2023 IL App (1st) 1211405-U No. 1-21-1405
FIRST DIVISION June 5, 2023
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT ____________________________________________________________________________
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of Cook County. Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) v. ) No. 07 CR 07355 ) PEDRO FUENTES, ) ) The Honorable Defendant-Appellant. ) Stanley Sacks, ) Judge Presiding.
____________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE PUCINSKI delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Hyman and Lavin concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: We affirm denial of leave to file a successive postconviction petition where defendant did not establish cause for his claim that his sentence was unconstitutional based on his youth and background.
¶2 Defendant appeals the circuit court’s denial of his motion for leave to file a successive
postconviction petition filed under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act), 725 ILCS 5/122-1 et
seq. (West 2018), arguing that he established cause and prejudice for his claim that his de facto 1-21-1405
56-year life sentence is unconstitutional because he was 22 years old at the time of the murder. For
the following reasons, we affirm the trial court’s order.
¶3 BACKGROUND
¶4 Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of the 2007 first degree murder of Edgar
Salvardor Cisneros (Edgar) and home invasion and sentenced to consecutive terms of 50 years’
and 6 years’ imprisonment. We affirmed on direct appeal. People v. Fuentes, 2013 IL App (1st)
092909-U. As we have provided detailed accounts of the facts in this prior order, we recount the
facts here only as necessary to resolve the issue raised in the instant appeal.
¶5 A. Trial
¶6 The State proceeded to trial on the theory that defendant went to the apartment of his ex-
girlfriend, Anabella Rojas (Anabella), uninvited and armed with a gun, and shot and killed her new
boyfriend as a result of jealousy. At trial, Anabella testified that she and defendant had been in a
relationship for several years and they had a son together. After their relationship ended in 2006,
she moved into her own apartment in Chicago with their young son. Anabella and defendant
remained in touch with each other, and she continued to drive one of defendant’s car, a beige
Grand Marquis, but she did not tell defendant where she was living. After their relationship ended,
Anabella began a relationship with Edgar.
¶7 On the 5th or 6th of March 2007, defendant called Anabella and asked to borrow the car she
was driving. She agreed and provided defendant with a key ring which contained a key to the car
as well as keys to her apartment. Defendant borrowed the car again on March 9, 2007. They agreed
that defendant would drop off the vehicle at Anabella’s mother’s house later that afternoon. When
Anabella finished working sometime around 4:00 or 5:00 p.m., she arrived at her mother’s house,
but did not see the car. She called defendant several times, but his cell phone had been turned off.
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Anabella returned to her apartment around 9:00 or 10:00 p.m., without her car, as she had plans
with Edgar that evening. Edgar arrived at her apartment around 10:30 p.m., and they began
watching television.
¶8 Later that evening, Edgar looked out her apartment window and told Anabella that her car was
parked in front of the apartment building. Anabella told Edgar that he had to be mistaken because
he never provided defendant with her new address. Shortly thereafter, Anabella heard footsteps on
the stairs of her apartment building and then two or three knocks on her door. Before she could get
to the door, defendant let himself into her apartment. At that point, Edgar was in the kitchen
approximately 15 feet away from the front door. He threw a bottle at defendant, but it missed him.
¶9 Defendant asked Anabella if Edgar was the guy that she was “cheating on [him] with” and
walked over to Edgar. The two men started “tussling” and punching each other. As the fight
continued, they moved from the kitchen into the bedroom where Anabella and defendant’s son
was sleeping. Anabella followed the two of them, heard two gunshots, and saw Edgar drop to the
ground. At that point, she saw defendant holding a gun. Defendant looked at her, told her “not to
tell anybody” and ran out of her apartment. Anabella called 911 and the police arrived shortly
thereafter. Anabella testified that she did not keep a gun at her house, she had never seen that gun
before that night, and she had never seen Edgar pull out a gun. Prior to that evening, she had never
seen defendant with a gun, but she had no doubt that defendant brought the gun to her apartment
that night.
¶ 10 Cook County Assistant Medical Examiner Doctor Tera Jones performed the autopsy on Edgar.
The autopsy revealed multiple signs of injury to his body, including gunshot wounds to his head,
back, and right forearm. There were signs of soot and stippling around the entry wounds, indicating
that the shot had been fired from a close distance. The doctor also observed signs of bruising on
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Edgar’s lower lip and an abrasion near his eyebrow. The doctor recovered three bullets from his
body during the autopsy. The doctor concluded that he died from multiple gunshot wounds, and
the manner of death was homicide.
¶ 11 At 1:30 a.m., defendant was arrested after Chicago Police Officer Ivan Lopez and his partner,
Officer Robert Bell, observed him driving a beige colored four-door sedan southbound on Kedzie
Avenue at “a high rate of speed.” At that time, the officers were unaware that defendant was a
suspect in a shooting. Defendant then made a left-hand turn onto 58th Street without using a turn
signal and then pulled into an alley. When the officers approached the vehicle, defendant started
getting out of the vehicle, but stopped when he saw the officers walking in his direction. Officer
Lopez saw defendant make movements in the vehicle and, upon walking close to the vehicle, he
saw defendant holding a handgun and attempting to hide it under the driver’s seat. The officers
ordered defendant out of the car, and they recovered a .22 caliber pistol underneath the driver’s
seat, which was subsequently inventoried. The gun was loaded with four rounds of ammunition.
The officers transported defendant to the 8th District police station.
¶ 12 Officers Mark Harvey and Joseph Bebynista, both forensic investigators, processed the crime
scene at Anabella’s apartment. They observed some broken glass in the hallway and near the front
door of the apartment. Blood was found in the bedroom along with two Remington .22 caliber
cartridge casings that had been fired from an automatic weapon. The officers returned to the 8th
District police station and performed a gunshot residue test on defendant’s hands. The evidence
that they collected was inventoried in accordance with police protocol.
¶ 13 Scott Rochowicz, a forensic scientist with the Illinois State Police, tested the gunshot residue
test kit administered to defendant and found the results to be inconclusive. He explained that it is
“pretty easy” for someone to remove gunshot residue from their hands and the lack of gunshot
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residue did not mean that he or she did not fire a weapon. Moreover, he explained the Remington
ammunition does not leave residue that can be detected by standard gunshot residue tests because
it does not contain the type of metals that the standard test is designed to detect.
¶ 14 Brian Mayland, a forensic scientist with the Illinois State Police, concluded that the cartridge
casings recovered from Anabella’s apartment and the bullets removed from Edgar’s body had been
fired from the .22 Beretta recovered from defendant’s car.
¶ 15 The defense presented the testimony of Laura Garcia, an interpreter employed by the Cook
County Public Defender’s Office, who read and translated a letter that had been written by
Anabella to defendant during his pre-trial imprisonment. In that letter, she wrote that the police
yelled at her, threatened to put her in jail and to take her son away from her, and she “had to make
things up.” She “remembered too late that he had the gun…” On cross-examination, Garcia
testified that she did not know whether the letter was written entirely by Anabella or by someone
else.
¶ 16 The parties stipulated that Assistant State’s Attorney Gene Wood would testify that he spoke
to Anabella on March 10, 2007, and she provided a handwritten statement in which she stated that
she met Edgar in the summer of 2006 and began dating him seriously in November 2006.
¶ 17 During the jury instruction conference, the trial court granted defendant’s request for the jury
to receive instructions on second degree murder based upon imperfect self-defense and strong
provocation. The jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder, home invasion and felony
murder predicated on home invasion. The jury also found that defendant personally discharged a
firearm that proximately caused Edgar’s death.
¶ 18 The sentencing hearing was held on October 15, 2009. The trial court and the parties received
the presentence investigation report (PSI), and neither party made any corrections or amendments
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to it. The PSI showed that defendant’s date of birth was December 25, 1984, and he grew up in
Mexico with his parents and five siblings. In 1998, defendant and his younger brother came to the
United States and lived with his paternal uncle in Chicago, and his parents arrived two years later.
Defendant reported that he had a “good relationship with his parents and siblings…” He described
his childhood as “normal with no physical, emotional, sexual or substance abuse present in the
home.” Prior to incarceration, he lived with his parents. He stated that he graduated from Farragut
Career Academy High School in 2004, had “poor” grades, but was not in any special education
classes. He told the investigator that he wanted to go to college and had been working to save
money to pay for it. He reported that he had been working at a paper box factory since the summer
of 2004 and earned $16.00 per hour.
¶ 19 As far as defendant’s health history, he reported no health problems, his mental health was
“good” and was not taking any prescribed medication. He denied previously using illegal drugs
and not having a problem with alcohol. He also denied any gang memberships or affiliations.
¶ 20 During the sentencing hearing, the State read the victim impact statement from Edgar’s aunt.
In mitigation, defendant presented the testimony of his mother, Maria Fuentes. She testified that
defendant was born in Mexico and came to the United States sometime before she and his father
arrived in 2002. She saw defendant interact with his son and testified that “he loved his son very
much…” At one point, defendant and Anabella lived together in the basement apartment with their
son. She described her own relationship with defendant as “[e]xcellent” and her “children are really
good people.” She never saw any of her children act in a violent manner.
¶ 21 Defendant stated, in allocution, that he “fe[lt] sorry for the family” and the shooting was “an
accident… [He] never wanted it to happen.” He stated that he came to the United States when he
was 11 years old and he “came here to study….because that’s what I wanted to do for my family.”
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He further stated that he started working approximately three years ago. He described himself as
not someone “who goes around looking for trouble with any other people.”
¶ 22 Defense counsel argued, in mitigation, that defendant was “not in a gang…he’s not involved
in any gang activity. He has no drug or alcohol problem…” He pointed out that defendant was
“employed, he was making 16 dollars an hour.” He informed the trial court that defendant was
currently 25 years old and asked the trial court to sentence defendant to the statutory minimum.
¶ 23 The trial court, in recalling the evidence, stated that defendant shot Edgar because he was
jealous that his ex-girlfriend was with him, that “[h]e didn’t like the thought she was with some
other man with his baby”, that “[h]e went to the house uninvited”, and the “whole thing could have
been avoided.” The trial court acknowledged that, in reading the pre-sentence investigation report,
defendant did not have anything “really bad” in his background, and he came from “[a] good
family…” The trial court sentenced defendant to consecutive sentences of 25 years’ imprisonment
for first degree murder, 25 years’ imprisonment for personally discharging a firearm that
proximately caused the victim’s death, and 6 years’ imprisonment for home invasion.
¶ 24 B. Direct Appeal
¶ 25 Defendant challenged his conviction on direct appeal, arguing that: (1) the sufficiency of the
evidence of first degree murder and argued that his conviction should be reduced to second degree
murder; (2) trial court error in ordering the jury to continue deliberating when it returned with a
partial verdict, solely finding him guilty of home invasion and felony murder; and (3) trial court
error in refusing to send an exhibit back to the jury room during deliberations. On June 28, 2013,
we affirmed defendant’s conviction. People v. Fuentes, 2013 IL App (1st) 092909-U.
¶ 26 C. Prior Postconviction Petitions
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¶ 27 On November 3, 2014, defendant filed his first pro se postconviction petition. In his petition,
he argued: (1) the police unlawfully searched his car and did not provide Miranda warnings to
him; (2) the police coerced him into implicating himself; (3) the police unlawfully searched
Anabella’s apartment and she was not provided with an attorney during questioning; (4) the State
engaged in malicious prosecution because the victim had shot himself with his own gun during
mutual combat; (5) the trial court erred in directing the jury to continue its deliberations; and (6)
his sentence was unconstitutional where the trial court improperly considered, as aggravation, his
contemporaneous conviction for felony murder as a prior conviction. The circuit court summarily
dismissed defendant’s petition. On March 15, 2017, appellate counsel’s motion for leave to
withdraw was granted and we affirmed the summary dismissal of this petition.
¶ 28 On April 19, 2017, defendant filed a motion for leave to file a successive postconviction
petition. In this motion, defendant argued that the circuit court erred when it found the allegations
in his initial petition were incomprehensible and reasserted the same allegations from this initial
petition. He also alleged that his trial and appellate counsels were ineffective. On May 18, 2017,
the circuit court denied defendant leave to file a successive postconviction petition. Defendant did
not appeal the circuit court’s decision.
¶ 29 On March 7, 2018, defendant filed a second motion for leave to file a successive postconviction
petition. Defendant reasserted four of the six claims that he raised in his initial petition. On
September 4, 2018, the circuit court denied defendant leave to file a second successive
postconviction petition. Defendant appealed this decision and on September 22, 2020, we granted
appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirmed the circuit court’s denial of leave to file a
second successive petition.
¶ 30 D. Current Postconviction Petition
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¶ 31 On July 7, 2021, defendant filed a pro se request for leave to file his third postconviction
petition. In this petition, defendant raised a single claim that his de facto life sentence was
unconstitutional under the Illinois Constitution’s proportionate penalties clause as applied to him
as an emerging adult because the circuit court did not consider his youth or rehabilitative potential.
He alleged that he could not have raised this claim previously because the law and the science
supporting the law had not been sufficiently developed at that time. He also argued that he was 23
years old at the time of the offenses with a brain similar to a juvenile offender, possessed
rehabilitative potential, experienced a traumatic childhood, and should be allowed to file a
successive petition so he could develop the record supporting his argument. 1
¶ 32 He contended that he established the “cause” element where this claim was previously
unavailable to him on direct appeal because it turned on the United States Supreme Court’s
decision in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and the Illinois Supreme and Appellate
Courts’ decisions in People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, People v. House, 2019 IL App (1st)
110580-B, People v. Ruiz, 2020 IL App (1st) 163143, and People v. Johnson, 2020 IL App (1st)
171362. And, citing to People v. Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, and People v. Harris, 2018 IL
121932, he argued that the Illinois Supreme Court also “opened the door for a young-adult
offender” who had been sentenced to a life sentence to rely on the evolving neuroscience and
societal standards underlying the rule in Miller.
¶ 33 Defendant also alleged in his petition that he came to the United States at the age of 13 and
thereafter struggled in elementary and high school due to his lack of proficiency in the English
language. He alleged that other students teased and bullied him. At school, he was “forced to adopt
1 Defendant incorrectly alleged in this postconviction petition that he was 23 years old at the time of the offense, however, his date of birth is December 25, 1984, and the offense was committed on March 9, 2007. Consequently, he was 22 years and two months at the time of the offense. -9- 1-21-1405
to a problematic schools [sic] setting dealing with fights, shootings, beatings, stabbings, drugs
and liquor.” In his neighborhood, he was exposed to “gangs, drugs, and prostitution” and
“threatened by gangs/drug-dealers to join, use drugs, and have group sex with prostitutes.” At
home, he saw family members using drugs and alcohol and “being extremely abusive…” As a
teenager, he attended many funerals for other teens who had died because of street violence,
suicide and drug overdoses.
¶ 34 To his petition, he attached a report entitled “Report to the 2017 Illinois PTA Convention on
Young Adults Involved in the Justice System.” This report focused on the brain development and
maturity of young adults between the ages of 18 and 25 and the treatment for offenders in this age
range within the criminal justice system. In addition to attaching certificates of achievements that
he received while incarcerated, defendant also attached a letter dated June 2, 2021, indicating that
defendant’s request for medical records from Menard Correctional Center could not be fulfilled
due to a lack of specificity.
¶ 35 On September 9, 2021, the circuit court denied defendant leave to file a third successive
postconviction petition in a written order. After outlining some of the relevant caselaw pertaining
to the Miller line of authority, the circuit court then found that, in Harris, 2018 IL 121932, our
Supreme Court indicated that a defendant may raise an as-applied challenge “pursuant to the
Proportionate Penalties Clause if the defendant could demonstrate that the ‘evolving science on
juvenile maturity and brain development highlighted in Miller’ applied to the fact of his case.” The
circuit court found that “the First District has generally held that ‘individuals who are 21 years or
older when they commit an offense are adults for purposes of a Miller claim.’” People v.
Humphrey, 2020 IL App (1st) 172837, ¶ 33; People v. Minniefield, 2020 IL App (1st) 170541, ¶¶
37-45; and People v. Rivera, 2020 IL App (1st) 171430, ¶¶ 25-27. However, the circuit court
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recognized that the First District made an exception in People v. Savage, 2020 IL App (1st)
173135, ¶¶ 69-76, for a defendant who was several months past his 21st birthday but who argued
that his mental health issues and long history of drug abuse lowered his effective age. Looking at
the allegations raised by defendant in his petition and defendant’s age at the time of the offense,
the circuit court found that “none of them come close to the exceptional facts of the defendant in
Savage.” Thus, upon finding that defendant was an adult at the time of the offense and unable to
claim proportionate penalty protection under Miller or Harris, the circuit court denied defendant
leave to file his third successive postconviction petition
¶ 36 ANALYSIS
¶ 37 At issue, here, is the circuit court’s denial of defendant’s motion for leave to file a successive
postconviction petition under the Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1
et seq. (West 2018)). The Act provides a statutory mechanism for a criminal defendant to assert
that there was a substantial denial of his or her rights under the United States Constitution, the
Illinois Constitution, or both. 725 ILCS 5/122-1(a)(1) (West 2018). The Act contemplates the
filing of only one petition. People v. Lusby, 2020 IL 124046, ¶ 27; 725 ILCS 5/122-3 (West 2018)
(“Any claim of substantial denial of constitutional rights not raised in the original or an amended
petition is waived.”) As a result, a defendant faces “immense procedural default hurdles when
bringing a successive postconviction petition.” People v. Davis, 2014 IL 115595, ¶ 14. These
hurdles are lowered only in very limited circumstances so as not to impede the finality of criminal
litigation. Id.
¶ 38 Prior to filing a successive postconviction petition, a petitioner must obtain leave of the circuit
court. Robinson, 2020 IL 123849, ¶ 43. To obtain leave of court a defendant must demonstrate
“cause” for the failure to raise the claim in the initial petition and that “prejudice” resulted from
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that failure. Lusby, 2020 IL 124046, ¶ 27; see also 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2018). Alternatively,
the second basis to relax that bar against a successive postconviction petition is “what is known as
the ‘fundamental miscarriage of justice’ exception.” People v. Edwards, 2012 IL 111711, ¶ 22.
We review the trial court’s decision to deny leave to file a successive petition de novo, accepting
all well-pled facts and attached affidavits as true. Edwards, 2012 IL 111711, ¶ 25.
¶ 39 Here, in defendant’s third successive postconviction petition, he challenges his 56-year
discretionary sentence as unconstitutional under the Illinois Constitution because the trial court
failed to consider his age (22 years old) at the time of the shooting, when sentencing him. Because
defendant raised this claim in a successive postconviction petition, defendant must satisfy the
cause-and-prejudice test. The Act defines “cause” as “an objective factor that impeded [the
defendant’s] ability to raise a specific claim during his or her initial post-conviction proceedings.”
725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2018). “Prejudice” involves the “demonstrat[ion] that the claim not
raised during [the defendant’s] initial post-conviction proceedings so infected the trial that the
resulting conviction or sentence violated due process.” Id. The cause-and-prejudice test establishes
a more onerous standard than that at the first-stage pleading stage. People v. Smith, 2014 IL
115946, ¶ 35. Leave to file a successive petition should be denied where (i) the petitioner’s claims
“fail as a matter of law” or (ii) the petition and accompanying documents are “insufficient to justify
further proceedings.” Id.
¶ 40 Defendant’s sentencing challenge is based upon Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), in
which the United States Supreme Court held that the prohibition on cruel or unusual punishment
in the eighth amendment of the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend VIII) forbids
mandatory life sentences without the possibility of parole for “those under the age of 18 at the time
of their crimes.” Miller, 567 U.S. at 465, 479. Our supreme court has subsequently held that, where
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an offender is younger than 18 years old, the trial court must consider certain factors before
imposing a life sentence, including: his age and evidence of his “particular immaturity”; his family
and home environment; his degree of participation in the homicide and any familiar or peer
pressure; his incompetence; and his rehabilitative potential. People v. Savage, 2020 IL App (1st)
173135, ¶ 58 (citing People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 46). Miller applies retroactively to cases
on collateral review. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 206 (2016).
¶ 41 After the decision in Miller, the Illinois Supreme Court has concluded that Miller applied to
de facto life sentences. People v. Reyes, 2016 IL 119271, ¶¶ 9-10. In People v. Buffer, 2019 IL
122327, our supreme court defined a de facto life sentence for a juvenile as a sentence of more
than 40 years’ imprisonment. Id. ¶ 41. Here, the parties do not dispute that defendant’s 56-year
sentence constituted a de facto life sentence.
¶ 42 Defendant exclusively raises this claim as a violation of Illinois’ proportionate penalties clause
as “Illinois courts typically consider the sentencing claims of young adults under the proportionate
penalties clause rather than the eighth amendment.” People v. Savage, 2020 IL App (1st) 173135,
¶ 61 (citing People v. Minniefield, 2020 IL App (1st) 170541, ¶¶ 37-38). This is because federal
cases have generally drawn a line at 18 years of age and because the Illinois clause offers a broader
path to the same type of relief. Savage, 2020 IL App (1st) 173135, ¶ 61.
¶ 43 The proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution states that “[a]ll penalties shall
be determined both according to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring
the defendant to useful citizenship.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11. Our supreme court has held that
the “limitation on penalties” in this clause “goes beyond the framers’ understanding of the eighth
amendment and is not synonymous with that provision.” People v. Clemons, 2012 IL 107821, ¶
40. For a defendant to succeed in a proportionate penalty claim, he must first demonstrate that the
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penalty is degrading, cruel or “so wholly disproportionate to the offense that it shocks the moral
sense of the community.” People v. Klepper, 234 Ill.2d 337, 348-49 (2009).
¶ 44 The Illinois Supreme Court has, on two occasions, indicated that young adult offenders may
establish an unconstitutional life sentence through a postconviction petition. In People v.
Thompson, our supreme court rejected the 19-year-old defendant’s as-applied constitutional
challenge because it was raised for the first time on appeal. People v. Thompson, 2015 IL 118151,
¶ 44. However, the court noted that the defendant was not prohibited from raising the issue through
the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. Id.
¶ 45 Subsequently, in People v. Harris, our supreme court reversed the appellate court’s decision
because the “appellate court held [the] defendant’s sentence violated the Illinois Constitution
without a developed evidentiary record on the as-applied constitutional challenge.” People v.
Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 40. The supreme court found that, because Miller did not apply directly
to the 18-year-old defendant’s circumstances, the record must be sufficiently developed to support
the defendant’s as-applied challenge. Id. ¶ 45.
¶ 46 Consequently, the import of these two decisions has been described as permitting “young adult
offenders” to bring a postconviction claim “alleging that their sentences in excess of 40 years
imposed without consideration of the Miller factors are unconstitutional as applied to them under
the proportionate penalties clause.” People v. Horshaw, 2021 IL App (1st) 182047, ¶ 69. However,
for a young adult’s proportionate penalties claim to be successful, the defendant must provide a
factual showing that “the science concerning juvenile maturity and brain development applies
equally” to a young adult’s case. See People v. House, 2021 IL 125124, ¶ 29.
¶ 47 With this background, we initially address the issue of whether defendant established “cause”
for his failure to raise this issue during his initial postconviction proceedings. Defendant alleges
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that he could not have challenged the constitutionality of his sentence prior to this successive
petition as the decisions in People v. Harris, 2018 IL 121932; People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327;
and People v. House, 2021 IL 125124, had not been decided prior to him requesting leave to file
this successive petition. He points to the fact that his current petition was filed on March 7, 2018,
prior to any of these cases being decided. In response, the State argues that defendant cannot
establish cause because all the cases defendant relies upon were based upon Miller, which was
decided in 2012 and two years prior to defendant’s initial postconviction petition.
¶ 48 We recognize that our supreme court has held that, under the proportionate penalties clause,
young adults may rely on the evolving neuroscience and societal standard underlying the rule in
Miller to support an as-applied challenge to a life sentence. See People v. Thompson, 2015 IL
118151, ¶¶ 43-44 (19-year-old defendant “is not necessarily foreclosed from renewing his as-
applied challenge in the circuit court” pursuant to the Act); Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶¶ 59-61.
Recently, in House, 2021 IL 125124, ¶¶ 29-31, our supreme court once again found that a young
adult may bring an as-applied challenge under the proportionate penalties clause based on a
developed evidentiary record as to how the “science concerning juvenile maturity and brain
development applies equally to young adults, or to petitioner specifically.”
¶ 49 However, “while our supreme court has suggested that emerging adults may be able to leverage
Miller to challenge their sentences under the proportionate penalties clause, that suggestion is not
tantamount to a substantial change in the law that would provide the defendant cause to file a
successive petition under the Act.” People v. Walker, 2022 IL App (1st) 201151, ¶ 28 (court found
that a 20-year-old defendant was unable to establish “cause” as an emerging adult). Specifically,
in People v. Dorsey, 2021 IL 123010, our supreme court considered whether a 14-year-old
defendant could establish the “cause” element for his proportionate penalties clause claim. Our
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supreme court held that “Miller’s announcement of a new substantive rule under the eighth
amendment does not provide cause for a defendant to raise a claim under the proportionate
penalties clause.” Id. ¶ 74. The court found that “Illinois courts have long recognized the
differences between persons of mature age and those who are minors for purposes of sentencing.”
Id. The court went on to find that “Miller’s unavailability prior to 2012 at best deprived defendant
of ‘some helpful support’ for his state constitutional law claim, which is insufficient to establish
‘cause.’” Id. (quoting People v. LaPointe, 2018 IL App (2d) 160903, ¶ 59).
¶ 50 Since Dorsey, this court has “universally applied the holding in Dorsey to conclude that cause
has not been established based on the prior unavailability of Miller and its progeny.” People v.
Walsh, 2022 IL App (1st) 210786, ¶ 33 (18-year-old defendant)(citing People v. Figueroa, 2022
IL App (1st) 172390-B, ¶¶ 36, 39; People v. Ruddock, 2022 IL App (1st) 173023, ¶ 72 (16-year-
old defendant); People v. Hemphill, 2022 IL App (1st) 201112, ¶ 31 (21-year-old defendant); see
also People v. Walker, 2022 IL App (1st) 201151, ¶¶ 28-29 (20-year-old defendant); People v.
French, 2022 IL App (1st) 220122, ¶¶ 27-28 (20-year-old defendant); People v. Wimberly, 2022
IL App (1st) 211464, ¶ 9 (20-year-old defendant); People v. Peacock, 2022 IL App (1st) 170308-
B ¶ 20 (17-year-old defendant); and People v. Jones, 2022 IL App (1st) 200569-U, ¶ 43 (20-year-
old defendant). More recently, our supreme court reaffirmed its analysis in Dorsey and found that
“[o]ur analysis of ‘cause’ in Dorsey applies equally to defendant’s request for leave to renew his
proportionate penalties clause challenge with respect to his intellectual disabilities.” People v.
Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 62.
¶ 51 Prior to Clark, however, the dissent in People v. Mobley, 2022 IL App (1st) 201255-U,
criticized Dorsey on the basis that “[s]ome constitutional claims – like Miller claims and cases
expanding on it – are so novel that their legal bases are not reasonably available until a court makes
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them so.” Id. ¶ 68 (dissent, Justice Hyman). Consequently, the dissent found that the defendant
made a prima facie showing of cause to challenge his de facto life sentence. Id. We recognize that,
in Mobley, the dissent looked at when the defendant filed his initial postconviction petition in 1998,
he “could not have anticipated the line of cases expanding the holding of Miller.” Id. ¶ 61. Here,
the initial postconviction petition was filed much more recently, in 2014; two years after Miller
was decided, which more closely aligns with the holding in Dorsey.
¶ 52 Defendant filed a motion to cite additional authority, in which he cited to People v. Meneses,
2022 IL App (1st) 191247-B, in support of his argument that he was able to establish the “cause”
element. In Meneses, the defendant was 16 years old and had been convicted of first degree murder
and attempt murder and sentenced to 60 years’ imprisonment with eligibility for a day-to-day
sentencing credit; thus, his sentence was not a de facto life sentence. Meneses, 2022 IL App (1st)
191247-B, ¶¶ 1-5. We find that Meneses does not provide any support for defendant’s claim. In
sharp contrast to the facts here, in Meneses, the State did not dispute that the defendant satisfied
the “cause” prong for leave to file. Id. ¶ 4.
¶ 53 In his reply brief, defendant attempted to distinguish Dorsey on the basis that the defendant in
Dorsey was a juvenile at the time of the offense, and defendant was 22 years old at the time that
he committed the offense in this case. However, in People v. Hemphill, 2022 IL App (1st) 201112,
¶ 31, following Dorsey, we already determined that a 21-year-old defendant could not satisfy the
cause prong of the cause-and-prejudice test for bringing a successive postconviction petition with
respect to a proportionate penalties’ claim. More recently, in Clark, our supreme court followed
its decision in Dorsey, finding that the defendant could not establish cause with respect to his
proportionate penalties clause challenge as to his intellectual disabilities, and the defendant in
Clark was 24 years old at the time that he committed the offense. Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶¶ 1, 62.
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¶ 54 Likewise, in People v. Moore, 2023 IL 126461, ¶¶ 40-41, our supreme court found that the
defendants, who were 19 and 20 years old, could not establish the cause element for their claims.
The supreme court found that, “‘Miller’s announcement of a new substantive rule under the eighth
amendment does not provide cause for a [juvenile offender’ to raise a claim under the proportionate
penalties clause.’” Id. ¶¶ 40-41; (quoting Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 61; quoting Dorsey, 2021 IL
123010, ¶ 74). Further, our supreme court found that, because Miller did not directly apply to
young adults, “it also does not provide cause for a young adult offender to raise a claim under the
proportionate penalties clause.” Id. ¶ 40.
¶ 55 Consequently, based upon the clear holding in Dorsey, Clark, and Moore, defendant cannot
establish cause for his failure to raise his proportionate penalties claim in his successive
postconviction petition. See French, 2022 IL App (1st) 220122, ¶ 25 (following Dorsey and
concluding that the defendant could not establish cause). Having found defendant failed to
establish “cause” for failing to raise the claim in the current petition sooner, we decline to address
the question of whether defendant was “prejudiced” by the failure. People v. Walker, 2022 IL App
(1st) 201151, ¶ 31 (quoting People v. Brown, 225 Ill.2d 188, 207 (2007).
¶ 56 In so holding, however, “we are mindful that recent research on brain development in young
adults has overwhelmingly found that emerging adults are ‘more similar to adolescents than fully
mature adults ***, more susceptive to peer pressure, less future-oriented and more volatile in
emotionally charged settings.’” People v. Ward, 2021 IL App (1st) 181402-U, ¶¶ 31-38 (collecting
studies). Clearly, Miller recognized that children lack maturity, have an underdeveloped sense of
responsibility, are more vulnerable to negative influences, and have character that is not yet well
formed. Miller, 567 U.S. at 471. Not only do these characteristics diminish a child’s culpability,
but the “distinctive attributes of youth diminish the penological justifications” for imposing life
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without parole upon children. Id. at 472. However, this defendant, while trying to establish his
link to Miller and related cases, cannot show the very impulsivity that is necessary. He had a well-
paying job. Defendant did not know where Anabella, his ex-girlfriend, lived, but he obtained a key
to her apartment when he borrowed her car, took a weapon, found her apartment, and let himself
into her apartment while armed with a gun. He then confronted her and Edgar, her new boyfriend,
and shot Edgar twice before warning her to not tell anyone what happened and running away.
These actions are not the indicia of impulsive behavior.
¶ 57 Not only does defendant’s proportionate penalties claim fail because he cannot establish the
“cause” element but, at age 22 when he committed these offenses, he is not considered to be a
“young adult offender.” Although there is some recent precedent recognizing the potential to
expand Miller’s holding to teens who have recently reached the age of maturity at the time that
they committed their offenses, Illinois courts have rejected claims that an offender who was 21-
year-old at the time of the criminal offense was entitled to have the sentencing court consider his
age and treat him differently from other adult offenders when imposing a sentence. See, e.g.,
People v. Rivera, 2020 IL App (1st) 171430, ¶24 (affirming the circuit court’s order denying the
defendant leave to file a successive postconviction in seeking sentencing relief pursuant to Miller
where the defendant was 23-years-old at the time of the offense, reasoning that there was no case
law to support the proposition that an offender who committed an offense after reaching the age
of 21 was entitled to receive special sentencing consideration and treatment different from other
adult offenders for sentencing purposes); People v. Humphrey, 2020 IL App (1st) 172837, ¶¶ 33-
35 (affirming a circuit court order denying the defendant leave to file a successive postconviction
petition, reasoning that his argument that the discretionary life sentence he received for crimes
committed at the age of 21 lacked merit where there was no legal authority to support his claim
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that a life sentence imposed on someone who was 21-years-old or older was unconstitutional and
a violation of the Illinois proportionate penalties clause and where there were no special
circumstances present that would justify expanding Miller’s holding to him); but see People v.
Savage, 2020 IL App (1st) 173135, ¶¶ 70-78 (reversing the circuit court’s summary dismissal of
the defendant’s postconviction petition challenging the 85-year sentence he received for a murder
he committed when he was 22 years old where there was evidence that his age in conjunction with
his drug use made him the functional equivalent of a younger offender and where the
circumstances of the crime suggested that he acted impetuously).
¶ 58 In rejecting such claims, courts have observed that legislative enactments have evidenced the
Illinois legislature’s intent to consider youthful offenders as those under 21 years of age. See, e.g.,
730 ILCS 5/3-3-9(a)(1.5) (West 2018) (parole review for under-21-year-old offenders is called
“youthful offender parole”); Pub. Act. 100-1182 (eff. June 1, 2019) adding 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-110;
Pub. Act 101-288, § 5 (eff. Jan. 1, 2020) (amending 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5(110(b) and renumbering as
730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-115(b)) (amending the law to allow persons convicted of first degree murder
from seeking parole after 20 years if the offender was under 21 years old at the time of the crime);
730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-95(b) (West 2018) (limiting class X sentencing to recidivist offenders to those
“over the age of 21 years”); 705 ILCS 405/1-3(10), (2) (West 2018) (The Juvenile Court Act of
1987 defines a “minor” as a “person under 21 years” and defines an adult as “a person 21 years of
age or older”).
¶ 59 As defendant notes, this court has, in one case, held that a defendant who was 21 years or older
may invoke Miller’s protection in a collateral challenge. In Savage, this court reversed the first-
stage summary dismissal of a postconviction petition by a defendant who had been 22 years old at
the time of the offense giving rise to the first degree murder and attempt first degree murder
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convictions. Savage, 2020 IL App (1st) 173135, ¶ 2. The defendant argued that his 85-year
sentence violated the proportionate penalties clause because the trial court failed to consider his
long-term drug addiction in conjunction with his young age because it “made him the functional
equivalent of a juvenile...” Savage, 2020 IL App (1st) 173135, ¶ 60. The defendant’s allegation of
a life-long drug addiction from the age of nine was corroborated by a hospital discharge report
from when he was 15 years old, which indicated that he had been using drugs at the age of nine.
Id. ¶ 72. The defendant was also diagnosed with dysthymic disorder and conduct disorder. Id. ¶
33. The defendant further alleged that he was using drugs every day at the time of the offense, that
he was attempting to rob a drug house at the time of the murder, and that his drug addiction left
him susceptible to peer pressure and more volatile in emotionally charged settings. Id. ¶ 71. The
defendant’s history of mental health disorders and drug problems were presented at the defendant’s
sentencing hearing and supported by documentation. Id. ¶¶ 32-34.
¶ 60 However, in People v. Guerrero, 2022 IL App (1st) 210400, a case which defendant was 22
years old at the time that he committed the offense, the court recognized that “[t]he Savage decision
was published on September 30, 2020, at a time when the law on this subject was still in the infant
stage, and that decision appears to be the only reported decision of this court extending Miller-
based sentencing protections [citation omitted] to a defendant over 21 years of age.” Id. ¶ 29. The
court in Guerrero also distinguished Savage on the basis that “there is nothing in the record to
indicate that defendant’s upbringing would have somehow increased his propensity for, or even
explained his participation in, a gang lifestyle” or that “his cognitive abilities were someone
affected or lessened by the circumstances of his upbringing.” Id. ¶ 25.
¶ 61 Defendant’s suggestion that Savage provides an avenue for him to obtain relief based upon
Miller is distinguishable from the facts in the instant case. “First, the burden on defendant in this
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case is higher as he is attempting to file a successive postconviction petition whereas the defendant
in Savage filed an initial postconviction petition.” People v. Montanez, 2022 IL App 191930, ¶ 61
(citing People v. Horshaw, 2021 IL App (1st) 182047, ¶ 134 (recognizing that the pleading
requirements for successive postconviction petitions are higher than the pleading requirements for
initial postconviction petitions)). Moreover, while defendant averred in his postconviction petition,
for the first time, that he faced difficulties in his childhood, the allegations do not rise to the same
level of drug addiction and mental health history as presented in Savage. In his PSI, defendant
reported that his mental health was “good”, he was not taking any prescribed medication; and he
denied previously using illegal drugs and having a problem with alcohol. Also, there is nothing in
the record to indicate that defendant’s upbringing played any role in his decision to arm himself
with gun, enter the apartment of his ex-girlfriend uninvited and without permission to use the key,
and engage in a physical fight with the current boyfriend of his ex-girlfriend, then repeatedly shoot
him in the same room where defendant’s young son was sleeping, and told his ex-girlfriend “not
to tell anybody” before he ran out of her apartment.
¶ 62 Here, based on the current legal landscape and relevant details contained in the record, we are
unable to conclude that the 56-year sentence that defendant received for crimes he committed when
he was 22 years old is unconstitutional. Moreover, although it is true that defendant’s 56-year
sentence is a de facto life sentence, defendant did not establish the element of “cause” in the cause-
and-prejudice test in order to succeed in his third successive postconviction petition. Accordingly,
the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion for leave to file his successive postconviction
petition.
¶ 63 CONCLUSION
¶ 64 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
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¶ 65 Affirmed.
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