the firearm. Defendant’s counsel sought to introduce the ATF report
received in this case and elicit Detective Monferdini’s testimony that the report indicated the gun
was purchased by someone other than defendant. The State objected on hearsay grounds which the
court sustained following an offer of proof.
¶ 26 Illinois State Police forensic scientist Kurt Zielinski, a firearms identification expert,
testified to his examination of the recovered Hi-Point Model C9, 9-millimeter semiautomatic
8 handgun, the recovered bullet, and shell casings. As part of his examination, he fired test shots
from the Hi-Point handgun. The general class characteristics from the crime scene bullet matched
the Hi-Point handgun and he knew of no other type of weapon that had those same characteristics.
However, the individual characteristics from the bullet and test shots were inconclusive. Therefore,
he could neither identify nor eliminate the recovered bullet “as having been fired from this
particular firearm.” He did conclude that “all five fired cartridge cases *** were fired from the Hi-
Point *** pistol in this case.” Cross examination focused on the inconclusive finding that the
recovered bullet was fired from the Hi-Point handgun. Defense counsel did not question his
conclusion that the shell casings came from the recovered gun, nor did he endeavor to cross-
examine the witness concerning scientific peer reports that called into question the reliability of
bullet casing identification.
¶ 27 Detective David Skelly interviewed defendant after he was apprehended on the day of
Harris’s death. A video of the interview was played to the jury in which defendant stated he was
across the street from his residence on his way to buy drugs when he heard gunshots and ran
northbound. Photographs taken at the interview depicted defendant in a white stocking cap and
tan, white, and brown checkered coat covered with images of hundred-dollar bills. Skelly swabbed
defendant’s hands, which were analyzed by an Illinois State Police forensic scientist, Scott
Rochowicz, who specializes in microscopy and trace chemistry. Rochowicz testified the swabbed
samples were negative for gunshot residue, though he explained it was easy to remove gunshot
residue through rubbing or wiping. Detective Monferdini later interviewed defendant on
September 13, 2022, just 10 days before his indictment. A recording of the interview was played
at trial, during which defendant denied shooting Harris, admitted he was at the crime scene, and
9 that he saw an individual named “Black” shoot Harris. According to defendant, Black was
murdered in retaliation.
¶ 28 Former Police Chief Robin Passwater, who held the position of Investigations Commander
on the date of the shooting, testified to his participation in the case. His department intentionally
withheld information that they had recovered the Hi-Point handgun and the location of its recovery.
As such, that information had not been divulged to the public when Bledson described the gun and
its whereabouts to the authorities based on defendant’s purported description during their phone
call. Passwater traced the ownership of the gun and found it did not come back to defendant or
Bledson.
¶ 29 The defense called one witness in its case-in-chief, Jessica Robinson, the operation
supervisor of 911 dispatch. She reviewed the records of police communication at the time of the
shooting which revealed slight discrepancies with the timeline Finley testified to concerning
where, and at what time, he had apprehended defendant.
¶ 30 During its initial and rebuttal closing arguments, the State relied on Bledson’s testimony
and Campbell’s videotaped police interview, which it stated was “as good as testimony about what
happened at the time,” arguing both supported the proposition that defendant had shot and killed
Harris. It replayed snippets of Campbell’s interview for the jury followed by the prosecutor’s
reiteration of key statements, such as Campbell’s identification of defendant as the shooter,
Bledson standing at defendant’s side during the shooting, and Campbell’s reasoning for not being
initially forthright with authorities due to his fear of “ripple effects.” It interlaid Bledson’s
testimony and Campbell’s interview to create a single narrative of the moments surrounding the
shooting, which it argued were consistent with one another. Defense counsel argued in closing that
Bledson and Campbell were unbelievable, noting Campbell waited until he was in police custody
10 in 2018 and wanted something in return on his current case before speaking to the police. After
deliberation, the jury returned a guilty verdict.
¶ 31 The court conducted a sentencing hearing on June 17, 2024. It denied defendant’s motion
for a new trial and sentenced him to a term of 45 years’ imprisonment in the Illinois Department
of Corrections. On June 21, 2024, defendant filed a motion to reconsider his sentence based on
asserted medical problems and mental health disorders. The court denied his motion to reconsider
on July 1, 2024, and the notice of appeal was filed on that date.
¶ 32 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 33 On appeal, defendant argues he was denied his constitutional right to a fair trial based on
three points of error. His initial appellate contentions concern the representation he received at trial
as he argues his counsel provided him with ineffective assistance in two material ways. First, he
argues that the stipulation to the admission of Campbell’s videotaped police interview surrendered
his constitutional right to confront and cross-examine Campbell with no apparent benefit to his
defense. Moreover, the stipulation precluded him from impeaching Campbell with his prior felony
convictions. Second, he contends that he was rendered ineffective assistance for his counsel’s
failure to question Zielinski on his conclusion that tied the crime-scene shell casings to the
recovered firearm and for not questioning Zielinski regarding the reliability of firearms
identification as a scientific field. Unrelated to his ineffective assistance of counsel claims,
defendant maintains that the circuit court erred by sustaining the State’s hearsay objection and
excluding the ATF report which revealed he was not the owner of the firearm in question.
¶ 34 Before considering defendant’s appeal, we must address the threshold jurisdictional issue
raised by his motion for leave to file a late notice of appeal which we have taken with his case.
¶ 35 A. Defendant’s Motion for Leave
11 ¶ 36 Approximately six months into the pendency of his appeal, defendant filed a motion with
this court for leave to file a late notice of appeal. According to his motion, after reviewing the
preliminary documents in this matter, his appellate counsel became aware that the notice of appeal,
which was prepared, signed, and filed by the circuit court clerk, violated Illinois Supreme Court
Rule 606 (eff. April 15, 2024). Specifically, the notice identified the wrong judgment date and was
not in the requisite form. Defendant concedes that, at the time of his motion’s filing, Rule 606’s
deadline for amendment had lapsed. Nonetheless, he argues that he may correct these errors by
perfecting his notice under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 606(c) (eff. April 15, 2024), which allows
a reviewing court to extend the time for filing a notice of appeal under certain circumstances.
¶ 37 The State objects to the motion on the grounds that Rule 606(c) is not a vehicle for
amendment; rather, by its plain language, it affords a reviewing court discretion to allow a late
filing only where no notice of appeal has been previously filed. Given defendant did file a timely
notice of appeal, he is bound by the amendment deadlines within Rule 606 that have since expired,
and he therefore may not amend the errors that he has identified.
¶ 38 Defendant asserts in reply that the State’s reading of Rule 606(c) is unduly narrow and that
the provision’s language concerning “the failure to file a notice of appeal” permits amendment by
implying a failure to file a correct notice of appeal. Id. He also raises equitable concerns that the
State’s position endangers a criminal defendant’s constitutional right to appeal. See People v.
Abdullah, 2019 IL 123492, ¶ 19 (explaining that in Illinois, criminal defendants possess the
fundamental right to appeal their convictions following the entry of their sentence). Should the
State’s position prevail, a non-party’s error can deprive a defendant’s right to appeal without
procedural recourse—an injustice, defendant argues, that is most often visited upon indigent
criminal defendants.
12 ¶ 39 Reviewing courts possess an independent duty to consider jurisdictional issues. People v.
Smith, 228 Ill. 2d 95, 104 (2008). A notice of appeal confers jurisdiction on a reviewing court
(People v. Patrick, 2011 IL 111666, ¶ 21), and the court may only consider judgments that the
notice specifies (People v. Lewis, 234 Ill. 2d 32, 37 (2009)). Its purpose is to notify the prevailing
party that the other party seeks review of the circuit court’s judgment. Patrick, 2011 IL 111666, ¶
21. A notice “ ‘should be considered as a whole’ ” and successfully confers jurisdiction “ ‘when it
fairly and adequately sets out the judgment complained of and the relief sought, thus advising the
successful litigant of the nature of the appeal.’ ” Smith, 228 Ill. 2d at 105 (2008) (quoting Lang v.
Consumers Insurance Service, Inc., 222 Ill. App. 3d 226, 229 (1991)). A notice of appeal is
generally construed liberally. Id. at 104.
¶ 40 However, we may not excuse the filing requirements of our supreme court’s rules
governing appeals. Secura Insurance Co. v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co., 232 Ill. 2d 209, 217-
18 (2009). Illinois Supreme Court Rule 606 sets forth the requirements of perfecting a criminal
appeal. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 606(a) (eff. April 15, 2024). Rule 606(d) governs amendment to a notice
and states in relevant part that a “notice of appeal may be amended as provided in Rule 303(b)(5).”
Ill. S. Ct. R. 606(d) (eff. April 15, 2024). Rule 303 governs appeals from final judgments in civil
cases, and 303(b)(5) permits the appellant to amend the notice of appeal without leave of court
during the initial filing period. Ill. S. Ct. R. 303(b)(5) (eff. July 1, 2017). Therefore, the initial
period to amend a notice of appeal without restriction under Rule 606 is within 30 days after a
final judgment or 30 days after the entry of an order disposing a motion directed against the final
judgment. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 606(b) (eff. April 15, 2024). Beyond the initial 30-day period, a notice
may be amended only by motion pursuant to Rule 303(d). Ill. S. Ct. R. 303(b)(5) (eff. July 1,
2017). Rule 303(d) affords the reviewing court discretion to grant leave to file an amended notice
13 within 30 additional days after the filing period, provided that the motion for leave is supported by
a “showing of a reasonable excuse” for failing to timely file. Ill. S. Ct. R. 303(d) (eff. July 1, 2017).
Once Rule 303(d)’s additional period “has lapsed, ‘the appellate court lacks jurisdiction to permit
any further amendment of the notice of appeal.’ ” People v. Ratliff, 2024 IL 129356, ¶ 16 (quoting
Peters v. Herrin Community Unit School District No. 4, 2015 IL App (5th) 130465, ¶ 22 (citing
Ebert v. Dr. Scholl’s Foot Comfort Shops, Inc., 137 Ill. App. 3d 550, 556 (1985))).
¶ 41 In sum, Rule 606(b) and (d), in tandem with Rule 303(b)(5) and (d), provide that a
reviewing court may grant a criminal defendant’s request to amend a timely-filed notice of appeal
within 60 days from the entry of a final judgment or disposal of a motion directed against the
judgment, if the request is supported by a motion showing a reasonable excuse. See Ill. S. Ct. R.
606(b), (d) (eff. April 15, 2024); see also Ill. S. Ct. R. 303(b)(5), (d) (eff. July 1, 2017).
¶ 42 Our supreme court clarified the strictures of Rule 606’s amendment deadlines in Ratliff, a
case cited by both parties. Ratliff, 2024 IL 129356, ¶¶ 15-18. In Ratliff, a criminal defendant
appealed his 15-year prison sentence after the court entered his guilty plea for robbery. Id. ¶¶ 1, 5.
The notice of appeal expressly identified that it was the denial of his motion to reconsider his
sentence, and not his conviction, being appealed. Id. ¶ 8. After more than six months passed,
however, defendant filed a motion in the appellate court and was granted leave to amend his notice
to clarify that he was appealing his conviction. Id. The appellate court went on to affirm his
conviction and sentence. Id. ¶ 9.
¶ 43 The supreme court held that it was improper for the appellate court to reach the merits of
defendant’s challenged conviction based on his belated request to amend his notice and vacated
its judgment on the grounds that it lacked jurisdiction to do so. Id. ¶¶ 18, 48. It reasoned that the
notice conferred jurisdiction only to review the specified judgment appealed from—the order
14 denying the motion to reconsider his sentence—and not the order the appellate court ultimately
reviewed concerning the entry of defendant’s guilty plea. See id. ¶¶ 17-18.
¶ 44 The State asserts Ratliff is instructive, Rule 606’s amendment deadlines control, and we
must deny defendant’s request to amend his defective notice. Defendant maintains that Rule 606(c)
offers a viable avenue for amendment which in relevant part provides:
“Extension of Time in Certain Circumstances. *** on motion supported by
a showing of reasonable excuse for failing to file a notice of appeal on time filed in
the reviewing court within 30 days of the expiration of the time for filing the notice
of appeal, or on motion supported by a showing by affidavit that there is merit to
the appeal and that the failure to file a notice of appeal on time was not due to
appellant’s culpable negligence, filed in the reviewing court within six months of
the expiration of the time for filing the notice of appeal, in either case accompanied
by the proposed notice of appeal, the reviewing court may grant leave to appeal and
order the clerk to transmit the notice of appeal to the trial court for filing.” Ill. S.
Ct. R. 606(c) (eff. April 15, 2024).
In conformity with this provision, defendant avers that he filed his motion for leave to file a late
notice of appeal within six months of the initial filing period, there is merit to his appeal, and the
errors on the notice were not due to his own culpable negligence.
¶ 45 By its plain language, Rule 606(c) does not concern amendment. People v. Knight, 2023
IL App (3d) 220198, ¶ 21 (explaining supreme court rules are interpreted under the cardinal rule
of construction by using their plain and ordinary language). Rule 606, considered in its entirety
(Ferris, Thompson & Zweig, Ltd. v. Esposito, 2017 IL 121297, ¶ 22), affords one avenue for
amendment pursuant to provision 606(d). See Ill. S. Ct. R. 606(d) (eff. April 15, 2024). The
15 language clarifying the deadline for amendment is clear and unambiguous. Knight, 2023 IL App
(3d) 220198, ¶ 21; Ratliff, 2024 IL 129356, ¶ 16. Defendant moved for leave to file a late notice
of appeal on January 10, 2025, more than six months after initiating his appeal, which is well
beyond the amendment period. Supra ¶ 41. We therefore must deny defendant’s motion to amend
his notice, filed under the guise of a motion to file a late notice, as untimely.
¶ 46 Irrespective of this denial, we hold that the notice conferred jurisdiction upon this court to
consider defendant’s asserted trial errors related to his conviction. The circuit court sentenced
defendant following a hearing on June 17, 2024. Subsequently, he filed a motion seeking
reconsideration of his sentence, which was denied on July 1, 2024. On that date, he filed his notice
of appeal. The notice discordantly features both dates; it lists the “Judgment Order Date” as June
17, 2024, and contains the following language: “Appellant hereby appeals to the Appellate Court
of Illinois, 3rd District, from the Judgment Order of the Circuit Court of Kankakee County, Illinois,
entered in said cause on: 7/1/2024.” Therefore, as it relates to the order appealed from, the error in
defendant’s notice is not the identification of an incorrect judgment date, as defendant’s motion
suggests. Rather, its identification of two judgment dates shrouds which “Judgment Order”
defendant is appealing.
¶ 47 This differs from the error presented in Ratliff’s notice of appeal. The defendant in Ratliff
sought to challenge the judgment order on his accepted guilty plea entered on November 19, 2019.
Ratliff, 2024 IL 129356, ¶ 6. However, his notice explicitly identified the judgment date as May
7, 2021—the date the court denied his motion to reconsider his sentence—and to support that as
the judgment appealed from, included a paragraph stating that “If appeal is not from a conviction,
nature of order appealed from: MOTION TO RECONSIDER SENTENCE.” Id. ¶ 8; In Re Marcus,
2022 IL App (3d) 170014, ¶ 46 n. 4 (A reviewing court may sua sponte take judicial notice of
16 “public documents contained in the record of any other judicial proceeding if doing so” aids in
deciding the appeal.). No such definitive language qualifies defendant’s notice here.
¶ 48 Defendant’s notice is distinguishable from notices that omit the judgment complained of
entirely. See Ratliff, 2024 IL 129356, ¶ 8; see also Smith, 228 Ill. 2d at 103, 105. Here, while the
notice identifies the appealed-from judgment order as the date defendant’s motion to reconsider
was denied, other indicia on the notice suggest he is appealing from his conviction. It accurately
identifies his offense, sentence, and the date his sentence was entered as the “Judgment Order
Date.” See Patrick, 2011 IL 111666, ¶ 25. Applying a liberal construction to defendant’s notice,
we hold that it adequately apprised the State that he is appealing from his conviction. See id. ¶ 21.
As evidenced by his appellate brief, defendant’s appeal rests on challenging his conviction and
thereby rectifies any confusion the State could have endured from the notice’s multiple dates. Id.
¶ 26 (“Briefs, not the notice of appeal, specify the precise points relied upon for reversal.”).
Further, by specifying the date his sentence was entered as the “Judgment Order Date,” we are
conferred jurisdiction to consider his conviction. See Ratliff, 2024 IL 129356, ¶ 17.
¶ 49 We likewise conclude that the notice’s incorrect form, which defendant concedes is not
prescribed by Rule 606, does not present a substantive issue. People v. Kellerman, 342 Ill. App.
3d 1019, 1024 (2003); Ill. S. Ct. R. 606(d) (eff. April 15, 2024) (A notice shall be in or substantially
adopt “the form provided in the Article VI Forms Appendix.”). Where a notice’s deficiency is a
matter of form and not substance, we have jurisdiction “if (1) the notice fairly and accurately
advises the appellee of the nature of the appeal; and (2) the appellee is not prejudiced by the
deficiency in form.” Kellerman, 342 Ill. App. 3d at 1024. The notice fairly and accurately advised
the State of the nature of defendant’s appeal. Moreover, we cannot conclude the State was
17 prejudiced by the notice’s deficiencies, and the State makes no argument in its objection to
defendant’s motion that it was.
¶ 50 B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
¶ 51 Turning to the merits, defendant’s initial assertion is he was rendered ineffective assistance
when his counsel stipulated to the admission of Campbell’s videotaped police interview.
Defendant argues the stipulation deprived him of his fundamental right to confront and cross-
examine Campbell without any perceived benefit. Counsel also failed to impeach Campbell with
his numerous prior felony convictions. The State responds that defense counsel’s decision to
stipulate was valid trial strategy under the circumstances and that defendant cannot establish he
was prejudiced by the stipulation based on the remaining evidence adduced at trial.
¶ 52 The sixth amendment guarantees criminal defendants the right to the effective assistance
of counsel. U.S. Const., amend. VI; People v. Hughes, 2012 IL 112817, ¶ 44. Ineffective assistance
of counsel claims are governed by the familiar two-part test outlined in Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). See People v. Albanese, 104 Ill. 2d 504, 526-27 (1984) (adopting
Strickland’s two-part test). First, defendant must show that his counsel’s performance was
deficient. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. To satisfy this prong, a defendant must demonstrate his
counsel’s performance was deficient through “ ‘ errors so serious that counsel was not functioning
as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.’ ” People v. Clendenin, 238
Ill. 2d 302, 317 (2010) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). There is a strong presumption that
the challenged action or inaction may have been the product of sound trial strategy. People v.
Smith, 195 Ill. 2d 179, 188 (2000). Matters of trial strategy are typically immune from ineffective
assistance of counsel claims. People v. Manning, 241 Ill. 2d 319, 327 (2011). Even so, the
presumption may be overcome “where no reasonably effective defense attorney, confronted with
18 the circumstances of the defendant’s trial, would engage in similar conduct.” People v. Watson,
2012 IL App (2d) 091328, ¶ 24. A reviewing court accords deference to counsel’s “ ‘exercise of
judgment, discretion or trial tactics even where [it] would have acted differently.’ ” People v.
Gallagher, 2012 IL App (1st) 101772, ¶ 25 (quoting People v. Ingram, 382 Ill. App. 3d 997, 1006
(2008)). We review the totality of counsel’s conduct in determining whether defendant received
effective assistance (People v. Evans, 186 Ill. 2d 83, 94 (1999)) and consider the entire record in
analyzing ineffective assistance claims (People v. Burnett, 2019 IL App (1st) 163018, ¶ 9).
¶ 53 Second, defendant must show that he was prejudiced by his counsel’s deficient
performance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. To establish prejudice defendant must demonstrate that,
but for defense counsel’s deficient performance, “there is a reasonable probability that the result
of the proceeding would have been different.” Clendenin, 238 Ill. 2d at 317 (citing Strickland, 466
U.S. at 694). A reasonable probability means probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome, i.e., counsel’s deficient performance rendered an unreliable trial result or the proceeding
fundamentally unfair. People v. Enis, 194 Ill. 2d 361, 376 (2000). Both prongs of the Strickland
test must be proven, and failure to establish either is fatal to an ineffective assistance claim. People
v. Jackson, 2020 IL 124112, ¶ 90. Defendant raises his ineffective assistance claim on direct
appeal, which may be done “when the basis of the claim can be ascertained from the record.”
Watson, 2012 IL App (2d) 091328, ¶ 21; People v. Veach, 2017 IL 120649, ¶ 47 (holding that, in
general, a defendant must raise ineffective assistance of counsel claims on direct review or risk
forfeiting the claim).
¶ 54 Central to defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim is the alleged deprivation of
his confrontation rights through his counsel’s action. A criminal defendant possesses the
fundamental right to confront witnesses against him. People v. Campbell, 208 Ill. 2d 203, 211
19 (2003). This right is enshrined in the confrontation clause of our federal and state constitutions,
providing that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right *** to be confronted
with the witnesses against him ***.” U.S. Const., amend. VI; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 8. The
confrontation clause confers two types of protections: “ ‘the right physically to face those who
testify against him, and the right to conduct cross-examination.’ ” People v. Hood, 2016 IL 118581,
¶ 19 (quoting Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 51 (1987)). Accordingly, a criminal
defendant’s right to confront witnesses encompasses the right to cross-examination. People v.
Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d 81, 130 (1998); People v. Pacheco, 2023 IL 127535, ¶ 45. The confrontation
clause is designed to ensure reliable evidence “ ‘by subjecting it to rigorous testing in the context
of an adversary proceeding before the trier of fact.’ ” People v. McClanahan, 191 Ill. 2d 127, 132
(2000) (quoting Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845 (1990)). Defense counsel may stipulate to
the admission of evidence that impinges upon a defendant’s confrontation right, thereby waiving
the right, if the defendant does not object to counsel’s decision and “the decision to stipulate is a
matter of legitimate trial tactics or prudent trial strategy.” Campbell, 208 Ill. 2d at 217, 220-21.
Defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim is subject to a de novo standard of review.
People v. Hale, 2013 IL 113140, ¶ 15. Furthermore, we review de novo a defendant’s claim that
his or her sixth amendment right of confrontation was violated, as it presents a question of law.
People v. Barner, 2015 IL 116949, ¶ 39.
¶ 55 For the deficient performance prong of defendant’s ineffective assistance claim, the
question before us is whether counsel’s decision to stipulate to the admission of Campbell’s
videotaped police interview was sound trial strategy. To support the notion that his counsel’s
decision to stipulate was neither a legitimate trial tactic nor prudent strategy, defendant identifies
the importance of Campbell’s interview to the State’s case. As a purported eyewitness, Campbell
20 recalled observing defendant confront and shoot Harris without provocation. These statements
were, by and large, taken at face value by the Kankakee Police detectives conducting the interview.
According to defendant, and confirmed by the video, the tenor of Campbell’s interview was non-
confrontational—not tantamount to a rigorous cross-examination that he was entitled to.
¶ 56 The State counters that counsel’s stipulation was valid trial strategy. Admission of the
videotaped interview in lieu of Campbell’s live testimony prevented the State from fully examining
its own material witness to elicit additional information or clarify inconsistencies in his statements.
It relies on People v. McClinton, 2024 IL App (4th) 230667-U, ¶ 49, an unpublished order, as
persuasive authority addressing a similar circumstance. Defense counsel in McClinton, a first-
degree murder case involving a fatal shooting at a gas station in Springfield, Illinois, stipulated to
the admission of a nontestifying witness’s police recorded interview. Id. ¶¶ 5, 9. During the
interview, the witness professed that while he accompanied defendant at the gas station, he
overheard the victim’s brother state that he was carrying a firearm, heard defendant respond that
he was also carrying, saw the defendant brandish a gun at which point he left the gas station before
hearing shots, and subsequently drove away with the defendant. Id. ¶¶ 6, 9-10. During a hearing
on a motion for new trial, his counsel explained the stipulation allowed the defense to establish the
fact that the victim’s brother was armed. Id. ¶ 27. Counsel was concerned this statement would be
excluded as hearsay absent the stipulation. Id.
¶ 57 The appellate court held that defense counsel was not ineffective for stipulating to the
admission of the interview. Id. ¶¶ 53, 56. It reasoned that while the defense was limited to what
the nontestifying witness stated during the recorded interview, so too was the State. Id. ¶ 49. It
characterized the decision to stipulate as “strategic,” and one done in “response to an unexpected”
trial complication Id. It was unpersuaded by defendant’s assertion that, on balance, the admission
21 of the nontestifying witness’s interview was damaging, whereas its purported benefit—to establish
the victim’s brother as armed—was slight and merely cumulative when both he and another state
witness testified to that fact. Id. ¶ 51. Rather, in upholding the reasonability of the stipulation, the
McClinton court categorized the admitted statements complained of as “at best, tangential” to the
State’s case. Id. ¶ 56. It considered that the interview “was essential to defendant’s case” in that it
supported the “only plausible basis” for defendant’s self-defense or mitigation arguments. Id. ¶ 53.
While the appellate court “did not necessarily find trial counsel’s decision was best,” it concluded
that defendant failed to “overcome the strong presumption it was reasonable.” Id.
¶ 58 McClinton is distinguishable on several fronts. Notably, the record in McClinton included
defense counsel’s explanation as to why he found it appropriate to stipulate to the video interview’s
admission. Id. ¶ 27. In turn, the appellate court analyzed defense counsel’s rationale which, in part,
aided in determining the reasonableness of his decision to stipulate. See id. ¶¶ 50-52. The record
in this matter does not include defense counsel’s reasoning for stipulating to the admission of
Campbell’s interview. A related and more worrisome dissimilarity is that the McClinton stipulation
offered an articulable benefit to the defendant’s case. Casting aside cost-benefit concerns of
cumulative evidence, the stipulation supported that defendant felt threatened with imminent harm
based on the victim’s brother’s statement as the “only plausible basis” for his trial strategy. Id. ¶
53. In contrast, here, defendant proceeded on his presumption of innocence. Campbell’s statements
made during his recorded interview directly undermined this trial strategy. Campbell’s interview
corroborated Bledson’s testimony, identifying defendant as the shooter and as the “guy who killed”
Harris.
¶ 59 We are unpersuaded by the State’s position that the stipulation allowed defendant to
sufficiently undermine Campbell’s credibility during closing, when, had no stipulation been
22 entered, the defendant could have done so through the exercise of his right to cross-examine
Campbell. Furthermore, we are unconvinced by the State’s assertion that it endured any detriment
akin to defendant’s inability to confront and cross-examine Campbell when it had the benefit of
eliciting such damaging statements via the stipulation.
¶ 60 In reviewing the entire record before us, we cannot see how the stipulation to such
damaging corroborating evidence can be characterized as a legitimate trial tactic or prudent trial
strategy. It cannot be characterized as such in this instance where defendant received virtually no
benefit from his counsel’s stipulation. See Campbell, 208 Ill. 2d at 220 (explaining defense
counsel’s stipulation to nontestifying witness’s testimony was a matter of sound trial tactics where
counsel used the stipulation to establish defendant’s lack of criminal intent in residential burglary
case); see also Clendenin, 238 Ill. 2d at 307-08, 325-26 (noting case presented by stipulation
preserved suppression issues for review which was in line with pursued defense strategy).
Therefore, examining defense counsel’s conduct as a whole, the decision to stipulate to the
admission of Campbell’s videotaped interview was unsound and “no reasonably effective defense
attorney, confronted with the circumstances of the defendant’s trial, would engage in similar
conduct.” Watson, 2012 IL App (2d) 091328, ¶ 24.
¶ 61 We also hold that defendant was prejudiced by his counsel’s stipulation. Regarding
Strickland’s prejudice prong, we conclude that there is a reasonable probability that, absent the
admission of Campbell’s interview, the jury would have had a reasonable doubt respecting
defendant’s guilt. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695.
¶ 62 The State argues that even without the admission of Campbell’s videotaped interview, the
trial evidence overwhelmingly supports defendant’s conviction. We disagree. The significance of
Campbell’s videotaped interview to the State’s case was anything but tangential. See McClinton,
23 2024 IL App (4th) 230667-U, ¶ 56. The State’s reliance on Campbell’s interview in its closing
argument reveals its significance. During closing, the State explained its burden as follows:
“To sustain the charge of first-degree murder, the State must prove the
following propositions: [f]irst proposition, that the defendant performed the acts
which caused the death of DeArrion Harris; second proposition, that when the
defendant did so, he intended to kill DeArrion Harris or he knew that his acts
create[d] a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to DeArrion Harris.”
See 720 ILCS 5/9-1 (West 2022).
To support that it satisfied the first proposition, the State relied on Bledson and Campbell’s
accounts as eyewitnesses to the shooting. While making only a passing reference to Campbell in
its opening statement, it freely acknowledged that the jury would not like Bledson due to his
lengthy criminal background. Its closing argument repeated that sentiment by asserting that
Bledson “is a convicted felon looking for some kind of consideration.”
¶ 63 The State referenced Campbell’s interview over a dozen times in its closing arguments. It
repeatedly utilized the interview to bolster Bledson’s live testimony by arguing that: Campbell
also saw defendant shoot Harris, both Bledson and Campbell knew defendant, both Bledson and
Campbell “pointed” out defendant as the shooter, there were no inconsistencies between Bledson’s
testimony and Campbell’s statements, neither Bledson’s testimony nor Campbell’s statements
were impeached, Campbell heard the same thing Bledson did at the time of the shooting, they saw
the same thing, and their description of the positions of Harris and defendant at the crime scene
were consistent and explained the location where the bullet casings were recovered.
¶ 64 The State similarly used Campbell’s interview to bolster Larusso’s testimony. Larusso was
present at the scene on the date of the shooting. His trial testimony, however, diverged from the
24 statement that he provided to the authorities the day after the shooting. Namely, he testified that
he did not see defendant in a brown coat that day, did not look back when a voice called after him
to “check it out” during his first visit to Harris’s apartment, and did not see who Harris was arguing
with during that visit. He testified that he told the police he saw defendant in a brown coat because
other “people” had told him that the perpetrator wore a “money coat, *** a leather jacket,” and the
police showed him two photographs of defendant in a brown coat. He did not recall identifying
the defendant in the photo array despite the State publishing a recording of this identification to
the jury.
¶ 65 The State argued in closing that Larusso’s testimony was corroborated by both Campbell
and Bledson, and in rebuttal, that Campbell’s statements were consistent with that of Bledson and
Larusso. Lastly, Campbell’s interview indicated that he previously told the police in 2014 that he
did not witness the shooting and that he lied because he feared “ripple effects.” The State argued
this figure of speech meant he was fearful of being killed. The State employed this phrase to
explain both why Bledson fled the scene and did not talk to the police until he was in custody
months later, and why Larusso’s testimony diverged from his earlier statement.
¶ 66 In the absence of the stipulation to the Campbell interview, the State had a case with one
eyewitness to the shooting in Bledson who had a criminal record and arguably, as someone in
business with defendant, had the same motive to harm Harris, a competitor. It is evident from the
record that the State relied heavily on Campbell’s interview to bolster its case. In reaching that
conclusion, we find notable that no charges were levied against defendant in the nearly eight years
that elapsed between Harris’s death and defendant’s indictment, that nearly four years elapsed
between Campbell providing his initial statement and sitting for his interview, and another nearly
25 four years elapsed between Campbell’s recorded interview and the levy of charges against the
defendant.
¶ 67 Given its importance to the State’s case, we conclude that counsel was ineffective in
stipulating to the admission of the Campbell interview, thus waiving both defendant’s right to
cross-examination and depriving defendant the opportunity to impeach Campbell with his criminal
record. The State argues it is enough that Campbell was in custody during his interview and the
stipulation clarified that the interview was conducted pursuant to a signed proffer agreement. We
consider that a poor substitute for undermining credibility during cross-examination. People v.
Butler, 2025 IL 130988, ¶ 51 (“ ‘Cross-examination is the principal means by which the
believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are tested.’ ” (quoting Davis v. Alaska, 415
U.S. 308, 316 (1974))). We further conclude that there exists a reasonable probability that the
outcome would differ in the absence of the stipulation given the damaging nature of statements
introduced through Campbell’s interview and the State’s heavy reliance on the interview to
corroborate Bledson and Larruso’s testimonies. We hold that defendant received ineffective
assistance of counsel based on the stipulation to the admission of Campbell’s interview, and we
reverse on that ground. Therefore, we need not reach the remaining points of error defendant
alleges on appeal.
¶ 68 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 69 The judgment of the circuit court of Kankakee County is reversed, and this cause is
remanded for a new trial.
¶ 70 Reversed and remanded.