2020 IL App (1st) 172837
SIXTH DIVISION August 14, 2020
IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT
No. 1-17-2837
) THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County. ) v. ) No. 82 CR 00761 ) FRED HUMPHREY, ) Honorable ) James Michael Obbish, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge Presiding. )
PRESIDING JUSTICE MIKVA delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justices Connors and Harris concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 Defendant, Fred Humphrey, appeals from the circuit court’s denial of his request for leave
to file a successive petition for relief pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS
5/122-1 et seq. (West 2016)). On appeal, Mr. Humphrey argues that this denial was in error
because his claim that his natural-life sentence for offenses he committed at the age of 21 was
unconstitutional pursuant to the eighth amendment of the federal constitution (U.S. Const., amend.
VIII) and the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I,
§ 11) satisfied the cause-and-prejudice test. For the following reasons, we affirm.
¶2 I. BACKGROUND
¶3 Mr. Humphrey’s convictions stem from events occurring on January 8, 1982, when he— No. 1-17-2837
along with his codefendants Lydell White and Lawyer Pace—robbed Harrison Young outside of
Mr. Young’s apartment. Mr. White and Mr. Pace both pleaded guilty prior to Mr. Humphrey’s
trial and are not parties to this appeal. The facts outlined below are taken from Mr. Humphrey’s
direct appeal unless otherwise noted.
¶4 The evidence at trial showed that, on January 8, 1982, Mr. Young was returning to his
apartment when Mr. Humphrey, Mr. White, and Mr. Pace robbed him at gunpoint, taking his wallet
and 11 cents. As they turned to go, Mr. Young asked for his identification cards back. The men
then forced Mr. Young to let them into his apartment, where Mr. White proceeded to rob two
individuals who lived with Mr. Young—Dorothy Gordon and Stanley Stinson—taking $130 from
Mr. Stinson and 30 cents from Ms. Gordon. Mr. Pace forced Mr. Young into a bedroom, and
eventually one of the men entered the room, wrapped a blanket around Mr. Young’s head, tied his
feet and hands, and dragged him to the bathroom. Later, someone shoved a plastic bag into Mr.
Young’s mouth, wrapped a second blanket around his head, and then shot him twice in the face.
¶5 Ms. Gordon was raped twice by Mr. Pace, once by Mr. Humphrey, and was shot in the
side. Mr. Stinson was shot multiple times in the face. Before leaving the apartment, the men turned
on the gas stove and extinguished the pilot light, leaving the victims inside. Mr. Young survived
the incident, Ms. Gordon also survived but was paralyzed, and Mr. Stinson died from his wounds.
¶6 Mr. Pace turned himself into the police approximately 10 hours after the incident. Mr.
Humphrey was arrested soon after and eventually admitted his role in the incident, including raping
Ms. Gordon. He also submitted a written statement confirming these events. When he testified at
trial, however, while repeating much of his statement to the police, he denied raping Ms. Gordon.
¶7 The jury found Mr. Humphrey guilty of murder, attempted murder, armed robbery, home
invasion, and rape. Prior to sentencing, the circuit court received a presentence social investigation
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report concerning Mr. Humphrey, which detailed, among other things, his education history,
employment history, criminal background, and family background. Mr. Humphrey was
adjudicated a delinquent in 1975 for armed robbery, in 1976 for possession of a sawed-off shotgun,
and later that same year for murder. During the sentencing hearing, Mr. Humphrey argued in
mitigation that he was only 15 and 16 at the time of the prior offenses and that he was “a product
of the [Chicago Housing Authority].” He argued, “there is a lot of peer pressure on a young
individual who has no money and is unable to do really much outside the boundaries of Cabrini-
Green” and further noted that while he was incarcerated in the Juvenile Department of Corrections,
“he had some adjustment problems, but around 1979 he started to make extremely good progress”
and was released on parole in September 1980. Finally, Mr. Humphrey noted that he “didn’t initiate
or instigate this series of events” or take part in any planning, but rather that “[t]he case against
him is based on accountability.” Mr. Humphrey’s pastor also testified on his behalf at sentencing.
¶8 On December 9, 1982, the circuit court sentenced him to natural life in prison, reasoning:
“All I can say is I s[aw] you during the trial. You have no remorse. You have no remorse
even today, despite the fact that this is one of the most vicious killings, one of the vicious
acts of cruelty of one man to another that I have ever seen in my thirteen years on the
criminal bench. And I don’t see any possibility of you being rehabilitated *** as far as I
am concerned, there is no hope for you. Therefore I am going to give you natural life. And
I think that is the only way I am going to keep you out of hurting some more people.”
¶9 Mr. Humphrey appealed his conviction, and this court affirmed it on December 17, 1984.
People v. Humphrey, No. 1-82-2999 (1984) (unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule
23). Thereafter, Mr. Humphrey filed his first postconviction petition, which the circuit court denied
on January 24, 2002, and this court affirmed on March 30, 2004. People v. Humphrey, No. 1-02-
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0350 (2004) (unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23).
¶ 10 Mr. Humphrey filed his successive postconviction petition—the subject of this appeal—
on May 15, 2017, arguing that the United States Supreme Court case Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S.
460 (2012), and its Illinois progeny, specifically People v. House, 2015 IL App (1st) 110580,
vacated, 2019 IL App (1st) 110580-B, and People v. Harris, 2018 IL 121932, rendered his natural-
life sentence unconstitutional in light of his age at the time he committed the offenses. Mr.
Humphrey requested a new sentencing hearing so his youth and attendant characteristics could be
considered.
¶ 11 On September 15, 2017, the circuit court denied Mr. Humphrey’s motion for leave to file
a successive postconviction petition. The circuit court distinguished House and Miller, stating
Miller applied only to juveniles—those under 18—and House did not extend Miller to youthful
offenders who were 21 or older at the time of their crimes. Specifically, the circuit court noted “the
defendant in House was 19 years old whereas petitioner here was older and more developed at 21
years old [and] the House defendant merely served as a lookout” while Mr. Humphrey “actively
participated in the events that day, including his rape of [Ms.] Gordon.”
¶ 12 Mr. Humphrey now appeals.
¶ 13 II. JURISDICTION
¶ 14 The circuit court denied Mr. Humphrey’s motion for leave to file a successive
postconviction petition on September 15, 2017. Mr. Humphrey dated his notice of appeal October
8, 2017, and the envelope was postmarked October 11, 2017. The circuit court received his notice
on October 17, 2017—32 days after the circuit court denied Mr. Humphrey’s motion for leave to
file his petition. Ten days later, the circuit court appointed appellate counsel and stated that Mr.
Humphrey’s appeal was timely filed “per the envelope.” Although the State does not contest
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appellate jurisdiction, “[a] reviewing court has an independent duty to consider issues of
jurisdiction, regardless of whether either party has raised them.” People v. Smith, 228 Ill. 2d 95,
104 (2008).
¶ 15 “[T]he notice of appeal must be filed with the clerk of the circuit court within 30 days after
the entry of the final judgment appealed from ***.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 606(b) (eff. July 1, 2017).
According to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 373 (eff. July 1, 2017), “briefs or other documents
required to be filed within a specified time will be the date on which they are actually received by
the clerk of the reviewing court.” However, “[i]f received after the due date, the time of mailing
by an incarcerated, self-represented litigant shall be deemed the time of filing” and “[p]roof of
mailing shall be as provided in Rule 12.” Id.
¶ 16 Illinois Supreme Court Rule 12(b)(6) (eff. July 1, 2017) states that service is proved:
“in case of service by mail by a self-represented litigant residing in a correctional facility,
by certification under section 1-109 of the Code of Civil Procedure of the person who
deposited the document in the institutional mail, stating the time and place of deposit and
the complete address to which the document was to be delivered.”
¶ 17 Section 1-109 of the Code of Civil Procedure further clarifies:
“The person or persons having knowledge of the matters stated in a pleading, affidavit or
other document certified in accordance with this Section shall subscribe to a certification
in substantially the following form: Under penalties as provided by law pursuant to Section
1-109 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the undersigned certifies that the statements set forth
in this instrument are true and correct, except as to matters therein stated to be on
information and belief and as to such matters the undersigned certifies as aforesaid that he
verily believes the same to be true.” 735 ILCS 5/1-109 (West 2016).
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¶ 18 Here, the record contained no such certification. Therefore, to find jurisdiction in this case,
we would have to exclusively rely on the postmark without the accompanying certification. While
some courts have refused to find that a postmark is equal to a certification (People v. Lugo, 391
Ill. App. 3d 995, 998 (2009); People v. Blalock, 2012 IL App (4th) 110041, ¶ 11), we follow the
view taken in People v. Hansen, 2011 IL App (2d) 081226, ¶ 14, where the court reasoned:
“Requiring a court to overlook a clearly legible postmark showing that a document was
processed by a disinterested third party, such as the post office, on or before the date by
which the document was required to be mailed is to disregard the best, most competent
evidence of the latest date of mailing consistent with the ‘pro-mailing policy of Rule 373.’ ”
¶ 19 Hansen was decided prior to the amendment of Rule 12, when a pro se litigant was still
required to include a notarized affidavit stating the time and place of mailing, the complete address
that appeared on the envelope, and that proper postage was prepaid. Id. ¶ 10. However, the idea
that “if there is a timely and legible postmark, an affidavit or a certification [by an attorney] of
mailing is a corroborative redundancy” remains unaffected. Id. ¶ 14. We think the rationale and
holding of Hansen remains persuasive and that a postmark may continue to serve as certification
of a timely filing by a self-represented litigant residing in a correctional facility,
¶ 20 We do not think the validity of Hansen was in any way impacted by our supreme court’s
more recent decision in Huber v. American Accounting Ass’n, 2014 IL 117293. In that case, the
court detailed the evolving requirements for Rule 373, which, when adopted in 1967, “provided
that time of mailing ‘may be evidenced by a post mark affixed in and by a United States Post
Office.’ ” Id. ¶ 13. The court noted that Rule 373 was eventually amended to require an affidavit
of a nonattorney or certification by an attorney due to illegible postmarks and delays in affixing
postmarks. Id. The plaintiff in Huber argued that the affidavit requirement “was not intended to
6 No. 1-17-2837
supplant other objective, competent proof of mailing, and that a legible postmark must be accepted
as proof of mailing.” Id. ¶ 14. The court, however, determined that it did not need to reach this
issue because the envelope in Huber was not postmarked at all, but rather only had a post label
that was dated the day of purchase and not necessarily the day of mailing. Id. ¶¶ 16-18. The court
held that this was not sufficient to satisfy Rule 12(b). Id. ¶ 18. In this case, in contrast, there was a
legibly postmarked envelope that made it clear the notice of appeal was timely deposited into the
mail.
¶ 21 In the case before us, we find Mr. Humphrey timely filed his notice of appeal because the
post office, a disinterested third party, legibly postmarked the envelope within the 30-day filing
deadline for the notice of appeal. Accordingly, we have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to
article VI, section 6, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 6) and Illinois Supreme
Court Rules 606 and 651(a) (eff. July 1, 2017), governing criminal appeals and appeals from final
judgments in postconviction proceedings.
¶ 22 III. ANALYSIS
¶ 23 The Act provides an avenue for an incarcerated person to collaterally attack his or her
conviction by asserting it was “the result of a substantial denial of [his or her] rights under the
United States Constitution or the Illinois Constitution or both.” People v. House, 2019 IL App (1st)
110580-B, ¶ 25; 725 ILCS 5/122-1(a)(1) (West 2016). The Act generally contemplates the filing
of only one postconviction petition, and successive petitions are disfavored. 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f)
(West 2016). However, a defendant can obtain leave to file a successive postconviction petition
“when fundamental fairness so requires.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Ortiz, 235
Ill. 2d 319, 329 (2009). In cases where actual innocence or the death penalty are not at issue, the
fundamental fairness standard is met if the petitioner can demonstrate cause and prejudice for not
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raising the alleged errors in his or her initial petition. People v. Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d 444, 459
(2002). Cause is “some objective factor external to the defense [that] impeded counsel’s efforts to
raise the claim in an earlier proceeding.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 460. Prejudice
is established “by demonstrating that the claim not raised during [the] initial post-conviction
proceedings so infected the trial that the resulting conviction or sentence violated due process.”
725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2016). The cause-and-prejudice test is a higher standard than the
frivolous-or-patently-without-merit standard employed at the first stage of a defendant’s initial
postconviction petition. People v. Smith, 2014 IL 115946, ¶ 35. First stage survival requires only
that a petitioner allege a claim that has an arguable basis in law or fact. People v. Tate, 2012 IL
112214, ¶ 9. An individual requesting leave to file a successive postconviction petition, however,
must make a prima facie showing of cause and prejudice (People v. Bailey, 2017 IL 121450, ¶ 24)
and “submit enough in the way of documentation to allow a circuit court to make that
determination” (People v. Tidwell, 236 Ill. 2d 150, 161 (2010)). The circuit court should deny leave
to file a successive postconviction petition “when it is clear, from a review of the successive
petition and the documentation submitted by the petitioner, that the claims alleged by the petitioner
fail as a matter of law or where the successive petition with supporting documentation is
insufficient to justify further proceedings.” Smith, 2014 IL 115946, ¶ 35. We review denial of leave
to file a successive postconviction petition de novo. Bailey, 2017 IL 121450, ¶ 13.
¶ 24 Mr. Humphrey argues on appeal that the circuit court erred in denying him leave to file a
successive postconviction petition because he satisfied the cause-and-prejudice test with respect
to his challenge that, as applied to him, his natural life sentence violates the eighth amendment
(U.S. Const., amend. VIII) and the Illinois proportionate penalties clause (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I,
§ 11). He argues the cause prong is met because Miller and its progeny were not decided until after
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his initial postconviction petition was filed and the prejudice prong is met because he is serving a
sentence that is unconstitutional as applied to him. The State responds that the eighth amendment
Miller protections only apply to juveniles and that Mr. Humphrey cannot make an as-applied
challenge under the proportionate penalties clause because he was not a “youthful offender,” his
sentence was discretionary, the circuit court considered evidence regarding Mr. Humphrey’s age
and circumstances before determining his sentence, and he failed to demonstrate how his specific
circumstances rendered him youthful.
¶ 25 The United States Supreme Court has held that the eighth amendment prohibits the
execution of juvenile offenders (Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578-79 (2005)), a life sentence
without parole for juvenile offenders who commit nonhomicide crimes (Graham v. Florida, 560
U.S. 48, 82 (2010)), and mandatory life sentences without the possibility of parole for all juvenile
offenders (Miller, 567 U.S. at 489). The Supreme Court further provided such protection applies
retroactively. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. ___, ___, 136 S. Ct. 718, 736 (2016).
¶ 26 The Miller line of cases has established that “children are constitutionally different from
adults for purposes of sentencing.” Miller, 567 U.S. at 471. The Court recognized three differences
critical to the distinction between the two groups: (1) “a lack of maturity and an underdeveloped
sense of responsibility, leading to recklessness, impulsivity, and heedless risk-taking,”
(2) heightened vulnerability to “negative influences and outside pressures” from family and peers
and an inability to extricate themselves from where they live, and (3) less fixed traits, meaning
actions are “less likely to be evidence of irretrievabl[e] deprav[ity].” (Internal quotations omitted.)
Id.
¶ 27 The Illinois Supreme Court, recognizing that the United States Supreme Court’s language
in Miller “is significantly broader than its core holding,” held that “[l]ife sentences, whether
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mandatory or discretionary, for juvenile defendants are disproportionate and violate the eighth
amendment, unless the trial court considers youth and its attendant characteristics.” People v.
Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶¶ 38, 40. The court has also held that a sentence of 40 years or more
constitutes a de facto life sentence under Miller. People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶ 40.
¶ 28 In Harris, the court opened the door for an offender who was 18 or older to make an as-
applied challenge under the proportionate penalties clause. Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 48; see also
People v. Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶ 44 (suggesting that a 19-year-old could raise an as-applied
challenge to a mandatory life sentence in a postconviction proceeding). The defendant in Harris
argued on direct appeal that eighth amendment Miller protections for juveniles should be applied
to all “young adults under the age of 21” and that his mandatory aggregate sentence of 76 years of
imprisonment violated both the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution and the
proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶¶ 37, 53.
¶ 29 The court rejected the defendant’s facial argument that Miller should apply categorically
to offenders between the ages of 18 and 21, reasoning that while the Supreme Court has
“unmistakably instructed that youth matters in sentencing,” it nevertheless has not “extended its
reasoning to young adults age 18 or over.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. ¶¶ 54, 56. The
court stressed that “the line drawn by the Supreme Court at age 18 was not based primarily on
scientific research” but, rather, was a societal distinction that is not necessarily affected by new
research findings and that “claims for extending Miller to offenders 18 years of age or older have
been repeatedly rejected.” Id. ¶¶ 60-61 (citing United States v. Williston, 862 F.3d 1023, 1039-40
(10th Cir. 2017), United States v. Marshall, 736 F.3d 492, 500 (6th Cir. 2013), and People v.
Argeta, 149 Cal. Rptr. 3d 243, 245-46 (Ct. App. 2012)).
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¶ 30 In analyzing the defendant’s as-applied challenge under the proportionate penalties clause,
the court found it to be “premature” and instructed that such a claim was more appropriately
resolved under the Act than on direct appeal so that evidence could be presented as to the
defendant’s specific characteristics. Id. ¶¶ 46, 48. The court reasoned that an as-applied claim is
“dependent on the specific facts and circumstances of the person raising the challenge.” Id. ¶ 39.
Accordingly, “it is paramount that the record be sufficiently developed in terms of those facts and
circumstances for purposes of appellate review.” (Internal quotations omitted.) Id. The court also
reasoned that any as-applied challenge to the eighth amendment would fail for the same reasons.
Id. ¶ 53.
¶ 31 In People v. House, 2019 IL App (1st) 110580-B, after the supreme court instructed us to
reconsider in light of Harris (see People v. House, No. 122134 (Ill. Nov. 28, 2018) (supervisory
order)), this court held that a 19-year-old offender’s mandatory life sentence was unconstitutional
under the proportionate penalties clause as applied to the defendant. House, 2019 IL App (1st)
110580-B. We reasoned that “[w]hile [the] defendant was not a juvenile at the time of the offense,
his young age of 19 is relevant under the circumstances of this case” and noted that the defendant’s
“sentence involved the convergence of the accountability statute and the mandatory natural life
sentence.” Id. ¶ 46. We stressed that “[t]here was no evidence that [the] defendant helped to plan
the commission but instead took orders from higher ranking [members of his gang]” and served
only as a lookout. Id. The House court also noted:
“The trial court was also precluded from considering the goal of rehabilitation in imposing
the life sentence, which is especially relevant in [the] defendant’s case. Given [the]
defendant’s age, his family background, his actions as a lookout as opposed to being the
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actual shooter, and lack of any prior violent convictions, we find that [the] defendant’s
mandatory sentence of natural life shocks the moral sense of the community.” Id. ¶ 64.
The court remanded the case for resentencing so the circuit court would have “the ability to
consider the relevant mitigating factors prior to imposing a sentence of such great magnitude.”
Id. ¶ 65. Our supreme court has recently granted the State’s petition for leave to appeal from the
decision that we issued in House following the supreme court’s 2018 remand on a supervisory
order. People v. House, No. 125124 (Ill. Jan. 29, 2020) (supervisory order).
¶ 32 In the wake of our second decision in House, we have issued several opinions that have
resolved as-applied challenges under the proportionate penalties clause by focusing on whether
sentencing was mandatory or discretionary and how actively a defendant participated in the crime.
See, e.g., People v. Handy, 2019 IL App (1st) 170213, ¶¶ 1, 41 (an 18-year-old defendant who
actively participated in the offense and received a discretionary sentence was not entitled to a new
sentencing hearing); People v. Ramsey, 2019 IL App (3d) 160759, ¶¶ 22-23 (proportionate
penalties claim failed where 18-year-old defendant was the sole actor in the offense).
¶ 33 Harris and House, while certainly an expansion of the Miller protections, do not support
Mr. Humphrey’s claim here that the circuit court erred in denying him leave to file a successive
petition. Both cases dealt with individuals who were between 18 and 21. Mr. Humphrey can point
to no case in which an Illinois court has recognized that a life sentence imposed on a young adult—
21 or older as Mr. Humphrey was—is unconstitutional as applied to that offender under the
proportionate penalties clause or the eighth amendment. The cases he cites, from Illinois or from
other states, all involve teenaged offenders. See Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 1 (18 years old);
Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶ 4 (19 years old); House, 2019 IL App (1st) 110580-B, ¶ 17 (19
years old); Cruz v. United States, No. 11-CV-787 (JCH), 2018 WL 1541898, at *1 (D. Conn. Mar.
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29, 2018) (18 years old); State v. O’Dell, 358 P. 3d 359, 360 (Wash. 2015) (en banc) (18 years
old); cf. People v. Suggs, 2020 IL App (2d) 170632, ¶¶ 30-44 (summary dismissal at the first stage
of an initial postconviction petition where the 23-year-old defendant raised eighth amendment and
proportionate penalties challenges to his de facto life sentence). The evolving science on brain
development may support such claims at some time in the future, but for now individuals who are
21 years or older when they commit an offense are adults for purposes of a Miller claim.
¶ 34 While 21 is undoubtedly somewhat arbitrary, drawing a line there is in keeping with other
aspects of criminal law and society’s current general recognition that 21 is considered the
beginning of adulthood. In Illinois, a person under the age of 21 when he or she commits first
degree murder is now eligible for parole review after serving 20 or more years of his or her
sentence. 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-115 (West Supp. 2019). The Illinois legislature has also prohibited the
sale of nicotine and tobacco products to persons under 21 (720 ILCS 675/1 (West Supp. 2019)),
prohibited the sale of alcohol products to persons under 21 (235 ILCS 5/6-16 (West 2016)); and
made possession of a firearm by those under the age of 21 an aggravating factor for aggravated
unlawful use of a weapon. (720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(I) (West 2016)).
¶ 35 We also note that even if there were some basis for an individual aged 21 or older at the
time of the offense to raise an as applied Miller-type claim under special circumstances, Mr.
Humphrey’s circumstances would not appear to meet that criteria. Mr. Humphrey stands in stark
contrast, for example, to the defendant in House, where we found such special circumstances In
House, the court stressed the mandatory nature of the sentence, which cut off the court’s ability to
consider the defendant’s youth and the minor role the defendant played as a lookout. House, 2019
IL App (1st) 110580-B, ¶ 46. Mr. Humphrey received a discretionary sentence, with the court
making a specific finding, based on all of the evidence presented, that Mr. Humphrey was beyond
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rehabilitation. Further, Mr. Humphrey was not a mere lookout. He played an active role in the
crimes committed, including raping Ms. Gordon. The court in House also noted the defendant’s
lack of prior violent offenses. Id. ¶ 63. Mr. Humphrey, in contrast, was adjudicated a delinquent
for armed robbery and murder.
¶ 36 Accordingly, under the current state of the law, Mr. Humphrey’s claim cannot meet the
cause-and-prejudice standard for an as-applied challenge under either the eighth amendment or the
proportionate penalties clause.
¶ 37 IV. CONCLUSION
¶ 38 For the above reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s denial of Mr. Humphrey’s motion for
leave to file a successive postconviction petition.
¶ 39 Affirmed.
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Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 82-CR-00761; the Hon. James Michael Obbish, Judge, presiding.
Attorneys James E. Chadd, Patricia Mysza, and Ashlee Johnson, of State for Appellate Defender’s Office, of Chicago, for appellant. Appellant:
Attorneys Kimberly M. Foxx, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. for Spellberg, Annette Collins, and Ashlee Cuza, Assistant State’s Appellee: Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.