Opinion
CHRISTIAN, J.
Jeffrey Richard Robbins appeals from a judgment of imprisonment which was rendered after a jury found him guilty of possession of marijuana (Health & Saf. Code, § 11357), possession of marijuana for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11359), and transportation of marijuana (Health & Saf. Code, § 11360).
On May 9, 1978, in an unpublished decision, this court modified the judgment to stay the sentence for possession of marijuana for sale, and affirmed the judgment as modified.
The United States Supreme Court subsequently dealt with the problem of search of a closed container found in an automobile in Arkansas v. Sanders (1979) 442 U.S. 753 [61 L.Ed.2d 235; 99 S.Ct. 2586]. The [38]*38court then granted certiorari in the present case, vacated this court’s decision and remanded the cause to us for further consideration in light of Arkansas v. Sanders.
Although the appeal is from a judgment after trial, the principal challenge is to the propriety of a pretrial order denying a motion to suppress evidence (Pen. Code, § 1538.5). Therefore the following narrative is based not on the trial record, but on the evidence received at the hearing on the motion to suppress evidence.
On January 5, 1975, at 1:45 a.m., California Highway Patrol Officer DePue and Sergeant Stoltz stopped appellant’s station wagon on Nelson Road in Solano County. Appellant had been driving erratically. He immediately left his car, meeting DePue halfway between the vehicles. The officer asked appellant for his operator’s license and ownership registration. Appellant began talking very rapidly and had difficulty in removing his license from his wallet. DePue followed appellant to the car, and smelled marijuana smoke when appellant opened the door.
Officer DePue patted appellant down for weapons and found only a vial of liquid. The officer saw a pair of tweezers on the front seat of the vehicle, of a type used to hold marijuana roaches. He retrieved the tweezers; appellant then began to vomit in the road. In the passenger compartment DePue found a pair of tweezers holding a burned hand-rolled cigarette butt, an alligator clip, a hand-rolled cigarette, and a cookie tin which contained marijuana seeds, two packs of cigarette papers, and a plastic baggie containing marijuana.
While Officer DePue was searching the passenger compartment, appellant said to Sergeant Stoltz, “What you are looking for is in the back.” The officers then placed appellant in the patrol car and DePue opened the luggage compartment of appellant’s automobile. De-Pue found a tote bag and two bulky packages wrapped in plastic. DePue opened all of the packages. Each of the plastic-wrapped parcels contained approximately fifteen pounds of marijuana; the tote bag contained approximately three pounds.
I
It was lawful for the officers to stop appellant’s car to determine why it was moving, erratically (People v. Boddie (1969) 274 Cal.App.2d 408 [39]*39[80 Cal.Rptr. 83]). Search of the automobile was proper when the officers learned that appellant was smoking marijuana when they stopped him.
The record establishes that when Officer DePue saw the containers in the back of the car he had probable cause to believe that they contained contraband.
Appellant contends that the Supreme Court’s mandate to consider this case in light of Arkansas v. Sanders compels the suppression of all the marijuana found in his automobile. The Attorney General concedes that the cookie tin retrieved from the passenger compartment and the tote bag found in the luggage compartment were both closed containers for which a warrant was required under Arkansas v. Sanders, but contends that the plastic-wrapped parcels were not protected by the Fourth Amendment because they were readily identifiable as marijuana bricks.
In Arkansas v. Sanders, the United States Supreme Court held that, absent exigent circumstances, a warrant is generally required to search closed containers removed from an automobile properly stopped in the field and searched for contraband. (Accord, People v. Dalton (1979) 24 Cal.3d 850 [157 Cal.Rptr. 497, 598 P.2d 467], cert. applied for Dec. 1979, Supreme Ct. Dock. No. 79-930.) The court declared, however, that “[n]ot all containers and packages found by police during the course of a search will deserve the full protection of the Fourth Amendment. Thus, some containers (for example a kit of burglar tools or a gun case) by their very nature cannot support any reasonable expectation of privacy because their contents can be inferred from their outward appearance. Similarly, in some cases the contents of a package will be open to ‘plain view,’ thereby obviating the need for a warrant.” (442 U.S. at p. 764, fn. 13 [61 L.Ed.2d at p. 245; 99 S.Ct. at p. 2593].)
Appellant argues that the contents of the plastic-wrapped packages were not in plain view. Indeed there was no testimony that the plastic wrapping was sufficiently transparent to reveal its contents. But the packages did not support a reasonable expectation of privacy.1 Officer [40]*40DePue described the packages as “green wrapped plastic blocks,” and testified that he had heard that contraband was commonly packaged this way.2 The packages were received in evidence at the preliminary hearing. At the subsequent suppression hearing the preliminary hearing testimony was stipulated into evidence, and the exhibits were also received, “under the same numbers they were marked at the preliminary hearing.” We have not examined the packages, but the trial record does include a photograph of them in place in appellant’s car. The bulky tape-secured packages do not present an appearance of containing anything other than contraband. The court could reasonably conclude that the contents of the packages could have been inferred from their outward appearance, so that appellant could not have held a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to the contents.
Appellant contends that diverse legally possessable objects could be wrapped in green plastic, citing Remers v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 659 [87 Cal.Rptr. 202, 470 P.2d 11]. In Remers, the California Supreme Court held that a suspect’s act of showing a tinfoil package to a companion did not provide probable cause for an arrest following which an incidental search revealed the package to contain seconal tablets. The prosecution argued that the officer knew that dangerous drugs are often packaged in tinfoil, but the court held that a tinfoil package is so commonly used for legitimate purposes, such as to wrap food or tobacco, that it in itself is not a suspicious circumstance. (Id., at pp. 665-666.) Remers is to be distinguished from the present case. Unlike a small tinfoil package, the very appearance of a bulky, 15 pound, brick-shaped, plastic-wrapped package suggested that it contains a specific type of contraband (a brick of marijuana). Although a variety of legally possessable objects could conceivably be wrapped in brick-shaped, plastic-wrapped packages, legally possessable objects are not commonly
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Opinion
CHRISTIAN, J.
Jeffrey Richard Robbins appeals from a judgment of imprisonment which was rendered after a jury found him guilty of possession of marijuana (Health & Saf. Code, § 11357), possession of marijuana for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11359), and transportation of marijuana (Health & Saf. Code, § 11360).
On May 9, 1978, in an unpublished decision, this court modified the judgment to stay the sentence for possession of marijuana for sale, and affirmed the judgment as modified.
The United States Supreme Court subsequently dealt with the problem of search of a closed container found in an automobile in Arkansas v. Sanders (1979) 442 U.S. 753 [61 L.Ed.2d 235; 99 S.Ct. 2586]. The [38]*38court then granted certiorari in the present case, vacated this court’s decision and remanded the cause to us for further consideration in light of Arkansas v. Sanders.
Although the appeal is from a judgment after trial, the principal challenge is to the propriety of a pretrial order denying a motion to suppress evidence (Pen. Code, § 1538.5). Therefore the following narrative is based not on the trial record, but on the evidence received at the hearing on the motion to suppress evidence.
On January 5, 1975, at 1:45 a.m., California Highway Patrol Officer DePue and Sergeant Stoltz stopped appellant’s station wagon on Nelson Road in Solano County. Appellant had been driving erratically. He immediately left his car, meeting DePue halfway between the vehicles. The officer asked appellant for his operator’s license and ownership registration. Appellant began talking very rapidly and had difficulty in removing his license from his wallet. DePue followed appellant to the car, and smelled marijuana smoke when appellant opened the door.
Officer DePue patted appellant down for weapons and found only a vial of liquid. The officer saw a pair of tweezers on the front seat of the vehicle, of a type used to hold marijuana roaches. He retrieved the tweezers; appellant then began to vomit in the road. In the passenger compartment DePue found a pair of tweezers holding a burned hand-rolled cigarette butt, an alligator clip, a hand-rolled cigarette, and a cookie tin which contained marijuana seeds, two packs of cigarette papers, and a plastic baggie containing marijuana.
While Officer DePue was searching the passenger compartment, appellant said to Sergeant Stoltz, “What you are looking for is in the back.” The officers then placed appellant in the patrol car and DePue opened the luggage compartment of appellant’s automobile. De-Pue found a tote bag and two bulky packages wrapped in plastic. DePue opened all of the packages. Each of the plastic-wrapped parcels contained approximately fifteen pounds of marijuana; the tote bag contained approximately three pounds.
I
It was lawful for the officers to stop appellant’s car to determine why it was moving, erratically (People v. Boddie (1969) 274 Cal.App.2d 408 [39]*39[80 Cal.Rptr. 83]). Search of the automobile was proper when the officers learned that appellant was smoking marijuana when they stopped him.
The record establishes that when Officer DePue saw the containers in the back of the car he had probable cause to believe that they contained contraband.
Appellant contends that the Supreme Court’s mandate to consider this case in light of Arkansas v. Sanders compels the suppression of all the marijuana found in his automobile. The Attorney General concedes that the cookie tin retrieved from the passenger compartment and the tote bag found in the luggage compartment were both closed containers for which a warrant was required under Arkansas v. Sanders, but contends that the plastic-wrapped parcels were not protected by the Fourth Amendment because they were readily identifiable as marijuana bricks.
In Arkansas v. Sanders, the United States Supreme Court held that, absent exigent circumstances, a warrant is generally required to search closed containers removed from an automobile properly stopped in the field and searched for contraband. (Accord, People v. Dalton (1979) 24 Cal.3d 850 [157 Cal.Rptr. 497, 598 P.2d 467], cert. applied for Dec. 1979, Supreme Ct. Dock. No. 79-930.) The court declared, however, that “[n]ot all containers and packages found by police during the course of a search will deserve the full protection of the Fourth Amendment. Thus, some containers (for example a kit of burglar tools or a gun case) by their very nature cannot support any reasonable expectation of privacy because their contents can be inferred from their outward appearance. Similarly, in some cases the contents of a package will be open to ‘plain view,’ thereby obviating the need for a warrant.” (442 U.S. at p. 764, fn. 13 [61 L.Ed.2d at p. 245; 99 S.Ct. at p. 2593].)
Appellant argues that the contents of the plastic-wrapped packages were not in plain view. Indeed there was no testimony that the plastic wrapping was sufficiently transparent to reveal its contents. But the packages did not support a reasonable expectation of privacy.1 Officer [40]*40DePue described the packages as “green wrapped plastic blocks,” and testified that he had heard that contraband was commonly packaged this way.2 The packages were received in evidence at the preliminary hearing. At the subsequent suppression hearing the preliminary hearing testimony was stipulated into evidence, and the exhibits were also received, “under the same numbers they were marked at the preliminary hearing.” We have not examined the packages, but the trial record does include a photograph of them in place in appellant’s car. The bulky tape-secured packages do not present an appearance of containing anything other than contraband. The court could reasonably conclude that the contents of the packages could have been inferred from their outward appearance, so that appellant could not have held a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to the contents.
Appellant contends that diverse legally possessable objects could be wrapped in green plastic, citing Remers v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 659 [87 Cal.Rptr. 202, 470 P.2d 11]. In Remers, the California Supreme Court held that a suspect’s act of showing a tinfoil package to a companion did not provide probable cause for an arrest following which an incidental search revealed the package to contain seconal tablets. The prosecution argued that the officer knew that dangerous drugs are often packaged in tinfoil, but the court held that a tinfoil package is so commonly used for legitimate purposes, such as to wrap food or tobacco, that it in itself is not a suspicious circumstance. (Id., at pp. 665-666.) Remers is to be distinguished from the present case. Unlike a small tinfoil package, the very appearance of a bulky, 15 pound, brick-shaped, plastic-wrapped package suggested that it contains a specific type of contraband (a brick of marijuana). Although a variety of legally possessable objects could conceivably be wrapped in brick-shaped, plastic-wrapped packages, legally possessable objects are not commonly packaged in this manner, as are food and tobacco commonly wrapped in tinfoil. Any experienced observer could have inferred from the appearance of the packages that they contained bricks of marijuana. The parcels thus could not support a reasonable expectation of privacy and were not protected by the Fourth Amendment.
[41]*41The Attorney General has conceded that suppression of the cookie tin found in the passenger compartment and the tote bag found in the luggage compartment is mandated by Arkansas v. Sanders. But erroneous denial of a suppression motion and admission of evidence does not require reversal if the error was harmless. (People v. Tarantino (1955) 45 Cal.2d 590, 595 [290 P.2d 505]; People v. Daniels (1971) 16 Cal.App.3d 36, 45 [93 Cal.Rptr. 628].) The amount of marijuana in the improperly searched containers (about three pounds), was insignificant when compared with that contained in the lawfully searched plastic-wrapped packages (about thirty pounds). It is certain beyond reasonable doubt that the error did not affect the verdict on the transportation count. The jury would have reached the same verdict as to the transportation count upon 30 pounds of marijuana as it did upon 33 pounds. Therefore, the Fourth Amendment point does not justify reversal of the judgment on that count. (See Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [17 L.Ed.2d 705, 710-711, 87 S.Ct. 824, 24 A.L.R.3d 1065].)
II
Appellant contends that the trial court erred when it refused to consider his renewed motion to suppress made during trial. It is clear that once a defendant’s motion to suppress evidence has been denied at a special Penal Code section 1538.5 hearing in the superior court, the trial judge should not entertain a renewed motion at trial unless there is an intervening change in the applicable law or the discovery of new evidence.3 (People v. Superior Court (Edmonds) (1971) 4 Cal.3d 605, 610 [94 Cal.Rptr. 250, 483 P.2d 1202].
On the second day of the trial, defense counsel moved to suppress evidence, asserting that the posted speed limit at the site of the arrest is 35 miles per hour rather than 55 miles per hour. The defense argued that this discovery destroyed the probable cause necessary for the initial stop. The motion was denied. Appellant contends that this is new evidence within the meaning of Penal Code section 1538.5, subdivision (h), and that the motion should have been granted.
[42]*42The California Supreme Court in People v. Martinez (1975) 14 Cal.3d 533, 537 [121 Cal.Rptr. 611, 535 P.2d 739], recognized a “due diligence” limitation on the availability of a belated motion to suppress under section 1538.5, subdivision (h). The court held that a motion to suppress raised at trial was properly denied when based on information defense counsel could have obtained at any time simply by interviewing his client. The present case is similar. It may be questioned whether appellant realized the actual speed limit prior to trial. However, it is clear that defense counsel could have discovered the true speed limit simply by visiting the scene of the arrest, an act which falls within the scope of due diligence. Under the Martinez limitation, appellant’s motion to suppress at trial was properly denied. (See People v. Burke (1974) 38 Cal.App.3d 708, 713 [113 Cal.Rptr. 553].)
III
Appellant contends and respondent concedes that the sentence must be stayed as to the possession for sale count. In People v. Sanders (1967) 250 Cal.App.2d 123 [58 Cal.Rptr. 259], and In re Adams (1975) 14 Cal.3d 629 [122 Cal.Rptr. 73, 536 P.2d 473], the court recognized that while possession for sale is a crime separate from transporting, where both were part of an indivisible course of conduct which has a single objective double punishment would violate Penal Code section 654.
Appellant further contends that the offense of possession must be included within the offense of possession for sale. The jury found appellant guilty of separate counts of possession and possession for sale, upon evidence which would support a determination that appellant possessed distinct quantities of marijuana for different purposes: a small amount in the cookie tin in the front of the car for personal use, and a large amount in the sealed packages in the baggage compartment for sale. But the contents of the cookie tin should have been suppressed under Arkansas v. Sanders. The only physical evidence available to support the verdicts was the marijuana in brick form found in the baggage compartment. Therefore, appellant’s contention with respect to the charge of simple possession must be upheld.
IV
Appellant argues that California’s marijuana laws are unconstitutional. Constitutional challenges to the marijuana laws have consistently [43]*43been rejected. (See People v. Oatis (1968) 264 Cal.App.2d 324 [70 Cal.Rptr. 524], cert. den. 393 U.S. 1108 [21 L.Ed.2d 805, 89 S.Ct. 920]; People v. Aguiar (1968) 257 Cal.App.2d 597 [65 Cal.Rptr. 171], cert. den. 393 U.S. 970 [21 L.Ed.2d 383, 89 S.Ct. 411]; People v. Glaser (1965) 238 Cal.App.2d 819 [48 Cal.Rptr. 427], cert. den. 385 U.S. 880 [17 L.Ed.2d 107, 87 S.Ct. 164], reh. den. 385 U.S. 965 [17 L.Ed.2d 310, 87 S.Ct. 402].) In a related contention it is argued that trial counsel manifested constitutional inadequacy when he failed to challenge the validity of the laws proscribing marijuana. It is not an indication of inadequacy for counsel to withhold making an unsound argument.
The purported appeal from the order denying the motion to suppress evidence is dismissed. The judgment is reversed as to the count of simple possession. The sentence as to the count of possession for sale is stayed. Upon such modification the judgment is affirmed as to the counts of possession for sale and of transportation.
Caldecott, P. J., concurred.