People v. Rainey

2024 IL App (1st) 220951-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: October 22, 2024
• Docket: 1-22-0951
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2024 IL App (1st) 220951-U No. 1-22-0951 Order filed October 22, 2024 Second Division

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________ THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of ) Cook County. Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) Nos. 12 CR 15811, 12 CR 15812, ) 12 CR 15813; 12 CR 15814, 12 CR v. ) 15815, 12 CR 15833, 12 CR 15834, ) 12 CR 15835, 12 CR 15836, 12 CR ) 15837, 12 CR 15838, 12 CR 15839, VIDAL RAINEY, ) 12 CR 16208, 12 CR 16209, 12 CR ) 16210, 12 CR 16212, 12 CR 16213, ) 12 CR 16214, 13 CR 5854 Defendant-Appellant. ) ) Honorable ) Sophia Atcherson, ) Judge, presiding.

JUSTICE ELLIS delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Van Tine and Justice Howse concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: Affirmed. Circuit court properly denied defendant’s pro se motion “Challenging the Jurisdiction of the Court” over his contention that his refusal to consent to the circuit court’s jurisdiction deprived the court of jurisdiction and rendered his convictions void. Defendant’s remaining contentions forfeited. No. 1-22-0951

¶2 Defendant Vidal Rainey appeals pro se from the circuit court’s denial of his pro se motion

“Challenging the Jurisdiction of the Court.” On appeal, he contends that his convictions and

sentences are void because he did not consent to the circuit court’s jurisdiction. We affirm.

¶3 On January 5, 2015, defendant entered a negotiated plea of guilty to one count of

aggravated kidnapping and three counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault in case number 12

CR 16213. He also entered negotiated guilty pleas to armed robbery in case numbers 12 CR 15811,

12 CR 15812, 12 CR 15813, 12 CR 15815, 12 CR 15835, and 12 CR 15839; to robbery in case

numbers 12 CR 15814, 12 CR 15833, 12 CR 15834, 12 CR 16209, and 12 CR 16210; to attempted

armed robbery in case number 12 CR 15836; to attempted aggravated criminal sexual assault in

case number 12 CR 15837; to attempted aggravated robbery in case number 12 CR 15838; to

attempted home invasion in case number 12 CR 16208; to attempted armed robbery in case number

12 CR 16212; to aggravated battery to a police officer in case number 12 CR 16214; and to

attempted residential burglary in case number 13 CR 05854. He was sentenced to a total of 40

years in prison.

¶4 Defendant filed a pro se motion to withdraw his guilty pleas and vacate the sentences,

which the trial court denied. Thereafter, an assistant public defender filed a motion to reconsider,

alleging that the court did not appoint post-plea counsel pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule

604(d) (eff. Dec. 11, 2014). The court appointed counsel, who filed a motion to withdraw the pleas

and certificates pursuant to Rule 604(d). The trial court held a hearing on the motion and thereafter

denied defendant leave to withdraw his guilty pleas. On direct appeal, we affirmed over

defendant’s contention that the circuit court improperly denied his request to proceed pro se for

the third time. See People v. Rainey, 2019 IL App (1st) 160187.

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¶5 On May 13, 2022, defendant filed a pro se motion “Challenging the Jurisdiction of the

Court.” The motion sought to have “Each Void Sentencing Order Reversed and Vacated” and to

dismiss each case “Pursuant to the Void Arrest Order [and] the Void Grand Jury Indictment

Orders,” as violations of defendant’s “Due Process Rights” because the court lacked jurisdiction.

The motion alleged that defendant was subject solely to “common law jurisdiction,” did not

consent to being a member of the “Legislative Government,” and that statutory rules, laws,

policies, and regulations did not apply to him. The motion asserted that because defendant did not

consent to the circuit court’s jurisdiction, the court did not have jurisdiction over him.

¶6 The motion further alleged that there were no injured parties in the cases in which

defendant entered guilty pleas, and that he was arrested by a police officer who did not witness

him commit an offense and who lacked probable cause and an arrest warrant. According to the

motion, the “arrest order” was void because defendant did not consent to his arrest. The motion

therefore concluded that the circuit court lacked personal jurisdiction over defendant and that all

19 cases should be “reversed and dismissed.”

¶7 On June 10, 2022, the circuit court held a hearing on the motion. Defendant was present

and argued, relevant here, that because he did not consent to the circuit court “having jurisdiction

over [his] body and soul,” the court lacked jurisdiction. He further argued that there were no injured

parties, and “command[ed] each case *** be dismissed” and that he be released from prison. He

asserted, inter alia, that the arrest “order” was void and could be challenged at any time because

he did not consent to be arrested, investigated, or questioned and did not admit to committing an

offense. Defendant further argued that the grand jury’s indictments and the trial court’s sentencing

orders were void.

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¶8 Defendant then “moved” the court to “the common law side of the courtroom” and asked

if the court objected. The court replied that the Illinois Constitution granted the circuit court general

jurisdiction over all civil and criminal matters, including defendant’s cases. Defendant responded

that jurisdiction could be challenged “at any time.” He reiterated that the police did not have

probable cause to arrest him or an arrest warrant, and that he did not consent to be arrested.

Defendant argued that he was “forced” to fire his attorney and enter guilty pleas because counsel

“refused” to argue that his arrest was unlawful.

¶9 The court denied defendant’s motion, finding that the circuit court had jurisdiction over

defendant and that defendant did not cite any legal authority in support of his arguments.

¶ 10 On appeal, defendant contends that he has withdrawn from the “Legislative Government”

and therefore, statutory laws, rules, regulations, and policies do not apply to him. Defendant argues

that the grand jury indictments were void, the trial court’s denial of his motion to withdraw the

pleas was void, this court’s order on direct appeal was void, and the circuit court’s order denying

his motion challenging the court’s jurisdiction was void because he never consented to the court

having jurisdiction over him. He repeatedly accuses the circuit judges who have heard his cases of

the crime of treason.

¶ 11 Initially, our review of defendant’s appeal is hindered by his failure to comply with Illinois

Supreme Court Rule 341(h) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020), which provides that an appellant’s brief should

contain a statement of “the facts necessary to an understanding of the case, stated accurately and

fairly without argument or comment,” and an argument “which shall contain the contentions of

the appellant and the reasons therefor, with citation of the authorities and the pages of the record

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relied on.” The brief contains no statement of facts, no citations to the record, and precious little

case law. It is littered with conclusory allegations and grievances but no developed legal argument.

¶ 12 As a reviewing court, we are entitled to have issues clearly defined, along with pertinent

authority and a cohesive legal argument. Walters v. Rodriguez, 2011 IL App (1st) 103488, ¶ 5.

This court is “not a depository in which the burden of argument and research may be dumped.”

Holzrichter v. Yorath, 2013 IL App (1st) 110287, ¶ 80. A pro se litigant is held to the same

standards as a litigant represented by an attorney. Williams v. Department of Human Services

Division of Rehabilitation Services, 2019 IL App (1st) 181517, ¶ 30.

¶ 13 “Arguments that do not comply with Rule 341(h)(7) do not merit consideration on appeal

and may be rejected by this court for that reason alone.” Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Sanders, 2015

IL App (1st) 141272, ¶ 43. Accordingly, to the extent that defendant’s brief fails to comply with

Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7), his arguments are forfeited.

¶ 14 We would note, in all fairness, that we warned defendant of the perils of self-representation

on appeal. We initially appointed the Office of State Appellate Defender to represent defendant on

appeal, and he objected vociferously. We thus acceded to his wishes to proceed pro se. Even then,

throughout some irregular motion practice, we again advised defendant that if he was “unable to

comprehend the appellate process and wishes to have counsel appointed in this appeal, he should

request that counsel be appointed” again. Defendant did not take us up on that invitation.

¶ 15 Considering the content of defendant’s brief, it would be within our discretion to dismiss

this appeal. See Epstein v. Galuska, 362 Ill. App. 3d 36, 42 (2005). But as it is clear that defendant

challenges the circuit court’s denial of his motion attacking the court’s jurisdiction and we have

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the benefit of a cogent appellee’s brief, we choose to consider the discernible merits of the appeal.

See Twardowski v. Holiday Hospitality Franchising, Inc., 321 Ill. App. 3d 509, 511 (2001).

¶ 16 Here, defendant claims his convictions and sentences are void because he did not consent

to the circuit court’s jurisdiction. It is certainly true that a party may attack a judgment as void ab

initio at any time, even if he fails to bring the motion as a postconviction petition or a petition

under section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure. See In re N.G., 2018 IL 121939, ¶¶ 53-54;

see also id. ¶ 57 (“[U]nder Illinois law, there is no fixed procedural mechanism or forum, nor is

there any temporal limitation governing when a void ab initio challenge may be asserted.”); LVNV

Funding v. Truce, 2015 IL 116129, ¶ 38; People v. Castleberry, 2015 IL 116916, ¶ 11.

¶ 17 That said, a judgment is void only when it was entered by a court that lacked personal or

subject-matter jurisdiction, or where it was based on a statute that is facially unconstitutional and

void ab initio. People v. Price, 2016 IL 118613, ¶ 31. No such circumstance is present here.

¶ 18 The circuit court had subject-matter jurisdiction when defendant was charged with criminal

offenses in 19 separate cases. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 9 (“Circuit Courts shall have original

jurisdiction of all justiciable matters except when the Supreme Court has original and exclusive

jurisdiction.”); see also Castleberry, 2015 IL 116916, ¶¶ 15-17. Defendant does not claim that any

of the statutes he was charged with violating are void ab initio. To the extent that defendant asserts

that the statutes do not “apply” to him, because he did not consent to jurisdiction, he offers no

citation to authority for this novel proposition, and we will not consider it further. Vilardo v.

Barrington Community School District 220, 406 Ill. App. 3d 713, 720 (2010); Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)

(eff. Oct. 1, 2020). In sum, there is no question that the circuit court possessed jurisdiction over

the subject matter.

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¶ 19 The court had personal jurisdiction as well. If nothing else, by appearing before the circuit

court and pleading guilty in 19 cases, defendant submitted to the circuit court’s jurisdiction. See

People v. Woodall, 333 Ill. App. 3d 1146, 1156 (2002) (defendant “confers personal jurisdiction

upon the trial court when he appears and joins the issues with a plea”).

¶ 20 On appeal, defendant raises the additional argument, relying on People v. Bass, 2019 IL

App (1st) 160640, aff’d in part, vacated in part, 2021 IL 125434, that arrests pursuant to an

investigative alert are unconstitutional. There are at least two problems with this argument. The

first, as the State notes, is that, by raising this claim for the first time on appeal, defendant has not

established the factual predicate that he was arrested pursuant to an investigative alert.

¶ 21 The far bigger problem is that, by pleading guilty to those offenses, defendant waived all

non-jurisdictional errors, “ ‘including constitutional ones.’ ” People v. Sophanavong, 2020 IL

124337, ¶ 33 (quoting People v. Townsell, 209 Ill. 2d 543, 545 (2004)). So even if his arrest was

constitutionally invalid—an assumption we make purely for the sake of argument—defendant

waived that constitutional objection when he pleaded guilty. “ ‘When a criminal defendant has

solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged,

he may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights

that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea.’ ” People v. Smith, 383 Ill. App. 3d 1078, 1085

(2008) (quoting Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973)).

¶ 22 There being no other salient arguments we can discern from defendant’s brief, we find no

basis to upset the trial court’s judgment. We thus affirm it in all respects.

¶ 23 Affirmed.

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