Opinion
DALSIMER, J.
David Wendell Ruggles (defendant) appeals his conviction after a guilty plea on one count of robbery with the use of a firearm in the commission of the offense.
Procedural History
Defendant was charged with (1) robbery (Pen. Code, § 211) and the use of a firearm in the commission of the offense (Pen. Code, § 12022.5) and (2) possession of a firearm by an ex-felon (Pen. Code, § 12021). The information was subsequently amended to charge six prior convictions, and thereafter the case was consolidated with a second case in which a single count of robbery (Pen. Code, § 211) was charged. Defendant pled not guilty to the charges, denied the priors, and moved to suppress evidence pursuant to section 1538.5 of the Penal Code. A hearing on the section 1538.5 motion ensued, and, following denial of that motion by the trial court, defendant, pursuant to a negotiated plea, withdrew his not guilty plea and entered a plea of guilty to count I (robbery), admitted the use allegation charged under section 12022.5, and also admitted three of the six prior convictions.
Defendant then appealed the denial of his section 1538.5 motion and the judgment of conviction. This court on June 16, 1980, filed its unpublished opinion wherein we ruled that the section 1538.5 motion to suppress was properly denied and affirmed the conviction. On August 13, 1980, the California Supreme Court denied defendant’s petition for a hearing. On November 6, 1980, defendant filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court.
Defendant’s petition presented to the Supreme Court a single ques[478]*478tion: “Was the warrantless search of petitioner’s briefcase, while he was under the exclusive control of the police, invalid, thereby necessitating the granting of petitioner’s motion to suppress?”
On July 2, 1981, the United States Supreme Court granted defendant’s petition and the clerk of the court advised this court, “[T]he judgment of the Court of Appeal in this cause is vacated, and . .. this cause is remanded to the Court of Appeal of California, Second Appellate District, for further consideration in light of Robbins v. California [(1981) 453 U.S. 420].”
Facts
In November 1978 Sergeant Morosky of the Los Angeles Police Department, intelligence division, received information that defendant had participated in several armed robberies in the City of Los Angeles. The sergeant communicated this information to Officer Robert G. Mc-Seveney of the robbery-homicide division of the Los Angeles Police Department. McSeveney was also informed that defendant was a parolee, had been in prison for armed robbery, and was living in San Pedro. He was given a physical description of the defendant, and he obtained verification of defendant’s description and criminal record from the records and identification division of the department. Morosky indicated to McSeveney that defendant had been involved in a recent motel robbery in which he had been accompanied by a male Latin, that during the commission of the robbery defendant had been armed and had handcuffed the victim, and that defendant drove a black over red Mercury Montego automobile. It was learned by McSeveney that defendant had been seen in the locale of the Nutel Motel and that he posed as a law enforcement officer. During the Nutel Motel robbery the victim had been shown a badge and told that the robber was an agent of the state narcotics department or of the Department of Justice.
After making a showup card with a photograph of the defendant, McSeveney displayed that card to the victim of the robbery and to two female employees of the motel. Mr. Carragher, the victim, stated that the person in the photograph strongly resembled the man who had robbed him.
From the information received by McSeveney concerning the Nutel robbery, he concluded that the description of the robber coincided with that of the defendant, that the defendant was the robber, and that he [479]*479had probable cause to arrest defendant. In spite of these conclusions no attempt was made to arrest the defendant because the officers hoped that by placing him under surveillance they would be able to effectuate the arrest of the accomplice as well. A surveillance of defendant and his residence was instituted.
On January 2, 1979, Sergeant Morosky told Officer McSeveney and his partner, Sergeant Stein, that he had information that the defendant was going to commit a major robbery and that there would be another suspect in the robbery. He informed them that the defendant was to meet the other person at 8 o’clock in the morning of January 3, 1979, on Reseda Boulevard near the Ventura Freeway in the San Fernando Valley and that the two of them would rob a jewelry store in Santa Barbara. Morosky said that his informant had indicated that two handguns would be used and that defendant normally carried one of the weapons on the small of his back and probably would have the second weapon in a briefcase or a satchel. McSeveney contacted the surveillance team and informed them that the defendant was armed and dangerous. They were made privy to all of the information related above and instructed to stop and arrest the defendant should he appear to be leaving the County of Los Angeles.
On the morning of January 3, Officer Brooks of the Los Angeles Police Department, a member of the surveillance team, set up a surveillance in the area of Reseda Boulevard and the Ventura Freeway as instructed. In addition to Officer Brooks, there were ten other officers, five or six police vehicles, and a helicopter employed in the surveillance. Brooks and his partner, Sergeant Hagele, took their positions at 7 a.m. and commenced communications by radio with other surveillance team members.
Observing the defendant’s automobile, Brooks watched defendant drive to a location on the north side of Irwin just east of Reseda Boulevard. Brooks watched defendant park and leave the automobile. Defendant was continuously looking back and forth, up and down the street, and from side to side. He then went to the rear of the vehicle, opened the trunk, removed a brown briefcase, and, continuing to make careful observations of the area, entered an apartment building complex.
Approximately 10 to 15 minutes later defendant returned to the car, again looking up and down the street, and opened the trunk, replacing [480]*480the brown briefcase therein. He then drove to the Ventura Freeway and entered proceeding westbound to the area of Chesebar. The surveillance team decided that defendant was about to leave the county, whereupon they stopped him. A black and white police unit displayed a red light, and defendant parked his vehicle on the shoulder in the center of the freeway. Defendant immediately emerged from the car, and Officer Brooks and other officers approached, displaying three or four handguns and at least one shotgun, all of which were pointed at the defendant. Complying with instructions, defendant lay prone on the center divider, where he was handcuffed, patted down, and informed that he was under arrest. He was then stood up against the center divider fence. By this time at least five or six police vehicles and approximately ten to twelve officersffiad gathered.
Brooks looked into defendant’s vehicle and observed in plain view a police call scanner, as well as narcotic paraphernalia, including two small vials such as frequently contain various narcotics. Officer Brooks concluded that the paraphernalia was a “hype” kit and that the vials and bottles contained controlled substances. Brooks took the keys to the vehicle from defendant and opened the car’s trunk. There he observed a large scanner for picking up police calls and the brown briefcase. There were also two other bags in the trunk, together with a raincoat, two other hats, four or five halloween-type masks with tape over the eye-holes, and a scanner company manual entitled “Police Frequencies.” Officer Brooks opened the briefcase and the other bags. Upon opening the briefcase he discovered a bag similar to a shaving kit which was unzipped and contained a gun. Another gun, ammunition, a holster, a sap, handcuffs, gloves, a flashlight, and a bandanna were found in the briefcase itself. In the other bags he found a sledge hammer, miscellaneous clothes, and a brown cap.
Issues
Defendant contends (1) the officers did not have probable cause to arrest him; (2) Officer Brooks did not have sufficient probable cause to conduct a warrantless search of the trunk of his car; and (3) the search of the briefcase without a warrant was illegal.1
[481]*481Discussion
I
Contrary to defendant’s contention, the evidence introduced at the section 1538.5 hearing amply supported the trial court’s determination that probable cause existed for his arrest without a warrant. In a section 1538.5 hearing, the trial court sits as the trier of fact. It is the role of the reviewing court only to measure the facts, as found by the trier, against the constitutional standard of reasonableness. (People v. Lawler (1973) 9 Cal.3d 156, 160 [107 Cal.Rptr. 13, 507 P.2d 621].) Probable cause to arrest without a warrant is based upon the facts known to the officers at the time of the arrest. (People v. Lara (1967) 67 Cal.2d 365, 373-374 [62 Cal.Rptr. 586, 432 P.2d 202], cert, den., 392 U.S. 945 [20 L.Ed.2d 1407, 88 S.Ct. 2303].) The standard is whether “.. . a man of ordinary care and prudence would be led to believe and conscientiously entertain an honest and strong suspicion that the accused is guilty. [Citations.]” (People v. Cockrell (1965) 63 Cal.2d 659, 665 [47 Cal.Rptr. 788, 408 P.2d 116], cert, den., 389 U.S. 1006 [19 L.Ed.2d 604, 88 S.Ct. 568].)
McSeveney’s belief that defendant may have been connected with the Nutel robbery was substantiated by information he obtained from the employees of the Nutel Motel.
As a result of information obtained by McSeveney’s investigation and Carragher’s identification of defendant, the police had reasonable cause to believe that defendant had participated in the Nutel robbery and probable cause to arrest him. Although defendant argues that there was a delay of over a month from the time the officers had probable cause to the time of defendant’s arrest, he has presented no facts from which it can be concluded that the probable cause to seize him had become stale. The arrest without a warrant was not offensive to defendant’s constitutional rights. (United States v. Watson (1976) 423 U.S. 411, 423-424 [46 L.Ed.2d 598, 96 S.Ct. 820].)
II
Defendant next contends that the search of the trunk of his car at the time of his arrest was invalid.
[482]*482Searches conducted outside the judicial process are per se unreasonable, subject to a few specific exceptions. (Katz v. United States (1967) 389 U.S. 347, 357 [19 L.Ed.2d 576, 585, 88 S.Ct. 507].) It is the burden of the People to show that the search falls within one of those exceptions. (People v. Minjares (1979) 24 Cal.3d 410, 416 [153 Cal.Rptr. 224, 591 P.2d 514], cert, den., 444 U.S. 887 [62 L.Ed.2d 117, 100 S.Ct. 181].) The warrantless search of the trunk of defendant’s car in the case at bench was justified under the “automobile exception” to the warrant requirement. This exception allows the police to conduct a warrantless search of an automobile where there is probable cause and exigent circumstances make it impracticable for the police to obtain a warrant. (Chambers v. Maroney (1970) 399 U.S. 42, 48-51 [26 L.Ed.2d 419, 426-428, 90 S.Ct. 1975].)
The automobile exception is applied where the seizing officer has probable cause to believe that the contents of the automobile offend against the law. (Carroll v. United States (1925) 267 U.S. 132, 155156, 158-159 [69 L.Ed. 543, 552-553, 45 S.Ct. 280, 39 A.L.R. 790].) This requirement is satisfied in the case at bench because the evidence disclosed that immediately prior to defendant’s arrest the officers received a second tip from the original informant saying that defendant was planning another crime and had two handguns in his possession. Police are entitled to rely on such information when it is shown that both the informant and his information are reliable. (Aguilar v. Texas (1964) 378 U.S. 108, 114-115 [12 L.Ed.2d 723, 728-729, 84 S.Ct. 1509].) In the present case police were entitled to conclude that the informant was reliable because McSeveney had by independent investigation established that his first tip to the police was true. Furthermore, the informant’s information was shown to be reliable because it was corroborated by other facts, sources, or circumstances. (People v. Lara, supra, 67 Cal.2d 365, 374-375.) The presence of the defendant at the rendezvous location at the correct time, the fact that he was seen taking the brown briefcase out of the trunk and later returning it to the trunk, and the fact that it appeared defendant planned to commit a crime in Santa Barbara because he was apprehended driving out of Los Angeles County westbound all corroborated the tip in its essential facts. Independent corroboration occurred through the officers’ observation of defendant’s suspicious behavior—continuous surveying of the street while he was removing and carrying the briefcase and again when he returned it to the trunk of his car. Such corroboration provided the officers with reasonable grounds to believe that the informant was telling the truth [483]*483and probable cause for the police to believe that the attache case in the trunk contained a gun.
Defendant argues, however, that there were no exigent circumstances in this case (Chambers v. Maroney, supra, 399 U.S. 42, 51 [26 L.Ed.2d 419, 428]) because the car was at the time of the search within the exclusive control of the police. Nonetheless, due to the inherent mobility of the automobile, various automobile searches have been upheld where no immediate danger was presented. (South Dakota v. Opperman (1976) 428 U.S. 364, 367 [49 L.Ed.2d 1000, 1004, 96 S.Ct. 3092].) If the police have to take the time to get a warrant to search every car on the highway, they run the risk that the vehicle may be moved out of the locality or the evidence destroyed. (Carroll v. United States, supra, 267 U.S. 132, 153 [69 L.Ed. 543, 551].) The fact that the occupants of the automobile have already been arrested does not negate the exigent circumstance. (See Chambers v. Maroney, supra, 399 U.S. 42, 44, 52 [26 L.Ed.2d 419, 424, 428-429].)
Despite defendant’s arrest, his car was still a fleeting target, it was on an open highway, and there was a possible confederate waiting to remove the evidence. (See Coolidge v. New Hampshire (1971) 403 U.S. 443, 460 [29 L.Ed.2d 564, 579, 91 S.Ct. 2022].) There had been no earlier opportunity to gain a warrant because the car had been under constant police surveillance; and now that it was seized, there was no constitutional difference between searching it or holding it until a warrant could be obtained. (Chambers v. Maroney, supra, 399 U.S. 42, 52 [26 L.Ed.2d 419, 428].) Consequently, the search of the trunk of the car without a warrant was valid under the automobile exception.
Ill
Defendant’s final contention is that the officers illegally searched the briefcase. This was also the issue which defendant presented to the United States Supreme Court. After reviewing Robbins v. California (1981) 453 U.S. 420 [69 L.Ed.2d 744, 101 S.Ct. 2841], we conclude that the search of defendant’s briefcase was illegal.
Noting the proliferation of litigation revolving around the principles limiting the search incident to a lawful arrest, the Supreme Court in New York v. Belton (1981) 453 U.S. 454 [69 L.Ed.2d 768, 101 S.Ct. 2860] took note of criticisms which have been leveled concerning sophisticated rules which must be followed by police in their day-to-day [484]*484work. The court noted the importance of establishing a single familiar standard which could guide police officers in the pursuit of their duties. Noting that no such rule has emerged from the litigated cases respecting the question of the search of an automobile, the court in Belton held that when there has been a lawful arrest of an occupant of an automobile, the officer or officers may, contemporaneously with that arrest, search the passenger compartment of the automobile. The court further held that upon making such a search, the police may also examine the contents of any containers found within, the passenger compartment. The court stated, “Such a container may, of course, be searched whether it is open or closed, since the justification for the search is not that the arrestee has no privacy interest in the container, but that the lawful custodial arrest justifies the infringement of any privacy interest the arrestee may have.” (Id., at p. 461 [69 L.Ed.2d at p. 775].)
That the Supreme Court did not include in its new rule a provision for searching the trunk of an automobile or a container within the trunk 453 U.S. 420, is made abundantly clear by the fact that Robbins v. California, supra, was decided the same day as Belton. Robbins involved the search of the “trunk” of a station wagon. Actually, because of the construction of the vehicle, the area in question was a recessed luggage compartment reached after opening the tailgate of the station wagon. This search was instituted after highway patrol officers had stopped petitioner’s car after observing erratic driving. After Robbins had alighted from his vehicle, the officers in patting him down discovered a vial of liquid. They also smelled marijuana smoke coming from the automobile, searched the passenger compartment, and found marijuana, as well as paraphernalia for using it. At that point Robbins was arrested, and, searching the luggage compartment, the officers found a tote bag and two packages wrapped in green opaque plastic. Opening the packages, they discovered blocks of marijuana.
After affirmance of Robbins’ conviction by the Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari, vacated the Court of Appeal’s judgment, and remanded the case for further consideration in light of Arkansas v. Sanders (1979) 442 U.S. 753 [61 L.Ed.2d 235, 99 S.Ct. 2586]. On remand, the Court of Appeal again affirmed, holding that the trial court “. .. could reasonably [have] conclude[d] that the contents of the packages could have been inferred from their outward appearance, so that appellant could not have held a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to the contents.” (People v. Robbins (1980) 103 Cal.App.3d 34, 40 [162 Cal.Rptr. 780].)
[485]*485The Supreme Court again granted certiorari “Because of continuing uncertainty as to whether closed containers found during a lawful warrantless search of an automobile may themselves be searched without a warrant. ...” (Robbins v. California, supra, 453 U.S. 420, 423 [69 L. Ed.2d 744, 748].) The lead opinion in Robbins was delivered by Justice Stewart and three justices concurred therein. A fifth justice, Justice Powell, concurred in the judgment with opinion. The Chief Justice concurred in the judgment.
The opinion by Justice Stewart rejected the contention that the “automobile exception” (Carroll v. United States, supra, 267 U.S. 132) warranted the search of the green plastic bag. The opinion pointed out that it had been determined in United States v. Chadwick (1977) 433 U.S. 1 [53 L.Ed.2d 538, 97 S.Ct. 2476] that the automobile exception is confined to special, possibly unique circumstances which were the occasion of the rule’s genesis. Chadwick held that although cars and luggage might both be characterized as being mobile, luggage itself is subject to being taken and kept under the control of the police. Also, the inherent mobility of an automobile is not the only justification for the automobile exception, since warrantless searches have been approved by the court even in cases where the automobile’s mobility was irrelevant. The other factor giving rise to the automobile exception is the “... diminished expectation of privacy which surrounds the automobile,” (id., at p. 12 [53 L.Ed.2d at p. 549]) which arises from the fact that a car is used for transportation and not as a residence or repository of personal effects; that a car’s occupants and contents travel in plain view; and that automobiles are necessarily highly regulated by government. (Id., at pp. 12-13 [53 L.Ed.2d at pp. 548-549].) The opinion of Justice Stewart in Robbins then held that there is not any diminished expectation of privacy regarding luggage and that “.. . on the contrary, luggage typically is a repository of personal effects, the contents of closed pieces of luggage are hidden from view, and luggage is not generally subject to state regulation.” (Robbins v. California, supra, 453 U.S. 420, 425 [69 L.Ed.2d 744, 749].) The court rejected the argument that the contents of a closed container which is placed in a vehicle are not fully protected by the Fourth Amendment. Justice Stewart pointed out that the Fourth Amendment protects people and their effects, and it makes no difference whether the effects are “personal” or “impersonal.” The criterion used to render the contents immune from a warrantless search is the type of container, and, if the container is closed and opaque, there is manifested thereby an expectation that the contents will be secure from examination. The court stated, “Once placed within such a container, a [486]*486diary and a dishpan are equally protected by the Fourth Amendment.” (Id., at p. 426 [69 L.Ed.2d at p. 751].) The opinion noted that the fact that some containers by their very nature disclose their contents or at least create an inference thereof from their outward appearances is the kind of exception which proves the rule.
The court in Robbins, as it did in Belton, supra, 453 U.S. 454, expressed a desire to establish a rule which would be easy to apply and not riddled with exceptions. As the opinion was signed only by a plurality, it apparently did not succeed in establishing such a rule. Nevertheless, the holding is not to be disregarded as is suggested by the Attorney General. Justice Powell in his opinion specifically agreed that the situation in Robbins must be distinguished from Belton because in Belton the court established a “bright line” rule which permits the interior or passenger compartment of a vehicle and containers found therein to be searched without a warrant where there has been an arrest of the occupant of the vehicle. Insofar as the plurality opinion in Robbins establishes a new “bright line” rule, Justice Powell would not join because he couldn’t assume that the police had probable cause to search the whole automobile as the plurality did. Justice Powell maintained that Robbins was a “container case.” However, he noted that both Chadwick, supra, 433 U.S. 1, and Sanders, supra, 442 U.S. 753, require a warrant to search a container when it is either one that generally is used for personal effects or is sealed in such a manner as to manifest an expectation of privacy. Justice Powell wrote, “I nevertheless concur in the judgment because the manner in which the package at issue was carefully wrapped and sealed evidenced petitioner’s expectation of privacy in its contents.” (Robbins v. California, supra, 453 U.S. 420, 429 [69 L.Ed.2d 744, 752].)
If a package wrapped in green opaque plastic material may not be opened without a warrant even if it is found during the course of the lawful search of an automobile, then, a fortiori, a briefcase, such as we have in the instant case, may not be opened even though found during the course of the lawful search of an automobile. It can scarcely be argued that a briefcase is not generally “a repository of personal effects.”
Assuming, arguendo, that Justice Powell distinguished Robbins from Belton because Robbins was a “container case” rather than an “automobile case” and that thus we are not bound by Robbins because the case at bench is an “automobile case,” we are nevertheless governed by the holding in People v. Minjares, supra, 24 Cal.3d 410.
[487]*487In Minjares the police stopped a car because of information linking the car and its occupant to a robbery. After arresting the driver and searching the passenger compartment, the police opened the trunk and found a tote bag, which they searched. The court held that under Chadwick v. United States, supra, 433 U.S. 1, the search was illegal. “The principles underlying Chadwick—and the Fourth Amendment—are not altered because the luggage in this case was found in the course of a search of an automobile.... ‘[t]he word “automobile” is not a talisman in whose presence the Fourth Amendment fades away and disappears.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Minjares, supra, 24 Cal.3d 410; 420.) The facts in Minjares cannot be distinguished from the case at bench.
There are, of course, exceptions which would permit the arresting officers to search a container such as the briefcase herein; however, it is not argued that the opening of this briefcase was incident to a lawful arrest. (See Chimel v. California (1969) 395 U.S. 752 [23 L.Ed.2d 685, 89 S.Ct. 2034].)
The People do, however, argue, and our dissenting colleague agrees, that in this case the search was justified by exigent circumstances (Arkansas v. Sanders, supra, 442 U.S. 753.) Recognizing, of course, that the doctrine of exigent circumstances is well established and well reasoned, we are unable to discern any such circumstances in this case. The briefcase in question was hardly within the “immediate control” of the respondent at the time of the search. Although footnote 11 in Arkansas v. Sanders, supra, 442 U.S. 753, 763-764 [61 L.Ed.2d 235, 245], states that exigencies will depend upon the probable contents of the luggage, this should not be taken as meaning that mere prior knowledge of the probable nature of such contents will justify the search. In both Sanders and. Chadwick, supra, 433 U.S. 1, the officers had prior information concerning the contents of the containers therein involved. It is only when the officers have knowledge of the probable contents and probable cause to believe that the contents of the container are in and of themselves inherently dangerous that the need to obtain a warrant is dissipated. The briefcase had been reduced to the exclusive custody of the police, and there were no grave circumstances justifying the officer in substituting his judgment for that of a magistrate in determining the existence of probable cause for the search. The exigent circumstances justifying the search of the trunk were eliminated once the trunk was opened and the contents were reduced to the possession of the police. (People v. Minjares, supra, 24 Cal.3d 410.)
[488]*488Finally, the People suggest (and our learned dissenting colleague seems to accept) that the warrantless search may be justified on the theory of an “accelerated booking search.” In People v. Bullwinkle (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 82 [164 Cal.Rptr. 163], the court justified the search of the arrestee’s purse when the arrestee took it with her to the police station after having been arrested. After arriving at the police department, the officers searched the purse and discovered incriminating evidence. The Bullwinkle court held that a person who is under arrest and subject to being booked into jail must yield to a search of his or her personal effects. The court correctly held that booking searches traditionally extend to a purse. The court noted, “[P]urses and wallets are entirely different from automobiles. The contents of automobiles ‘may be readily and adequately protected by locking the vehicle.’ [Citation.] The contents of purses and wallets, on the other hand, are easily susceptible to theft since purses and wallets cannot normally be locked. [Citation.]” (Id., at p. 89.) There was absolutely no necessity to search the briefcase in the case at bench during the booking of the defendant. On the contrary, the briefcase itself could have been secured while awaiting a decision by a magistrate as to whether to issue a warrant. “Once a closed container comes under an officer’s exclusive authority, an immediate search is no longer necessary. Thus probable cause to believe the item contains contraband or evidence of a crime can support at most the seizure of the item; but a warrant must be obtained for its search. [Citations.]” (People v. Minjares, supra, 24 Cal.3d 410, 423, fn. omitted.)
Our dissenting colleague also opines that the search herein should be justified on the basis of inevitable discovery. The inevitable discovery doctrine enunciated so cogently in People v. Superior Court (Tunch) (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 665 [145 Cal.Rptr. 795], is but a corollary of the “poison fruit” doctrine, i.e.: The constitutional compulsion to exclude evidence discovered as a result of official misconduct is logically limited to such evidence as would not have been discovered in the ordinary course of investigatory events. To now stretch the doctrine of inevitable discovery to the point where a warrantless search can be justified on the ground that a search warrant would have been “inevitably” issued had it been sought is not only sophistry, but would constitute a practical repeal of the Fourth Amendment. Such reasoning requires a retroactive evaluation of a nonexistent affidavit presented to an imaginary magistrate, all of which must then be reviewed at a subsequent hearing by employing mere speculation.
[489]*489Although we do agree that given the facts in the case at bench, the officers almost certainly would have been provided a warrant had they bothered to apply for such, this fact cannot be considered as justification for not making the effort to obtain the warrant. (United States v. Chadwick, supra, 433 U.S. 1, 15 [53 L.Ed.2d 538, 550-551].)
The order denying the motion to suppress the evidence of the contents of the briefcase is reversed. The matter is remanded. The court is directed to enter its order suppressing the evidence discovered from the search of the briefcase. The judgment of conviction is reversed. A new trial is ordered.
Spencer, P. J., concurred.