People v. Rainey

2025 IL App (1st) 231769

Opinion

2025 IL App (1st) 231769

No. 1-23-1769

Filed September 24, 2025

Third Division

IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County. ) v. ) No. 22 CR 2809 ) ANTONIO RAINEY, ) Honorable ) Steven G. Watkins, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding.

PRESIDING JUSTICE MARTIN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justices Lampkin and Reyes concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

¶1 Following a bench trial, Antonio Rainey was convicted of four counts of aggravated

domestic battery and one count of unlawful restraint. The court sentenced him to five years’

imprisonment. On appeal, Rainey argues (1) he was not proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt

because the victim disavowed her prior identification of Rainey as the offender and (2) the trial

court improperly allowed a witness to testify to the results of Internet database searches. We

affirm. 1

1 In adherence with the requirements of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 352(a) (eff. July 1, 2018), this appeal has been resolved without oral argument upon the entry of a separate written order. No. 1-23-1769

¶2 I. BACKGROUND

¶3 Chicago police officers arrived at L.G.’s apartment in response to a report of a domestic

disturbance on the evening of October 20, 2021. They found her distraught, clothed in a towel, and

coughing up blood. L.G.’s face was bloodied and swollen. Blood was visible on the walls and

floor. L.G. told the officers and paramedics that Rainey, her former boyfriend, had beaten her. She

repeated his name to them several times, once spelling out his last name. The interaction was

captured on Officer Kylie McMahon’s body worn camera (BWC). Footage from the BWC depicted

L.G. stating Rainey had beaten her. The trial court admitted L.G.’s statements captured on the

BWC as excited utterances.

¶4 L.G. was transported to a hospital, where she was found to have sustained blunt force

trauma to her face. Her left eye was badly swollen, her scalp was bruised, and her nose and cheeks

appeared disfigured. A CT scan revealed fractures to her nasal and cheek bones. L.G. told the

treating physician that her boyfriend had assaulted her. She was admitted to the hospital, as the

doctor and social workers believed she would be unsafe at home. L.G. remained in the hospital for

three days. She subsequently sought an order of protection against Rainey.

¶5 Detective Walter Martin spoke with L.G. by telephone on October 26, 2021. During their

conversation, she expressed interest in pursuing felony charges against Rainey. They met at a

police station on November 5, 2021, and reviewed medical records and photographs from L.G.’s

phone. L.G. met with Detective Martin four more times over the next few months, each time

maintaining Rainey was her assailant.

¶6 On February 8, 2022, L.G. met with Detective Martin and an assistant state’s attorney. L.G.

gave a video-recorded statement recounting the October 20, 2021, attack in detail, again naming

Rainey as the perpetrator. According to her statement, L.G. received voicemail messages from

-2- No. 1-23-1769

Rainey, stating he was coming to retrieve a Halloween mask and a pair of jeans that belonged to

him. L.G. did not want Rainey at her apartment. Before he arrived, she gathered Rainey’s

belongings together. L.G. permitted Rainey to enter, but he remained longer than necessary to

collect his belongings. She asked Rainey to leave but he refused. L.G. called Rainey’s current

girlfriend, asking her to come get him. L.G. later told Rainey she would call the police if he did

not leave. The statement “set [him] off.” L.G. exited her bathroom and brushed past Rainey in the

hallway. He pushed her and a struggle ensued. Rainey hit L.G., knocking her to the floor. He then

beat her with a long-handled dustpan. When the dustpan broke, Rainey looked for another object

to use as a weapon. He found a kitchen chair and struck her with it. Next, Rainey got on top of

L.G., placed his hands around her neck, and began choking her. L.G. tried to fight him off. She

pushed Rainey’s face and told him she could not breathe. Rainey relented upon seeing L.G.’s eyes

“bucking out.” L.G. rose to her feet. Rainey slapped her. She was out of breath and felt like she

was going to faint. Rainey pushed her onto a couch and turned the air conditioner on. L.G. found

her cell phone. A dispatcher could be heard asking questions. L.G. told Rainey she did not call 911

on purpose, but he “went belligerent” and resumed attacking her. L.G. attempted to escape through

her back door. Rainey grabbed her and ripped her shirt. L.G. picked up a pair of scissors to defend

herself. Rainey wrested the scissors from L.G. and attempted to stab her. Upon hearing an upstairs

neighbor calling out, Rainey collected his belongings and fled from the apartment.

¶7 At trial, L.G. acknowledged making the videotaped statement, but she said she could not

remember the specific statements. She also admitted that she had previously identified Rainey as

her assailant but asserted he was not. Instead, she claimed she was attacked by a man named Tyler

Wryles. L.G. testified she began seeing Wryles after breaking up with Rainey. She first met Wryles

while attending college in Mississippi. Wryles was from Memphis, Tennessee, and stayed with

-3- No. 1-23-1769

L.G. for two weeks in October 2021, while he was in Chicago. L.G. described Wryles’s appearance

as thin, with long braids, a wide nose, and prominent eyelids. He had several tattoos, including one

on his arm of a Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtle. L.G. stated Wryles was affiliated with a gang and

carried handguns. She believed his date of birth to be November 16 or 17 of 1998 or 1999. She

specified that his last name was spelled W-R-Y-L-E-S.

¶8 According to her trial testimony, the attack occurred exactly as she had described in her

videotaped statement, except the assailant was Wryles and he never choked her. When L.G. learned

Wryles had another girlfriend, she demanded he leave her apartment. Wryles became enraged and

began striking her with his fists. He punched L.G. in the face multiple times, causing her to bleed

from her nose and mouth. Wryles also slammed her to the floor and struck her with a broomstick

and chair. Wryles tore her shirt off when she tried to escape. L.G. managed to call 911 and was

screaming for help. Wryles fled when an upstairs neighbor called out, saying she was calling the

police. When paramedics and police officers arrived, L.G. was “really upset, hysterical.” L.G. did

not recall stating that Rainey had attacked her or spelling his name. She was bleeding, in pain, in

an emotional state, and “probably saying a lot of stuff.”

¶9 L.G. testified she told police Rainey was her attacker because Wryles had threatened to kill

her if she named him and she was “more scared of [Wryles] than I ever will be of [Rainey].” Rainey

was an “easy target,” L.G. explained, because they “had history” and she was mad at him for

ending their relationship. L.G. found Wryles throwing rocks at her window a few days after she

was discharged from the hospital. He showed her a gun and threatened that she would die if she

named him. L.G. stayed in a shelter out of fear of Wryles.

¶ 10 L.G. continued to identify Rainey to “keep the lie going.” She also believed that no

consequences would follow for Rainey, since he was in jail on other charges by that time. She did

-4- No. 1-23-1769

not hear from the state’s attorney’s office (SAO) for months after her February 2022 statement.

L.G. later learned that the State was seeking a prison sentence in this case. She had an “epiphany”

and decided she did not want Rainey to “take the fall.” She communicated with Rainey while he

was in jail, sending him a letter and speaking by telephone. L.G. also spoke with Rainey’s attorney

and sent her a statement by text message, explaining she had falsely accused him. The message

did not mention Wryles. She also informed the SAO that she did not want to pursue prosecution

of the case.

¶ 11 The State called SAO investigator Marcella Solis to testify about her investigation of the

name Tyler Wryles in database searches. The defense objected, contending that the results of

Solis’s searches were hearsay. Counsel noted the results were potentially admissible under the

business records exception, but argued Solis could not lay the necessary foundation since she was

not the keeper of the records. The court overruled the objection, ruling that the records may be

necessary for Solis to testify about the results and quality of her investigation. The court added

that it would determine how much weight Solis’s testimony deserved.

¶ 12 Solis explained that she previously worked for the Chicago Police Department for 31 years

and had been an SAO investigator for a year. Solis was asked to search for a person named either

Tyler Wryles or Tyler Wyles, with a date of birth from 1997 through 2001. She used various

database systems, including Accurint, I-Clear, FastPeople, FirstTwo, and VINELink, as well as

databases maintained by the Illinois Department of Corrections and the Federal Bureau of

Investigation. Solis had successfully located individuals using these databases throughout her

career. On this occasion, Solis was unable to locate any record of a person by either name in that

age range. In FastPeople, Solis found records of three individuals named Tyler Wryles: one in

Kentucky, one in Pennsylvania, and the third in California. None of those individuals were within

-5- No. 1-23-1769

the given age range or fit other identifiers Solis had been given. A search using Accurint yielded a

record of a 71-year-old Wisconsin man named Tyler Wyles.

¶ 13 On cross examination, Solis testified she did not conduct searches using the last names

Riles or Wiles, nor did she try alternate spellings of the first name. She did not conduct a search

specific to Tennessee. Solis admitted she did not know how any of the databases obtained

information or what, if any, measures each database uses for accuracy. She stated, however, that

the databases often proved reliable in her experience.

¶ 14 A redacted transcript from the hearing on L.G.’s application for an order of protection

against Rainey was admitted into evidence by stipulation. In that proceeding, L.G. stated under

oath that Rainey had beaten her on October 20, 2021.

¶ 15 The court found L.G.’s prior recorded out-of-court statements naming Rainey were credible

and the “true version of what occurred.” Accordingly, the court found Rainey guilty on all counts.

The court sentenced Rainey to five years’ imprisonment. This appeal followed.

¶ 16 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 17 A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶ 18 Rainey first claims the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. His

argument requires us to review the sufficiency of the evidence. When reviewing the sufficiency of

the evidence, “ ‘the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of

the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) People v. Bush, 2023 IL 128747,

¶ 33 (quoting People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261 (1985)). A conviction will be set aside only

when the evidence is so improbable or unsatisfactory that it creates a reasonable doubt of the

defendant’s guilt. Id.

-6- No. 1-23-1769

¶ 19 Rainey argues the evidence was insufficient to convict him because L.G.’s prior

inconsistent statements were the sole evidence identifying him as the perpetrator. To be sure,

“recanted prior inconsistent statements can be sufficient to support a conviction, even without

corroborating evidence.” People v. Thomas, 354 Ill. App. 3d 868, 878 (2004); People v. Morrow,

303 Ill. App. 3d 671, 677 (1999); People v. Douglas, 2014 IL App (5th) 120155, ¶ 28.

¶ 20 Nonetheless, Rainey argues that since no other evidence identified him, it is “objectively

*** impossible to discern which is the true account of the battery” and deciding between L.G.’s

conflicting statements is “essentially a coin flip.” Not so. The trier of fact’s very function is to

assess the credibility of witnesses and resolve discrepancies and inconsistencies in the evidence.

People v. Jackson, 2020 IL 124112, ¶ 66. This task includes determining which, if any, of a

witness’s inconsistent statements should be believed. See id. ¶ 68 (observing it was “up to the jury

as trier of fact to determine whether [a witness’s] statement was more credible than her subsequent

recantation”). Moreover, the trial court, as trier of fact, “was in a much better position than we are

to determine [L.G.’s] credibility and the weight to be accorded to her testimony.” Id. ¶ 69.

¶ 21 Thus, we do not regard the trial court’s credibility determination here like a coin flip, as

Rainey urges. The trial court did not make an arbitrary decision. Rather, the trial court assessed

L.G.’s credibility and determined her prior statements identifying Rainey as her attacker were

truthful. The trial court’s findings concerning credibility are entitled to great weight. People v.

Wheeler, 226 Ill. 2d 92, 115 (2007). When findings of fact depend on the credibility of witnesses,

we will defer to the trial court’s findings unless they are against the manifest weight of the

evidence. People v. Clark, 2014 IL App (1st) 130222, ¶ 26. A decision is against the manifest

weight of the evidence only when an opposite conclusion is apparent or when the findings appear

to be unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence. Id.

-7- No. 1-23-1769

¶ 22 Here, L.G. repeatedly told the responding paramedics and police officers Rainey had

beaten her. At that time, L.G. was distraught, she was badly beaten, her eye was swollen shut, and

she was coughing blood. Thus, she was still under the stress of the event. In this condition, it strains

credulity to believe she had the reflective capacity needed to consciously fabricate the identity of

her attacker. Indeed, this was the reason the trial court found her statements from Officer

McMahon’s BWC video admissible as excited utterances. See Michael H. Graham, Handbook of

Illinois Evidence § 803.2 (10th ed. 2025) (“The [excited utterance] exception is premised on the

notion that the excitement caused by the event or condition temporarily stills the capacity for

reflection, thus producing statements free of conscious fabrication ***.”). In L.G.’s trial testimony,

she described a deliberative process to name Rainey instead of Wryles. She reasoned that Wryles

had threatened her, she feared Wryles more than Rainey, and Rainey made an “easy target” because

of their “history.” But such thinking would have required a reflective capacity L.G. likely did not

possess in the immediate aftermath of the attack. L.G. contradicted herself at trial, testifying she

was both hysterical and did not know what she was saying, yet explaining how she deliberately

named Rainey instead of Wryles. For these reasons, the trial court could have reasonably

determined her initial statements were truthful.

¶ 23 In addition, L.G. repeatedly maintained that Rainey was her attacker for months after the

attack. She testified in support of an order of protection against him and named him on successive

occasions to Detective Martin, even giving a video recorded statement. By the time of trial, more

than a year had passed since the attack, L.G. had learned the State was seeking a six-year prison

term, and she had communicated with Rainey as he awaited trial in jail. Thus, the trial court could

reasonably find that her trial testimony naming a different person was not an admission to the truth

but an attempt to help Rainey avoid the consequences he faced. Solis’s inability to verify the

-8- No. 1-23-1769

existence of Tyler Wryles further reduced the credibility of L.G.’s trial testimony. For these

reasons, the trial court’s determination that L.G.’s prior statements were the “true version of what

occurred” was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 24 To support his argument, Rainey cites prior decisions from this court in which recanted

prior statements were found insufficient to sustain a conviction. See People v. Arcos, 282 Ill. App.

3d 870 (1996); People v. Reyes, 265 Ill. App. 3d 985 (1993); People v. Brown, 303 Ill. App. 3d 949

(1999); People v. Parker, 234 Ill. App. 3d 273 (1992). Those decisions, however, relied on the

unique facts and circumstances of each case and do not contradict that “recanted prior inconsistent

statements can be sufficient to support a conviction, even without corroborating evidence.”

Thomas, 354 Ill. App. 3d at 878. For instance, in Arcos, a disavowed prior statement was found

insufficient when the trial court also found that the witness “had absolutely no credibility” and

“would say anything to get the police to drop the charges against him.” Arcos, 282 Ill. App. at 874.

In Reyes, prior statements were found insufficient since they were “one-word responses” to

questions rather than a detailed account of the crime. Reyes, 265 Ill. App. 3d at 989. In Brown, a

prior statement was found insufficient when it was made two years after the crime and evidence

showed the witness gave the statement to avoid being charged with a drug offense. Brown, 303 Ill.

App. 3d at 965. Lastly, in Parker, prior statements from three witnesses were severely impeached

by their trial testimony, which explained the circumstances that caused each to sign their prior

statement. See Parker, 234 Ill. App. 3d at 275-78; People v. Davis, 2018 IL App (1st) 152413, ¶ 50

(describing the distinguishing facts of Parker). Unlike those cases, we are not persuaded that the

facts and circumstances here render L.G.’s disavowed prior statements insufficient to sustain

Rainey’s conviction.

-9- No. 1-23-1769

¶ 25 B. Admissibility of Search Results

¶ 26 Rainey next argues the trial court erred in allowing Solis to testify regarding the results she

obtained from searching various databases when attempting to confirm the existence of Tyler

Wryles. Rainey contends Solis’s testimony was inadmissible hearsay and the business records

exception did not apply.

¶ 27 A trial court’s decisions on whether to admit evidence are reviewed for an abuse of

discretion. People v. Caffey, 205 Ill. 2d 52, 89 (2001). An abuse of discretion will be found only

where the trial court’s ruling is arbitrary, fanciful, unreasonable, or where no reasonable person

would take the view adopted by the trial court. Id.

¶ 28 Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted.

People v. Moss, 205 Ill. 2d 139, 159 (2001); Ill. R. Evid. 801(c) (eff. Oct. 15, 2015). Hearsay is

inadmissible unless excepted by the rules of evidence, the rules of the supreme court, or statute.

Ill. R. Evid. 802 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011). But when an out-of-court statement is offered for some purpose

other than to establish the truth of the matter asserted, the statement is not hearsay and is

admissible. Moss, 205 Ill. 2d at 159. “Thus, whether a statement is hearsay depends upon the

purpose for which it is offered.” 29 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence § 652 (May 2025 Update).

¶ 29 Rainey asserts that the search results Solis testified to were offered for the truth of the

matter asserted. We disagree. The significance of Solis’s testimony was that she could find no

record of a person named Tyler Wryles, or a similar name, who fit L.G.’s description. Testifying

about an investigation’s negative result can be challenging. As one commentator explained:

“It is hard to prove a negative. If a witness, expert or not, has conducted a fruitless

investigation, the witness may, of course, simply testify conclusively to the negative

- 10 - No. 1-23-1769

results. But the significance of this testimony depends on the diligence of the investigator

and the thoroughness of the investigation. ***

The responses that the witness got would be hearsay if offered to prove their truth.

But the theory here is that the responses are offered, not for their truth, but only to prove

how thorough the investigation was, so that the trier of fact can determine how much weight

to place upon the testimony of the investigator.” David F. Binder, Hearsay Handbook § 49:1

(4th ed. Aug. 2024 Update).

¶ 30 Here, Solis did not testify about records to prove the truth that other individuals named

Tyler Wryles or Wyles existed. She testified about those records to demonstrate the thoroughness

of her investigation. Had Solis merely testified in conclusive fashion that she could not substantiate

the existence of Tyler Wryles, her testimony would have had little weight—the fact finder would

not know what effort she made to reach her conclusion. But by describing the sources she

examined, including whether those sources are commonly relied upon to locate individuals, and

the results she obtained, Solis demonstrated her investigation was thorough. By doing so, she gave

the factfinder a basis to give her testimony weight. Thus, the search results were offered for the

purpose of proving the thoroughness of Solis’s investigation. Since the records were offered for

that purpose, they were not hearsay.

¶ 31 “The courts of several jurisdictions have held that, where a witness conducts a fruitless

investigation, the witness’s testimony as to the responses he received would be hearsay if offered

for the truth of the responses but not if offered as proof of the thoroughness of the investigation.”

Tu v. State, 631 A.2d 110, 118 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993). In Tu, a defendant charged with killing

his wife, whose body was never found, claimed she had flown to California. Id. at 111-12. He

presented evidence of a ticket issued in his wife’s name for a flight to Los Angeles and an airline

- 11 - No. 1-23-1769

agent testified that she told police she recalled seeing a woman resembling his wife board the

flight. Id. at 112. Over the defendant’s objections, a detective testified that he interviewed other

airline employees and the flight crew, none of whom recognized the wife. Id. at 118. He also

testified that three passengers who sat next to the seat indicated on the ticket stated the seat was

empty. Id. The court found the responses the detective received were not hearsay since they were

not offered for their truth, but to demonstrate the thoroughness of his investigation. Id. The

defendant sought to show that the police neither sufficiently investigated whether his wife had

travelled to California nor took proper account of the airline agent’s statement. Id. The detective’s

testimony was offered to rebut that argument and demonstrate that the airline agent’s recollection

could not be corroborated. Id.

¶ 32 Similarly, in United States v. Albiola, 624 F.3d 431 (7th Cir. 2010), the existence of persons

by the names written on address labels was at issue. The court found a postal inspector was

properly allowed to testify to the responses he received in interviews he conducted to substantiate

the existence of such persons. Id. at 440-41. And in United States v. Blandina, 895 F.2d 293 (7th

Cir. 1989), the defendant claimed he sold a coin collection to dealers at shops in three cities. The

court found an Internal Revenue Service agent could testify to the negative responses he received

from the 61 coin dealers he interviewed in those cities. Id. at 300-01.

¶ 33 Like those cases, the records Solis testified to were not offered for their truth, but to

demonstrate the diligence of her effort to substantiate L.G.’s claim that Tyler Wryles was her

attacker. Defense counsel’s questions on cross examination underscored that the thoroughness of

Solis’s investigation was at issue. For instance, counsel asked whether she tried different spellings

or attempted to locate a person in Tennessee, since L.G. stated Wryles was from Memphis. In

closing argument, defense counsel argued that Solis did not use “the most natural combination of

- 12 - No. 1-23-1769

the facts that [L.G.] told” about Wryles, such as his date of birth or alternate spellings. Since

Wryles’s existence was essential to Rainey’s defense, counsel sought to elicit other reasons to

explain why Solis was unable to find him. Accordingly, it was appropriate for Solis to testify to

the search results so the fact finder could determine how much weight to give her inability to

substantiate the existence of Wryles.

¶ 34 Importantly, our recognition that out-of-court statements offered to demonstrate the

thoroughness of an investigation are not hearsay is limited and should not be taken as an expansion

of the “course of investigation” doctrine. 2 The “course of investigation” doctrine allows admission

of statements to the extent necessary to explain steps taken by police in the investigation of a crime.

People v. Williams, 2023 IL App (1st) 192463, ¶ 95. Since statements are admitted for that purpose,

they are not offered for their truth. Id. This court has observed, however, that “the likelihood of

misuse [is] great.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Boling, 2014 IL App (4th) 120634,

¶ 108. Therefore, “an officer may not testify to information beyond what is necessary to explain

his or her actions.” In re Jovan A., 2014 IL App (1st) 103835, ¶ 35. Furthermore, it is improper for

the prosecution to rely on such statements offered for this limited purpose in arguments to the jury.

Williams, 2023 IL App (1st) 192463, ¶ 98. Doing so alters their purpose, effectively offering the

statements for the truth of the matter asserted, making them hearsay. The same restrictions apply

when out-of-court statements are offered to prove the thoroughness of an investigation.

2 While often called the “course of investigation” exception (see, e.g., In re Jovan A., 2014 IL App (1st) 103835, ¶ 23; People v. Williams, 2023 IL App (1st) 192463, ¶ 95), it is inaccurate to refer to the doctrine as an exception to the hearsay rule. Exceptions to the hearsay rule are set forth in Illinois Rules of Evidence 803 and 804. Those rules recognize circumstances when hearsay—out-of-court statements offered for the truth of the matter asserted—are admissible. But when an out-of-court statement is admissible because it is not offered for the truth of the matter asserted, this is not an exception to the hearsay rule. The statement is simply not hearsay. - 13 - No. 1-23-1769

¶ 35 In sum, we conclude that the records of Solis’s database searches were not hearsay, and the

trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing her testimony.

¶ 36 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 37 Based on the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

¶ 38 Affirmed.

- 14 - No. 1-23-1769

People v. Rainey, 2025 IL App (1st) 231769

Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 22-CR- 2809; the Hon. Steven G. Watkins, Judge, presiding.

Attorneys James E. Chadd, Douglas R. Hoff, and Victoria Rose, of State for Appellate Defender’s Office, of Chicago, for appellant. Appellant:

Attorneys Eileen O’Neill Burke, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (John E. for Nowak, Matthew Connors, and Shannon Berkey, Assistant Appellee: State’s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.

- 15 -