People v. Morris

Opinion

2026 IL App (1st) 242425-U

No. 1-24-2425

Order filed July 14, 2026 SECOND DIVISION

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT

) THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) ) Appeal from the Circuit Court Plaintiff-Appellee, ) of Cook County ) v. ) No. 2024 CR 0115001 ) DESHOWN MORRIS, ) Honorable ) Stanley J. Sacks, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE D.B. WALKER delivered the judgment of the court. Justices McBride & Ellis concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The evidence presented was sufficient to sustain defendant’s convictions; the trial court did not step out of its neutral role and prejudice defendant; and the trial court did not prevent defense counsel from cross-examining witnesses about their past drug use.

¶2 Deshown Morris (Defendant) was arrested and charged with four counts of aggravated

battery after he beat two individuals with a hammer. After a bench trial, defendant was

convicted of two counts of aggravated battery with a deadly weapon and sentenced to 26

months’ imprisonment. He now appeals, arguing that 1) there was insufficient evidence to No. 1-24-2425

support his conviction; 2) the trial court was biased against defendant and prejudged the case;

and 3) the trial court erroneously prevented defense counsel from questioning witnesses

about past drug use and addiction. We disagree, and we affirm defendant’s convictions.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 Bodycam footage shows that around 1:30 a.m. on January 4, 2024, police responded to a

call at an apartment building where a physical altercation had reportedly taken place. Police

were flagged down by Felicia Banks (Banks) and Nathaniel Reed (Reed), the latter of whom

had blood running down from a wound on the top of his head. Banks and Reed explained to

the officers that they had been visiting a friend, “Mr. Lewis” (Lewis), who rented a room in a

shared apartment in the building. The two asserted that Deshown Morris (Defendant) hit

them with a hammer while attempting to force them to leave the apartment. Although he was

not questioned by the officers whose points of view are represented in the bodycam footage

in the record, Lewis can be heard confirming to another officer that Banks and Reed had

come to visit him.

¶5 Officers were allowed into the apartment by Lewis. There, they spoke to and detained

defendant, who asserted that he had also called the police and that Banks and Reed had

injured him while he was attempting to eject them from the premises after they had

awakened him making too much noise.

¶6 Reed spoke extensively to the officers at the scene. He stated that defendant was a new

roommate of Lewis whom he had not met on previous visits over the past several months.

Defendant had informed Banks and Reed that they were not allowed to visit the bathroom

and, at another point in time, that they needed to leave, despite the fact that they were there

visiting Lewis. Lewis told defendant the two were there visiting him. Defendant put on his

2 No. 1-24-2425

shoes, returned to the living room, assumed a fighting stance, and swung at Reed. A melee

ensued in which defendant hit both Reed and Banks with a hammer, which he grabbed from

Banks, while they attempted to block the blows and Reed tried to fight back using a piece of

furniture he referred to as both a chair and a stool at different points.

¶7 Later, in the ambulance, Reed stated he fell after the first blow and was trying to hold

defendant by the knee and drag him to the ground. He heard Banks say that defendant had hit

her with the hammer. Reed pulled defendant to the ground, where defendant got on top of

Reed and hit him in the head with the hammer. Defendant was “swinging crazy” and Reed

was uncertain how many times he was hit with the hammer but “the other spots didn’t appear

to do no harm” because his “adrenaline was up or whatever.”

¶8 While being treated in an ambulance on-scene, Banks stated that defendant attempted to

hit her with a hammer, but she partially blocked the blow by raising her arm, so the injury to

her head was minor. She also reported being hit in the shoulder but did not mention a wound

there. Banks and Reed both received treatment at the scene, and body camera footage ends

before the ambulances departed the scene. Defendant initially refused medical treatment but

was taken to the hospital anyway for medical clearance before booking.

¶9 Defendant was charged with four counts of aggravated battery. Counts I and II alleged he

battered and caused bodily harm to Banks and Reed, respectively, with a deadly weapon,

specifically a hammer. 720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(f)(1) (West 2022). Count III alleged defendant

battered Banks and caused great bodily harm by striking her about her body. 720 ILCS 5/12-

3.05(a)(1). Count IV alleged defendant battered and knowingly caused permanent

disfigurement to Banks when he struck her about the body. In the course of trial, Counts III

and IV were dismissed.

3 No. 1-24-2425

¶ 10 A. Reed’s Testimony

¶ 11 Reed testified that he went with Banks to Lewis’ apartment on January 3, 2024 to “hang

out.” The two arrived around 6:30 or 7:00 p.m. Reed stated that he drank about half a beer

and joined Banks and Lewis in getting high by smoking cigarettes laced with cocaine.

Defendant was present in the apartment but only socialized with the group for a portion of

their visit. He asked Reed to bring him back some chicken when Reed was making a trip to a

store. Reed did so.

¶ 12 Sometime after midnight, defendant began to repeatedly ask Reed and Banks when they

would be leaving. Reed eventually stopped answering defendant’s questions because he kept

asking the same thing. This irritated defendant, who put on his shoes and a hoodie before

approaching Reed “in an aggressive manner.” Reed said his high from earlier in the evening

had “passed over” because it was around 1:00 a.m. when defendant began to get aggressive.

¶ 13 Defendant assumed a “fight position,” and Reed did so as well. Defendant “threw a

punch or two” and then picked up a wood-and-metal stool, with which he hit Reed, who

blocked it with his arms, grabbed it, and began “rassling for it.” Reed fell to the ground in the

process while defendant remained standing. Defendant kept punching him, including in the

back of his head, while Reed grabbed defendant’s knees and tried unsuccessfully to drag him

down to the ground. Reed heard Banks asking Lewis to assist him in the fight, then saying

that defendant hit her with a hammer. Reed got up off the ground and retrieved the stool with

which he had earlier been hit and hit defendant with it.

¶ 14 Defendant pushed Reed, who fell between a couch and a chair. Defendant followed with

the hammer, “swinging it pretty wildly.” He struck Reed in the head, back, and legs while

Reed was attempting to kick defendant away. Defendant then approached Banks and began

4 No. 1-24-2425

striking her on the head with the hammer. Reed grabbed the stool and swung it again but

was pushed back and fell on the ground again. Banks again asked Lewis to help. Defendant

again began to strike Reed with the hammer while he was on the floor. It was then that

defendant hit Reed on top of the head and he began to bleed. Defendant went to the front

door, “stood there with his foot on the door with the hammer in his hand” and said, “now

ya’ll going to leave.” Reed was reluctant to pass by defendant and his hammer, and

ultimately exited through the apartment’s back door. Banks and defendant both called 911.

¶ 15 Paramedics and the police arrived and Reed was examined medically. He had bleeding

from the top of his head and had a swollen right forearm with a small hole in it. He was

transported to the hospital by ambulance. He had a CAT scan, his head wound was cleaned,

and his arm was bandaged. He was also given antibiotics for his head wound.

¶ 16 On cross-examination, Reed testified that he had used heroin earlier in the day, before

going to Lewis’ apartment. When asked whether he had “struggled with substance abuse for

some time,” the State objected and the court sustained the objection. When asked if the night

of the offense was his first time using illegal substances, the State again objected and the

court again sustained the objection. Very shortly thereafter, Reed confirmed that his memory

of the night was crystal clear. When asked if there were any details he could have forgotten,

the State objected and the court sustained the objection, asking: “How would he know if he

forgot something?”

¶ 17 Reed denied that he had been in Lewis’ bedroom at any point that night and stated that he

did not recall if he had told police that he had been in Lewis’ bedroom. Reed confirmed

many details of the fight and stated that one of his injuries, a knot on his arm, was caused

when defendant hit him with the stool.

5 No. 1-24-2425

¶ 18 During cross-examination, the following colloquy took place:

“DEFENSE COUNSEL (DC): You had learned just that day that [defendant] was

staying there, was renting a room?

REED: No.

DC: You learned before that day that he was staying there?

COURT: That’s assuming he learned it *** at some point or another. Sustained. You

keep saying, ‘You learned this. [Y]ou learned that.’ Lay a foundation for what you’re

talking about.

DC: How about instead you explain to me how you knew that Mr. Lewis rented a

room?

STATE: Objection.

COURT: Did Lewis rent a room?

DC: That was gone into on direct.

COURT: Just a moment, please. [Defense Counsel], don’t shake your head like that.

You don’t have to agree with me, but don’t shake your head in derision. Okay? I’m

asking the witness a question. Did Lewis live there?

REED: Yes.

COURT: How long did he live there, according to you?

REED: I don’t know but I been going to visit him for at least eight months.

COURT: All right. Next question. Next question. Go on.

DC: During the time that you had been visiting Mr. Lewis there, he was renting – you

believe he was renting a room?

6 No. 1-24-2425

DC: You never saw a lease for that room?

COURT: A lease? Sustained. Would you expect somebody to go to someone’s house

and say I want to see a lease that you live here? Sustained. Ask another question,

please.”

¶ 19 B. Banks’ Testimony

¶ 20 Banks testified that she went with her boyfriend, Reed, to Lewis’ home on January 3,

2024, and arrived around 8:00 or 8:30 p.m. Banks largely testified to the same facts as Reed

regarding what the two were doing there and the events of the night. She stated that they did

not start smoking cocaine-laced cigarettes when they first arrived but did so later.

¶ 21 Banks testified that defendant approached Reed after asking again when they would be

leaving. Reed stood up, defendant struck him and Reed fought back. Defendant grabbed a

nearby stool and swung it at Reed. Reed blocked it with his arm. She beseeched Lewis to put

a stop to the fight, then tried to assist Reed, who had fallen on the floor. Banks stated that she

“saw [defendant] looking” and tried to figure out what he was looking at. She believed it to

be a hammer near the door, so she retrieved the hammer and tried to give it to Reed to help

him defend himself. Instead, defendant took the hammer from her, pushed her away, and

began to beat Reed with the hammer.

¶ 22 Banks attempted to pull defendant off Reed. Defendant turned and struck Banks in the

back of the head with the hammer. Banks testified that “the first strike didn’t bust my head.”

She stated defendant continued to hit her “about two or three times, then the skin broke

which busted my head.” She tried to grab defendant, but defendant pushed her away and

7 No. 1-24-2425

went back to hitting Reed who was “in a daze” and could not get up off the floor. Defendant

alternated attacking Reed and Banks.

¶ 23 Banks said during the attack: “Nathaniel, my head bust. He bust my head.” Reed then

picked up the stool and held it aloft, leading to a pause in the fight where neither man was

swinging at the other. Reed eventually threw the stool as he and Banks were “trying to just

go.” Defendant went to the front door, hammer in hand, and opened the door. Both defendant

and Banks began calling the police. Reed and Banks exited through the back door to avoid

passing by defendant.

¶ 24 Banks confirmed that she had no injuries before the fight, but upon being taken to the

hospital, had minor bruises to the arm and chest, as well as a “busted head” that was treated

with two staples.

¶ 25 On cross-examination, Banks confirmed that she struck defendant after he struck her. She

denied ever stating to EMTs that she did not want stitches. When shown the bodycam

footage, she confirmed that she did state “I don’t need no stitches.” That statement was made

prior to receiving the two staples.

¶ 26 C. Subsequent Proceedings

¶ 27 After Reed’s and Banks’ testimony, the State rested. Defendant moved for a directed

finding, arguing that the State had not proved the elements of the counts charged. The court

dismissed Count IV, which required a showing of permanent disfigurement, but denied the

motion as to the other three counts.

¶ 28 Defendant called only one witness: Detective Sarah Rodenberg of the Chicago Police

Department (Rodenberg). Rodenberg testified that her understanding was that an evidence

8 No. 1-24-2425

technician had retrieved a hammer from the kitchen sink of the apartment before she arrived.

She stated that defendant was taken to the hospital as well and was treated for minor injuries.

¶ 29 The court interrupted defense counsel a number of times both during the examination of

witnesses and during defendant’s closing argument, and displayed impatience and frustration

with defense counsel’s lines of questioning and arguments. Rather than recount numerous

additional instances here in addition to the colloquy above, we will provide specific language

in our analysis where the language is pertinent.

¶ 30 After the bench trial, the court found defendant guilty of Counts I and II, but not guilty of

Count III, and sentenced him to 26 months’ imprisonment.

¶ 31 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 32 Defendant advances three arguments on appeal: that (1) the State failed to present

sufficient evidence to support defendant’s convictions, (2) the trial court abandoned its role

as a neutral arbiter and showed bias against defendant, and (3) the trial court abused its

discretion when it prevented defense counsel from inquiring about Reed’s and Banks’ history

with drug use.

¶ 33 A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶ 34 Defendant asserts that because Reed and Banks are, as individuals, not capable of giving

testimony that any rational trier of fact could credit, and because the vast majority of the

evidence presented at trial consisted of their testimony, the State did not present sufficient

evidence to support defendant’s convictions. Defendant also indicates specific

inconsistencies, both between their respective accounts and between their accounts and prior

inconsistent statements.

9 No. 1-24-2425

¶ 35 “It is well settled that, when reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, a

reviewing court must determine whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements

of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Cline,

2022 IL 126383, ¶ 25. “All reasonable inferences from the evidence must be drawn in favor

of the prosecution.” Id. “This court will not reverse the trial court’s judgment unless the

evidence is so unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory as to create reasonable doubt of

defendant’s guilt.” Id. As the trial court is the factfinder in bench trials, its “findings

concerning credibility are entitled to great weight.” People v. Rainey, 2025 IL App (1st)

231769, ¶ 21 (citing People v. Wheeler, 226 Ill. 2d 92, 115 (2007)). “When findings of fact

depend on the credibility of the witnesses, we will defer to the trial court’s findings unless

they are against the manifest weight of the evidence.” Id. “The testimony of a single witness,

if it is positive and the witness credible, is sufficient to convict.” People v. Smith, 185 Ill. 2d

532, 541 (1999).

¶ 36 Defendant’s convictions are for aggravated battery under section 12-3.05(f)(1), which

states: “[a] person commits aggravated battery when, in committing a battery, he or she ***

[u]ses a deadly weapon other than by discharge of a firearm***.” 720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(f)(1)

(West 2022). “A person commits battery if he or she knowingly without legal justification by

any means (1) causes bodily harm to an individual or (2) makes physical contact of an

insulting or provoking nature with an individual.” 720 ILCS 5/12-3 (West 2022). As such,

the question before us is whether the evidence presented, when interpreted in the light most

favorable to the prosecution, and with all reasonable inferences drawn in favor of the

10 No. 1-24-2425

prosecution, could show that defendant knowingly used a deadly weapon to harm someone or

make physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature with someone.

¶ 37 1. Inconsistencies

¶ 38 Defendant’s sufficiency of the evidence argument is entirely focused on the credibility of

Reed and Banks as witnesses, and contains arguments based on generalities about the two as

individuals and more specific points regarding their testimony. We begin with the latter:

defendant’s assertions that both of the key witnesses made prior inconsistent statements that

contradict their testimony, and that their stories contradict one another.

¶ 39 Banks testified at trial that she was hit multiple times in the head and only the last blow

“busted” her head. Bodycam footage shows her informing a paramedic that she had been hit

once on the head with the hammer. Given that Banks testified that only the third blow broke

the skin, it would be reasonable to infer that she was intending to tell the paramedic about her

wounds instead of delivering a blow-by-blow account of the fight. Defendant raises no other

prior inconsistent statements from Banks, and defendant does not claim that Banks’

testimony was internally inconsistent in any way.

¶ 40 Defendant points out that Reed’s assertions at the scene of the offense differ in some

ways from his testimony at trial. He said at the scene that defendant rented a room in the

apartment, then testified that he did not know whether defendant rented a room; he testified

that the altercation took place in the living room, yet Detective Rodenberg testified that Reed

told him that part of the altercation took place in Lewis’ bedroom; and Reed testified that his

recollection of the night of the offense was “crystal clear,” yet he was unable to recall various

details when asked. Furthermore, defendant asserts that Reed’s and Banks’ stories do not

11 No. 1-24-2425

corroborate one another, because, for instance, they testified to different times of arrival at

Lewis’ apartment.

¶ 41 Defendant also argues that Reed’s account of the fight was inconsistent. The

inconsistencies alleged are numerous. Some are not inconsistencies at all, such as the fact

that Reed testified that defendant “threw a punch or two” and he “did the same,” after which

defendant picked up the stool and attacked Reed with it, yet later Reed describes being

repeatedly struck by defendant. These two statements are not inconsistent in any way, and

defendant’s argument as to how they are is unclear. Other inconsistencies are speculative,

such as defendant’s argument that Reed’s description of defendant “swinging the hammer

wildly” does not match the injuries Reed sustained. No expert testimony was provided at trial

suggesting that the injuries did not match the story provided, nor did any police officer or

paramedic state on bodycam or testify at trial to that effect.

¶ 42 Our supreme court has stated unequivocally that “[a] conviction will not be reversed

simply because the evidence is contradictory or because defendant claims that a witness was

not credible.” People v. Gray, 2017 IL 120958, ¶ 36. To succeed at a sufficiency of the

evidence claim based on witness credibility, an area where we give great deference to the

trial court’s assessment, the testimony provided must be so flawed that “no reasonable

person could accept it beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Emphasis added.) Id.

¶ 43 In Cunningham, our supreme court was presented with a drug arrest in which the

arresting officer’s narrative included questionable and bizarre statements that (1) he

encountered a man in jeans and a t-shirt on the street in Chicago in mid-December, (2) the

oddly-dressed individual flagged him down to tell him about someone selling drugs, despite

the fact that he was patrolling in plain clothes, and (3) when defendant arrived in a station

12 No. 1-24-2425

wagon to sell drugs to the undercover officer, that officer openly accessed his radio to inform

other officers that the seller had arrived, despite his record as an undercover officer with ten

years of experience. People v. Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d 274, 280-81 (2004). Our supreme

court found these pieces of testimony to be questionable, but it concluded that “[w]here the

record is not such that the only inference reasonably drawn from flaws in the testimony is

disbelief of the whole, a reviewing court should bear in mind that the factfinder had the

benefit of watching the witness’ demeanor.” Id. at 284. Here, just as in Cunningham, we are

left with reasonable inferences that the trial court could have made in crediting Reed’s and

Banks’ testimony, despite contradictions, to support defendant’s convictions.

¶ 44 2. Felon Status and Drug Use

¶ 45 We began this section with a statement that might sound hyperbolic: that defendant

argues Banks and Reed cannot provide credible testimony. Defendant posits that Banks and

Reed have felony convictions in their past and were both using illegal drugs on the night of

the offense. Both of these are factors that may be considered in assessing witness credibility.

However, as we will explain below, defendant treats the idea that these statuses equate to

lack of credibility as a self-evident truism ignored by the court rather than a matter that was

weighed as the factfinder saw fit.

¶ 46 Defendant’s argument regarding the witnesses’ status as felons relies upon solid law,

Rule 609 of the Illinois Rules of Evidence, which states that past felony convictions can be

used to attack the credibility of a witness. Ill. R. Evid. 609 (eff. January 1, 2011). Banks was

convicted of felony retail theft, which, as defendant notes, is a crime of dishonesty that has

higher probative value when introduced to impeach a witness. People v. Diehl, 335 Ill. App.

13 No. 1-24-2425

3d 693, 704 (2002). Reed was previously convicted of armed robbery, and his sentence was

discharged in 2015.

¶ 47 Defendant asserts in his brief that Banks’ conviction was “something the court never

considered during the course of the trial.” Defendant cites nothing in the record to back up

this assertion and pursues no further this serious allegation that the court disregarded

evidence. Although the trial court did not explicitly mention Banks’ conviction, it has long

been the case that “even though it may be desirable for the trial court to explain its decision,

the court’s election not to comment or its failure to specifically mention certain portions of

the testimony does not permit a defendant on appeal to claim that those portions not

mentioned played no role in the court’s determination.” People v. Curtis, 296 Ill. App. 3d

991, 1000 (1998).

¶ 48 More troubling is defendant’s analysis on the matter of the witnesses’ drug use.

Defendant begins his discussion of Banks’ credibility by stating that “Banks’ testimony in

light of her admissions to drug and alcohol use and her conviction for a crime of dishonesty

was not credible.” Defendant then cites to cases from 1972 and 1985 for the proposition that

a witness’ status as a narcotics addict is relevant to credibility and that “the testimony of a

narcotics addict is subject to suspicion due to the fact that habitual users of narcotics become

notorious liars.” People v. Strother, 53 Ill. 2d 95, 99 (1972); see also People v. Collins, 106

Ill. 2d 237, 271 (1985). No evidence was presented at trial that Banks or Reed were narcotics

addicts. In fact, one of defendant’s arguments on appeal is that the court erred by not

allowing defense counsel to question Banks and Reed on their history with drugs.

¶ 49 Defendant faults the trial court for stating, while rendering its verdict: “I don’t see any

big deal about the fact they used narcotics.” The decision to put little to no weight on the

14 No. 1-24-2425

witnesses’ drug use is the court’s decision to make as the finder of fact. People v. Bobo, 2020

IL App (1st) 182628, ¶ 42 (“The factfinder determines the credibility of witnesses and the

weight to be given to their testimony, and this court will not substitute its judgment for that

of the [factfinder] on these matters.”).

¶ 50 Illinois law has long held that drug use and addiction were potentially relevant but did not

obligate a trier of fact to disregard a witness’ testimony. For example, this court previously

opined:

“Illinois courts have uniformly held that drug addiction at the time of trial or

when the crime occurred may affect credibility due to the impairment of testimonial

powers. Credibility is affected because addiction may influence the capacity of the

witness to observe, to receive accurate impressions and retain them in his memory.

Furthermore, addiction should be considered because of its effect upon the power and

inclination of the witness to be truthful.

Some courts have gone so far as to conclude that habitual users of narcotics

become notorious liars. (People v. Strother (1972), 53 Ill.2d 95 ***; People v. Smith

(1973), 12 Ill.App.3d 488 ***) On the other hand, the non-credibility of addicts is not

universally accepted. McCormick on Evidence points out that: ‘it can scarcely be

contended that there is enough scientific agreement to warrant judicial notice that

addiction in and of itself usually affects credibility.’ McCormick, Evidence, s 45, at

95 (2d ed. 1972).” People v. Smith, 70 Ill. App. 3d 250, 256-57 (1979).

¶ 51 The 1979 Smith case was not alone in its relative nuance on the matter. People v. West,

156 Ill. App. 3d 608, 612 (1987) (Highlighting courts’ willingness to allow impeachment via

testimony on drug addiction, but their reluctance to instruct juries to give addicts’ testimony

15 No. 1-24-2425

extra scrutiny.); People v. Cepolski, 79 Ill. App. 3d 230, 238 (1979) (“While the fact that the

complainant is a narcotics addict is an important factor in determining his credibility, even if

it is shown that the complainant was in fact using drugs at the time of the incident, this

consideration alone does not necessarily destroy his credibility.”); People v. Johnson, 87 Ill.

App. 2d 390, 395 (1967) (“The credibility of a narcotics addict is for the trier of facts to

determine, although drug addiction must be considered in the determination of the addict’s

veracity as a witness.”); People v. Romero, 54 Ill. App. 2d 184, 188 (1964) (“Although the

testimony of a narcotic[s] addict is scrutinized with caution, his testimony may be sufficient

to sustain a conviction if it is credible under the surrounding circumstances.”); People v.

Larry, 30 Ill. 2d 533, 536 (1964) (“While a witness’s addiction to narcotics has an important

bearing upon his credibility, it does not follow that his testimony must always be

disbelieved.”).

¶ 52 To be clear, our intention in belaboring this point is not to say that drug use, addiction, or

past felonies, for that matter, are inappropriate credibility considerations. Our point is that a

finder of fact is not obligated to change its analysis because a witness is a convicted felon or

drug user, especially where the inconsistencies in the witness’ testimony do not rise to a level

at which the witness’ testimony cannot reasonably be credited. The trial court, as the

factfinder, was presented with testimony as to Reed’s and Banks’ past, and gave the

information the weight it determined to be appropriate. Defendant alleges that the court

disregarded or was unaware of evidence, yet provides no evidence or argument that the

witness’ felony status or drug use was specifically relevant, given the circumstances. Without

such specificity, defendant’s argument is essentially that a court cannot credit the testimony

of a drug user or a felon. This is not a legally defensible position.

16 No. 1-24-2425

¶ 53 Here, there is no such reason to doubt Banks and Reed based on these statuses. At trial,

defense counsel repeatedly advanced the argument that there was no evidence presented that

Banks and Reed had been invited into the apartment and so they could have been motivated

to lie to the police about what had occurred if they were there illegally. However, this

argument holds no water, as Lewis can be clearly heard in the bodycam footage stating that

he invited them over. Nothing else in evidence or in defendant’s arguments suggests that

Reed or Banks were impaired by drug use or motivated for any other reason to lie.

¶ 54 With all of that said, we find that, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, a reasonable trier of fact could find defendant guilty of the charges for which he

was convicted.

¶ 55 B. Judicial Bias

¶ 56 Defendant argues that “the trial court abandoned its role as a neutral and impartial arbiter

of fact when it repeatedly interrupted the defense’s closing argument, going beyond

clarification and showing it had prejudged the case.” Defendant concedes that this issue was

not raised below and therefore not preserved for appeal. He asks us, instead, to review it

under the plain error doctrine.

¶ 57 “To preserve a purported error for appellate review, a defendant must object to the error

at trial and raise the error in a posttrial motion.” People v. Williams, 2022 IL 126918, ¶ 48.

“Failure to do so either results in forfeiture of such review, but the forfeiture may be excused

when the error is ‘plain.’ ” Id. “Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be

noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the trial court.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 615(a)

(eff. Jan. 1, 1967). “The plain-error doctrine does not create a ‘general savings clause’ to

allow defendants to escape the consequences of their nonfeasance.” Williams, 2022 IL

17 No. 1-24-2425

126918, ¶ 48. “Instead, it offers a narrow exception to the rule of procedural default for

unpreserved errors.” Id. “Whether there is plain error is a question of law, which we review

de novo.” Id.

¶ 58 The plain error doctrine establishes two categories, or prongs, of plain error: “prejudicial

errors, which may have affected the outcome in a closely balanced case, and presumptively

prejudicial errors, which must be remedied although they may not have affected the

outcome.” People v. Nitz, 219 Ill. 2d 400, 415 (2006) (citing People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d

167, 185 (2005)). Defendant’s assertion that the judge failed to maintain a neutral, unbiased

position throughout the trial is reviewable under the second prong, as it would be, if proven,

“a systemic error which serves to erode the integrity of the judicial process and undermine

the fairness of the defendant’s trial.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v.

Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d 598, 614 (2010).

¶ 59 “A criminal defendant who elects to be tried in a bench trial ‘is entitled to the same fair,

patient, and impartial consideration he would be entitled to by a jury composed of fair,

impartial, careful and considerate jurors.’ ” People v. Jackson, 409 Ill. App. 3d 631, 646

(2011) (citing People v. Trefonas, 9 Ill. 2d 92, 100 (1956)). “The trial court has the right to

question witnesses in order to elicit the truth or to bring enlightenment on material issues

which seem obscure.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. “A trial judge’s questioning of

a witness must be done in a fair and impartial manner, without showing bias or prejudice

against either party.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 646-47. Although the danger

of prejudice resulting from a trial judge’s questions is lessened in a bench trial, the court

abuses its discretion when it adopts the role of an advocate for one of the parties. Id. at 647;

see also People v. Griffin, 194 Ill. App. 3d 286, 296 (1990) (“[T]he danger of prejudice due

18 No. 1-24-2425

to judicial questioning decreases sharply in cases tried without a jury.”). “To show prejudice

in a bench trial, the defendant must show that the tenor of the court’s questioning indicates

the court has prejudged the outcome before hearing all of the evidence.” (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Id.

¶ 60 Furthermore, a trial judge is presumed to be impartial, and the burden of overcoming this

presumption rests on the party making the charge of prejudice. People v. Romero, 2018 IL

App (1st) 143132, ¶ 96. “In order to show bias, defendant must demonstrate that the judge

displayed ‘active personal animosity, hostility, ill will, or distrust toward the defendant.’ ” Id.

(quoting People v. Shelton, 401 Ill. App. 3d 564, 583 (2010)). However, “[t]he fact that a

judge displayed irritation or displeasure with the defense is not necessarily evidence of

judicial bias against defendant.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Moore, 2023

IL App (1st) 211421, ¶ 124. “We review de novo the question of whether the trial judge’s

conduct requires reversal of the judgment.” Id.

¶ 61 In his brief, defendant cites, across 23 different pages of the record of proceedings,

various instances in which the court interrupted defense counsel or made allegedly

impermissible comments. Some of the cited instances are patently absurd. For instance, when

defense counsel was focusing on how minor Reed’s head wound was, the court interrupted to

clarify that the charge did not require great bodily harm, but only bodily harm. It is difficult

to see how this could be seen as an illustration of bias, or even contributive to demonstrating

a broader pattern of bias. The severity of Reed’s injuries was utterly irrelevant to the question

of whether defendant’s actions satisfied the necessary elements of the crime. On the

following page, the court interrupted a mention of photographs to ask the State to show it the

photos of the injury. These interruptions in no way show bias or a lack of neutrality.

19 No. 1-24-2425

¶ 62 Immediately thereafter, the following colloquy occurred:

“Defense Counsel (DC): So, Judge, as the Court knows with no paramedics, nurses,

doctors being called to the stand, no reports – medical reports, records being entered,

we can make a reasonable inference that there was in fact no injury; right?

COURT: Why do you say that? Why do you say that?

DC: Well, Judge, we know the State’s got the burden; right? They have to prove that

there’s bodily harm.

COURT: Correct.

DC: And so all we have is his word, and I am going to go into his credibility, but all

we have is his word. There was no corroboration of that is what I’m saying. The

inference is that if there was some injury, it’s the State’s burden to put those

witnesses on to prove it. Absent that, the presumption of innocence remains with my

client.

COURT: Are you suggesting that given a case where a person is charged with

hypothetically aggravated battery – not this case, a hypothetical case. The State would

have to bring in a doctor or nurse, I treated them for this and that. The guy could say,

well, he cut me, my arm. I didn’t bother going to the hospital but he did cut me, I was

bleeding.

DC: I think it is up to the factfinder in that situation to determine the credibility of

that witness, and as I said I am going to go into the credibility of that witness who

testified to using heroin during the day and then smoking cocaine throughout the

night while also drinking. I will not forget to do that, I promise the court. ***”

20 No. 1-24-2425

¶ 63 Defense counsel continued speaking for two full pages of transcript before the following

exchange:

“DC: So, Judge, [Banks] wasn’t coming – and, again, if we want to talk about

credibility of witnesses and reasonable inference, she wasn’t coming over [to

defendant] to say hi, how are you. She said she came over to help [Reed], and then

later in the testimony when asked if she struck [defendant], she said, yeah, I struck

him after he struck me. That was her self-serving testimony was that she did admit to

striking him after he struck her.

COURT: I’m just curious. You keep saying self-serving testimony. Whatever

somebody says is self-serving in some sense or another, isn’t it? The guy shot me;

that’s self-serving by the person who got shot. I came over to help my boyfriend.

That’s sort of self-serving, but if the evidence shows that, the evidence shows that.

Any person who testifies [to] something is self-serving in some sense or another.

That’s why they’re offering them up as witnesses, it’s something to add to the State’s

case. If they say nothing happened, they probably wouldn’t even have been called to

begin with most likely. All right. Go ahead. Sorry to interrupt.

DC: You’re fine, Judge. I believe that by the time I’m done that I will have responded

to all of that adequately and I believe the Court will agree.”

¶ 64 Shortly thereafter, the court and defense counsel engaged in another lengthy exchange

prompted by defense counsel’s mention of Banks being on a blood-thinning medication and

the court questioning the relevance of that fact. After the court mentioned in passing that

Banks and Reed were invited up to Lewis’ apartment, defense counsel insisted that there was

no evidence supporting that statement, in continuation of his ongoing argument that there

21 No. 1-24-2425

was no evidence that Banks and Reed were in the apartment legally. The court’s frustration

with that argument was palpable in the transcript of the ensuing back-and-forth:

“DC: Judge, when you say he asked them to come up here, [Lewis] didn’t testify.

COURT: All right. Go on. You are missing the point. Go on.

DC: I’m not missing the point if the Court believes that there is evidence of an

invitation.

COURT: Let’s assume hypothetically –

DC: That’s hearsay.

COURT: Let’s assume a friend of mine wants to come down to 26th and California to

see a trial. I say, Hash – that’s his name – Hash, come up to Room 602, and he does,

do you need someone else to say I heard Sacks tell him come to 602? I asked Hash,

come up for the trial next week, come up and watch the trial. He does come up.

Walks in the audience, has a seat, watches the trial. You mean I have to have some

corroboration to say I told Hash to come up to Room 602 and someone else heard me

tell him that?

DC: Judge, the – this hypothetical if the Court wishes me to indulge in it, is referring

to a courtroom that is open to the public; right? This is an apartment that by their own

testimony is a private residence.

COURT: It’s a big room with bedrooms off on the sides, three bedrooms.

DC: It’s an apartment, Judge. The testimony was that it’s an apartment building with

multiple apartments. Within the apartment building, there is an apartment that has

three bedrooms.

22 No. 1-24-2425

DC: And that apartment with three bedrooms has different subletters of those three

bedrooms.

COURT: And the big room is used if anybody wants to use it, to watch TV, use

heroin, use cocaine.

DC: Again, that’s assuming facts that aren’t in testimony. This is – your Honor is

saying that this is a big room that anybody who wants to can use it.

COURT: I didn’t say anybody. If someone was invited up there, they could use it.

DC: And what evidence do we have here other than them saying they went to visit a

friend that they were invited to it?

COURT: Okay. What else would you possibly have? Someone comes up to my –

come up to the crib, we’ll smoke a joint together. You need a witness to say I heard

him say come up to the crib and we’ll smoke a joint together?

DC: Judge, I will go down this path as long as your Honor wants me to, but I’m not

disputing that those individuals were in that apartment. What I am saying –

COURT: You’re disputing they were – they were there illegally however.

DC: Judge, there is no evidence other than their own testimony of whether they were

there legally or illegally.

COURT: What else would you expect? What else would you expect?

DC: The Court repeatedly says that they were there by invitation.

COURT: What else –

DC: I have the transcript –

COURT: Counsel, I read it last night.

23 No. 1-24-2425

DC: There is no testimony that there was ever an invitation.

COURT: Just answer my question, would you please. I read the transcript again last

night. What else would you possibly expect? Come up to my crib, we’ll smoke a joint

together. You need a witness to that?

DC: So the court is assuming there was an invitation.

COURT: There was testimony about that. Go on.

DC: Sure. Where should I refer to in the transcript that your Honor read last night?

COURT: Just go ahead, please, Counsel.

(Brief pause.)

DC: While I’m looking through the transcript, Judge, I do want to reiterate that as

much as the court has pushed back on my use of lack of corroboration –

COURT: What do you mean by pushing back, Counsel?

DC: Inquired about. I will –

COURT: Right. Use a better phraseology than pushing back. Please, go on. I’m not

pushing back on anything at all. I’m just asking a question or making a comment.

DC: Judge, there is an individual [referred to as Lewis] – who both witnesses say –

who never came and testified; right? He wasn’t here, he’s the one who holds this

answer, and it’s not our burden to have him say they’re allowed here, they’re not

allowed here.

COURT: I’m not saying it is your burden. I never said that.”

¶ 65 This back-and-forth continued for some time. Under Liteky, “opinions formed by the

judge on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the course of the current

proceedings *** do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they display a

24 No. 1-24-2425

deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.” Liteky v.

U.S., 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994). Judicial remarks during trial, even if critical, disapproving,

or even hostile, “ordinarily do not support a bias or partiality challenge,” absent an

extrajudicial source for the opinion or else the kind of favoritism or antagonism that would

make fair judgment impossible. Id. While the court’s exchange with defense counsel may

have been both critical and disapproving, we see no evidence of favoritism or antagonism.

¶ 66 When defense counsel stated that defendant was not using the narcotics that the others

were using, the State objected, to which the court responded: “I heard the evidence. I’ll hear

the closing arguments. I’ll make my ruling eventually. Overruled. Go on.”

¶ 67 The court continued interjecting during defendant’s closing argument. While defense

counsel attempted to portray defendant as less culpable because he did not enter the fight

with the hammer in hand and so had no intention to commit an aggravated battery, the court

interjected with questions about how that changes anything, seemingly to get at the core

question of how it affected whether or not defendant’s actions satisfied the elements of

aggravated battery. Defense counsel focused on the fact that Banks testified to introducing

the hammer into the fight, at which point the court interrupted to note that although Banks

introduced the hammer, defendant took it from her. Defense counsel expressed confusion

about what distinction the court was suggesting, to which the court responded: “I’m not

suggesting anything. I’m just making a comment. Go ahead.” As defense counsel delved into

a theory that defendant was engaging in self-defense, the court continued to question him,

specifically about the necessary mental state of someone engaging in self-defense. Defense

counsel continued to engage with the court, even when the court advised him to continue,

and the following discussion took place:

25 No. 1-24-2425

“DC: There was also a – well, so, Judge, the Court seems to indicate that [defendant]

is at fault for intercepting the hammer. The alternative of that point is that he allows

Reed to get the hammer and then himself is a victim of the hammer.

COURT: Try not to read – try not to read my mind, Counsel. Try not to read my

mind. Just go on.

DC: I’ll just speak to common sense since the standard is a reasonable person.

Common sense is any –

COURT: So that means – hold on a second, Drew. You just argued common sense.

You mean I don’t have any?

DC: Judge, I – you just said that you don’t want to speculate and I can’t read your

mind. Now it seems that your Honor is trying to read my mind. I said nothing of the

sort, and I do not believe –

COURT: Just finish your argument. Just finish your argument, would you please,

Counsel. Just finish your argument and let’s move on. I’m not reading your mind and

you’re not reading mine. Just go ahead.”

¶ 68 Defense counsel then argued for several more pages of transcript virtually uninterrupted

before concluding his closing argument. While defendant is correct that the court did not

choose to interrupt the State’s closing argument, that argument spans only two pages of

transcript. Defendant’s closing argument, by comparison, spans 47 pages, with about 18 of

those consisting of questions or comments from the court and responses thereto. Given that

the court had very little time to interrupt or question the State’s very brief closing argument,

we do not see its decision to interrupt and question only defense counsel as evidence of bias

or prejudice.

26 No. 1-24-2425

¶ 69 Defendant compares his case to Crawford, which similarly concerns a bench trial

wherein the trial judge frequently interrupted defense counsel. People v. Crawford, 343 Ill.

App. 3d 1050 (2003). Although Crawford is in many ways similar to our case, it is

distinguishable because the tenor and content of that trial judge’s interjections indicated that

he had prejudged the case and evinced not only doubt, but outright hostility toward defense

counsel’s theory of the case. Unlike here, the judge in Crawford interrupted defendant’s

opening statement to question whether certain evidence corroborated the allegations, despite

the fact that no evidence had yet been presented. Id. at 1060. Furthermore, the trial judge in

Crawford interrupted defense counsel’s closing argument twice within the first four

sentences, in one instance expressing a sort of outraged incredulity, saying: “So it’s okay.

Then it’s okay. If she’s—if she’s some trollop that’s going around smoking crack or weed or

drinking beer, and she’s not old enough, she has no right to say no.” Id. Lastly, the Crawford

court accused defense counsel of misrepresenting the evidence by asserting that the physical

evidence of sexual assault that was presented could also be the result of a consensual act. Id.

¶ 70 We do not find the comments made by the trial judge during our defendant’s closing

argument to be indicative of bias, or of having prejudged the case. His questions and

comments undoubtedly carried a tone of considerable impatience and irritation. They did not,

however, evince prejudice against the defense, and unlike in Crawford, the court’s

interjections did not demonstrate prejudgment of the facts or merits before the court had the

chance to consider the evidence. Given that this was a bench trial, we need not worry about

whether the tenor of the court’s comments or any view of the facts implicit in its comments

might influence the finder of fact.

27 No. 1-24-2425

¶ 71 More comparable is Faria, in which the trial judge similarly expressed irritation and

impatience with defense counsel, and in harsher terms than in our case. People v. Faria, 402

Ill. App. 3d 475, 479-80 (2010). In Faria, the court was so dissatisfied with defense counsel

that it contacted the attorney’s supervisor, and even that level of dissatisfaction was

insufficient to show bias. Id. at 481-82. The trial judge in Faria, as here, interrupted

repeatedly, and even commented, at the end of the defense’s closing argument: “Okay. I

would normally let you argue [defense counsel], but I can’t stand it so I have to actually go

on.” Id. at 482. The key similarity between Faria and the case before us is that although the

trial judges in both cases found defense counsel to be vexing, neither made any statements

showing a prejudgment of the case or bias that would prevent the judge from arriving at a fair

judgment. This court concluded that the judge in Faria had not erred, despite having used

more hostile language. As such, we do not believe that the tenor of the comments from the

trial judge in the case before us evinces bias.

¶ 72 We additionally see no evidence that the court’s interruptions, frequent and sometimes

lengthy though they may have been, prevented defense counsel from presenting a robust

closing argument. In Crawford, this court opined that “most of defense counsel’s closing

argument was interrupted,” Id. at 1060, but here, defense counsel was able to speak

uninterrupted for a large portion of the closing argument. Defendant argues that the court’s

“pushing back” on his arguments shows that the court did not consider those arguments. On

the contrary, it could be fairly argued that the trial court’s so-called “pushback” demonstrated

its consideration of the arguments, given that consideration is a necessary prerequisite to

forming relevant questions. It is arguable that the court’s questioning was favorable to the

defendant in that it gave defense counsel the opportunity to understand the court’s

28 No. 1-24-2425

interpretation of the facts and to be aware of which of its arguments were not proving

persuasive so that it could adapt its arguments accordingly.

¶ 73 Defendant further argues that the trial court interfered with attempts to impeach Reed by

sustaining objections made by the State. With one exception, which we will address in the

next section, defendant makes no argument that any of the court’s evidentiary rulings were

erroneous. If the court’s rulings were not incorrect, we see no way they could be indicative of

bias against defendant except in their tone and in commentary that accompanied them.

Defendant quotes the following exchange:

“DC: How about instead you explain to me how you knew that Mr. Lewis rented a

COURT: Just a moment, please. [Defense counsel], don’t shake your head like that.

You don’t have to agree with me, but don’t shake your head in derision. Okay? I’m

REED: I don’t know but I been going to visit him for at least eight months.”

¶ 74 The court’s comment on defense counsel’s reaction could be said to evince annoyance or

frustration, but our analysis is the same here as with defendant’s closing argument.

¶ 75 Beyond the court’s words themselves, the surrounding context of the court’s handling of

the case does not suggest a biased judge. For instance, the court was receptive to the

29 No. 1-24-2425

defense’s arguments that led to the dismissal of two of the four charged counts. As the State

points out in its brief, although the court interrupted frequently or seemed irritated with

defense counsel, it never declined to listen to or consider the defense’s arguments, even

where it expressed confusion about defense counsel’s reasoning. At the close of trial, the

court even said to defendant: “[Y]ou have a good lawyer. We happen to disagree, but that’s

life. You don’t always agree with things. Okay?” We find that the trial court did not abandon

its neutral role and therefore did not err. Since there was no error, there was no plain error,

and this issue is forfeited.

¶ 76 C. Evidentiary Rulings at Trial

¶ 77 Defendant argues on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion by preventing

defense counsel from further cross-examining Reed on his drug use beyond what he had used

on the night of the offense.

¶ 78 “The confrontation clause of the sixth amendment of the United States Constitution

guarantees a defendant the right to cross-examine a witness.” People v. Pacheco, 2023 IL

127535, ¶ 45; U.S. Const., amend. VI. “A criminal defendant states a violation of the

Confrontation Clause by showing that he was prohibited from engaging in otherwise

appropriate cross-examination designed to show a prototypical form of bias on the part of the

witness, and thereby ‘to expose to the jury the facts from which … [one] could appropriately

draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness.” Pacheco, 2023 IL 127535, ¶ 45

(quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986)). However,

“[t]he trial court possesses wide latitude to impose reasonable limitations on cross-

examination based on concerns about harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues,

the witness’ safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or of little relevance, and it may

30 No. 1-24-2425

impose certain restrictions on cross-examination so long as those restrictions serve

legitimate interests in the criminal trial process and are not arbitrary or

disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve.” (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Id. ¶ 47.

¶ 79 “[W]hen reviewing a confrontation clause challenge, we do not ‘isolate the particular

limitation on cross-examination to determine whether reversible error occurred.’ ” Id. ¶ 48

(quoting People v. Harris, 123 Ill. 2d 113, 145 (1988)). “Instead, we look to the record as a

whole, including the necessity for the limitation and the alternative means open to the

defendant to impeach the witness.” Id. “If a review of the entire record reveals that the fact-

finder has been made aware of adequate factors concerning relevant areas of impeachment of

a witness, no constitutional question arises merely because the defendant has been prohibited

on cross-examination from pursuing other areas of inquiry.” Id. “Ultimately, the question in

each case must be whether defendant’s inability to make the inquiry created a substantial

danger of prejudice by depriving him of the ability to test the truth of the witness’ direct

testimony.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. “Whether cross-examination has satisfied

constitutional scrutiny is a question of law we review de novo.” Id.

¶ 80 As the specifics of defense counsel’s cross-examination are pertinent, we include here the

whole of the exchange on the subject, which took place at the very beginning of cross-

examination:

“DC: You started smoking crack cocaine at the residence at approximately 6:30 or

7:00 that night?

DC: You had also used crack cocaine earlier in the day that day?

31 No. 1-24-2425

DC: Just heroin?

COURT: The way the question is phrased, sustained.

DC: You used heroin earlier in the day that day?

COURT: He can answer that. Overruled.

***

REED: Earlier that day, yes.

COURT: All right.

DC: And you also continued to use heroin after arriving at that residence?

REED: No. Just smoking cigarettes laced with cocaine.

DC: And that was multiple cigarettes laced with cocaine; correct?

DC: You have struggled with substance abuse for some time?

COURT: Just a minute. Sustained.

DC: Was this the first time – this was not the first time you had ever used illegal

substances; correct?

COURT: Objection sustained. Disregard the answer “no.”

32 No. 1-24-2425

¶ 81 Defense counsel changed the subject and pursued the question of Reed’s history with

drugs no further. Later in cross examination, without any context related to drug use, defense

counsel asked: “Are you under the influence of any narcotics today?” Reed answered: “No.”

¶ 82 Defendant argues, based on the above exchanges alone, that defense counsel “was not

allowed to elicit any testimony about Reed’s drug use other than his use of heroin and

cocaine on the date of the incident and that he was not under the influence at the time of his

testimony.” The highlighted exchange, and the record more generally, do not support this

assertion, as defense counsel was never instructed not to ask further questions on the topic.

Defendant acknowledges that this court has permitted foreclosure of further evidence of

drug use where some such evidence had been presented to the factfinder. People v. Pitchford,

314 Ill. App. 3d 72 (2000). In that case, Jefferson, the sole eyewitness to a murder, testified

that he was a heroin user, that he was not using heroin on the night of the offense because he

was on medication after a hospital stay, and that although he had not used any drugs within

six hours before testifying, he had done so sometime within the preceding 24 hours. Id. at 75.

The defense called a woman who lived with Jefferson to testify about his drug use. Id. at 81.

After “several objections” sustained by the trial court, the defense made an offer of proof,

pursuant to which the witness testified that Jefferson used drugs “every day and all day” and

that she spoke to him on the telephone the morning that he testified, and “determined from

the tenor of the conversation that he had used narcotics that morning.” Id. at 81. The court

found that that determination was one “a jury is capable of ascertaining for itself.” Id.

Despite the offer of proof, the court sustained the objection and prevented the witness from

offering the testimony. Id. This court found that the trial court had not abused its discretion in

doing so, as “testimony of Jefferson’s drug use was otherwise presented” and “we [did] not

33 No. 1-24-2425

believe that prejudice resulted from the exclusion of [the witness’] testimony on that point.”

Id.

¶ 83 Here, defense counsel was not prohibited from eliciting further testimony on the subject

at all. Defense counsel asked two questions, the State made two non-specific objections, and

the court sustained both. Defense counsel did not argue the point further and did not make an

offer of proof. We see nothing about the exchange that warned defense counsel against

further pursuing the subject either explicitly or implicitly. As such, defendant’s right to

confront his accusers was not violated and the court did not abuse its discretion.

¶ 84 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 85 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm defendant’s convictions and sentence.

¶ 86 Affirmed.