2025 IL App (1st) 242157-U SIXTH DIVISION
February 28, 2025
No. 1-24-2157B
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________ THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of Cook County. Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) ) v. ) No. 24 CR 8646 ) JAYQUAN SCHWEDLER, ) Honorable ) Kenneth J. Wadas, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.
JUSTICE C.A. WALKER delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Tailor and Justice Hyman concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: We reverse the circuit court’s order granting the State’s pretrial detention petition and remand because the court failed to conduct an appropriate pretrial detention hearing. No. 1-24-2157B
¶2 Defendant Jayquan Schwedler appeals from the circuit court’s grant of the State’s petition
for pretrial detention pursuant to article 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILC
5/art. 110 (West 2022), as amended by Public Act 101-652, § 10-255 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023) and Public
Act 102-1104, § 70 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023), commonly known as the Pretrial Fairness Act (Act)). On
appeal, he argues the State’s petition was untimely, and that even if the petition was timely, the
court erred in ordering his detention. As set out below, we reject Schwedler’s claim that the State’s
petition was untimely, but reverse the court’s order and remand for a new hearing under the Act
because the court failed to conduct an appropriate hearing on the State’s petition.
¶3 BACKGROUND
¶4 Schwedler was arrested on August 6, 2024, and charged with reckless conduct with great
bodily harm, following an incident on Chicago Transit Authority platform which led to the
electrocution of the victim, Dyron Anderson, on a rail. Schwedler’s arrest occurred at 2:56 a.m.,
and the State made its final charging decision the next day, August 7, at 8:30 p.m. Schwedler first
appeared before the circuit court on August 8, 2024, on the 12:30 p.m. call.
¶5 At that appearance, Schwedler was released pending trial, with conditions. 1 During the
proceedings, the circuit court simultaneously addressed Schwedler and two other individuals also
charged in the incident, stating, “The State is not seeking to detain you on these new charges, so
we’re going to set the conditions for your release; however, for one of you, and that’s [Schwedler],
it looks like you were already on [probation] *** [s]o you’re going to be in custody at least until
tomorrow. You’re going to have to see the judge whose probation you violated.” The State’s
attorney responded to the court’s question “And just so the record’s clear, you’re not asking me to
1 Schwedler was on probation in two other matters at the time of this arrest, case Nos. 23 CR 11553 and 21 CR 14584. His separate appeal from the pretrial detention order in those matters is resolved in another order of this court, issued today, in case No. 1-24-1895B.
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detain of these defendants?” with “That’s correct Judge.” The court continued, “Despite somebody
having been electrocuted?” and the prosecutor confirmed, “Yes, your Honor.”
¶6 Anderson died on August 14, 2024. On September 3, 2024, the grand jury indicted
Schwedler on involuntary manslaughter and mob action in case No. 24 CR 8646, the present case.
The State filed the indictment on September 9, 2024, and Schwedler was arraigned on the new
matter on September 17, 2024.
¶7 On September 26, 2024, the State filed a petition for pretrial detention. In a written
attachment to the petition, the State alleged that on August 6, Anderson boarded a CTA red line
train heading south. Around 2:25 a.m., Schwedler and three other individuals entered the train, and
one of the individuals pinned Anderson against a wall. Anderson fled into an adjoining car, with
Schwedler and the three others in pursuit. During the chase, one of the individuals kicked Anderson
in the back. When the train stopped and the doors opened, Anderson exited and fled, but fell onto
the train tracks as he ran, and his head struck an electrified rail. Anderson received treatment at the
hospital before passing away from his injuries on August 14, 2024.
¶8 At Schwedler’s September 26 court appearance, the assistant public defender representing
him stated, “I believe he has already been arraigned. I did receive a petition to detain my client on
this matter, he is already I believe detained on his [probation violations], we would not waive
notice on that as well. And the October 18th date is good for us.” After which the circuit court
stated “Motion defendant [October 18, 2024] in person, 9:30 for detention hearing.”
¶9 On October 7, Schwedler moved to strike the petition, arguing it was untimely. In support,
he maintained that because he was eligible for pretrial detention on the charge of reckless conduct
with great bodily harm in case No. 24111086101, the Act required the State to file its petition
within 21 days of his August 8, 2024 release on that matter, which it did not do. He argued the
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superseding indictment did not reset the clock because his new case also arose from the CTA
platform chase.
¶ 10 The State responded, arguing reckless conduct causing great bodily harm “is not a
specifically enumerated offense under any subsection of [the Act] for which the People could have
sought pretrial detention.” It further argued that the 21-day clock for case No. 24 CR 8646 started
on September 17, the day of his first appearance, making the September 26 pretrial detention
petition filing timely. In support, it contended the Act “does not discuss the situation presented in
the instant case where the charge defendant was originally arrested on was superseded by
indictment on a separate charge.” The State continued that Anderson’s death was “a change of
material circumstances,” and the Act “was not intend[ed] to elevate form over substance by
engaging in unnecessary procedure.” It argued, “whether [the State] could or could not have filed
a petition when defendant was charged with reckless conduct is irrelevant. What matters is that
there has been a material change in circumstances resulting in a new charge.”
¶ 11 During Schwedler’s court appearance on October 18, 2024, the circuit court prompted the
parties that there were two filings for resolution that day: (1) Schwedler’s motion to strike, and (2)
the State’s pretrial detention petition. The court heard argument on the motion to strike first. The
assistant public defender representing Schwedler argued, “The statute is clear. It’s about release,
arrest and release. Mr. Schwedler was arrested August 6th, released August 8th. The State had
until August 29th to file. They did not do so.” The State’s attorney responded that it was unclear
whether Schwedler could be detained on the initial charge, and Anderson was expected to live at
the time of August 8 hearing. The State’s Attorney continued “it raises a very unusual and absurd
result of if the State is going to be able to take advantage of new information, having to file a
petition that would be likely to fail at first appearance court just to preserve an opportunity with
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new information *** to file a second or subsequent petition. There’s basically a hole in the statute
for this circumstance.” In rebuttal, the assistant public defender argued, “The State’s attempt to
read in what charging decisions were made later mean that there’s somehow a new case as a result
is nowhere in the statute. It’s about arrest and release for the conduct at issue and solely for the
conduct at issue on August 6.”
¶ 12 The circuit court concluded argument at this point, and stated, “the State has shown by clear
and convincing evidence that proof is evident or the presumption great that” Schwedler committed
a detainable offense. Moreover, the court found, Schwedler posed a real and present threat if
released pretrial because he “and two others chased the victim in this case on a Chicago transit El
train and, ultimately, the victim left the train. The chase was, in some level, still going on and the
defendant—or the victim fell or ran off the El platform and hit the third rail. Initially, he did not
die but, ultimately, that action resulted in his death.” The court continued that less restrictive
conditions could not mitigate the threat because “the defendant was on probation for two cases,
one of which was a Class 1 felony.”
¶ 13 The assistant public defender asked, “is there a ruling on the defense motion to strike?” to
which the circuit court responded, “Yeah. The defense motion to strike is denied.” Defense counsel
then stated the State had not made a proffer, and he was not aware the court would proceed
immediately “into the petition itself in substance.” The court responded, “I didn’t bifurcate the
ruling into separate things. So my rulings stand.”
¶ 14 Schwedler filed his motion for relief on October 21, 2024, reiterating his argument that the
State’s petition was untimely. He also claimed the circuit court improperly failed “to bifurcate the
Motion to Strike and the substance of the State’s Petition” for pretrial detention, preventing defense
counsel from presenting mitigating evidence, specifically video evidence of the incident.
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Schwedler further complained that he did not receive an initial court appearance within 48 hours
of his August 6, 2024 arrest, and the court did not hold a pretrial detention hearing on the State’s
Septembe 26, 2024 petition within the time provided by the Act. He also challenged the court’s
substantive findings that (1) the presumption was great or proof was evident that he committed
involuntary manslaughter; (2) no lesser restrictive conditions could mitigate the threat he posed;
and (3) he posed a high likelihood of willful flight. Finally, he argued the court’s order was
insufficient per the Act’s requirements because it did not summarize why less restrictive conditions
would not mitigate his threat.
¶ 15 At the hearing on the motion for relief, the assistant public defender reiterated his arguments
on the untimeliness of the State’s petitions, and further contended the circuit court denied him the
opportunity to present mitigating evidence.
¶ 16 The State responded that its proffer was sufficient regarding whether the proof was evident
and presumption great that Schwedler committed involuntary manslaughter and posed a real and
present threat. Counsel continued that the fact Schwedler allegedly committed the offense while
on probation, and his violation of that probation led to someone’s death, showed no less restrictive
conditions could mitigate the threat he posed.
¶ 17 The circuit court denied the motion for relief, stating,
“I’m going to stand on my original rulings. I continue to deny [the defense’s] request to play
the video. I don’t think it will change anything. Again, it’s just a factual dispute on what
happened on the el train. I’m not getting into that. I take the State’s petition on its face and
the State has outlined ample reasons why defendant poses a serious threat to the community,
especially in light of the fact that he was on two probations; one a class 1 felony, a fentanyl
case, and then a class 2 felony, a burglary case. Defense motion for relief is denied.”
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This appeal followed.
¶ 18 JURISDICTION
¶ 19 The circuit court denied Schwedler’s motion for relief on October 21, 2024, and Schwedler
filed his notice of appeal that same day. Accordingly, absent any indication Schwedler has been
convicted of his current charges, this court has jurisdiction pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule
604 (h)(2), (3) (eff. Apr. 15, 2024) and section 110-6.1(j) of the Act (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(j) (West
2022)).
¶ 20 ANALYSIS
¶ 21 On appeal, Schwedler first argues the State’s petition for pretrial detention was untimely.
He further contends that should this court find the State’s petition was timely, reversal is still
necessary because the circuit court erred in ordering his detention pursuant to that petition because
of procedural violations, specifically (1) his first appearance before the court was not within 48
hours of his arrest; (2) the hearing on the State’s petition for pretrial detention did not occur within
48 hours of filing; and (3) the court failed to conduct an appropriate pretrial detention hearing on
October 18, 2024. Finally, he raises claims as to the substance of the court’s detention findings
and its October 18, 2024 order, arguing (1) the State failed to show the proof was evident or
presumption great that he committed involuntary manslaughter, (2) the State failed to show less
restrictive conditions could not mitigate the threat he posed, (3) the court’s order failed to explain
why less restrictive conditions could not mitigate his threat, and (4) the court erred by detaining
him on the grounds that he posed a flight risk.
¶ 22 We first consider the timeliness of the State’s petition. Pursuant to the Act, a criminal
defendant is presumed eligible for release pending trial, and cannot be detained unless the State
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files a petition for pretrial detention. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a), (a)(1)-(8), (e) (West 2022). The Act
requires, in relevant part, that:
“A petition may be filed without prior notice to the defendant at the first appearance before
a judge, or within the 21 calendar days *** after arrest and release of the defendant upon
reasonable notice to defendant; provided that while such petition is pending before the court,
the defendant if previously released shall not be detained.” Id. § 110-6.1(c)(1).
The Act further states, “If the State seeks to file a second or subsequent petition under this Section,
the State shall be required to present a verified application setting forth in detail any new facts not
known or obtainable at the time of the filing of the previous petition.” Id. § 110-6.1(d)(2). The
State may only move for pretrial detention for defendants charged with certain offenses
enumerated in the Act, one of which includes any felony that “involves the threat of or infliction
of great bodily harm or permanent disability or disfigurement.” Id. § 110-6.1(a)(1.5). Involuntary
manslaughter is also a detainable offense. Id. § 110-6.1(a)(6)(P).
¶ 23 Schwedler argues that the State’s petition was untimely because he was arrested on August
6, 2024, pursuant to the CTA platform chase, and the State chose not to move for his pretrial
detention at his first court appearance on August 8. This constituted his day of “release” per the
Act, and started the statutory 21-day clock within which the State had to file a detention petition.
That period then expired on August 29, rendering the State’s September 26 petition untimely.
¶ 24 The State responds that because Schwedler was charged in a new case with involuntary
manslaughter and mob action via superseding indictment following Anderson’s death on August
14, it is entitled to a new timetable under the Act for the new case. The grand jury returned the
indictment on September 3, the State filed it on September 9, and Schwedler first appeared in court
at his arraignment on September 17. Based on this sequence of events, the State maintains that
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September 17 was the date of Schwedler’s “release” on the present case, as it did not move for
pretrial detention at that hearing, which started the 21-day clock. This makes the September 26
petition well within the required period.
¶ 25 The operative question for this court to resolve is whether, per the Act, the State reset the
21-day clock by filing its superseding indictment. This presents an issue of statutory interpretation,
which we review de novo. People v. Milner, 2024 IL App (1st) 241284, ¶ 27.
¶ 26 We find that the State’s petition was timely because the superseding indictment constituted
a new case that alleged a new, detainable offense, for which the Act then permitted the State to
determine whether to request pretrial detention at either Schwedler’s first court appearance or
within 21 days of his release. The Act does not directly address this scenario, but its plain language,
interpreted alongside the Illinois Rules of Criminal Procedure, dictates this result. A new criminal
case “commence[s]” when an indictment is returned. 720 ILCS 5/2-16 (West 2022). Schwedler
was indicted on involuntary manslaughter and mob action on September 3. This created a new
case that charged Schwedler utilizing facts which were not available when he was charged with
reckless conduct causing great bodily harm in case No. 24111086101. While a new “arrest” may
not have occurred because Schwedler was already detained per his probation matters, a new
arraignment did—on September 17. This constituted Schwedler’s first court appearance on case
No. 24 CR 8646. See 725 ILCS 5/113-1 (West (2022) (Arraignment is a procedure in which a
defendant is “called into open court, informed of the charge against him, and called upon to plead
thereto.”). Applying section 110-6.1(c)(1) of the Act (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(c)(1) (West 2022)) to
this procedural posture, the State, if it wanted to detain Schwedler pretrial on case No. 24 CR 8646,
had to either file a petition for pretrial detention on September 17, or within 21 days of his “release”
for purposes of the new case, which occurred on that date because the State decided not to file a
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petition at his first appearance. See People v. Bradford, 2023 IL App (1st) 231785, ¶¶ 23-25 (a
defendant is considered “released” for purposes of a specific case when a court orders his release
in that case). The State filed its petition nine days later—well within the Act’s timeframe.
¶ 27 Section 110-6.1(d)(2) of the Act (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(d)(2) (West 2022)) supports this
interpretation. Under that section, the State may seek to file a second or subsequent petition for
pretrial detention if it can demonstrate it learned of “new facts not known or obtainable at the of
time of the filing of the previous petition.” 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(d)(2) (West 2022). Applied here,
this section demonstrates that in passing the Act, the legislature understood the full universe of
relevant facts might not be immediately available to the State when making its initial pretrial
detention decision, and accordingly it should have the ability to seek pretrial detention later if new,
relevant information emerges while a case is pending. Id. Anderson’s unfortunate passing was a
new fact which could reasonably affect the State’s calculus regarding whether to seek pretrial
detention, and the intent of the Act as demonstrated through this section supports our conclusion
that the State can request pretrial detention based on the new information.
¶ 28 Schwedler’s arguments for untimeliness are based on the premise that case No. 24 CR 4686
is the same as case No. 24111086101. This argument fails because the two prosecutions constitute
two different cases. Besides having different case numbers and different charges alleging different
elements, the cases are based on different facts, with the latter case based in significant part on a
fact not available to the State at the time of initial charging and Schwedler’s first court appearance
on case No. 24111086101. The Illinois Rules of Criminal Procedure on compulsory joinder are
helpful here—compulsory joinder applies when “several offenses are known to the [prosecutor] at
the time of commencing the prosecution.” 720 ILCS 5/3-3 (West 2022). Involuntary manslaughter
10 No. 1-24-2157B
was not known to the State at the time of the first case commenced; it was not until Anderson’s
death on August 14 that the State could attempt to pursue charges with death as an element.
¶ 29 To account for this fundamental flaw, Schwedler argues the September 3 indictment was
not based on new “conduct” unknown to the State at the time of charging in case No. 24111086101,
as both cases arose from the August 6 CTA platform chase, and this should be the operative
consideration for applying section 110-6.1(c)(1) of the Act. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(c)(1) (West
2022). This argument fails because the Act does not delineate between first court appearances for
new cases based on whether a defendant was previously charged for the same incident, and we
will not interpret a statute to include additional requirements not supported by the text. People v.
Glisson, 202 Ill. 2d 499, 505 (2002). As discussed above, the superseding indictment charged
Schwedler with a crime he could not have been charged with at the time of the initial appearance
on his first case, based on information learned by the State only after the initial charging and
pretrial detention decisions, and for which he had an initial appearance. We find that per the intent
of the legislature, unambiguously explained in sections 110-6.1(c)(1) and (d)(2) of the Act (725
ILCS 5/110-6.1(c)(1), (d)(2) (West 2022)), the State was permitted to file an initial pretrial
detention petition within 21 days of the September 17 arraignment, even if the new case arose from
the same general “conduct” of a previous case.
¶ 30 Schwedler also contends that the new fact of Anderson’s death should not be determinative
because Schwedler was detainable on the reckless conduct with great bodily harm charge in the
first case. Even if we concede (without holding) that Schwedler was detainable in his first case on
that charge, however, this would not change the result. The Act does not require that the State
pursue detention any time a defendant is eligible for it, and indeed is designed to ensure the State
does not endeavor to pursue detention automatically—it must also take into account whether it can
11 No. 1-24-2157B
make the evidentiary showings required by section 110-6.1(e) of the Act. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e)
(West 2022). In permitting this discretion, the Act asks that prosecutors make decisions based on
the facts available to them at the time—“the specific articulable facts of the case”—and specifically
contemplates the potential that these facts will change as the discovery process unfolds and
investigation continues before trial. See 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(d)(1)-(2), (e) (West 2022). This case
is a prime example—when the State chose not to pursue pretrial detention on August 8, it did so
with the knowledge that Anderson survived, and without the benefit of having weeks to investigate
and further review the evidence (which includes a video of the incident, the availability of which
on August 8 is unclear). When the facts changed, leading to a new case being filed, the State then
reconsidered Schwedler’s pretrial detention status based on the updated information.
¶ 31 Schwedler’s next claim is his detention should be reversed because the State failed to bring
him to court within 48 hours of his arrest. This presents another question of statutory interpretation,
which we review de novo. People v. Taylor, 2023 IL 128316, ¶ 45. He also raises this claim in
case No. 1-24-1895B, and our analysis of why the claim fails is the same in both orders:
¶ 32 The record shows Schwedler’s arrest occurred on August 6 at 2:56 a.m., and he was not
brought before the circuit court until August 8, 2024, on its 12:30 p.m. call. The State finalized its
charging decision at 8:30 p.m., on August 7, 2024.
¶ 33 We find that Schwedler is not entitled to relief because he appeared approximately 10 hours
after the 48-hour period from the time of his arrest expired. Other panels of this court have
addressed, and rejected, nearly identical claims in situations where the defendant was brought to
court on the second day following arrest, but outside of 48 hours, after the State’s charging decision
occurred the previous day after court closed. See People v. Garduno, 2024 IL App (1st) 240405-
U, ¶¶ 9-13; People v. Williams, 2024 IL App (1st) 232219-U, ¶¶ 27-29. In so finding, the Williams
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court explained that the inclusion in the statute of the phrase “without unnecessary delay” provided
latitude with respect to the 48-hour requirement, citing People v. Ballard, 206 Ill. 2d 151, 177
(2002). In Ballard, our supreme court explained that so long as presentment was done with
“reasonable promptness,” timeliness requirements on this point were met. We agree with those
resolutions and adopt their reasoning. Schwedler was not officially charged until the evening of
August 7, and he appeared in court the next day on the 12:30 p.m. call. In accordance with Ballard,
Williams, and Garduno, we find this constituted “reasonable promptness.”
¶ 34 Schwedler next claims that he should be released because the circuit court did not hold a
hearing on the State’s September 26 petition within 48 hours of filing. See 725 ILCS 5/110-
6.1(c)(2) (West 2022). Schwedler cannot pursue this argument, however, because the record shows
his counsel agreed to the continuance on September 26 to October 18 for hearing on the petition
for pretrial detention. See People v. Reimolds, 92 Ill. 2d 101, 106 (1982).
¶ 35 Schwedler’s next claim is that the circuit court failed to conduct a proper pretrial detention
hearing. Per the Act, after the State files a petition for pretrial detention, the court must hold a
hearing on the petition. The Act further explains, in relevant part, that, “The State or defendant
may present evidence at the hearing by way of proffer based upon reliable information,” and, “The
defendant shall have the opportunity to testify, to present witnesses on his *** behalf, and to cross-
examine any witnesses that are called by the State.” 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(f)(2), (3) (West 2022).
Whether the court conducted an appropriate pretrial detention hearing is another issue of statutory
interpretation subject to de novo review. Taylor, 2023 IL 128316, ¶ 45.
¶ 36 The record shows that at the October 18, 2024 proceeding, the circuit court first heard
argument specifically on Schwedler’s motion to strike, then moved directly to finding that the
State had satisfied the three requirements of section 110-6.1(e)(1)-(3) of the Act. 725 ILCS 5/110-
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6.1(e)(1)-(3) (West 2022). Defense counsel requested that the court make an official ruling on the
motion to strike, to which the court only replied it was denied. Counsel then complained that the
court had granted the State’s petition without requiring a proffer, let alone permitting Schwedler
to present evidence. The court indicated the State had already made a “10-page” proffer, and it
based its findings thereon.
¶ 37 On this record, we find that the circuit court did not conduct an appropriate pretrial detention
hearing. In referencing the “10-page” proffer in response to defense counsel, the court was
apparently referring to a 2-page written summary of the facts of the case attached to the State’s
petition. Even presuming the Act permits the State to offer only a written proffer, the Act is clear
that the court must provide the defendant the opportunity to challenge the State’s proffer. Here,
the court denied Schwedler the opportunity to present any challenge. Accordingly, we reverse the
detention order and remand for the court to conduct a pretrial detention hearing in accordance with
the Act’s requirements.
¶ 38 The State contends that the circuit court’s proceeding was sufficient because any error was
“harmless” based on Schwedler’s counsel’s arguments at the motion for relief. This argument fails
because the plain language of the Act unequivocally requires the court to conduct a hearing on the
State’s petition before a defendant can be detained, and the court simply failed to do so. 725 ILCS
5/110-6.1(f) (West 2022). Whether an error at a pretrial detention hearing can be “harmless” in
this context is an issue for another case, as the court did not comply with the basic requirements
of conducting the hearing.
¶ 39 Because remand is required to hold a proper hearing, we do not reach Schwedler’s claims
regarding the circuit court’s substantive findings at, or pretrial detention order from, the October
18, 2024 proceeding.
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¶ 40 CONCLUSION
¶ 41 The circuit court failed to hold an appropriate pretrial detention hearing on the State’s timely
petition, and accordingly, we reverse the detention order and remand for a new hearing.
¶ 42 Reversed and remanded.