People v. Sanders

2023 IL App (3d) 200209-U

Opinion

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

2023 IL App (3d) 200209-U

Order filed October 4, 2023 ____________________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ILLINOIS, ) of the 10th Judicial Circuit, ) Peoria County, Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) Appeal No. 3-20-0209 v. ) Circuit No. 10-CF-500 ) DOMINICK M. SANDERS, ) Honorable ) Paul P. Gilfillan, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding. ____________________________________________________________________________

PRESIDING JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE delivered the judgment of the court. Justices McDade and Hettel concurred in the judgment. ____________________________________________________________________________

ORDER

¶1 Held: The court did not err by summarily dismissing the defendant’s postconviction petition.

¶2 The defendant, Dominick M. Sanders, appeals the first-stage dismissal of his

postconviction petition, arguing that the Peoria County circuit court erred by dismissing the

petition because it stated the gist of a claim that his sentence is unconstitutional as applied to him.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND ¶4 After a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1)

(West 2010)), aggravated battery with a firearm (id. § 12-4.2(a)(1)), aggravated discharge of a

firearm (id. § 24-1.2(a)(1)), aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (id. § 24-1.6(a)(1)), and unlawful

possession of a weapon by a felon (id. § 24-1.1(a)). The evidence established that Nick and Davon

Renfro engaged in a verbal argument with Willie Wilson, which turned into a physical altercation.

People v. Sanders, 2016 IL App (3d) 130511, ¶ 4. After the conclusion of the fight, Joyce Renfro

(Nick and Davon’s mother) engaged in an argument with a woman named Patrice. Id. Patrice

summoned the defendant, who exited a nearby apartment and began shooting an automatic firearm.

Id. The defendant shot Joyce in the leg and Nick in the back. Id. Nick died while being transported

to the hospital. Id.

¶5 The defendant was originally sentenced to 45 years’ imprisonment for first degree murder,

plus a 25-year firearm enhancement; a consecutive term of 25 years’ imprisonment for aggravated

battery with a firearm; and concurrent terms of 10 years’ imprisonment for aggravated discharge

of a firearm and 7 years’ imprisonment for aggravated unlawful use of a weapon. Id. ¶ 1. On the

unlawful use of a weapon by a felon count, no sentence was entered. Id. ¶ 6. However, on direct

appeal this court reversed the defendant’s sentence and remanded for a new sentencing hearing as

the court erroneously considered a factor inherent in the offense of first degree murder. Id. ¶ 17.

¶6 On remand, the defendant’s presentence investigation report (PSI) was updated, but also

included information from the previous PSI. The PSI stated that the defendant denied any

involvement in gangs and denied committing the offenses. The defendant had been on probation

at the time he committed the offenses in this case. He had multiple prior convictions. The defendant

had completed the ninth grade. He had never been employed until he went to the Illinois

Department of Corrections (IDOC). While the defendant had taken general education diploma

2 (GED) courses in the IDOC, he had not obtained his GED. Regarding the defendant’s family, he

noted that he had last seen his father when he was 12 or 13 years old and was raised by his mother,

Helen Sanders. The defendant reported that he began smoking cannabis and drinking alcohol when

he was 18 years old. Prior to his arrest, he smoked five or six “blunts” a day and drank alcohol on

the weekends. He had no prior drug or alcohol treatment, was in good mental and physical health,

and took no prescription medications. The defendant was 22 years old at the time he committed

the offenses.

¶7 Helen had filled out a PSI questionnaire in 2013, which stated that the defendant did not

have any problems during his childhood and was not a disciplinary problem as a child or teen. The

defendant had a good relationship with his mother. He was not violent and did not have any

learning disabilities. Helen stated that the defendant did not have a drug or alcohol problem, and

his friends and peers were a good support and a good influence. According to Helen, the defendant

was not abused as a child.

¶8 The case proceeded to a new sentencing hearing. The State did not present any evidence in

aggravation. Helen testified that she talked to the defendant regularly since he had been in the

IDOC and noted that he had matured significantly. She stated that the defendant was very

remorseful for his actions. The defendant chose not to offer a statement in allocution. The court

sentenced the defendant to the same sentence he had previously received. In doing so, the court

stated, inter alia,

“The defendant is 28 years old. He was somewhere around 21 at the time,

I think. Not a child. Not a babe in the woods. There was no crowd around him,

chanting him on. There was no evidence that anybody pushed him out the door

3 and said, ‘Go get ‘em, pal.’ He was a table of 1, no waiting, all by himself and a

gun.”

The defendant again challenged his sentence on direct appeal. This court affirmed the sentence.

People v. Sanders, 2019 IL App (3d) 170188-U, ¶ 2.

¶9 On March 9, 2020, the defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition, which is the subject

of this appeal. In the petition, the defendant argued, in pertinent part, that his sentence violated the

eighth amendment of the United States Constitution and the proportionate penalties clause of the

Illinois Constitution. The defendant cited Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and related case

law regarding juvenile sentencing. The defendant stated:

“Although, [the defendant] was a young adult of [22] years of age at the

time the alleged crime occurred, the same science with respects to the brain

development in juvenile offenders applies likewise to young adults, where studies

have concluded that the brain is not fully developed up to and including individuals

24 years of age. [The defendant] was raised in a single parent household in an

impoverished gang and drug infested housing projects in Peoria, Illinois. [The

defendant] was recruited and joined a violent street gang “Gangster Disciples[”] or

(G.D.’s) at the age of 11 years old, where he was continuously influenced by

negative influences throughout his adolescent years into young adulthood. At the

age of 13 he began to experiment with drugs and started to abuse various narcotic

substances, and as a result his values and interest in obtaining an education

diminished.”

The defendant attached to the petition his affidavit stating that everything contained in the petition

was true and accurate as well as a document titled “Scientific Rationale to Extend the

4 Graham/Roper/Miller protections upward from age 18 to 25,” written by James Garbarino at

Loyola University Chicago. On May 15, 2020, the court issued a written order summarily

dismissing the defendant’s petition. The defendant appealed.

¶ 10 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 11 The defendant argues that the circuit court erred by dismissing his postconviction petition

as frivolous and patently without merit. Specifically, the defendant argues that his petition stated

the gist of an arguable claim that his sentence is unconstitutional as applied to him, where he was

22 years old at the time of the offenses and the court did not consider his youth and its attendant

characteristics in imposing the de facto life sentence.

¶ 12 At the outset, we note that the State argues that the defendant’s claim is barred by

res judicata as the defendant could have raised it during his direct appeal. However, as the

defendant raises an as-applied constitutional challenge, we find that his claim is more properly

raised in a postconviction petition. See People v. Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 41 (finding “a

reviewing court is not capable of making an as-applied finding of unconstitutionality in the ‘factual

vacuum’ created by the absence of an evidentiary hearing and findings of fact by the trial court”

and the defendant’s juvenile sentencing claim would be more properly raised in a collateral

proceeding (quoting People v. Minnis, 2016 IL 119563 ¶ 19)). Therefore, we will consider whether

his petition stated the gist of a constitutional claim.

¶ 13 The Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2020)) provides a

process for a criminal defendant to assert that his conviction or sentence resulted from a substantial

denial of his rights under the United States Constitution, the Illinois Constitution, or both. People

v. Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d 1, 9 (2009). The defendant need only state the “gist” of a constitutional claim

at the first stage. Id. The petition may be summarily dismissed at the first stage of proceedings if

5 it is frivolous or patently without merit, such that it “has no arguable basis either in law or in fact.”

Id. at 16. “A petition which lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact is one which is based

on an indisputably meritless legal theory or a fanciful factual allegation.” Id.

¶ 14 The defendant raised his claim under both the eighth amendment to the United States

Constitution and the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. The eighth

amendment prohibits the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment. U.S. Const., amend. VIII.

The United States Supreme Court has applied the eighth amendment to juvenile offenders who

have committed serious offenses. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (holding the

eighth amendment prohibited imposition of the death penalty for offenders under the age of 18);

Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010) (the eighth amendment prohibits life without parole

for juvenile offenders convicted of a crime other than homicide); Miller, 567 U.S. at 479 (the

eighth amendment forbids mandatory life without parole for juvenile offenders). The Illinois

Supreme Court has further extended these protections. See People v. Reyes, 2016 IL 119271, ¶¶ 9-

10 (Miller applied to de facto life sentences); People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶ 41 (defining a

de facto life sentence for a juvenile as one of more than 40 years). For juvenile claims under the

eighth amendment, the United States Supreme Court has specifically drawn the line at the age of

18. Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 58 (citing Miller, 567 U.S. at 465). Therefore, the defendant’s claim,

as it relates to the eighth amendment, is meritless since he was 22 years old at the time of the

offenses.

¶ 15 The Illinois Supreme Court has included the possibility that young adult offenders could

raise a claim arguing their sentence was unconstitutional under the proportionate penalties clause.

See People v. Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶ 44 (finding a 19-year-old defendant was “not

necessarily foreclosed from renewing his as-applied [Miller] challenge in the circuit court” in a

6 postconviction petition). “The key question in this case is whether defendant falls into the category

of ‘young adult offenders.’ ” People v. Montanez, 2022 IL App (1st) 191930, ¶ 54. “The vast

majority of [appellate court] cases have drawn a bright line at 21 years old in determining who

qualifies as a ‘young adult offender.’ ” Id. ¶ 55. Our legislature has also continuously drawn the

line at 21 years old. As the court said in People v. Humphrey, 2020 IL App (1st) 172837, ¶ 34:

“While 21 is undoubtedly somewhat arbitrary, drawing a line there is in

keeping with other aspects of criminal law and society’s current general recognition

that 21 is considered the beginning of adulthood. In Illinois, a person under the age

of 21 when he or she commits first degree murder is now eligible for parole review

after serving 20 or more years of his or her sentence. 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-115 (West

Supp. 2019). The Illinois legislature has also prohibited the sale of nicotine and

tobacco products to persons under 21 (720 ILCS 675/1 (West Supp. 2019)),

prohibited the sale of alcohol products to persons under 21 (235 ILCS 5/6-16 (West

2016)); and made possession of a firearm by those under the age of 21 an

aggravating factor for aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (720 ILCS 5/24-

1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(I) (West 2016)).”

The majority of cases concerning a 22 year or older defendant have upheld the first-stage dismissal

of the defendant’s postconviction petition in similar circumstances. See, e.g., People v. Guerrero,

2022 IL App (1st) 210400, ¶ 34 (upholding first-stage dismissal of the defendant’s postconviction

petition where the defendant was 22 years old); People v. Williams, 2021 IL App (1st) 190535,

¶ 36 (same); People v. Suggs, 2020 IL App (2d) 170632, ¶¶ 35-36 (same for 23-year-old

defendant). We agree with this line of reasoning and find that, because the defendant was 22 years

old at the time of the offense, he was not a young adult offender, and his claim has no basis in law.

7 ¶ 16 Moreover, even accepting the defendant’s age, the defendant’s petition did not state the

gist of a constitutional claim. Though he only needed to present a limited amount of detail in his

petition, that does not mean that he was “excused from providing any factual detail at all

surrounding the alleged constitutional deprivation.” People v. Delton, 227 Ill. 2d 247, 254 (2008).

For the defendant to make his claim under Miller and its progeny, he had to allege how the evolving

science on juvenile maturity and brain development applied to the facts of his case. See Harris,

2018 IL 121932, ¶ 46. “In other words, defendant’s claim must allege facts specific to him as a

22-year-old adult and how they rendered him more akin to a juvenile when he committed his

offenses.” Williams, 2021 IL App (1st) 190535, ¶ 28. While a first-stage petition is liberally

construed, the court need not take facts as true if they are affirmatively rebutted by the trial record.

People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 381 (1998); People v. Rademacher, 2016 IL App (3d) 130881,

¶ 26.

¶ 17 Here, the only factual allegations the defendant raised in his petition were he (1) was raised

in a single parent household in “impoverished gang and drug infested housing projects,” (2) joined

a gang when he was 11, (3) was “influenced by negative influences” into adulthood, and (4) was

13 years old when he began experimenting with drugs and abusing various narcotics. However,

many of these allegations are rebutted by the record from the defendant’s sentencing hearing. The

defendant reported in his PSI that he never joined a gang, did not use narcotics, and began smoking

cannabis and drinking alcohol when he turned 18 years old. The defendant committed the crime

on his own; it was not the product of peer pressure or negative influence. His mother also reported

that the defendant did not have a drug or alcohol problem, his friends and peers were a good

support and a good influence, and the defendant was not abused as a child. There is nothing to

show that the defendant’s cognitive abilities were somehow affected or lessened by the

8 circumstances of his upbringing or that his cognitive development was that of a juvenile at the

time he committed the offenses. Because Miller and its progeny do not apply to a 22-year-old

offender, the defendant’s factual allegations are rebutted by the record, and the defendant’s

cognitive abilities were not that of a juvenile at the time of the crime, we find that the court properly

dismissed the defendant’s postconviction petition at the first stage.

¶ 18 In coming to this conclusion, we reject the defendant’s reliance on People v. Savage, 2020

IL App (1st) 173135, ¶ 76, which advanced a postconviction petition to the second stage where

the defendant was 22 years old, finding that the claim was not frivolous. We disagree with the

determination that such a claim is not frivolous, and we decline to follow Savage. See People v.

McKee, 2017 IL App (3d) 140881, ¶ 33. Further, Savage is factually distinguishable. In Savage,

the defendant alleged that his long-term drug addiction left him more susceptible to peer pressure

and rendered him “ ‘more volatile in emotionally charged settings.’ ” Savage, 2020 IL App (1st)

173135 ¶ 71. The defendant argued that his drug addiction and other issues made him the

functional equivalent of a juvenile. Id. ¶ 60. The Savage court found the defendant’s allegations

were supported by detailed hospital records and the PSI. Id. ¶ 72. This is a vast difference from

the defendant’s claim, where his allegations were rebutted by the record.

¶ 19 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 20 The judgment of the circuit court of Peoria County is affirmed.

¶ 21 Affirmed.