People v. Morris

2026 IL App (1st) 241844-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: January 21, 2026
• Docket: 1-24-1844
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2026 IL App (1st) 241844-U Order filed: January 21, 2026

FIRST DISTRICT THIRD DIVISION

No. 1-24-1844

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________

IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County ) v. ) No. 22 CR 06083 ) ANTHONY MORRIS, ) Honorable ) Charles P. Burns, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding. _________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE ROCHFORD delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Martin and Justice Lampkin concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: We affirm defendant’s conviction and four-year sentence for leaving the scene of a motor vehicle accident involving personal injury. We find no ineffective assistance of trial counsel and no abuse of discretion during sentencing.

¶2 Following a bench trial, the court convicted defendant, Anthony Morris, of leaving the

scene of a motor vehicle accident involving personal injury (625 ILCS 5/11-401(b) (West 2022))

and sentenced him to four years in prison. On appeal, defendant argues that his trial counsel

provided ineffective assistance by failing to argue a necessity defense at trial. Defendant also

contends that during sentencing, the court violated the rule against double enhancement by relying

in aggravation on a factor inherent in the offense and abused its discretion by imposing a “trial

tax” on him for refusing to plead guilty and taking the case to trial. We affirm. No. 1-24-1844

¶3 The grand jury indicted defendant under section 11-401(b) of the Illinois Vehicle Code

(625 ILCS 5/11-401(b) (West 2022)). Section 11-401 states:

“(a) The driver of any vehicle involved in a motor vehicle crash[] resulting in personal

injury to or death of any person shall immediately stop such vehicle at the scene of such

crash, or as close thereto as possible and shall then forthwith return to, and in every event

shall remain at the scene of the crash until the requirements of Section 11-403 [for giving

identifying information and aid] have been fulfilled. Every such stop shall be made without

obstructing traffic more than is necessary.

(b) Any person who has failed to stop or to comply with the requirements of paragraph (a)

shall, as soon as possible but in no case later than one-half hour after such motor vehicle

crash, or, if hospitalized and incapacitated from reporting at any time during such period,

as soon as possible but in no case later than one-half hour after being discharged from the

hospital, report the place of the crash, the date, the approximate time, the driver’s name

and address, the registration number of the vehicle driven, and the names of all other

occupants of such vehicle, at a police station or sheriff’s office near the place where such

crash occurred. ***.” Id.

¶4 Defendant was charged with failing to report the crash to police within one-half hour after

leaving the scene, as required by section 11-401(b).

¶5 Prior to trial, defendant requested a Rule 402 conference. Ill. S. Ct. R. 402(d) (eff. July 1,

2012). At the conference, the State informed the court about what the evidence at trial would show.

Specifically, the State related that on May 8, 2022, the victim’s automobile became disabled on

the eastbound I-290 expressway. As the victim exited the vehicle, he was struck by defendant’s

automobile and badly injured. A nearby witness observed the collision. Defendant exited his

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automobile, walked over to the witness, and asked to use his cell phone. The witness handed

defendant his cell phone, and defendant placed two calls to the same number, neither of which was

answered. Defendant returned the cell phone and then walked over to the victim, after which he

left the scene on foot, leaving his vehicle behind.

¶6 Police officers arrived at the scene, examined the witness’s cell phone, and obtained the

number that defendant had called. An officer called the number and spoke briefly to someone.

After the officer hung up, defendant called him back from the same number and arranged to meet

the officer at the police station. Defendant met with the officer the next day, May 9, and admitted

to being the sole occupant of the vehicle that struck the victim. Defendant stated that he did not

call the police right away because he was scared.

¶7 The State informed the court of defendant’s criminal history, including two convictions for

identity theft and one conviction for delivery of a controlled substance.

¶8 In mitigation, defense counsel told the court that the accident occurred because defendant’s

automobile struck the victim’s vehicle, which was stalled on the expressway with its lights off.

The collision was not the result of any “bad driving” by defendant. After the collision, defendant

exited his automobile and saw the victim and three other persons who had been passengers in the

victim’s automobile. Defendant was afraid that the three persons could be “quite angry” at him

and that they might be armed; defendant’s fear was amplified because he had been shot on a

previous occasion. Defendant exited the scene to avoid a confrontation. Defendant voluntarily

surrendered the next day and made a statement.

¶9 At the conclusion of the Rule 402 conference, the court stated that in exchange for a guilty

plea, it would agree to sentence defendant to 42 months’ imprisonment, which is six months more

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than the minimum sentence. The record on appeal does not contain defendant’s rejection of the

offer, but the case was subsequently set for a bench trial.

¶ 10 At trial, Rafael Zuniga testified that just after midnight on May 8, 2022, he was driving on

the eastbound I-290 expressway near Austin Boulevard with three friends. Zuniga’s automobile

suddenly “shut down” and came to a complete stop in the second lane of the expressway with the

lights off. Zuniga decided to retrieve a reflector from the trunk to make his automobile more visible

to other vehicles. As he began to exit the automobile, Zuniga was struck by another vehicle and

rendered unconscious. He awoke four days later in the hospital, where he underwent stomach

surgery and reconstruction of his left leg. His right leg was amputated.

¶ 11 On cross examination, Zuniga testified that he was not under the influence of alcohol or

cocaine at the time of the accident but that the other occupants of his vehicle were drinking.

¶ 12 Diego Jacobo-Chacon testified that in the “evening hours on May 7 into early morning

hours of May 8, 2022,” he was a backseat passenger in a vehicle bring driven by Zuniga. Two

other persons, Danny and Rolando, were also passengers in the vehicle. As they entered the I-290

expressway, Zuniga’s automobile suddenly “shut off in the middle lane.” Zuniga told his fellow

passengers that he was going to exit the vehicle and try to get it started again. As Zuniga stepped

out of the automobile, Jacobo-Chacon saw another vehicle strike him. Zuniga was “tossed in the

air and he flew back like 10 feet.” The collision rendered Zuniga unconscious and caused a visibly

severe injury to his right leg and foot. Jacobo-Chacon called the police.

¶ 13 The vehicle that struck Zuniga’s automobile came to a stop a few feet in front of them.

Jacobo-Chacon saw a thin, black male with dreadlocks exit the vehicle and walk over to check on

Zuniga. Rolando said something to the man, but Jacobo-Chacon did not hear what was said. When

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the man saw the extent of Zuniga’s injuries, he ran away without ever providing his name or any

other identifying information.

¶ 14 Cruz Hernandez testified that at approximately 12:20 a.m. on May 8, 2022, he was driving

with his wife and four children. As he merged onto the eastbound I-290 expressway at Austin

Avenue, a black sedan sped past him, “lost control,” and crashed into another automobile that was

in the middle lane. The black sedan came to a stop on the left shoulder. Hernandez drove over to

the sedan, where he saw defendant standing near the vehicle. Hernandez walked to defendant and

noticed that he smelled like “heavy alcohol” and was slurring his words. Defendant asked

Hernandez to use his cell phone to call his girlfriend. Hernandez handed him the phone and

defendant placed two calls to the same number, which were not answered. Defendant returned the

phone to Hernandez, who called 911.

¶ 15 Hernandez went over to the other vehicle and saw Zuniga on the ground with an injury to

his leg. Defendant followed Hernandez and also viewed Zuniga. Defendant then returned to his

sedan and Hernandez did not see him again. Defendant never gave Hernandez his name or any

other identifying information. The following day, May 9, 2022, Hernandez went to the police

station and identified defendant in a photographic lineup.

¶ 16 On cross examination, Hernandez testified that at the time of the collision, he did not see

Zuniga exiting his vehicle, nor did he see defendant’s automobile strike Zuniga; he only saw the

impact between the vehicles themselves. When Hernandez drove over to defendant’s sedan, he

saw that the air bag had deployed on the driver’s side and that defendant’s lip was bleeding.

Defendant asked Hernandez to take him to the hospital, but defendant later left the scene before

Hernandez could do so.

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¶ 17 Matthew Dumais, a special agent with the Illinois State Police, testified that he arrived at

the accident scene on May 8, 2022, after midnight and observed a black sedan resting against the

left median wall and another vehicle in the middle of the expressway in the eastbound lanes. None

of the persons involved in the crash were present. Dumais looked up the sedan’s license plate

number in a law enforcement database and learned that the vehicle belonged to Tijuana Wilson.

Dumais texted Wilson the “next day” at an unidentified time and told her that he needed to speak

with her. Approximately 16 minutes after the text was sent, defendant called Dumais and identified

himself as the driver of the sedan. Defendant agreed to meet with Dumais on May 9.

¶ 18 Dumais testified he spoke with defendant in the afternoon on May 9 at the police station.

Dumais gave defendant his Miranda warnings and defendant agreed to talk. Defendant stated that

in the early morning hours on May 8, he was driving his girlfriend’s vehicle on the eastbound I-

290 expressway and collided with a vehicle that had its lights off. After the collision, defendant’s

automobile came to a stop on the left shoulder and he exited his vehicle and spoke with a witness.

Defendant asked the witness if he could use his cell phone to call his girlfriend. Defendant then

left the scene. At about 10 or 11 a.m. on May 8, defendant called 311 to report the accident and

was told to go to the police station. Defendant stated that he went to the police station and spoke

with a trooper; however, Dumais testified that there “is no record” of defendant speaking or

meeting with any officers prior to his meeting with Dumais.

¶ 19 On cross examination, Dumais testified that defendant stated he left the accident scene

because the people in Zuniga’s vehicle were cussing at him and he was frightened of them. On

redirect examination, Dumais testified that defendant stated that after leaving the scene he went

home, where there were cell phones he could have used to immediately call the police. Defendant

waited about 10 or 11 hours, until approximately 11 a.m., before calling the police.

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¶ 20 Defendant gave a second, videotaped statement to Dumais and another officer at

approximately 1:40 p.m. on May 9. The videotaped statement was entered into evidence and

played for the trial court. The videotape is contained in the record on appeal and shows defendant

giving the same account of the accident as testified to by Dumais.

¶ 21 Following all the evidence, the trial court convicted defendant of leaving the scene of a

motor vehicle accident involving a personal injury and sentenced him to four years’ imprisonment.

Defendant appeals.

¶ 22 First, defendant argues that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. To prevail on

a claim of ineffective assistance, defendant must show that counsel’s representation fell below an

objective standard of reasonableness, which prejudiced defendant such that there is a reasonable

probability that but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the trial would have been

different. People v. Haynes, 2024 IL 129795, ¶ 23. Defendant must overcome the strong

presumption that the challenged action was the product of sound trial strategy. People v. Gunn,

2020 IL App (1st) 170542, ¶ 94. Generally, matters of trial strategy are immune from claims of

ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. Our review is de novo. Id. ¶ 91.

¶ 23 Defendant claims that his trial counsel acted ineffectively by failing to raise the defense of

necessity at trial. Necessity is an affirmative defense that is forfeited unless raised at trial. People

v. Shepherd, 2020 IL App (1st) 172706, ¶ 17. To raise the affirmative defense of necessity,

defendant must only present slight evidence thereon. Id. ¶ 23. Section 7-13 of the Criminal Code

of 2012 provides that a defendant claiming necessity must show that (1) he was without blame in

occasioning or developing the situation and (2) he reasonably believed that his conduct was

necessary to avoid a public or private injury greater than the injury that reasonably might result

from his own conduct. 720 ILCS 5/7-13 (West 2022). Defendant’s chosen conduct must be the

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“sole option available to avoid” the public or private injury. People v. Azizarab, 317 Ill. App. 3d

995, 999 (2000). This is because the defense of necessity is viewed as “involving the choice

between two admitted evils where other optional courses of action are unavailable” and the chosen

conduct promotes a value higher than the value of complying with the law. People v. Janik, 127

Ill. 2d 390, 399 (1989). In addition, our supreme court has held that defendant must show that he

faced a “specific and immediate threat” for the necessity defense to apply. People v. Kite, 153 Ill.

2d 40, 46 (1992).

¶ 24 Defendant argues that there was at least slight evidence supporting the evidence of

necessity, such that his counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the defense at trial. First,

defendant notes that he is required to show that he was without blame in occasioning the situation

precipitating the necessity defense, which in this case means that he must show that he did not

cause the motor vehicle accident. Defendant argues there was some evidence that he was blameless

in occasioning the accident, where Zuniga’s automobile was stopped with its lights off in the

middle of the expressway at night such that the accident was unavoidable.

¶ 25 Second, defendant notes that he must show that he faced an immediate and specific threat

and reasonably believed that his leaving the scene of the accident was necessary to avoid an injury.

Defendant argues there was some evidence that he fled the scene because he reasonably believed

he faced an immediate and specific threat of violence from Zuniga’s three companions, who were

angry at him for striking and injuring Zuniga with his automobile. In support, defendant points out

that the accident occurred in the middle of the night, he was alone, and he was fearful because he

was facing three persons who were cussing at him and speaking in Spanish, a language he did not

understand. Defendant did not know if they were armed or intended to hurt him in retaliation for

the accident and therefore he left to avoid any bodily injury to himself. Defendant contends he did

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not harm Zuniga by leaving the scene, as Jacobo-Chacon and Hernandez remained with Zuniga

and had already called 911 for help. There was nothing more defendant could do for Zuniga under

the circumstances. Defendant argues that on this evidence, he has made a showing of ineffective

assistance as there was no objective reason for counsel’s failure to argue necessity as a defense

and there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different had

the defense been formally raised.

¶ 26 The State counters that defense counsel was not ineffective because the record shows that

he raised the elements of the necessity defense at trial. Specifically, counsel elicited testimony

from Dumais on cross examination that defendant told him he ran away because Zuniga’s

companions were cussing at him, causing him to become frightened. During opening statement

and closing arguments, counsel stated that Dumais’ testimony showed that defendant left the scene

due to his fear that Zuniga’s companions were about to hurt him.

¶ 27 In his reply brief, defendant concedes that “counsel informally raised some elements of the

necessity defense.” However, he contends that “[t]he fact that counsel did indeed argue the

substance of the necessity defense but failed to formally put it before the judge at trial was

ineffective, and it prejudiced [defendant] by denying him the chance of the judge viewing his case

through the lens of the defense.”

¶ 28 We find no ineffective assistance of counsel. As discussed, defendant was charged and

convicted under section 11-401(b) of the Illinois Vehicle Code for failing to report to police the

place of the crash, the date, the approximate time, the driver’s name and address, the registration

number of his vehicle, and the names of any other occupants of his vehicle, within 30 minutes after

the crash. Even assuming that defendant had a reasonable fear of imminent harm from Zuniga’s

companions necessitating that he leave the scene immediately to avoid personal injury to himself,

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he has shown no reason for why he failed to report the accident to the police within 30 minutes

thereof as required by section 11-401(b). Once defendant left the scene, any threat from Zuniga’s

companions was over, as there is no evidence that any of them followed after him. Therefore, he

was no longer under any risk of public or private injury which would legally excuse him from

complying with section 11-401(b)’s 30-minute notification requirement.

¶ 29 Instead of reporting the accident to the police within 30 minutes, though, defendant states

he waited approximately 10 or 11 hours before speaking with an officer; Dumais testified that

defendant in fact waited approximately 36 hours before speaking with police and making the

report. Either way, defendant did not make the report within 30 minutes of the accident as required

by section 11-401(b) and he presented no evidence of any specific and immediate threat of injury

during those 30 minutes after he left the scene which would legally excuse him, under the defense

of necessity, from timely making that report. Therefore, necessity was not an available defense to

the charge against him and his defense counsel did not act unreasonably or prejudice him by failing

to formally raise it at trial. Defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance fails. See People v. Webb,

2023 IL 128957, ¶ 22 (an attorney is not ineffective for failing to formally make an argument that

has no basis in law).

¶ 30 Next, defendant contends that the trial court erred during sentencing by considering

Zuniga’s injury as a factor in aggravation, as his injury was already a factor in the offense of

leaving the scene of an injury accident (625 ILCS 5/11-401(b) (West 2022)). Defendant argues

that the single factor of Zuniga’s injury cannot be used both as an element of the underlying offense

and as a basis for imposing a harsher sentence than otherwise would have been imposed. Such dual

use of a single factor is referred to as double enhancement and is not permissible. See People v.

Gonzalez, 151 Ill. 2d 79, 83-84 (1992). The determination of whether the court made a double

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enhancement error is a question of law reviewed de novo. People v. Chaney, 379 Ill. App. 3d 524,

527 (2008).

¶ 31 To preserve a sentencing issue for appellate review, defendant must make a

contemporaneous objection and file a written post-sentencing motion raising the issue. People v.

Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d 539, 544 (2010); 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-50(d) (West 2022). In the present case,

defendant forfeited review by failing to specifically raise the double enhancement issue in his post-

sentencing motion. People v. Fouts, 319 Ill. App. 3d 550, 553 (2001).

¶ 32 Even if the sentencing issue had not been forfeited, we still would affirm. Defendant’s

argument centers on multiple instances during sentencing where the court referred to Zuniga’s

injury, thereby allegedly violating the rule against double enhancement. First, defendant cites the

following statement by the trial court:

“He is not charged with DUI or agg DUI. He’s not charged with reckless—any type of—

it wouldn’t be reckless homicide, but charged with agg DUI. He is just charged with not

fulfilling the affirmative reporting obligations of someone involved in a crash. Particularly,

someone involved in a crash where there is serious bodily injury, great bodily harm.”

¶ 33 In that statement, the court was merely citing the charge against defendant and was not

expressly considering Zuniga’s injury as an enhancing factor. We find no error.

¶ 34 Defendant next cites a second statement by the trial court containing multiple references to

Zuniga’s injury:

“I don’t believe something like this is going to happen again but there were serious injuries

here to the victim. Albeit the injuries to the victim are really more concerning to me with

regard to the fact that you should have stayed as compared to the fact that it’s aggravating

because it’s leaving the scene of a personal injury and accident no matter how you look at

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it failure to report the accident [sic]. But that man suffered some serious injuries. I could

give you the higher end of sentencing possibilities. I don’t think that’s going to do you any

good. I don’t think that’s going to do society any good. I do not believe—I think probation

would deprecate the seriousness of this offense. But I will sentence you to four years [in

the] Illinois Department of Corrections.”

¶ 35 Again, we find no error. Careful review of the trial court’s comments shows that the court

again referenced the crime charged when it stated that defendant was convicted of “leaving the

scene of a personal injury and accident.” The court twice noted Zuniga’s “serious injuries” but

stated that those injuries necessitated defendant’s staying at the scene and reporting the accident

under section 11-401(b), which was “more concerning” to the court “as compared to the fact that

[the injuries were] aggravating.” We read the court’s comments to mean that Zuniga’s serious

injuries triggered defendant’s reporting requirement under section 11-401(b) but were not in and

of themselves an aggravating factor justifying a more severe sentence.

¶ 36 Next, defendant contends that his four-year sentence reflects a “trial tax” imposed by the

court as punishment for refusing its pretrial offer. Our review is for an abuse of discretion. People

v. Brown, 2025 IL App (1st) 230772, ¶ 150.

¶ 37 Initially, we note that defendant again forfeited review by failing to raise this specific issue

in his post-sentencing motion. Fouts, 319 Ill. App. 3d at 553. Even choosing to address the issue

on the merits, we find no reversible error.

¶ 38 The United States and Illinois Constitutions grant an accused the right to be tried. U.S.

Const., amend. VI; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 8. The trial court may not penalize defendant for

declining a pretrial offer during plea negotiations and exercising his constitutional right to trial.

People v. Jones-Beard, 2019 IL App (1st) 162005, ¶ 26. However, “ ‘the mere fact that the

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defendant was given a greater sentence than that offered during plea bargaining does not, in and

of itself, support an inference that the greater sentence was imposed as a punishment for demanding

trial.’ ” Id. (quoting People v. Carroll, 260 Ill. App. 3d 319, 348-49 (1992)). The evidence must

clearly establish that the harsher sentence resulted from the trial demand. Jones-Beard, 2019 IL

App (1st) 162005, ¶ 26. Such evidence can include the trial court’s explicit remarks concerning

the harsher sentence “or where the actual sentence is outrageously higher than the one offered

during plea negotiations.” Id.

¶ 39 In Jones-Beard, the defendant was charged with aggravated vehicular hijacking and armed

robbery. Id. ¶ 1. Prior to trial, he participated in a pretrial Rule 402 conference, during which the

trial court offered to sentence him to seven years’ imprisonment in exchange for a guilty plea. Id.

¶ 4. The defendant rejected the offer and proceeded to a bench trial, where he was convicted and

sentenced to two concurrent terms of 15 years’ imprisonment. Id. ¶ 1, ¶ 4. On appeal, the defendant

argued that the sentence constituted an unconstitutional trial tax imposed on him for rejecting the

pretrial offer. Id. ¶ 25. We affirmed in pertinent part, noting that the defendant had offered no

evidence, other than the sentence itself, showing it was the product of a trial tax. Id. ¶ 27. We held

that his sentence “which amounts to just over a twofold increase from the pretrial offer, is not so

outrageously disproportionate that we are left only to conclude that it was the product of a trial

tax.” Id. We concluded that the trial court’s pretrial offer was best viewed as an acceptable

dispositional concession afforded to the defendant in exchange for his guilty plea. Id. ¶ 28. After

he rejected the plea and was convicted at trial, the resultant 15-year sentence did not constitute an

abuse of discretion. Id.

¶ 40 Similarly, in the instant case, defendant has offered no evidence, other than the sentence

itself, showing it was the product of a trial tax. The four-year sentence, which is only six months

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greater than the 3 ½ year sentence offered during the pretrial Rule 402 conference, is not so

outrageously disproportionate that we are left to conclude that it was imposed as punishment for

demanding trial.

¶ 41 Defendant argues that People v. Garcia, 2023 IL App (1st) 172005, and People v. Dennis,

28 Ill. App. 3d 74 (1975), compel a different result. We disagree. In Garcia, 2023 IL App (1st)

172005, we held that defendant’s sentence, after trial, of 100 years’ imprisonment for three counts

of aggravated criminal sexual assault and one count of aggravated kidnapping constituted a trial

tax where it was 64 years more than the pretrial offer, an increase of 177%. Id. ¶ 77. In Dennis, 28

Ill. App. 3d 74, we held that defendant’s sentence, after trial, of 40 to 80 years’ imprisonment for

armed robbery constituted a trial tax where it was about 20 times greater than the pretrial offer of

no more than 2 to 6 years’ imprisonment. Id. at 78. We further stated:

“[O]ur holding that petitioner suffered a constitutional deprivation which must be

remedied is limited to the facts of the instant case, namely, a sentence imposed following

a jury trial approximately 20 times greater than that offered during plea negotiations. We

do not intend it to erode the well established principle that a mere disparity between the

sentence offered during plea bargaining and that ultimately imposed, of itself, does not

warrant the use of our power to reduce a term of imprisonment imposed by the trial court.”

Id.

¶ 42 The sentence imposed by the trial court in the instant case does not even remotely approach

the outrageously disproportionate sentences at issue in Garcia and Dennis, as it was only six

months more than the Rule 402 offer. As in Jones-Beard, the pretrial offer of 42 months’

imprisonment is best viewed as an acceptable dispositional concession to induce a guilty plea; the

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resultant 48-month sentence after the plea was rejected and the case went to trial is not so

outrageous as to constitute a trial tax or an abuse of discretion.

¶ 43 For all the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court.

¶ 44 Affirmed.

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