2025 IL App (1st) 251815-U Order filed: December 3, 2025
FIRST DISTRICT THIRD DIVISION
No. 1-25-1815B
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County. ) v. ) No. 25 CR 7727 ) MICHAEL RICHARDSON, ) Honorable ) Thomas J. Byrne, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE ROCHFORD delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Lampkin and Reyes concur in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: We affirm the denial of defendant’s motion for relief, where the petition for detention hearing was timely filed, was not a subsequent petition, and the State met its burden of proof as to his detention.
¶2 Defendant-appellant, Michael Richardson, appeals from the denial of his motion for relief
which challenged the order granting the State’s petition that he be detained pretrial pursuant to
article 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/110-1 et seq. (West
2022), as amended by Public Act 101-652 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023)), commonly known as the Pretrial
Fairness Act (Act). 1 Defendant argues that the petition was untimely under section 110-6.1(c)(1)
1 While commonly known by these names, neither the Illinois Compiled Statutes nor the foregoing public act refer to the Act as the “Safety, Accountability, Fairness and Equity-Today” Act, i.e., SAFE-T No. 1-25-1815B
of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(c)(1) (West 2022)), the petition should be considered a
“subsequent” petition which did not meet the requirements of section 110-6.1(d)(2) of the Code
(725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(d)(2) (West 2022)), and the State did not meet its burden of proof to support
his detention. We affirm.
¶3 On May 9, 2025, defendant was charged in a felony complaint (municipal case number
25110786501) (municipal case) which alleged that on May 8, 2025, defendant possessed a nickel-
toned Rossi Magnum .357 revolver with a 6-inch barrel and live rounds while being a convicted
felon. The circuit court granted the State’s petition for a pretrial detention hearing and ordered that
defendant be detained pretrial. The State, on the June 9, 2025, preliminary hearing date, informed
the court that the police officer was not in court and nol-prossed the municipal case. Defendant
was released from detention.
¶4 On July 9, 2025, following presentation to a grand jury, defendant was charged in a three-
count indictment (25 CR 0772701) with two counts of aggravated unlawful possession of a weapon
and one count of unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon, based on the same circumstances of
May 8, 2025. On July 17, 2025, defendant failed to appear at the scheduled arraignment. The court
continued the arraignment hearing to July 31, 2025, and the clerk notified defendant of the date.
¶5 On July 31, defendant appeared. The court appointed the office of the Cook County Public
Defender to represent him and defendant was arraigned.
¶6 That same day, the State filed a petition for a pretrial detention hearing (petition) requesting
that defendant be detained pretrial. The petition asserted that defendant posed a real and present
Act, or the “Pretrial Fairness Act.” See Rowe v. Raoul, 2023 IL 129248, ¶ 4 n. 1. Certain provisions of the legislation in question were amended by Pub. Act 102-1104 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023). See Rowe, 2023 IL 129248, ¶ 4. The supreme court initially stayed the implementation of this legislation but vacated that stay effective September 18, 2023. Id. ¶ 52.
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threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community. To support this claim, as it similarly
did in the municipal case petition, the State alleged:
“Defendant has multiple felony convictions. Defendant was wearing all black and a black
mask with another co-offender wearing all black, a blue hoodie and a black face mask.
Both men appeared armed. Defendant was gripping a black handle of a handgun in his
waistband. Both men fled. Defendant and co-offender ran through the Victim’s residence
(a 65+year old woman) to avoid arrest. Defendant discarded the loaded .357 magnum
revolver that officers saw him with near the front door of the Victim’s residence.”
¶7 The assistant public defender (APD) moved to strike the petition as untimely under section
110-6.1(c)(1) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(c)(1) (West 2022)), because it was not brought at
defendant’s first appearance or within 21 days after defendant’s arrest and release in the municipal
case. The court denied the motion to strike and proceeded to a detention hearing.
¶8 The State proffered that on May 8, 2025, while on routine patrol police officers observed
defendant and a co-offender on North Lawndale in Chicago. Defendant was wearing a black
hoodie and pants and a face mask; the co-offender was wearing black pants and a face mask.
Defendant saw the officers and made eye contact. He gripped the front of his waistband and
adjusted a heavy object. The officers approached defendant and saw him gripping the black handle
of a firearm with a silver finish in the front of his waistband. Defendant and co-offender entered
and then locked the gate of the property at 726 North Lawndale. The co-offender took a black
firearm from his front waistband and left it by the front door of the home. Police later recovered a
9mm firearm from next to the front door. Defendant and co-offender entered the first-floor
residence and defendant closed and locked the door. The police heard voices from inside the
residence screaming and asking the intruders to leave the home. The police entered the home and
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were told the offenders had run through the house. Defendant was discovered on the porch stairs,
between the first and second floor, and he was detained. The officers recovered a nickel-toned
magnum revolver with a six-inch barrel and live rounds. Defendant does not have a valid firearm
owners identification (FOID) card or concealed carry license (CCL). Police later learned that
defendant is a convicted felon.
¶9 The proffer did not include any discussion of the age of any resident in the home located
on North Lawndale. The proffer in the municipal case showed that a woman in the home was 65
years old or older.
¶ 10 The State informed the court that defendant had four felony convictions. He was convicted
in 2019 on a Class 4 felony, possession of a controlled substance and sentenced to one year of
prison; in 2018, on reckless conduct and sentenced to one year in prison; in 2016, on possession
of a controlled substance and sentenced to three years in prison; and in 2016, on possession of a
controlled substance where he received probation that was terminated unsatisfactorily.
¶ 11 Defendant argued that the State had not shown that defendant had possessed either of the
recovered firearms. Additionally, defendant does not pose a threat in that he has not been charged
with using a firearm or making any threats of force or injury in the criminal case, has not been
convicted of any firearm offenses, and his last conviction was in 2019. He appeared voluntarily at
the arraignment which demonstrates he would comply with any conditions of release. Defendant
has a five-year-old son and is responsible for taking him to school. His release would allow him
to continue to carry out his parental responsibilities, and attend medical appointments relating to a
recent car collision and proceedings relating to a pending civil case.
¶ 12 At the conclusion of the hearing, the court made oral findings, including that the State had
shown by clear and convincing evidence that the proof is evident or the presumption great that
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defendant committed an eligible offense, a Class 2 non-probationable offense of unlawful
possession of a weapon by a felon. As to defendant’s threat to safety and whether there are
conditions which would mitigate the threat, the court stated:
“The officers saw this defendant armed with what they recognize to be a silver-
finish handgun. The defendant immediately fled from the police. He was with another
armed individual. He was masked at the time and ran from the police and he ran into an
elderly citizen’s home, a person he didn’t know to avoid detention. It shows the defendant
certainly presents a danger to the community at large if he’s willing to avoid arrest by
running into an unknown person’s home thereby putting those individuals in danger.
There is no combination of conditions available to the Court that can mitigate the
danger and safety of the community that this defendant poses when he chooses to arm
himself, although he has no right pursuant to law to arm himself with a gun. He chooses to
disregard the sanctity of individuals’ homes for his own needs to avoid arrest and
responsibility. The petition for detention is granted.”
¶ 13 The court entered a written order finding that the State proved by clear and convincing
evidence that the proof is evident or the presumption great that defendant committed an eligible
offense, unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon, poses a real and present threat to any person
or persons or the community based on the specific articulable facts of the case, and no condition
or combination of conditions can mitigate defendant’s threat. As to the threat posed by defendant,
the court noted in the order that police observed defendant, a convicted felon, in possession of a
gun and masked. He ran from police into the home of an older individual to avoid apprehension.
As to mitigating the threat, the court further found that detention was the “only means” to protect
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the community because defendant did not abide by court orders or the law which prohibited him
from possessing a gun.
¶ 14 On August 29, 2025, defendant filed a motion for relief. Defendant argued that the court
erred in not striking the petition for being untimely as it was not filed on the first appearance or
within 21 days of defendant’s release; the petition should be considered as a subsequent petition,
which did not comply with the Code and for this additional reason it should have been struck; and
the State did not meet its burden to provide clear and convincing evidence that his detention was
warranted. In the motion for relief, defendant acknowledged that he “has difficulty attributing the
[State’s] conduct to bad faith” when it nol-prossed the municipal case and brought the criminal
case after a grand jury indictment.
¶ 15 On September 5, 2025, the court heard and denied the motion for relief. Of note, during
the hearing, defendant stated that he was not alleging bad faith on the part of the State in its
prosecution of defendant.
¶ 16 Defendant appealed under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(h) (eff. Apr. 15, 2024). In this
court, defendant filed a “Notice in Lieu of Rule 604(h) Memorandum” indicating that defendant
would not file a Rule 604(h) memorandum setting forth his claims on appeal. The issues on appeal
are those raised in the motion for relief. Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(h)(7) (eff. Apr. 15, 2024).
¶ 17 Pretrial release is governed by article 110 of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110 (West 2022)), as
amended by the Act. Under the Code, the requirement of posting monetary bail was abolished in
Illinois as of September 18, 2023, in favor of pretrial release on personal recognizance or with
conditions of release. See 725 ILCS 5/110-1.5 (West 2022); Rowe, 2023 IL 129248, ¶ 52. Under
the Code, the State may file a verified petition requesting the denial of pretrial release and the
circuit court may deny a defendant pretrial release if the State satisfies its burden at an evidentiary
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hearing. People v. Cooper, 2025 IL 130946, ¶ 18 (citing 725 ILCS 5/110-2(a) (West 2022); People
v. Clark, 2024 IL 130364, ¶ 1).
¶ 18 Defendant first argues that the circuit court was not authorized to detain him because the
petition was untimely under section 110-6.1(c) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(c) (West 2022)).
We review this question de novo as it requires us to interpret a statute. People v. Milner, 2024 IL
App (1st) 241284, ¶ 27 (citing People v. Ramyyeh, 2024 IL App (1st) 240299, ¶ 10.
¶ 19 Section 110-6.1(c) provides that “[a] petition may be filed without prior notice to the
defendant at the first appearance before a judge, or within 21 calendar days *** after arrest and
release of the defendant upon a reasonable notice to defendant.” 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(c) (West
2022). Defendant asserts that his first appearance took place on May 9, 2025, and he was released
from detention in the municipal case on June 9, 2025. The petition was filed in the criminal case
on July 31, 2025, well past the first appearance date and more than 21 calendar days from the day
he was released from detention in the municipal case. This argument depends on defendant’s
position that the criminal case is a continuation of the municipal case because both cases arise
from the same incident.
¶ 20 As the State asserts and as defendant acknowledges, however, this court rejected a similar
argument in People v. Suber, 2025 IL App (1st) 250488-U. The defendant in that case originally
was charged in a municipal case where the State did not seek his detention. Id. ¶¶ 4-5. The
municipal case was nol-prossed. Id. The State later returned an indictment from a grand jury
against the defendant. On the defendant’s first appearance in the later case, the State petitioned for
the defendant’s detention pretrial. Id. ¶ 8. The defendant argued that this petition was untimely
because the municipal case and the criminal case were effectively one case. Id. ¶ 25. The Suber
court found the petition was timely, stating:
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“[The defendant’s] argument fails because he overlooks the legal implications of
the State’s motion to dismiss the earlier case. When the State ‘nolle prosses’ a case, it
formally enters into the record that it is no longer willing to prosecute it. [Citation.] Once
a case is nol-prossed, the proceedings are terminated, and the defendant is free to go.
[Citation.] The defendant has not been acquitted but instead finds himself returned to the
status he had before facing prosecution. [Citation.] If, as here, the State nol-prosses early
on (before jeopardy attaches), the State may re-prosecute, absent proof of bad faith.
[Citation.]” Id. ¶ 26 (citing People v. Hughes, 2012 IL 112817, ¶¶ 22-23).
¶ 21 The Suber court concluded that given the nature of the nolle prosequi of the first case, and
that there was no contention that the State acted in bad faith, the petition was timely filed on the
defendant’s first appearance in the subsequent case. Although Suber cannot be cited as precedent,
we may and do find the reasoning of the decision persuasive. Ill. S. Ct. R. 23(e) (eff. Jun. 3, 2025);
see also, People v. Schwedler, 2025 IL App (1st) 242157, ¶¶ 24-29 (finding under somewhat
similar circumstances, that “the State reset the 21-day clock” for filing a petition for pretrial
detention by filing a superseding indictment).
¶ 22 Here, the State nol-prossed the original municipal case, after a testifying officer failed to
appear at the preliminary hearing, formally entering into the record that it was no longer pursuing
the municipal case. The municipal proceedings were terminated, and defendant was free to go and
was returned to the status he had prior to facing the municipal charges. Because the State nol-
prossed the municipal case early on, prior to jeopardy attaching, it was allowed to re-prosecute
defendant, absent bad faith. The State did so and brought the criminal case by returning an
indictment. The record contains no indication that the State acted in bad faith when it nol-prossed
the municipal case and brought the criminal case against defendant. In his motion for relief and in
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arguments during the hearing on the motion, defendant admitted that he had no evidence of bad
faith on the part of the State.
¶ 23 The State, at defendant’s first court appearance in the criminal case, timely petitioned to
detain defendant. We therefore reject defendant’s argument to the contrary and find that the circuit
court had the authority to hear and grant the petition.
¶ 24 Defendant next argues that the petition should be considered as a subsequent petition and,
as such, the State was required to comply with section 110-6.1(d)(2) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-
6.1(d)(2) (West 2022)). Again, we review this issue de novo as a matter of statutory interpretation.
Milner, 2024 IL App (1st) 241284, ¶ 27 (citing Ramyyeh, 2024 IL App (1st) 240299, ¶ 10).
¶ 25 Section 110-6.1(d)(2) of the Code provides that “[i]f the State seeks to file a second or
subsequent petition under this Section, the State shall be required to present a verified application
setting forth in detail any new facts not known or obtainable at the time of the filing of the previous
petition.” 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(d)(2) (West 2022). Defendant contends that the petition which was
filed in the criminal case was subsequent to the petition filed in the municipal court case, and
should have been struck as it failed to assert additional or new facts which were not known or
obtainable when the municipal case petition was filed. We disagree that the petition was a
subsequent petition.
¶ 26 As Suber explained, the municipal case was terminated upon the nolle prosequi and
defendant was returned to his status prior to the municipal case charges. The criminal case was a
new prosecution and the petition was an initial and not a subsequent petition in the criminal case.
The State was therefore not required to comply with the provisions of section 110-6.1(d)(2) and
set forth additional or new facts in the petition which were not known or obtainable at the time of
the municipal case petition.
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¶ 27 Finally, defendant argues that the State failed to meet its burden of proof to justify his
detention as it failed to establish that he posed a danger and that there were no conditions which
would mitigate any danger.
¶ 28 For qualifying offenses, upon filing a verified petition requesting the denial of pretrial
release, the State has the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that: (1) the proof is
evident or the presumption great that the defendant has committed a qualifying offense, (2) the
defendant’s pretrial release poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person or the
community, and (3) less restrictive conditions would not avoid a real and present threat to the
safety of any person or the community and/or prevent the defendant’s willful flight from
prosecution. 725 ILCS 5/110-2(a), 110-6.1 (West 2022).
¶ 29 Our supreme court recently defined the applicable standard of review for initial detention
hearings, which is dependent on whether live witness testimony was presented at the hearing. See
People v. Morgan, 2025 IL 130626. Specifically, where live witness testimony is presented, “the
circuit court’s ultimate detention decision under section 110-6.1 [(725 ILCS 5/110-6.1 (West
2022)], in addition to any underlying factual findings supporting the decision, will not be disturbed
on review unless found to be contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.” Morgan, 2025 IL
130626, ¶ 54. However, if the hearing proceeds solely by proffer, “the reviewing court is not bound
by the circuit court’s factual findings and may therefore conduct its own independent de novo
review of the proffered evidence and evidence otherwise documentary in nature.” Id. Our review
of the detention here is therefore de novo.
¶ 30 As to the issue of whether defendant posed a danger, section 110-6.1 of the Code provides
a list of factors that a court may consider in evaluating defendant’s dangerousness including, “[t]he
nature of and circumstances of any offense charged, including whether the offense *** involve[d]
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a weapon;” “evidence of the defendant’s prior criminal history;” whether the defendant is “known
to possess or have access to any weapon;” and “[w]hether, at the time of the offense ***, the
defendant was on *** parole.” 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(g)(1), (2)(A), (7), (8) (West 2022).
¶ 31 “A person who acts with such disregard could reasonably be found to place the public at
risk, even where, as here, that person was not arrested while actively using the firearm.” People v.
Johnson, 2024 IL App (1st) 240154, ¶ 4 (citing People v. Lee, 2024 IL App (1st) 232137, ¶ 29
(noting the public policy in Illinois that the public health and welfare is furthered by identifying
individuals who should not have firearms (citing 430 ILCS 65/1 (West 2022))); People v. Parker,
2024 IL App (1st) 232164, ¶¶ 74-77 (circuit court did not err in finding a defendant with a criminal
history posed a danger due to possession of a firearm where, in part, the defendant was already
barred from possessing a firearm and demonstrated noncompliance with court orders)).
¶ 32 The State proffered that while on patrol on a public street, police observed defendant and
another individual wearing dark clothes and masks while defendant was carrying a loaded
Magnum revolver in his waistband. The co-offender also carried a firearm. Defendant and his
accomplice posed a threat of harm to the community by being armed and masked on a city street.
They entered private property and a private residence without permission in order to avoid the
police. Defendant locked the door of the house after entering it. Defendant acted with disregard to
the sanctity of the home and caused the residents to scream in fear.
¶ 33 The State proved by clear and convincing evidence that defendant was a danger to any
person or persons or the community and to the safety and wellbeing of the innocent individuals in
the home which he entered without permission while illegally armed with a loaded firearm and
masked and with a co-offender who was similarly dressed, masked, and armed.
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¶ 34 Under the Code, to determine which conditions of release, if any, will reasonably ensure
the safety of any person or the community and the defendant’s likelihood of compliance with all
the conditions of pretrial release, the court must examine, in part:
“(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense charged;
(2) the weight of the evidence against the defendant ***;
(3) the history and characteristics of the defendant, including:
(A) the defendant’s character, physical and mental condition, family ties,
employment, financial resources, length of residence in the community, community
ties, past relating to drug or alcohol abuse, conduct, criminal history, and record
concerning appearance at court proceedings; and
(B) whether, at the time of the current offense or arrest, the defendant was on
probation, parole, or on other release pending trial, sentencing, appeal, or
completion of sentence for an offense under federal law, or the law of this or any
other state;
(4) the nature and seriousness of the real and present threat to the safety of any person or
persons or the community, based on the specific articulable facts of the case, that would be
posed by the defendant’s release ***.” 725 ILCS 5/110-5(a) (West 2022); see People v.
Harris, 2024 IL App (1st) 240310-U, ¶ 15.
¶ 35 Further, the “proof as to the danger presented by a defendant’s pretrial release will
frequently overlap with the evidence supporting a conclusion that less restrictive conditions cannot
mitigate the threat” and “that proof may overlap again with the elements of the crime charged, but
that does not render those facts any less compelling.” People v. Carpenter, 2024 IL App (1st)
240037, ¶ 17.
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¶ 36 Defendant was shown to be a danger in that he joined with an accomplice to carry firearms
on a public street while wearing dark clothes and masked. In order to avoid being questioned by
the police he and the co-offender fled. They entered a residence without permission and alarmed
the residents. Defendant carried a firearm without having a FOID card and CCL, and despite the
fact that as a convicted felon he was prohibited from doing so. His brazen conduct showed no
regard for the authority of the police, the well-being of the public and the home’s residents, and
the legal mandates prohibiting his possession of a firearm. Additionally, defendant had a criminal
history which included an unsuccessful termination of probation which provides further evidence
that he was not likely to comply with conditions of release. Finally, while defendant contends that
electronic monitoring would have been a sufficient condition of release, we note that electronic
monitoring would still allow defendant two days of weekly movement. 730 ILCS 5/5-8A-4(A),
(A-1) (West 2024) (providing for a two-day-per-week period of movement mandated for those on
pretrial home confinement and electronic monitoring); People v. Thomas, 2024 IL App (4th)
240248, ¶ 26 (“any condition of release must be appropriately measured to meet the danger
presented in each case. Knowing that electronic monitoring might detect a failure to comply with
conditions of release does not diminish concerns that a particular defendant appears to present a
greater risk of noncompliance, especially if the consequences of noncompliance may be grave.”).
¶ 37 This clear and convincing evidence leads to our agreement with the circuit court that there
were no conditions which would mitigate defendant’s dangerousness. In sum, we find that the
State demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that there were no conditions that would
mitigate defendant’s threat to any person or persons or the community.
¶ 38 For these reasons, we affirm the denial of defendant’s motion for relief and the order
requiring defendant’s pretrial detention.
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¶ 39 Affirmed.
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