2022 IL App (2d) 200715 No. 2-20-0715 Opinion filed June 29, 2022 ______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
SECOND DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court OF ILLINOIS, ) of Winnebago County. ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) v. ) No. 15-CF-2716 ) JOSE B. RODRIGUEZ-ARANDA, ) Honorable ) Robert Randall Wilt, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________
PRESIDING JUSTICE BRIDGES delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justices Zenoff 1 and Birkett concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 Defendant, Jose B. Rodriguez-Aranda, appeals his conviction of first-degree murder (720
ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West 2016)) relating to the stabbing death of his wife, Martina Chagoya-
Espinoza. Defendant was sentenced to 40 years’ imprisonment. After an Illinois Supreme Court
Rule 402 (eff. July 1, 2012) conference, defense counsel represented to the trial court that
1 Justice Zenoff participated in this appeal, but has since been assigned to the Fourth District
Appellate Court. Our supreme court has held that the departure of a judge prior to the filing date
will not affect the validity of a decision so long as the remaining two judges concur. Proctor v.
Upjohn Co., 175 Ill. 2d 394, 396 (1997). 2022 IL App (2d) 200715
defendant intended to enter a guilty plea, with a 35-year sentencing cap. As the court questioned
defendant, who spoke only Spanish, regarding whether he intended to plead guilty, defendant
indicated he did not wish to plead guilty and asked for a new attorney, or a new interpreter, or to
represent himself. The court denied defendant’s request to represent himself, on the ground that,
because defendant had schizophrenia, spoke only Spanish, and exhibited unspecified courtroom
behavior, he was unable to represent himself. Additionally, prior to trial, defense counsel requested
that defendant’s hands be unshackled. The court then ordered that one hand be unshackled.
Defendant now appeals, arguing that the court erred in denying his request to represent himself
and erred in leaving him mostly shackled for the duration of the trial. For the following reasons,
we reverse and remand for a new trial.
¶2 I. MOTION TAKEN WITH CASE
¶3 As a preliminary matter we address the State’s motion to strike the citations contained in
footnotes 2-5 of defendant’s brief, which reference secondary sources, and any references thereto.
¶4 The State argues that these authorities are not proper secondary sources, do not refer to
matters over which the court may take judicial notice, and were not presented to the trial court,
and therefore should be stricken.
¶5 Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341 (eff. Oct. 1, 2020) “expresses no restriction on the nature
or source of material which may be cited in support of an argument. Whether the authority cited
may be nonprecedential, irrelevant, or incomplete will be determined by the reviewing court as a
proper consideration in assessing the merits of a proponent’s argument.” In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d
53, 56 (1993). Further, while an appellant must preserve issues or claims for appeal, there is no
requirement that arguments or authorities be limited strictly to those made at trial. See Brunton v.
Kruger, 2015 IL 117663, ¶ 76. Accordingly, we deny the State’s motion; however, we will take
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the State’s arguments regarding these authorities into consideration and assign them the weight we
believe is appropriate.
¶6 II. BACKGROUND
¶7 On the night of November 20, 2015, after an argument, defendant stabbed his wife 23 times
in the chest and face, resulting in her death. Defendant then tried to take his own life, cutting his
wrists and throat and stabbing himself several times in the abdomen. Sometime in the early
morning hours of November 21, 2015, defendant’s son discovered his mother’s body, as well as
his father, barely conscious in the bathtub. Defendant told his son to call 911 and defendant was
taken to the Order of St. Francis Medical Center for treatment. When defendant arrived at the
hospital, he had very low blood pressure, had a very high heart rate, and was near death.
¶8 After spending over a week in the hospital, defendant was placed under arrest and taken to
the Winnebago County Criminal Justice Center on November 30, 2015, by Detective Bob Juanez
of the Winnebago County Sheriff’s Department. While being transferred, defendant asked
Detective Juanez about his children. Detective Juanez informed him they were doing all right, and
defendant became emotional, cried a lot, and began repeating, “I can’t believe I did this. I can’t
believe I did this to her. I can’t believe I failed my kids.” When they arrived at the station,
defendant was taken to an interview room and read his Miranda warnings (see Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966)). Detective Juanez then proceeded to interview defendant.
¶9 In that interview, defendant described how on the night of November 20, 2015, he and his
family were watching a movie. He noticed his wife was texting someone and demanded to know
who. He believed that she was texting with another man. He had been drinking and, after the
children went to sleep, he confronted her about the cellphone messages again, asking her to unlock
her phone. She refused loudly; defendant believed she did so in order to wake the children so he
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would stop. She said she wanted to leave with the children. He then grabbed a knife and told her
to unlock her phone. She refused and went to stand up from the chair she had been sitting in. He
then proceeded to stab her. Realizing what he had done, he lowered her to the ground. He cut his
wrists and arranged himself and his wife’s body as if they were going to sleep. He awoke the next
morning. The children were awake, and he told them to stay in their room. He began stabbing
himself. He tried to cut himself further but felt the knife was no longer sharp. He grabbed another
knife and tried to sharpen the knives. Not much blood was coming out. He passed out and awoke
in the kitchen. He took several pills to try and kill himself, and possibly vomited. He remembered
going to the bathroom but could not recall anything else from before he awoke in the hospital. The
interview and conversations with Detective Juanez were conducted in Spanish.
¶ 10 Defendant was charged in a December 21, 2015, indictment with three counts of first-
degree murder.
¶ 11 A. Dr. Lichtenwald’s Report
¶ 12 On September 13, 2016, defendant filed a motion to suppress the statements he made while
he was being transported from the hospital and during his November 30, 2015, interview with
Detective Juanez. Defendant argued that he could not knowingly and intelligently waive his
Miranda rights because he had been diagnosed with schizophrenia, he had been prescribed the
psychotropic medication Zyprexa, and his suicide attempt left him in a compromised physical
state. In support of that motion, defendant sought to have Dr. Meyer interview defendant and
prepare a report. The State hired Dr. Lichtenwald to examine defendant and prepare a report
regarding his capacity to waive his Miranda rights. Dr. Meyer’s report was never entered into the
record, as defendant chose to withdraw his motion to suppress, but defendant’s trial attorney
testified in a posttrial hearing that his report was similar to Dr. Lichtenwald’s.
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¶ 13 Dr. Lichtenwald’s report included summaries of his interview with defendant, as well as
medical reports from defendant’s treatment at the hospital after his suicide attempt and medical
records from the jail. According to Dr. Lichtenwald’s report, defendant was evaluated at the
hospital by psychiatrist Dr. Martin Fields. On November 25, 2015, Dr. Fields noted that defendant
was exhibiting “no evidence of psychosis, impaired thinking, or severe depression.” On November
27, 2015, his notes indicated that defendant began reporting that he saw people who came through
the walls and threatened to kill him. His notes on November 28, 2015, reflect a similar state, though
Dr. Fields questioned the veracity of defendant’s claims, as his anxiety did not seem high. His
notes from November 29, 2015, indicated that defendant’s symptoms were worsening, and that he
was
“[v]ery delusional, claims that all the staff are out to kill him, that one person here is in
communication with his wife and is recording the things done to him, there is a book kept
by another person here that is recording things done to him for his children and he wants
to see that book.”
Dr. Fields diagnosed defendant with paranoid schizophrenia and prescribed Zyprexa.
¶ 14 Progress notes from the Winnebago County Justice Center were likewise provided to Dr.
Lichtenwald. Per these notes, on December 1, 2015, defendant denied being suicidal, stating he
was suicidal for the first two days after killing his wife, but was no longer so, as he wanted to be
there for his children. The notes indicated that defendant “[d]id not present as confused. Thoughts
were organized and coherent.” Defendant denied being suicidal or mentally ill. A note dated
December 9, 2015, indicated that
“[s]ince being incarcerated, he denied auditory or visual hallucinations. He denies feeling
paranoid believing others are listening to him, or are reading his thoughts. He states he
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feels upset but mostly because of what happened to his wife. *** Assessment: Rule out
psychotic Disorder unspecified. [L]ikely acute stress reaction vs. delirium while
hospitalized. Monitor closely while tapering off meds.”
Another note, dated December 28, 2015, stated that defendant “[h]as been in jail almost one month
and off psych meds X 3 weeks. Denies current symptoms, mood, affect, speech, thoughts within
normal limits. Psychiatria [sic] believes symptoms in hospital were related to the situation.” A note
dated April 22, 2016, stated that defendant had no reported symptoms of mental illness and could
be removed from special housing. The reports continued through to February 13, 2017, with no
indication of hallucinations or mental illness.
¶ 15 Dr. Lichtenwald’s report ultimately concluded that defendant was competent to waive his
Miranda rights, stating that his “[j]udgment with regard to decisions affecting his own well-being
was good” and “[t]here were no indications that Mr. Rodriguez Aranda was not competent to
manage his own affairs.”
¶ 16 B. Defendant Seeks to Represent Himself
¶ 17 The motion to suppress was withdrawn on July 12, 2017. A Rule 402 conference was held
on December 15, 2017. As a result of that conference, on May 3, 2018, defense counsel, Shauna
Gustafson of the Winnebago Public Defender’s Office, stated that defendant would be entering an
open plea with an agreement for a sentencing cap of 35 years. After defendant was advised of the
charges and the State provided the factual basis for the charges, the trial court asked if defendant
intended to accept the plea agreement and plead guilty. Defendant, through the aid of an interpreter,
asked if he could say something to the court. The court advised him he should consult with his
attorney before saying anything. Defendant refused to consult with counsel and stated,
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“I do not want to plead guilty. Please assign me somebody else to represent me
because in my case there is a lot of things that they are not clear yet. *** If it’s possible;
otherwise I can represent myself or somebody else. Can you assign me somebody else that
speak the same language? That is a big problem. They say something to me, and then they
say something different.”
The court asked why he wanted new counsel, and he responded that his counsel had not shown
him discovery until the day before and that the cap had been raised from 30 to 35 years. He again
requested to represent himself, saying, “I can do it myself. I’m asking you to please give me the
right to be represented by another attorney, if it’s possible, bilingual, or if you cannot, please give
me the chance to represent myself. Thank you.”
¶ 18 The trial court then proceeded to question Gustafson, who stated that she had reviewed
discovery with defendant and that the 30-year number represented a counteroffer she proffered to
the State, which declined, insisting on a 35-year cap. Gustafson also stated that, to her knowledge,
there were no Spanish speaking attorneys in the public defender’s office. After conducting its
inquiry, the trial court determined that no basis existed for removing the Public Defender’s Office
or appointing outside counsel. The trial court also commented that, of the three attorneys who were
on contract for such purpose, none spoke Spanish. The court then asked defendant if he still wished
to represent himself. Defendant responded that if the court could not appoint him a new attorney,
he wanted the court to assign a new interpreter (referring to the interpreter from the Public
Defender’s Office who accompanied Gustafson to the jail). About the interpreter he said,
“She was mean to me. She was pushing me and forcing me. They made me feel with a lot
of pressure. I told them I do not want to sign. I told them I do not want to. They were with
me for half an hour. I kept telling them I don’t want to do it. What they never done it before,
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they were doing it just yesterday. They told me, ‘We are coming back’ but never told me,
‘We are coming by with pictures; we are coming by with a computer.’ All of that made me
feel uncomfortable like I have to do it.”
¶ 19 The trial court told defendant that he did not have to plead guilty if he did not want to and
that they could proceed to trial. The court also reiterated that it would not appoint new counsel.
The court again asked if defendant wished to represent himself, and the following exchange
occurred.
“THE COURT: Now, you said you want to represent yourself. Is that something
you wish to do?
THE DEFENDANT (by means of an INTERPRETER): Well, if I have no other
choice, yes.
THE COURT: Well, you are at a significant disadvantage, more so than somebody
else that might want to represent themselves because you don’t read or speak English and
you are in jail. I cannot assign an investigator or an interpreter to sit with you up in jail and
review things, read things to you. I don’t have an interpreter available for that purpose. If
you represent yourself, you are bound by the same rules and conduct that an attorney would
be. That means you would have to learn the Rules of Evidence. You would have to learn
the Rules of Criminal Procedure. You would have to learn what you have to do to file
motions. You would have to be able to do your own legal research. You have to be able to
draft pleadings from the Court if you are going to file motions, because all motions have
to be in writing.
I can’t help you out. I am not allowed to help you out. Anybody who represents
themselves, I have to treat them the same that I would treat any attorney. That means I
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can’t help you even one little bit. If you don’t know what you are doing, if you don’t know
how to do what you are supposed to do, that’s your problem. If, for example, you want to
get a piece of evidence in and you don’t know how to lay the evidentiary foundation, I
can’t help you. If the State, for example, has a piece of evidence that they are seeking to
admit and they don’t lay the proper foundation and you don’t know enough to object, it
would come in. If you represent yourself, you are going to be at a significant disadvantage,
aside from the fact that you don’t speak English and do not read English, because you are
going to be going up against people who have been practicing the law as lawyers for the
State’s Attorneys’ Office for many years. Miss Clifford has tried many, many jury trials.
She is one of their most experienced attorneys, as is Miss Gustafson one of the most
experienced attorneys in the Public Defenders’ Office. Plus you are always at a
disadvantage where you are the Defendant trying to represent yourself because you think
more with your emotion than you do with your head, and a lot of times people make the
wrong decision. They don’t make the logical, right decision.
You also need to know that if you do this, *** [the court goes on to describe the
charges against him and the possible sentences]. Do you understand that?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: Have you ever been evaluated for any kind of a mental health
problem?
THE INTERPRETER: No; but I do not remember. They are saying that they are
showing in discovery [three] different doctors. I just saw [one].
THE COURT: Is there evidence that he’s been evaluated by a psychiatrist or
psychologist?
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MS. CLIFFORD [(ASSISTANT STATE’S ATTORNEY)]: Yes, Your Honor.
After he was put in the hospital after this event occurred, he was seen by a psychiatrist, and
my recollection of the medical records was that he was diagnosed as schizophrenic, but I
don’t have all of them in front of me. I don’t know what other diagnoses there were.
THE COURT: Miss Gustafson, you would have had access to those records as well.
What is your recollection as to what if any diagnoses were made?
MS. GUSTAFSON [(PUBLIC DEFENDER’S OFFICE)]: I believe that that’s
correct, Judge. He also was assessed pursuant to a motion that Mr. Fuller had filed. I believe
that Dr. Lichtenwald met with him at the jail per the State’s request, and Dr. Meyer had
reviewed the medical per Mr. Fuller’s request.
THE COURT: All right. If there’s been a diagnosis of schizophrenia, I cannot allow
him to represent himself. That type of mental health diagnosis, and I am pretty lenient about
allowing people to represent themselves, but that’s one of the reasons I cannot.
That coupled with his inability to speak or read English and his incarceration in the
County Jail, I am going to deny your request to represent yourself, sir. You are not
competent and able to do that, more so than normal because of some of the other problems
that you have.
So I am not removing the Public Defenders’ Office. I’m not going to grant your
request to represent yourself.
Now, I want the attorneys to check into this. If in fact the diagnosis is not
schizophrenia, if it is something else, I want to you [sic] bring that back to my attention
because I may reconsider if he does not have any mental health diagnoses that would impair
his ability to represent himself. But with a diagnosis of something like schizophrenia or
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bipolar, that is a significant problem as far as somebody’s ability to even think rationally
at times.
MS. CLIFFORD: That was my recollection based on motions that were filed by
Mr. Fuller.
MS. GUSTAFSON: I am not certain as we stand here right now, Judge. I would
have to review the medical.
THE COURT: All right. Well, the request to represent yourself is denied for the
reasons stated on the record.”
¶ 20 The court then stated on the record that it had known the interpreter from the Public
Defender’s Office for many years and that she was not the type of person who would be mean to
or bully defendant. After discussion of administrative and scheduling matters, the following
colloquy occurred.
“MS. CLIFFORD: If I can just note, according to my records from Mr. Fuller, the
Defendant was diagnosed by Dr. Martin J. Fields with schizophrenia while he was in the
hospital in November of 2015 and was prescribed medication including Zyprexa, Z-y-p-r-
e-x-a.
THE COURT: All right. And I know that there were evaluations done as was said
by Dr. Lichtenwald and Dr. Meyer, although they are psychologists and not psychiatrists.
Were there anything in their reports that were inconsistent with those diagnoses?
MS. CLIFFORD: I don’t recall Dr. Meyer, but I do remember Dr. Lichtenwald was
reviewing for the basis of knowingly or voluntarily.
MS. GUSTAFSON: Those were both in relation to the Motion to Suppress which
was withdrawn. Mr. Meyer, I believe, Dr. Meyer was who Mr. Fuller had spoken with. I
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believe the State had asked Dr. Lichtenwald to do the evaluation.”
¶ 21 Accordingly, a written order was entered that stated as follows,
“Defendant’s request to proceed pro se is denied for the following reasons:
a) Defendant’s inability to read or speak English
b) His incarcerated status and the court’s inability to provide a full time Spanish
interpreter in jail to read discovery to Defendant, to perform legal research (English
language sites), to assist in drafting pleadings and to teach Defendant all applicable laws,
rules of evidence and rules of procedure
c) Defendant’s disruptive behavior as exhibited in court this date
d) Defendant’s mental state as reflected by the prior diagnosis of schizophrenia
made previously after this offense allegedly occurred coupled with evidence of his
attempted suicide. Based upon the foregoing the court finds Defendant truly lacks the level
of appreciation necessary to make a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel
and further that due to the above impediments it is not just a matter of his not being able to
do a ‘good job’ of representing himself but rather he is incapable of doing so and to permit
it would result in the inability of the court to ensure orderly fair proceedings.”
¶ 22 As court was adjourning, defendant asked the trial court what schizophrenia was. The court
informed him that it was not trained in psychiatry but that schizophrenia was a mental health
diagnosis, and it recommended he consult the DSM-5 for more information. Defendant apparently
took this advice to heart as, according to records from the jail’s mental health services clinic, he
went there the next day and asked the clinician what schizophrenia was. The clinician explained
the disease to him and told him that he had been initially diagnosed with schizophrenia at the
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hospital but that “the jail psychiatrist felt it was because of trauma and blood loss as he had no
symptoms when taken off meds.”
¶ 23 Also on May 4, 2018, a status hearing was held and defendant again expressed his
dissatisfaction with Gustafson, saying, “With all respect, Your Honor, I do not want to offend
anybody. I don’t—I don’t feel like I can trust her and that she is representing me the right way.
I’m refusing. I have refused for her to represent me, with all respect. I apologize.” The trial court
again refused to remove Gustafson and the Public Defender’s Office and refused to allow
defendant to represent himself. It is unclear whether the hearing took place before or after he
visited the mental health clinic.
¶ 24 C. Defendant Remains Partially Shackled at Trial
¶ 25 The case proceeded to a two-day bench trial, held from September 19 to 20, 2018. At the
beginning of trial, defense counsel asked that defendant have his hands unshackled for the trial:
“MS. GUSTAFSON: I would ask the Court, if possible, to have Mr. Aranda
unshackled at the hands so that he can take notes during the course of the trial, uh, write
down any questions or comments that he has for us. Currently he would be limited in his
ability to do that.
THE COURT: I think that seems to be a fair request.
To the officers here—we have two of you—if this were a jury trial, he would be
unhandcuffed and unshackled. All I’m asking you to do is uncuff one hand.
Is your client right-handed or left-handed?
(No response.)
THE COURT: Mr. Aranda, do you write with your right hand or the left hand?
THE DEFENDANT: The right one.
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THE COURT: Then I would like his right hand unshackled so he can take notes.”
The record indicates that, immediately prior to the trial court giving its verdict, defendant had both
hands shackled and needed assistance putting on the interpreter’s headphones. Defendant was
found guilty on all three counts.
¶ 26 Before sentencing, defendant alleged in a posttrial motion that trial counsel was ineffective.
As such, the trial court appointed conflict counsel to represent defendant on his posttrial motions.
Conflict counsel filed a motion for a new trial, alleging inter alia that trial counsel was ineffective,
the trial court erred in denying defendant’s request to represent himself, and the trial court erred in
leaving defendant’s left hand shackled at trial.
¶ 27 The trial court denied the motion for a new trial. In doing so, it made the following
statement regarding defendant remaining shackled at trial.
“Paragraph 8, ‘The Court erred in having the defendant shackled except for one
hand to take notes during the trial where the defendant did not pose a threat or escape risk.’
This was a bench trial. This was not a jury trial. In a jury trial the defendant has a
right not to be handcuffed or shackled unless it’s established that they cannot conduct
themselves appropriately, and there has to be a separate hearing held for that.
I’m not aware, nor have I been presented any authority by the defense, that indicates
that that right extends to a bench trial.
The underlying reasoning for that right is because you don’t want a defendant to be
unduly prejudiced in the eyes of a jury. That is not the same concern when there is a bench
trial.
I made the decision to keep him handcuffed and shackled, other than allowing him
to free one hand so he could take notes. I think that decision was correct. I stand by my
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decision, and I’m guessing the appellate court will tell me whether or not I’m right or I’m
wrong.”
¶ 28 On August 26, 2020, defendant was sentenced to 40 years’ imprisonment. Defendant filed
a motion to reconsider the sentence, which was denied, and defendant timely appealed.
¶ 29 III. ANALYSIS
¶ 30 At issue in this appeal is whether the trial court erred in denying defendant’s request to
represent himself, and whether the trial court erred by leaving defendant shackled during the trial.
¶ 31 A. Defendant’s Right to Self-Representation
¶ 32 A criminal defendant has the right to self-representation under both the United States and
Illinois Constitutions. U.S. Const., amend. VI; Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975);
Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 8; People v. Simpson, 204 Ill. 2d 536, 573 (2001).
¶ 33 In order to invoke the right to self-representation a defendant must knowingly and
intelligently waive the right to be represented by counsel. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835; People v. Baez,
241 Ill. 2d 44, 115-16 (2011). Such waiver must be clear, unequivocal, and unambiguous. People
v. Burton, 184 Ill. 2d 1, 21 (1998). However, this right is not absolute, and trial courts may deny a
defendant’s request for self-representation under certain circumstances, including where a
defendant’s lack of civility and decorum would result in an abuse of the dignity of the courtroom
(People v. Rainey, 2019 IL App (1st) 160187, ¶ 74), where a defendant abuses the right to waive
counsel as a tactic to delay or disrupt proceedings (Martinez v. Court of Appeal of California,
Fourth Appellate District, 528 U.S. 152, 162 (2000)), or where a defendant suffers from a severe
mental illness and thus is not competent to conduct trial proceedings without counsel (Indiana v.
Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 178 (2008)). However, a defendant’s lack of legal knowledge and ability
is no basis for denying a defendant’s request for self-representation. People v. Albea, 2017 IL App
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(2d) 150598, ¶ 25. A trial court’s denial of a defendant’s request to represent oneself is reviewed
for an abuse of discretion. Baez, 241 Ill. 2d at 116. “An abuse of discretion occurs only when the
trial court’s decision is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable or where no reasonable person would
take the view adopted by the trial court.” Seymour v. Collins, 2015 IL 118432, ¶ 41.
¶ 34 1. Defendant’s Request to Represent Himself was Clear and Unequivocal
¶ 35 The State maintains that defendant did not clearly, unequivocally, and unambiguously
request to proceed pro se and that his main request was for a new attorney who spoke Spanish, or
a new interpreter. Defendant argues that, while it is true that his first request was to be assigned a
new attorney who spoke Spanish, he did request to represent himself as a fallback and this was
sufficient to waive his right to counsel. In support defendant cites Rainey, 2019 IL App (1st)
160187, ¶ 16, for the proposition that a request for self-representation is not unclear or equivocal
merely because it is a fallback to a defendant’s first choice. In Rainey, the defendant had twice
waived his right to counsel in order to proceed pro se with a public defender ultimately being
reassigned to handle his case. Id. ¶ 1. During this time, the defendant made it clear that he wanted
either the court to appoint him private counsel or to hire private counsel himself. Id. ¶¶ 9, 14. After
the defendant failed to obtain private counsel, he made a third request to waive counsel, which the
court denied. Id. ¶ 19.
¶ 36 While the reviewing court ultimately upheld the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s third
request to proceed pro se, it held that the mere fact that the defendant would have preferred private
counsel did not render his request to represent himself equivocal. “The court thus viewed
defendant’s request for self-representation as equivocal because it was conditional—his second
choice, not his preference. The case law has held that line of reasoning to be reversible error.”
(Emphasis in original.) Id. ¶ 66; see also Freeman v. Pierce, 878 F.3d 580, 588 (7th Cir. 2017)
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(request to represent oneself is not equivocal when accompanied by a request for stand-by counsel,
nor when request is made based on dissatisfaction with particular appointed counsel); Williams v.
Bartlett, 44 F.3d 95, 100 (2d Cir. 1994) (“[A] defendant is not deemed to have equivocated in his
desire for self-representation merely because he expresses that view in the alternative,
simultaneously requests the appointment of new counsel, or uses it as a threat to obtain private
counsel.”); Adams v. Carroll, 875 F.2d 1441, 1445 (9th Cir. 1989) (the defendant’s request to
represent himself if the only alternative was to be represented by the previously appointed public
defender was conditional, but not equivocal).
¶ 37 The State maintains that, while a defendant may assert the right to self-representation as a
fallback position, defendant’s request in this case was anything but clear and unequivocal,
emphasizing that most of the hearing focused on defendant’s request for a new attorney. While it
is true that courts must indulge in every presumption against waiver of counsel (Brewer v.
Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 (1977); Burton, 184 Ill. 2d at 23), we disagree with the State that
defendant’s request to represent himself was not clear and unequivocal. Defendant requested to
represent himself three times, and based on the lengthy admonishments provided by the trial court,
it clearly understood defendant’s request as one to represent himself. See Rainey, 2019 IL App
(1st) 160187, ¶ 43 (request for self-representation was clear where the trial judge clearly
understood the request as such).
¶ 38 We then turn to the basis for the trial court’s denial of defendant’s request to represent
himself. The trial court identified three bases for the denial of defendant’s request: his
schizophrenia diagnosis, the fact that defendant could not understand English, and his disruptive
courtroom behavior.
¶ 39 2. Defendant’s Lack of proficiency in English is Not a Basis to Deny Self-Representation
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¶ 40 To begin, we address defendant’s English proficiency. Defendant maintains that the denial
of his request to represent himself based on the fact that he did not speak or read English is akin
to a denial based on perceived legal ability, as it spoke not to his ability to knowingly and
intelligently waive his right to counsel but, rather, to his ability to conduct a legal defense. The
trial court made it clear that its concern regarding defendant’s inability to speak or read English
was directed toward his ability to prepare an effective defense, stating,
“Well, you are at a significant disadvantage, more so than somebody else that might want to
represent themselves because you don’t read or speak English and you are in jail. I cannot
assign an investigator or an interpreter to sit with you up in jail and review things, read things
to you. I don’t have an interpreter available for that purpose.”
Consequently, the trial court intricately linked defendant’s inability to read and speak English to
his legal ability to represent himself.
¶ 41 Nonetheless, the denial of a defendant’s request to proceed pro se cannot be based on the
lack of legal knowledge and ability. Albea, 2017 IL App (2d) 150598, ¶ 25. The mere fact that the
court believes such a decision to be unwise is not a basis for denying a request for self-
representation. Baez, 241 Ill. 2d at 116. Defendant also argues that he could find no case law that
stands for the proposition that a lack of English proficiency could serve as the basis for denying a
request for self-representation, and he cites two cases where non-English speakers have been
permitted to represent themselves. See United States v. Torres, 793 F.2d 436, 438 (1st Cir. 1986)
(the defendant who spoke Spanish but not English was permitted to represent himself through the
aid of an interpreter.); Diaz v. State, 513 So. 2d 1045, 1047 (Fla. 1987) (the trial court did not err
in granting Spanish-speaking defendant’s request to represent himself, although he required an
interpreter). Similarly, illiterate defendants may be permitted to represent themselves. See People
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v. Owens, 2018 IL App (3d) 150616, ¶ 23 (recognizing that the wrong legal standard was applied
where the trial court denied the defendant’s request to represent himself based on the fact he was
illiterate).
¶ 42 The State cites no case that stands for the proposition that the inability to speak English is
a valid basis for denying defendant’s right to represent himself, nor were we able to locate any
case law to that effect. Cf. United States v. Betancourt-Arretuche, 933 F.2d 89, 95 (1st Cir. 1991)
(neither a lack of education beyond high school nor the inability to speak English are
insurmountable barriers to self-representation). Further, the primary evidence in this case consisted
of defendant’s interview with police, which was in Spanish, and photographs of the crime scene.
Accordingly, the fact that defendant spoke and read only Spanish was not a proper basis to deny
defendant’s request to represent himself.
¶ 43 3. Defendant’s Behavior was not so Egregious as to Forfeit his Right to Self-Representation
¶ 44 “A defendant’s lack of civility and decorum, unlike his lack of legal ability, is a valid basis
for denying his request for self-representation.” Rainey, 2019 IL App (1st) 160187, ¶ 74. “The
kind of misconduct that would justify imposing counsel on an unwilling defendant is, in essentials,
the same kind of misconduct that would justify excluding him from his trial.” Id. ¶ 75. Such
misconduct must be “so disorderly, disruptive, and disrespectful of the court that his trial cannot
be carried on with him in the courtroom.” Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343 (1970). For example,
the defendant in Rainey left the courtroom and, upon being brought back by security, launched
into a tirade of deeply offensive slurs directed at the judge and his public defender. Rainey, 2019
IL App (1st) 160187, ¶ 82. In Allen, the defendant argued with the judge in a “most abusive and
disrespectful manner” before tearing his file and throwing it on the floor, yelling, “When I go out
for lunchtime, you’re (the judge) going to be a corpse here.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
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Allen, 397 U.S. at 339-40. In United States v. Brock, 159 F.3d 1077, 1080 (7th Cir. 1998), the
defendant’s right to represent himself was revoked when he repeatedly demanded the court provide
him with a bill of particulars and state the basis for its authority, and he otherwise declined to
answer questions or participate in proceedings despite several contempt findings.
¶ 45 While great deference is afforded to the trial court’s observations regarding in court
behavior, as the trial court “is in a superior position to determine and weigh the credibility of the
witnesses, observe the witnesses’ demeanor, and resolve conflicts in their testimony” (People v.
Radojcic, 2013 IL 114197, ¶ 34), the record simply does not reflect that defendant’s behavior was
egregious enough to justify denying him the right to represent himself. Overall, defendant’s
demeanor throughout the proceedings was polite and respectful. He would often thank the court
for considering his motions, or what he had to say. Likewise, he would often raise his hand and
wait to be recognized before speaking. At the hearing where defendant requested to proceed
representing himself, his behavior was perhaps less respectful than was typical, but nothing reflects
that defendant was abusive or insulting toward the court. On two occasions, he was told he needed
to slow down or was speaking too quickly. The court also admonished him for interrupting,
“THE COURT: Stop. I have given you the opportunity to talk. You have interrupted
me. You have interrupted Miss Gustafson. When somebody else is speaking, you wait.
THE DEFENDANT: I am sorry.”
As the right to represent oneself is a fundamental right, trial courts must be prepared to tolerate a
pro se defendant with a “rough-around-the-edges demeanor” who engages in some “irritating,
foolish, unprofessional, or occasionally wacky behavior.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Rainey, 2019 IL App (1st) 160187, ¶ 76. The record reflects that defendant’s behavior was well
within those bounds. He did not have to be removed from court, he did not threaten or insult the
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court, and he did not refuse to participate in proceedings. In a moment of agitation, he spoke
quickly and talked over others in the courtroom. This is not the type of behavior that would justify
denying defendant’s request to represent himself. Even licensed attorneys must occasionally be
instructed to slow down or chastised for interrupting. As such, defendant’s courtroom behavior
was not a basis for denying his request to represent himself.
¶ 46 4. The Trial Court Failed to Adequately Consider Defendant’s Particular Mental Ability
¶ 47 Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his request for self-representation
based upon a bright-line rule that defendants who have been diagnosed with schizophrenia cannot
represent themselves. Defendant argues that under Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993), the
competence to waive counsel is measured by the same standard as the competence to stand trial.
Accordingly, defendant maintains that the standard for whether he was fit to represent himself is
measured by the same standard as his fitness to stand trial.
¶ 48 On this point, we do not agree. In Godinez, the United States Supreme Court clarified that
whether a defendant is competent to plead guilty or waive the right to counsel is decided by the
same standard as whether the defendant is competent to stand trial. Id. at 400-01. That being,
“whether the defendant has ‘sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable
degree of rational understanding’ and a ‘rational as well as factual understanding of the
proceedings against him.’ ” Id. at 396 (quoting Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960)).
However, in order to waive the right to counsel, a defendant must both be competent to do so and
knowingly and voluntarily waive the right. Id. at 400-01. In that sense, there is a heightened
standard, but not a heightened standard of competence. Id.
¶ 49 In Edwards, the seminal case regarding the rights of mentally ill defendants to represent
themselves at trial, the Supreme Court held that “the Constitution permits States to insist upon
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representation by counsel for those competent enough to stand trial under Dusky but who still
suffer from severe mental illness to the point where they are not competent to conduct trial
proceedings by themselves.” Edwards, 554 U.S. at 178. In rendering its decision, the Court made
it clear that in Godinez it was considering the competency to waive the right to counsel, not the
competency to conduct trial proceedings on one’s own. Id. at 172. Accordingly, the Court
recognized a gray area of defendants who were competent to stand trial under Dusky (and therefore
competent to waive the right to counsel) but who were not competent to conduct trial proceedings
themselves. Id. at 177-78. As such, the standard for deciding whether defendant was competent to
conduct trial proceedings on his own is not the same standard for whether he was fit to stand trial.
¶ 50 We further note that Edwards is permissive rather than prescriptive: the trial court may
deny a severely mentally ill person from representing himself, however, the trial court is not
required to perform an additional inquiry regarding competency before allowing a defendant to
represent himself. People v. McNutt, 2020 IL App (1st) 173030, ¶ 90.
¶ 51 Defendant further argues that the trial court’s bright-line ruling that defendant’s
schizophrenia diagnosis precluded him from representing himself did not satisfy the type of
individualized inquiry contemplated by Edwards. Defendant likewise takes issue with the trial
court’s failure to conduct a further hearing regarding defendant’s particular condition rather than
relying on the attorneys’ passing recollections of Dr. Lichtenwald’s report. We agree.
¶ 52 The Supreme Court in Edwards took a nuanced view regarding the role mental illness
played in a defendant’s ability to participate in court. “Mental illness itself is not a unitary concept.
It varies in degree. It can vary over time. It interferes with an individual’s functioning at different
times in different ways.” Edwards, 554 U.S. at 175. The Court emphasized the importance of
taking “realistic account of the particular defendant’s mental capacities.” Id. at 177. “[T]he trial
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judge, particularly one such as the trial judge in this case, who presided over one of Edwards’
competency hearings and his two trials, will often prove best able to make more fine-tuned mental
capacity decisions, tailored to the individualized circumstances of a particular defendant.” Id.
¶ 53 While the Court in Edwards did not endorse any particular test or factors for trial courts to
consider, it did favorably reference a portion of the American Psychiatric Association’s amicus
brief, which stated, “[d]isorganized thinking, deficits in sustaining attention and concentration,
impaired expressive abilities, anxiety, and other common symptoms of severe mental illnesses can
impair the defendant’s ability to play the significantly expanded role required for self-
representation even if he can play the lesser role of represented defendant.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id. at 176.
¶ 54 While it is certainly true that schizophrenia can constitute a severe mental illness, such that
a defendant is not competent to represent himself, a past diagnosis alone may be insufficient to
support the denial of a defendant’s right to represent himself. In People v. Washington, 2016 IL
App (1st) 131198, the defendant, who manifested antisocial personality traits, was prescribed
antipsychotic medication, and self-reported a diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia, was found to
be fit to represent himself, as he was not delusional or irrational. Id. ¶¶ 9, 80.
¶ 55 We agree with defendant that his purported two-year-old diagnosis of schizophrenia was
insufficient to support a finding that he was incompetent to conduct trial proceedings on his own,
where he was not suffering from any hallucinations or paranoid delusions when he requested self-
representation. The trial court made no finding as to how defendant’s schizophrenia diagnosis
affected his ability to represent himself. There was no mention of any particular symptoms from
which defendant was suffering, nor did the court inquire of defendant whether he had any particular
symptoms of a severe mental illness. This was far from the fine-tuned mental capacity decision
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contemplated by Edwards.
¶ 56 For instance, in Edwards, the trial court had held three competency hearings for the
defendant, who was suffering from schizophrenia, at points finding him incompetent to stand trial
and at other points finding him fit for trial. Edwards, 554 U.S. at 167-69. The trial court heard
testimony from psychiatric and neuropsychological experts. Id. Likewise, the trial court had the
defendant’s pro se filings, which were disorganized and incomprehensible. Id. at 179, Appendix.
Likewise, in People v. Potochney, 2022 IL App (2d) 191011-U, ¶ 37, the trial court denied the
defendant’s request to represent himself in postplea proceedings, where the trial court was aware
that the defendant:
“1) had a prolonged history of experiencing auditory hallucinations; 2) believed he could
converse with God and listen to sounds emanating from Hell; 3) had scored below average
in cognitive functioning; 4) was—like the defendant in Edwards—diagnosed with
schizophrenia; 5) had stopped taking his antipsychotic medication despite the reported
need for on-going treatment; 6) was previously diagnosed with bipolar disorder;
7) responded to the court’s relevant questions in a disjointed, borderline nonsensical
manner; 8) could not remember whether he had a mental health diagnosis; and
9) acknowledged that he could not remember the circumstances surrounding his guilty
plea.”
¶ 57 In the instant case, the trial court did not consider or discuss any particular symptoms that
would have made it difficult for defendant to represent himself. Nor was the trial court sufficiently
familiar with defendant’s mental health. The court relied on the attorneys’ passing recollections
that defendant had been diagnosed with schizophrenia at some earlier point and the attorneys’
offhand recollections that Dr. Lichtenwald’s report did not contradict that diagnosis.
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¶ 58 From the record, it would appear no one thoroughly examined Dr. Lichtenwald’s report.
The medical history established from the hospital and jail records did indicate that defendant had
been diagnosed with schizophrenia by Dr. Fields, after suffering from hallucinations at the
hospital, and was prescribed Zyprexa, a psychotropic medication. However, subsequent medical
records from the jail showed that defendant had been reevaluated by the jail psychiatrist, who
believed that defendant’s symptoms were attributable to acute stress. The report also indicates that
defendant had not been taking Zyprexa since early December 2015. Likewise, the medical history
showed that he was not suicidal and not experiencing symptoms of mental illness. Lastly, our
review of Dr. Lichtenwald’s report supports that defendant’s past schizophrenia diagnosis did not
render defendant unable to represent himself.
¶ 59 The State notes that the trial court also considered defendant’s suicide attempt as a basis
for denying his request for self-representation. However, it is not clear how defendant’s suicide
attempt, made nearly two and a half years prior and in the immediate aftermath of having killed
his wife, would have affected his present ability to represent himself. There was no indication that
defendant was currently suicidal, and, again, the medical history from Dr. Lichtenwald’s report
indicated that defendant stopped having suicidal ideations within a few days of being admitted to
the hospital.
¶ 60 The improper denial of a defendant’s right to self-representation is a structural defect that
defies harmless error analysis. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177 n.8 (1984) (“Since the
right of self-representation is a right that when exercised usually increases the likelihood of a trial
outcome unfavorable to the defendant, its denial is not amenable to ‘harmless error’ analysis. The
right is either respected or denied; its deprivation cannot be harmless.”); People v. Wrice, 2012 IL
111860, ¶ 66. Accordingly, we find the trial court abused its discretion when it denied defendant’s
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request to represent himself, based simply on a prior diagnosis of schizophrenia without reviewing
all the medical records, including Dr. Lichtenwald’s lengthy report, and without otherwise more
fully considering defendant’s present ability to conduct trial proceedings by himself. We therefore
reverse defendant’s conviction and remand for a new trial.
¶ 61 B. The Trial Court Erred in Leaving Defendant Partially Shackled at Trial
¶ 62 Having already determined that we must reverse based on the trial court’s improper denial
of defendant’s request for self-representation, we will touch only briefly on the issue of defendant
remaining shackled at trial.
¶ 63 “[T]he shackling of the accused should be avoided if possible because: (1) it tends to
prejudice the jury against the accused; (2) it restricts his ability to assist his counsel during trial;
and (3) it offends the dignity of the judicial process.” People v. Boose, 66 Ill. 2d 261, 265 (1977).
The trial court asserted that removing defendant’s shackles in the instant case was not necessary,
as the case was to be decided by a bench trial rather than by jury. This is incorrect. “[E]ven when
there is no jury, any unnecessary restraint is impermissible because it hinders the defendant’s
ability to assist his counsel, runs afoul of the presumption of innocence, and demeans both the
defendant and the proceedings.” People v. Allen, 222 Ill. 2d 340, 346 (2006). Accordingly, the trial
court should have either granted defendant’s request to unshackle his hands or held a hearing
pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 430 (eff. July 1, 2010), to determine whether restraints
were necessary to “protect the security of the court, the proceedings, or to prevent escape.”
¶ 64 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 65 For the reasons stated, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court of Winnebago County,
and the cause is remanded for a new trial.
¶ 66 Reversed and remanded.
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2022 IL App (2d) 200715
Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Winnebago County, No. 15-CF- 2716; the Hon. Robert Randall Wilt, Judge, presiding.
Attorneys James E. Chadd, Douglas R. Hoff, and Jonathan Yeasting, of State for Appellate Defender’s Office, of Chicago, for appellant. Appellant:
Attorneys J. Hanley, State’s Attorney, of Rockford (Patrick Delfino, Edward for R. Psenicka, and Lynn M. Harrington, of State’s Attorneys Appellee: Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People.
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