2016 IL App (3d) 130511
Opinion filed June 13, 2016 ____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
A.D., 2016
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ILLINOIS, ) of the 10th Judicial Circuit, ) Peoria County, Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) Appeal No. 3-13-0511 v. ) Circuit No. 10-CF-500 ) DOMINICK M. SANDERS, ) Honorable ) Kevin Lyons, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding. ____________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE delivered the judgment of the court with opinion. Presiding Justice O'Brien and Justice Carter concurred in the judgment and opinion. ____________________________________________________________________________
OPINION
¶1 A jury found the defendant, Dominick M. Sanders, guilty of first degree murder (720
ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West 2010)), aggravated battery with a firearm (720 ILCS 5/12-4.2(a)(1)
(West 2010)), aggravated discharge of a firearm (720 ILCS 5/24-1.2(a)(1) (West 2010)),
aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(1) (West 2010)), and unlawful
possession of a weapon by a felon (720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a) (West 2010)). After a hearing, the trial
court sentenced the defendant to 45 years' imprisonment for first degree murder, plus a 25-year
firearm enhancement, and a consecutive term of 25 years' imprisonment for aggravated battery
with a firearm. The court also sentenced the defendant to concurrent terms of 10 years' imprisonment for aggravated discharge of a firearm and 7 years' imprisonment for aggravated
unlawful use of a weapon. 1 No sentence was entered on the unlawful possession of a weapon by
a felon count.
¶2 On appeal, the defendant argues that: (1) the trial court erred when it considered a factor
inherent in the offense during sentencing, overemphasized the defendant's nonviolent criminal
history, and failed to consider the defendant's relative youth during sentencing; and (2) his DNA
fee must be vacated because his DNA was previously registered, and his cost assessments are
subject to multiple errors.
¶3 FACTS
¶4 The evidence at the defendant's jury trial showed that Nick Renfro and his brother,
Davon, got into an argument with Willie Wilson and a second individual named "Willard" or
"Willis." The argument escalated into a physical altercation. After the fight, Nick's and Davon's
mother, Joyce Renfro, got into an argument with a woman named "Patrice" who was the mother
of Wilson's child. Patrice summoned the defendant who came out of a nearby apartment. The
defendant was dressed in black and started shooting an automatic firearm. Nick pushed Joyce
into her apartment, and Joyce received a gunshot wound to the leg. Nick was shot in the back
and died on the way to the hospital. A forensic pathologist testified that Nick had received
several gunshot wounds, the most significant of which was one to the back of the upper right
shoulder. The fragments of the round struck Nick's right lung, aorta, and esophagus and caused
massive bleeding.
1 On appeal, the defendant does not challenge his sentences for aggravated discharge of a
firearm and aggravated unlawful use of a weapon.
2 ¶5 The jury found the defendant guilty of all of the charges and that the defendant had
personally discharged a firearm that proximately caused the death of another person. Thereafter,
the cause proceeded to a sentencing hearing.
¶6 After the parties presented their arguments on the sentencing alternatives, the trial court
considered the factors in aggravation and mitigation. In aggravation the trial court stated:
"[A]mong other things, the defendant's conduct did cause or threaten serious
harm. It may be inherent in the actual fact that he committed a murder, but it did
occur, and that the defendant has a history of prior delinquency of criminal
activity. And that the sentence is necessary to deter others from committing the
same crime, and that the defendant was convicted of a felony while he was
serving a period of probation."
In mitigation, the court said that it had "a hard time to find anything." The court sentenced the
defendant to 45 years' imprisonment for first degree murder, plus an additional 25-year firearm
enhancement, and a consecutive term of 25 years' imprisonment for aggravated battery with a
firearm. The trial court also sentenced the defendant to concurrent terms of 10 years'
imprisonment for aggravated discharge of a firearm and 7 years' imprisonment for aggravated
unlawful use of a weapon. No sentence was entered on the unlawful possession of a weapon by
¶7 The defendant filed a motion to reconsider sentence arguing that he did not have a history
of significant criminal activity that would justify such a long sentence and he had a strong
possibility of rehabilitation given his young age. After a hearing, the court denied the
defendant's motion. The defendant filed a notice of appeal.
3 ¶8 On July 20, 2015, we affirmed the defendant's prison sentence, vacated his DNA fee and
the remaining costs and remanded the cause with directions for the trial court to expressly
impose any and all fines and the circuit clerk to specifically impose all fees in a written order.
Subsequently, the defendant filed a petition for rehearing arguing that our affirmance of his
prison sentences was in error because, under People v. Martin, 119 Ill. 2d 453, 458-60 (1988),
the consideration of a factor inherent in the offense is reversible under the second prong of the
plain error analysis. We granted rehearing.
¶9 ANALYSIS
¶ 10 I. Sentence
¶ 11 The defendant argues that the trial court improperly considered a factor inherent in the
offense of first degree murder, while sentencing the defendant. Specifically, the court found that
the defendant's conduct caused or threatened serious harm. The defendant acknowledges that he
did not properly preserve this issue for appellate review, but contends that it is reversible under
the second prong of the plain error doctrine. 2
¶ 12 To overcome a claim of forfeiture, we must determine whether the alleged errors can be
reviewed under the plain error doctrine. The first step in a plain error analysis is to determine
whether a "plain error" occurred. People v. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d 551, 564-65 (2007). "The
word 'plain' here is synonymous with 'clear' and is the equivalent of 'obvious.' " Id. at 565 n.2.
¶ 13 Generally, a trial court may not consider as an aggravating factor in sentencing a fact that
is inherent in the offense with which the defendant was charged. People v. Thomas, 171 Ill. 2d
207, 226-27 (1996). This rule is not meant to apply rigidly because public policy dictates that a
2 The defendant does not argue that this issue may be reversed under the first prong of the
plain error doctrine.
4 sentence be varied in accordance with the circumstances of the offense. People v. Cain, 221 Ill.
App. 3d 574, 575 (1991). The court may consider the nature and circumstances of an offense,
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2016 IL App (3d) 130511
Opinion filed June 13, 2016 ____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
A.D., 2016
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ILLINOIS, ) of the 10th Judicial Circuit, ) Peoria County, Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) Appeal No. 3-13-0511 v. ) Circuit No. 10-CF-500 ) DOMINICK M. SANDERS, ) Honorable ) Kevin Lyons, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding. ____________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE delivered the judgment of the court with opinion. Presiding Justice O'Brien and Justice Carter concurred in the judgment and opinion. ____________________________________________________________________________
OPINION
¶1 A jury found the defendant, Dominick M. Sanders, guilty of first degree murder (720
ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West 2010)), aggravated battery with a firearm (720 ILCS 5/12-4.2(a)(1)
(West 2010)), aggravated discharge of a firearm (720 ILCS 5/24-1.2(a)(1) (West 2010)),
aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(1) (West 2010)), and unlawful
possession of a weapon by a felon (720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a) (West 2010)). After a hearing, the trial
court sentenced the defendant to 45 years' imprisonment for first degree murder, plus a 25-year
firearm enhancement, and a consecutive term of 25 years' imprisonment for aggravated battery
with a firearm. The court also sentenced the defendant to concurrent terms of 10 years' imprisonment for aggravated discharge of a firearm and 7 years' imprisonment for aggravated
unlawful use of a weapon. 1 No sentence was entered on the unlawful possession of a weapon by
a felon count.
¶2 On appeal, the defendant argues that: (1) the trial court erred when it considered a factor
inherent in the offense during sentencing, overemphasized the defendant's nonviolent criminal
history, and failed to consider the defendant's relative youth during sentencing; and (2) his DNA
fee must be vacated because his DNA was previously registered, and his cost assessments are
subject to multiple errors.
¶3 FACTS
¶4 The evidence at the defendant's jury trial showed that Nick Renfro and his brother,
Davon, got into an argument with Willie Wilson and a second individual named "Willard" or
"Willis." The argument escalated into a physical altercation. After the fight, Nick's and Davon's
mother, Joyce Renfro, got into an argument with a woman named "Patrice" who was the mother
of Wilson's child. Patrice summoned the defendant who came out of a nearby apartment. The
defendant was dressed in black and started shooting an automatic firearm. Nick pushed Joyce
into her apartment, and Joyce received a gunshot wound to the leg. Nick was shot in the back
and died on the way to the hospital. A forensic pathologist testified that Nick had received
several gunshot wounds, the most significant of which was one to the back of the upper right
shoulder. The fragments of the round struck Nick's right lung, aorta, and esophagus and caused
massive bleeding.
1 On appeal, the defendant does not challenge his sentences for aggravated discharge of a
firearm and aggravated unlawful use of a weapon.
2 ¶5 The jury found the defendant guilty of all of the charges and that the defendant had
personally discharged a firearm that proximately caused the death of another person. Thereafter,
the cause proceeded to a sentencing hearing.
¶6 After the parties presented their arguments on the sentencing alternatives, the trial court
considered the factors in aggravation and mitigation. In aggravation the trial court stated:
"[A]mong other things, the defendant's conduct did cause or threaten serious
harm. It may be inherent in the actual fact that he committed a murder, but it did
occur, and that the defendant has a history of prior delinquency of criminal
activity. And that the sentence is necessary to deter others from committing the
same crime, and that the defendant was convicted of a felony while he was
serving a period of probation."
In mitigation, the court said that it had "a hard time to find anything." The court sentenced the
defendant to 45 years' imprisonment for first degree murder, plus an additional 25-year firearm
enhancement, and a consecutive term of 25 years' imprisonment for aggravated battery with a
firearm. The trial court also sentenced the defendant to concurrent terms of 10 years'
imprisonment for aggravated discharge of a firearm and 7 years' imprisonment for aggravated
unlawful use of a weapon. No sentence was entered on the unlawful possession of a weapon by
¶7 The defendant filed a motion to reconsider sentence arguing that he did not have a history
of significant criminal activity that would justify such a long sentence and he had a strong
possibility of rehabilitation given his young age. After a hearing, the court denied the
defendant's motion. The defendant filed a notice of appeal.
3 ¶8 On July 20, 2015, we affirmed the defendant's prison sentence, vacated his DNA fee and
the remaining costs and remanded the cause with directions for the trial court to expressly
impose any and all fines and the circuit clerk to specifically impose all fees in a written order.
Subsequently, the defendant filed a petition for rehearing arguing that our affirmance of his
prison sentences was in error because, under People v. Martin, 119 Ill. 2d 453, 458-60 (1988),
the consideration of a factor inherent in the offense is reversible under the second prong of the
plain error analysis. We granted rehearing.
¶9 ANALYSIS
¶ 10 I. Sentence
¶ 11 The defendant argues that the trial court improperly considered a factor inherent in the
offense of first degree murder, while sentencing the defendant. Specifically, the court found that
the defendant's conduct caused or threatened serious harm. The defendant acknowledges that he
did not properly preserve this issue for appellate review, but contends that it is reversible under
the second prong of the plain error doctrine. 2
¶ 12 To overcome a claim of forfeiture, we must determine whether the alleged errors can be
reviewed under the plain error doctrine. The first step in a plain error analysis is to determine
whether a "plain error" occurred. People v. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d 551, 564-65 (2007). "The
word 'plain' here is synonymous with 'clear' and is the equivalent of 'obvious.' " Id. at 565 n.2.
¶ 13 Generally, a trial court may not consider as an aggravating factor in sentencing a fact that
is inherent in the offense with which the defendant was charged. People v. Thomas, 171 Ill. 2d
207, 226-27 (1996). This rule is not meant to apply rigidly because public policy dictates that a
2 The defendant does not argue that this issue may be reversed under the first prong of the
plain error doctrine.
4 sentence be varied in accordance with the circumstances of the offense. People v. Cain, 221 Ill.
App. 3d 574, 575 (1991). The court may consider the nature and circumstances of an offense,
including the nature and extent of each element of the offense as committed by the defendant.
People v. James, 255 Ill. App. 3d 516, 532 (1993). The cause must be remanded for
resentencing where a reviewing court is unable to determine the weight given to an improper
factor. People v. Beals, 162 Ill. 2d 497, 509 (1994). Remand is unnecessary where a reviewing
court can determine from the record that the trial court placed insignificant weight upon the
improper aggravating factor. Id. at 509-10.
¶ 14 Here, the trial court expressly stated, in aggravation, that the defendant's conduct did
cause harm and acknowledged that this fact was inherent in the offense of murder, but reasserted
that the conduct "did occur." Supra ¶ 6. Because the court noted this improper factor,
acknowledged that it was inherent in the offense, and then indicated that it was still considering
the factor in aggravation, we find that the court erroneously gave improper weight to the double
enhancing factor.
¶ 15 The defendant argues that the court's error was reversible under the second prong of the
plain error doctrine because consideration of an improper factor in aggravation affected his
fundamental right to liberty. Our supreme court has equated the second prong of the plain error
doctrine with structural error. People v. Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d 598, 613-14 (2010). Under this
analysis, "automatic reversal is only required where an error is deemed 'structural,' i.e., a
systemic error which serves to 'erode the integrity of the judicial process and undermine the
fairness of the defendant's trial.' " People v. Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d 173, 197-98 (2009) (quoting
People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167, 186 (2005)). The Thompson court noted that "[t]he Supreme
Court has recognized an error as ' "structural" ' only in a ' "very limited class of cases." ' "
5 Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d at 609 (citing Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d at 198, quoting Neder v. United States,
527 U.S. 1, 8 (1999); quoting Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468 (1997)). "Those cases
include a complete denial of counsel, trial before a biased judge, racial discrimination in the
selection of a grand jury, denial of self-representation at trial, denial of a public trial, and a
defective reasonable doubt instruction." Id. (citing Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212, 218
n.2 (2006).
¶ 16 In our original order, we applied the Thompson structural error language as a strict
limitation on the categories of plain error that are reversible under the second prong. We then
concluded that consideration of a factor inherent in the charged offense was not one of these
select errors. However, since our decision, the supreme court clarified that "although [its]
decisions in Glasper and Thompson equated second-prong plain error with structural error, [it]
did not restrict plain error to the types of structural error that have been recognized by the
Supreme Court." People v. Clark, 2016 IL 118845, ¶ 46.
¶ 17 In light of Clark, the defendant argues on rehearing that the consideration of a factor
inherent in the charged offense is reversible under the second prong. See Martin, 119 Ill. 2d at
458-60. In Martin, our supreme court found that both prongs of the plain error doctrine applied
to this issue. Id. Regarding the second prong, the supreme court noted that:
"[t]he trial judge's consideration of the fact that the defendant's conduct caused
serious harm to [the victim], resulting in his death, as a factor in aggravation in
sentencing clearly affected the defendant's fundamental right to liberty (see
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 674-74 (1977)) and impinged on her right not
to be sentenced based on improper factors (see People v. Conover, 84 Ill. 2d 400,
405 (1981) (sentence based on improper factors will not be affirmed unless the
6 court can determine from the record that the weight placed on the improperly
considered aggravating factor was so insignificant that it did not lead to a greater
sentence))." Id. at 458.
We find that the Martin rationale controls the outcome of this case. Specifically, the trial court's
express finding that the defendant's conduct caused or threatened serious harm, a factor inherent
in the offense of first degree murder, impinged on the defendant's right not to be sentenced based
on an improper factor and affected his fundamental right to liberty. See id. Therefore, we
reverse the defendant's sentence under the second prong of the plain error analysis, and we
remand the cause for resentencing.
¶ 18 II. Fines and Fees
¶ 19 The defendant raises two issues with regard to the imposition of his fines and fees. First,
the court erroneously imposed a DNA analysis fee when the defendant was previously subject to
the fee because of his prior felony conviction. See People v. Marshall, 242 Ill. 2d 285, 303
(2011). Second, the case payment sheet includes several errors, which includes the omission of
his $5-per-day presentence incarceration credit. We find that our resolution of the first issue has
rendered these cost issues moot. However, on remand, we note that the defendant should not be
subject to the DNA analysis fee as the record establishes that his DNA was previously recorded.
See id. We further order that all fines and fees imposed shall comply with the following
directions: (1) the trial court shall expressly impose any and all fines; (2) the circuit clerk may
impose any individual fee or court cost; (3) the amount of each fine, fee, assessment or court cost
the defendant has been ordered to pay as part of the sentence shall be set forth in a written order
bearing the court's signature; (4) the written order shall provide the statutory authority for each
7 individual financial charge; and (5) the trial court shall calculate and offset the defendant's fines
by the appropriate amount of $5-per-day presentence incarceration credit.
¶ 20 CONCLUSION
¶ 21 The judgment of the circuit court of Peoria County is reversed and remanded with
directions.
¶ 22 Reversed and remanded with directions.