People v. Leach

2024 IL App (4th) 230298

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: January 29, 2024
• Docket: 4-23-0298
• Status: Published

Opinion

2024 IL App (4th) 230298 FILED NO. 4-23-0298 January 29, 2024 Carla Bender IN THE APPELLATE COURT 4 th District Appellate Court, IL OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of v. ) Winnebago County JAVARUS T. LEACH, ) No. 03CF2076 Defendant-Appellant. ) ) Honorable ) Joseph G. McGraw, ) Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justices Lannerd and Knecht concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

¶1 In August 2005, a jury found defendant, Javarus T. Leach, guilty of first degree

murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(2) (West 2002)), and the trial court later sentenced him 35 years in

prison and imposed a 25-year mandatory firearm enhancement, for an aggregate sentence of 60

years in prison. In December 2022, defendant filed a motion for leave to file a successive

postconviction petition, arguing that his sentence violated the proportionate penalties clause of the

Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11) because he was 20 years old at the time of the

offense and the sentence was imposed without consideration of his youth and its attendant

characteristics.

¶2 In February 2023, the trial court denied defendant’s motion for leave to file.

¶3 Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by denying him leave to file a

successive postconviction petition because he established a prima facie case of both cause and prejudice for his youth-based proportionate penalties claim.

¶4 We disagree and affirm.

¶5 I. BACKGROUND

¶6 A. The Charges and the Jury Trial

¶7 In August 2003, the State charged defendant with first degree murder (id.), alleging

that, in July 2003, defendant shot and killed Quantel Blaylock.

¶8 In August 2005, the trial court conducted defendant’s jury trial. The State presented

the testimony of six eyewitnesses who were present at the intersection of Henrietta and West State

Streets in Rockford, Illinois, on the evening of July 24, 2003, when defendant shot Blaylock. Each

witness testified similarly that defendant and Blaylock were arguing in the street. Blaylock told

defendant that he did not want to argue. Defendant pulled a gun and pointed it at Blaylock. Two

of the eyewitnesses additionally testified that Blaylock put his hands in the air when defendant

pulled out his gun and pointed it at Blaylock. All six witnesses testified that Blaylock then turned

around and began running away. Defendant chased after Blaylock and shot at Blaylock’s back.

¶9 A forensic pathologist testified that Blaylock suffered two gunshot wounds. One

shot entered his left hip and did not exit. The other shot entered his back, traveled through his lung,

and exited his chest. Blaylock died of pneumonia resulting from the gunshot wound.

¶ 10 A Rockford police detective testified that he attempted to obtain defendant’s “side

of the story” on four separate occasions between August 3 and 14, 2003. During one interview,

the detective provided defendant with details of the investigation, including the eyewitness

statements implicating defendant, and asked defendant whether it was possible that Blaylock had

a gun and defendant had shot him in self-defense. Each time the detective asked defendant for his

statement, defendant answered that he was not present and did not know Blaylock.

-2- ¶ 11 At his jury trial, defendant testified that he shot Blaylock in self-defense.

Specifically, defendant stated that went to the intersection of Henrietta and West State Streets to

visit a friend. While defendant was standing with his friend next to a car, Blaylock and three other

men began approaching defendant, yelling at him. Defendant testified that he saw Blaylock reach

under his shirt, so defendant pulled his gun, waved it around, and told Blaylock to “get back.”

Defendant said he saw the butt of a gun in Blaylock’s waistband, so he shot Blaylock three times.

He did not remember what happened after the shooting except that everyone began running.

¶ 12 On cross-examination, defendant agreed that when the detectives asked for his side

of the story on August 3, 4, and 14, 2003, he told them he was not present at the shooting.

¶ 13 The trial court instructed the jury on self-defense and second degree murder. The

jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder.

¶ 14 B. The Sentencing Hearing

¶ 15 In October 2005, the trial court conducted defendant’s sentencing hearing. The

sentencing range for first degree murder was 20 to 60 years in prison, and defendant’s conviction

required the imposition of a 25-year mandatory firearm enhancement because the jury found that

defendant “performed the acts which caused the death of Quantel Blaylock by use of a firearm.”

¶ 16 1. The Presentence Investigation Reports

¶ 17 The trial court received a presentence investigation report (PSI) prepared by a

probation officer. The report stated that defendant was born in August 1982, making him 20 years

old at the time of the offense. Regarding defendant’s criminal record, he had one prior conviction

in 2001 for possession of a controlled substance, for which he received a sentence of 30 months in

the Illinois Department of Corrections (DOC). (Defendant had other minor offenses in his past,

including traffic tickets and a conservation offense.)

-3- ¶ 18 Regarding defendant’s history of delinquency, the PSI referred the trial court to a

PSI prepared in 2001 in conjunction with defendant’s felony drug conviction (the 2001 PSI).

According to the 2001 PSI, defendant was adjudicated delinquent in 1996 for possession with

intent to deliver a controlled substance and received a sentence of probation. In 1997, defendant’s

juvenile probation was revoked because, while on probation, he committed the offenses of resisting

a peace officer and possession of cannabis. Defendant was placed on intensive probation and

sentenced to 30 days’ detention. Shortly thereafter, defendant violated the rules of home detention

and served additional time in detention. In 1998, defendant was found to have again violated his

probation by violating curfew, failing to meet with his probation officer, running away from his

placement, and failing to attend substance abuse treatment. As a result, in December 1998,

defendant was committed to the DOC juvenile division.

¶ 19 The 2001 PSI also quoted from the social history report prepared for the juvenile

court prior to defendant’s commitment to the DOC juvenile division. The social history report

stated the following about defendant as a juvenile:

“[Defendant] has clearly disregarded the privilege of his probation and

continued to exhibit criminal behavior. He has no regard for the law, authority, or

rules and regulations of probation.

The minor has been out of the reach of the Probation Office since May of

1998 and was unable to be located, seemingly with the aid of his parents.

When asked how he has money, the minor replied with the question, ‘How

does anybody else on the street get money?’ This response leads this officer to

believ [sic] that he is involved in illegal monetary gain. He attempted to cover up

this comment by saying that he finds money on the ground; he sees it and picks it

-4- up.”

¶ 20 The 2005 PSI also referred the trial court to the 2001 PSI “for greater insight into

defendant’s upbringing.” According to the 2001 PSI, defendant’s parents, although separated for

“several years,” remained legally married. His parents were both employed, and he had a close

relationship with both his mother and father. In particular, defendant reported that his father was

“always available to him” and his mother was “supportive of him unconditionally.” Both parents

shared disciplinary duties, which consisted primarily of “privilege restrictions.” Defendant “denied

ever being abused in any manner by anyone.” Defendant had four brothers but was only able to

provide the surnames of two of them. He denied that any immediate family members had been

convicted of criminal offenses or experienced substance abuse problems, but probation department

records indicated that (1) defendant’s father was on probation for a drug-related felony and was in

jail and (2) one of defendant’s brothers had been convicted of a firearms-related offense.

¶ 21 The 2005 PSI also referred to the 2001 PSI regarding defendant’s educational

background. According to the 2001 PSI, defendant claimed he had completed the ninth grade, but

school records showed that he completed eighth grade and never entered ninth grade. In 2001,

defendant expressed interest in obtaining a general equivalency degree (GED) but had no further

educational or training goals. According to the PSI, “[s]ince the 2001 Presentence Report,

[defendant] has not attended school, academic or vocational, nor has he received his GED.”

¶ 22 The PSI also contained information about defendant’s health history. Specifically,

“[defendant] underwent emergency surgery for a brain tumor at the age of 12. He reported no ill

effects other than continual tremors.”

¶ 23 The PSI further detailed defendant’s history of substance abuse, noting that

defendant had received treatment in 1997 and 1998 while on juvenile probation. The 2001 PSI

-5- contained more detailed information about that treatment. Specifically, defendant reported that he

began using drugs at age 12 and alcohol at age 14. The only treatment he received occurred during

his juvenile probation sentence. During that time, he was terminated from outpatient treatment for

(1) sporadic attendance, (2) his refusal to provide urine specimens, and (3) his overall lack of

motivation. He received inpatient services but was subsequently terminated from outpatient

aftercare services due to his lack of attendance. Substance abuse treatment records were attached

to the 2001 PSI.

¶ 24 The 2001 PSI also contained information from the 1998 juvenile social history

report regarding defendant’s gang affiliation. According to the report, although defendant denied

gang affiliation, he had two tattoos that were associated with gang involvement.

¶ 25 Last, the 2001 PSI included a “Summary and Analysis” section, which concluded

that defendant’s social history revealed, among other things, the “lack of structure or behavioral

guidelines within home of origin” and the “lack of education or marketable skills.”

¶ 26 2. The State’s Evidence in Aggravation

¶ 27 In aggravation, the State offered into evidence copies of defendant’s jail

disciplinary records going back to 2003 and the testimony of several witnesses. Local journalist

Ed Wells testified that he knew Blaylock through a youth program and Blaylock had been a “good

kid.” The State also called Walter Valentine, a special agent with the Illinois State Police, who

testified that in 2002, he utilized a confidential source to purchase two baggies of crack cocaine

from defendant near a public grade school. Michael Clark, a Rockford police officer, testified that

in 2003, he encountered defendant in a parked car behind a business at 6 a.m. in possession of a

loaded handgun and cannabis. Clark stated that defendant attempted to flee, and Clark had to

“t[ake] him to the ground.” While on the ground, defendant continued to struggle with Clark, and

-6- Clark’s partner had to utilize pepper spray to subdue defendant.

¶ 28 James Randall, a Rockford police detective in the department’s “Gang Unit,”

testified that defendant was a member of the Black Keystone Rangers gang, which originated in

Chicago and was involved with drugs and crime.

¶ 29 Blaylock’s brother, Quartez, testified about his relationship with the deceased. The

State also presented victim impact statements from Quartez and Blaylock’s mother, Doris

Blaylock. Both reported suffering depression and other negative effects resulting from Blaylock’s

death. Doris also reported having trouble sleeping at night and having nightmares that included

memories of her son lying in the hospital “fight[ing] for his life.”

¶ 30 3. Defendant’s Evidence in Mitigation and Statement in Allocution

¶ 31 Defendant did not offer any evidence in mitigation but made a statement in

allocution in which he offered “condolences to the victim’s family” but maintained that he acted

in self-defense. Defendant stated, “If they never put me in a situation where a danger existed, this

would never have happened. They should have left me alone.”

¶ 32 4. The Arguments

¶ 33 The State requested a sentence of “not anywhere near the minimum sentence in this

case,” emphasizing that five witnesses testified to “watching this defendant chasing the victim

down the street and shooting him in—in the back.” Additionally, the State emphasized that when

Quartez was attempting to get Blaylock into a vehicle after Blaylock had been shot, defendant shot

at the vehicle, which was corroborated by the physical evidence. The State also argued that the

evidence showed that Blaylock had been unarmed at the time of the shooting.

¶ 34 Additionally, the State argued that defendant was an “unrepentant *** drug dealer,

gang member, [and] criminal,” starting in 1996 with his juvenile record. The State then referred to

-7- the 2001 PSI and quoted from the 1998 juvenile social history report. The State also talked about

defendant’s lack of education due to dropping out in eighth grade in preference of “gang and

criminal activity.” The State then detailed defendant’s juvenile history contained in the 2001 PSI.

¶ 35 Defense counsel argued that defendant had acted in self-defense and denied that

defendant was involved in gang activity. Counsel also argued, “This is a young man. He’s age 23,

Judge. I would ask for a minimum sentence of 20 years, uh, give him a chance for rehabilitation,

give him a chance at life after 20 years in prison. 20 years is a—a huge sentence.”

¶ 36 5. The Sentence

¶ 37 The trial court first observed that it had considered, among other things, both the

PSI and the 2001 PSI. Additionally, the court stated as follows:

“[I]n mitigation I have considered the defendant’s age. He is a young person. He

has a lot of his life ahead of him. *** [H]e had some health problems at an early

age, including surgery for a brain tumor, although there is no indication that had

anything to do with the commission of the crime.

In terms of aggravation, the Court has considered that the defendant has

been an offender in the past. He was committed to the Juvenile Department of

Corrections. He was later sentenced to the adult Department of Corrections for a

drug case.”

¶ 38 The trial court then commented that “the most aggravating factor” was the nature

of the crime, which the court described as an unarmed victim running for his life and being shot

from behind by defendant, who fired multiple shots. The court commented, “There is no question

about [defendant’s] intent to kill or do great bodily harm to the victim. Um, and it is probably one

of the most aggravating kinds of homicide that the Court has to deal with.” The court reasoned

-8- that, “[b]ased on the defendant’s background of criminal conduct and *** the evidence showing

that he’s continued that course of action, *** I would find that the defendant presents a danger to

the community and that a substantial sentence is necessary in this case.”

¶ 39 Accordingly, the trial court sentenced defendant to 35 years, with a mandatory

firearm enhancement of 25 years, for an aggregate sentence of 60 years in prison.

¶ 40 6. The Motion To Reconsider

¶ 41 At the conclusion of the sentencing hearings, defendant filed instanter a motion to

reconsider his sentence, arguing, among other things, that his sentence was excessive. Specifically,

defendant contended that “the [trial] court failed to follow [the proportionate penalties clause] of

the Illinois Constitution which states [that] [a]ll penalties shall be determined both according to

the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship.”

The trial court denied the motion to reconsider.

¶ 42 C. The Direct Appeal

¶ 43 In October 2005, defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred when

sentencing him because it failed to consider the cumulative effect of the normal sentence for first

degree murder (see 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(a) (West 2004)) and the add-on for the use of a firearm

in conjunction with the murder (see id. § 5-8-1(a)(1)(d)(iii)). The appellate court affirmed. People

v. Leach, 372 Ill. App. 3d 1103 (2007) (table) (unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court

Rule 23).

¶ 44 D. The Initial Postconviction Petition

¶ 45 In March 2008, defendant, through attorney Francis Martinez, filed a petition for

relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2008)),

alleging various ways his trial counsel had rendered ineffective assistance at trial. In May 2008,

-9- the trial court advanced the petition to the second stage of proceedings and granted defense

counsel’s request for leave to file an amended petition.

¶ 46 In August 2010, Martinez filed a third amended petition, alleging several claims of

ineffective assistance, actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence, and trial errors by

the trial court.

¶ 47 In December 2011, the State filed a motion to dismiss all of defendant’s

postconviction claims. In March 2013, the trial court conducted a hearing on the State’s motion to

dismiss and took the matter under advisement.

¶ 48 In August 2013, the trial court issued an oral ruling allowing three of the claims

(not relevant to this appeal) to proceed to a third-stage evidentiary hearing. However, in February

2014, before that hearing was conducted, Martinez withdrew as counsel for defendant because he

was appointed to the bench.

¶ 49 In May 2014, attorney David Carter entered his appearance on behalf of defendant.

¶ 50 In November 2017, following years of status hearings regarding Carter’s

discussions with defendant about amending his petition, Carter filed his “Supplemental Counts to

Defendant’s Third Amended Petition for Postconviction Relief,” alleging that (1) “defendant’s due

process rights were violated when the verdict form the jury received *** lacked any reference to

the use of or personal discharge of a firearm” and (2) actual innocence based upon newly

discovered eyewitness Tyron Pearson. Carter concurrently filed a certificate pursuant to Illinois

Supreme Court Rule 651(c) (eff. July 1, 2017).

¶ 51 The State thereafter requested a series of continuances to respond to these newly

filed claims. During this time, in June 2019, defendant pro se filed a “Motion for Leave to

Supplement Petitioner’s Amended Postconviction Petition,” alleging that, pursuant to Miller v.

- 10 - Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), his sentence violated both the proportionate penalties clause of the

Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11) and the eighth amendment of the United States

Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. VIII). Defendant requested a new sentencing hearing. Neither

the trial court nor the parties addressed defendant’s pro se filing.

¶ 52 In March 2020, the State filed a motion to dismiss defendant’s supplemental claims,

and in February 2021, the trial court entered an order dismissing the sentencing enhancement claim

but advancing the actual innocence claim to the third stage.

¶ 53 In November 2021, the trial court conducted the third-stage evidentiary hearing,

and in December 2021, the court denied defendant postconviction relief.

¶ 54 Defendant appealed, and this court affirmed. People v. Leach, 2023 IL App (4th)

220014-U, ¶ 1.

¶ 55 E. The Motion for Leave To File a Successive Postconviction Petition

¶ 56 In December 2022, defendant pro se filed a motion for leave to file a successive

postconviction petition, alleging Carter rendered unreasonable assistance by failing to adopt

defendant’s 2019 pro se motion for leave to supplement his initial petition, which alleged a Miller-

based proportionate penalties claim. As to cause, defendant alleged that Miller applied

retroactively to state collateral proceedings. As to prejudice, defendant alleged that a reasonable

probability existed that under the “new rule,” he would have received a lesser sentence.

¶ 57 Defendant alleged the following facts pertaining to his own circumstances:

(1) while he was growing up, his father was on drugs and fought with his mother, making it

difficult for him to learn in school while acting out against other children; (2) defendant had a

shortage of food in the home while growing up, and his father’s drug use forced him “grow up

fast” to protect his mother while they “went in and out of shelters”; (3) defendant was bullied while

- 11 - young and was hit in the head with rocks and in the back with a pole; and (4) defendant witnessed

his brother shoot his father when defendant was young, and his brain tumor was found days later,

resulting in emergency surgery at 12 years old.

¶ 58 Defendant claimed that all of these difficult past experiences and family

circumstances “contributed to hanging out with the wrong crowd and doing drugs to numb the pain

while still getting into trouble, not learning my [lesson] time after time of the same thing;

eventually dropping out of school after ninth grade.” Defendant argued that “[due] to these above

mentioned specific individual characteristics an as applied claim exists under Miller v. Alabama

(newly discovered evidence) for young adults at the time of the offense my quick reaction w[ere]

those of a juvenile.” Defendant also asserted that when he was nine years old, he “burned his room

up” and subsequently saw a psychiatrist. He also cited People v. Franklin, 2020 IL App (1st)

171628, 171 N.E.3d 971, and People v. Daniels, 2020 IL App (1st) 171738, 163 N.E.3d 1216, to

illustrate “recent trends in treating offenders under 21 years old (differently) than ADULTS.”

¶ 59 In February 2023, the trial court denied defendant leave to file a successive petition,

concluding as follows:

“[Defendant] fails to show cause or prejudice or actual innocence or that

there is some recently discovered information that he could not have previously

presented. He’s essentially just making legal arguments that could have been made

before, citing case law that could have been cited before[,] so the motion is heard

and denied.”

¶ 60 This appeal followed.

¶ 61 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 62 Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by denying him leave to file a

- 12 - successive postconviction petition because he established a prima facie case of both cause and

prejudice for his youth-based proportionate penalties claim.

¶ 63 We disagree and affirm.

¶ 64 A. The Act

¶ 65 “The [Act] (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2018)) is the statutory procedure by

which a defendant can pursue a claim that his conviction or sentence was based on a substantial

denial of his constitutional rights.” People v. Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 38, 216 N.E.3d 855. “The

Act itself contemplates the filing of a single petition ***.” People v. Lusby, 2020 IL 124046, ¶ 27,

182 N.E.3d 563. “[T]he filing of successive postconviction petitions is highly disfavored [citation]

because it plagues finality [citation].” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Clark, 2023 IL 127273,

¶ 39. “ ‘Without finality, the criminal law is deprived of much of its deterrent effect.’ ” Id. (quoting

Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 309 (1989)).

¶ 66 A defendant must obtain leave of court to file a second or subsequent petition. 725

ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2022). To obtain leave of court, a defendant must demonstrate both

(1) “cause” for the failure to raise the claim in the initial petition and (2) “prejudice” resulting from

that failure. Lusby, 2020 IL 124046, ¶ 27. To demonstrate “cause,” a defendant must identify an

objective factor that impeded his ability to raise a specific claim during the initial postconviction

proceeding. 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2022). To demonstrate “prejudice,” a defendant must show

that the claim not raised during the initial proceeding so infected the trial that the resulting

conviction or sentence violated due process. Id.

¶ 67 To obtain leave to file a successive petition, the defendant must allege a prima facie

showing of both cause and prejudice. Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 47. Meeting the cause-and-

prejudice test is a “more exacting” standard than the “ ‘gist’ standard” applicable to the review of

- 13 - initial postconviction petitions. People v. Conick, 232 Ill. 2d 132, 142, 902 N.E.2d 637, 643 (2008).

Leave of court to file a successive petition should be denied when it is clear from a review of the

successive petition and supporting documents that the claims raised fail as a matter of law or are

insufficient to justify further proceedings. People v. Smith, 2014 IL 115946, ¶ 35, 21 N.E.3d 1172.

¶ 68 A trial court’s denial of leave to file a successive petition is reviewed de novo.

Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 47.

¶ 69 B. Defendant’s Proportionate Penalties Claim

¶ 70 Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying him leave to file in a

successive petition a claim that his 60-year sentence, imposed for a crime he committed when he

was 20 years old, violated the proportionate penalties clause as applied to him.

¶ 71 Defendant contends that he demonstrated “cause” in two separate ways. First, he

claims that he “could not have included in his initial petition a claim that the tenets of Miller

applied to him under the proportionate penalties clause [when] the Illinois Supreme Court did not

invite such arguments until years after both his sentencing hearing and the filing of his initial post-

conviction petition.” Second, defendant asserts that his postconviction counsel unreasonably failed

to adopt his pro se motion to supplement the initial petition with the proportionate penalties claim.

¶ 72 Defendant contends that he established prejudice by alleging facts about his

upbringing that demonstrate that he was the functional equivalent of a juvenile at the time of his

offense and was thus entitled to a Miller-compliant hearing.

¶ 73 We disagree that defendant established either cause or prejudice.

¶ 74 1. Miller’s Previous Unavailability Does Not Establish “Cause”

¶ 75 Regarding defendant’s first argument about cause, the Illinois Supreme Court has

made clear that “Miller’s announcement of a new substantive rule under the eighth amendment

- 14 - does not provide cause for a defendant to raise a claim under the proportionate penalties clause.”

People v. Dorsey, 2021 IL 123010, ¶ 74, 183 N.E.3d 715. The court explained, “Miller’s

unavailability prior to 2012 at best deprived defendant of ‘some helpful support’ for his state

constitutional law claim, which is insufficient to establish ‘cause.’ ” Id. (quoting People v.

LaPointe, 2018 IL App (2d) 160903, ¶ 59, 127 N.E.3d 131).

¶ 76 One obvious distinction between Dorsey and the present case is that Dorsey

involved a juvenile defendant, while the present case involves a young adult defendant.

Nonetheless, the supreme court has recently applied the rule it announced in Dorsey to young adult

defendants as well.

¶ 77 In Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶¶ 1-2, the supreme court affirmed the denial of the

defendant’s request for leave to file a successive postconviction petition in which he claimed that

his 90-year sentence for first degree murder, committed when he was 24 years old, violated the

proportionate penalties clause. In doing so, the supreme court reaffirmed Dorsey and explained the

reasoning behind that holding, writing as follows:

“We further held in Dorsey that ‘Miller’s announcement of a new

substantive rule under the eighth amendment does not provide cause for a defendant

to raise a claim under the proportionate penalties clause’ in a successive

postconviction petition. [Citation.] We reached this conclusion because, long

before Miller, many cases in this state already recognized that ‘courts have

discretion to grant leniency to a juvenile even if he or she is prosecuted as an adult.’

[People v. Miller, 202 Ill. 2d 328, 342 (2002) (Leon Miller)]; Dorsey, 2021 IL

123010, ¶ 74 (discussing Miller). As far back as 1894, this court recognized that

‘[t]here is in the law of nature, as well as in the law that governs society, a marked

- 15 - distinction between persons of mature age and those who are minors. The habits

and characters of the latter are, presumably, to a large extent as yet unformed and

unsettled.’ People ex rel. Bradley v. Illinois State Reformatory, 148 Ill. 413, 423

(1894). In addition, other Illinois cases have long held that the proportionate

penalties clause required the trial court to take into account the defendant’s ‘youth’

and ‘mentality’ in fashioning an appropriate sentence. People v. Haines, 2021 IL

App (4th) 190612, ¶ 47 (citing People v. Maldonado, 240 Ill. App. 3d 470, 485-86

(1992); [citations]). In Maldonado, the court stated that ‘[t]he balancing of the

retributive and rehabilitative purposes of punishment [as required by the

proportionate penalties clause] requires careful consideration *** and the

defendant’s personal history, including his age, demeanor, habits, mentality,

credibility, criminal history, general moral character, social environment, and

education.’ [Citation.]

Dorsey involved a juvenile offender [citation], i.e., one under age 18, and

the same reasoning applies to defendant here, who was 24 years old when he

murdered [the victim]. As is the case with juvenile offenders, Illinois courts were

also aware that ‘less than mature age can extend into young adulthood—and they

have insisted that sentences take into account that reality of human development.’

Haines, 2021 IL App (4th) 190612, ¶ 47 (citing Maldonado ***). Accordingly,

Miller does not present new proportionate penalties clause principles with respect

to discretionary sentencing of young adult offenders. Instead, defendant ‘had the

essential legal tools to raise his present proposed claim under the proportionate-

penalties clause’ when he filed his previous postconviction petitions. [Citations.]

- 16 - Therefore, citing the Miller line of cases does not satisfy the ‘cause’ prong

of the cause-and-prejudice test for raising a proportionate penalties claim in a

successive postconviction petition, as Miller’s unavailability does nothing to

explain why defendant neglected to raise the proportionate penalties clause claim

in his prior postconviction proceedings.” (Emphases in original.) Clark, 2023 IL

127273, ¶¶ 92-94.

¶ 78 Similarly, in People v. Moore, 2023 IL 126461, ¶ 1, the supreme court addressed

the consolidated cases of two young adult defendants who were denied leave to file successive

petitions alleging youth-based proportionate penalties challenges to their sentences. Both Tory

Moore and Marvin Williams, in separate prosecutions, were sentenced to life in prison without the

possibility of parole for first degree murders they committed at the age of 19 years old. Id. Both

defendants sought leave to file successive petitions, asserting Miller-based proportionate penalties

claims. Id. ¶¶ 1, 15, 25. The supreme court cited Dorsey and Clark for the proposition that Miller

does not provide cause for a juvenile to raise a claim under the proportionate penalties clause and

then concluded, “As Miller does not directly apply to young adults, it also does not provide cause

for a young adult offender to raise a claim under the proportionate penalties clause.” Id. ¶ 40.

Because the defendants were unable to make a showing of cause, the supreme court affirmed the

judgments of the trial courts denying them leave to file their successive petitions. Id. ¶ 42.

¶ 79 Nonetheless, despite the supreme court’s clear pronouncements in Clark and

Moore, defendant contends in his brief that it is not Miller’s unavailability that excuses his failure

to bring his claim earlier, but the unavailability of People v. Harris, 2018 IL 121932, 120 N.E.3d

900. In Harris, the supreme court held that a young adult offender could use the evolving

neuroscience on juvenile maturity and brain development referenced in Miller to support a claim

- 17 - that a statutory sentencing scheme, as applied to him, was unconstitutional in view of his

neurological immaturity. Id. ¶¶ 46-48. Defendant argues that Harris is the case that “invited”

young adult offenders to utilize the reasoning of Miller to advance youth-based proportionate

penalties claims.

¶ 80 However, this court considered and rejected this argument in People v. Haines,

2021 IL App (4th) 190612, ¶¶ 56-57, 188 N.E.3d 825. In Haines, the defendant was sentenced to

55 years in prison for first degree murder, consisting of 30 years plus a 25-year firearm

enhancement. Id. ¶ 1. The defendant sought leave to file a successive petition, alleging that his

sentence, imposed for a crime he committed at the age of 18, violated the proportionate penalties

clause because he was still neurologically immature when he committed murder and his de facto

life sentence failed to account for his youth and potential for rehabilitation. Id. ¶ 12. The trial court

denied him leave to file his successive petition (id. ¶ 13), and this court affirmed, holding that “the

nonexistence of Harris was no cause for defendant’s failure to raise, in his initial postconviction

proceeding, the proportionate-penalties claim that he seeks to raise now” (id. ¶ 57).

¶ 81 Similar to Moore, we explained that the defendant did not need Harris to tell him

that he could have brought his youth-based proportionate penalties claim in his initial

postconviction petition, writing as follows:

“Not everything the supreme court says in its decisions is newly minted law. Under

already-existing case law, the proportionate-penalties clause required sentencing

courts to take into account the immaturity or incomplete development of young

adults. [Citations.] Necessarily, then, it would have been entirely acceptable for a

young-adult offender to present neurological research buttressing the already-

accepted ‘wisdom in favor of according a defendant’s youth great weight in

- 18 - sentencing.’ [Citation.] The claim was buildable.” (Emphasis in original.) Id. ¶ 56.

¶ 82 This court further explained as follows:

“If, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, a claim can be built out of existing legal

materials, the defendant has to build the claim without waiting for someone else in

another case to do so. Defendants cannot wait until a claim falls ready-made into

their lap. Some assembly may be required. Ease of argument is not the standard.

‘[T]he question is not whether subsequent legal developments have made counsel’s

task easier, but whether at the time of the default the claim was “available” at all.’ ”

Id. ¶ 45 (quoting Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 537 (1986)).

¶ 83 Simply put, even prior to Miller or Harris, defendant had the tools to construct a

claim that his sentence violated the proportionate penalties clause because the sentencing judge

did not take into account (1) his youth and (2) how his particular neurobiological development

affected his maturity and decision-making. The present case is a perfect example of a defendant

waiting until the claim “falls ready-made into [his] lap.” Id. Miller and Harris made defendant’s

task easier, but the claim was available to him long before those decisions were issued.

¶ 84 We note that defendant spends considerable time in his brief asserting that Haines

was wrongly decided and should be abandoned. We emphatically reject defendant’s claim and

resolutely reaffirm our reasoning and holding in Haines. As further support for our reaffirmation

of Haines, we note that the Illinois Supreme Court in Clark, as part of its “cause” analysis, twice

cited Haines with approval. See Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶¶ 92-93.

¶ 85 Defendant also contends that Dorsey does not “control the analysis in [the present]

case” because Dorsey involved a discretionary sentence, while defendant’s sentence was

mandatory. Defendant claims that the supreme court “recently made it clear [in Moore] that the

- 19 - Dorsey rationale did not extend to situations where the sentencing scheme mandates the imposition

of at least a de facto life sentence.” (Emphasis in original.) In support of this claim, defendant

quotes from Moore: “As Miller did not change the law applicable to discretionary sentences

imposed on young adult offenders, it does not provide cause for Moore and Williams to file their

proposed successive postconviction petitions.” Moore, 2023 IL 126461, ¶ 44. Defendant reads

Moore too broadly.

¶ 86 However, nothing in Moore suggested a distinction between discretionary and

mandatory sentences. Moore used the term “discretionary” because that case involved

discretionary sentences, not mandatory ones. See id. ¶ 23 (noting that the trial court had imposed

a “discretionary life sentence” upon Williams (internal quotation marks omitted)); People v.

Moore, No. 4-99-0451 (2001) (unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23) (noting

that “[t]]he trial court has great discretion in fashioning an appropriate sentence within statutory

limits” and holding that the trial court’s imposition of a natural life sentence was not excessive).

¶ 87 We further note that, in paragraph 42 of Moore, just prior to the quote from

paragraph 44 that defendant selected to highlight in his brief, the court announced the same holding

but omitted the word “discretionary,” stating simply, “As Miller did not change the law applicable

to young adults, it does not provide cause for the proportionate penalties challenges advanced in

Moore’s and Williams’s proposed successive postconviction petitions.” (Emphasis added.) Moore,

2023 IL 126461, ¶ 42. For these reasons, we disagree with defendant that the supreme court in

Moore “made it clear” that Dorsey did not extend to young adults. Instead, Moore makes clear that

defendant engages in selective reading.

¶ 88 The supreme court recently reaffirmed its holdings in both Dorsey and Moore in

People v. Hilliard, 2023 IL 128186, ¶ 28, in which the supreme court affirmed the summary

- 20 - dismissal of the 18-year-old defendant’s Miller-based as-applied proportionate penalties claim. In

Hilliard, the court cited Dorsey for the proposition that “Miller’s announcement of a new

substantive rule under the eighth amendment does not provide cause for a defendant to raise a

claim under the proportionate penalties clause in a successive postconviction petition” and Moore

for the proposition that “Miller applies to neither discretionary sentences nor adults.” (Emphasis

added and internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

¶ 89 Due to the factual similarity of People v. Minniefield, 2020 IL App (1st) 170541,

we note in particular Hilliard’s abrogation of Minniefield. In Minniefield, the appellate court

reversed the decision of the trial court denying the 19-year-old defendant leave to file a successive

Miller-based proportionate penalties challenge to his 50-year mandatory de facto life sentence,

which consisted of 25 years for murder plus a 25-year mandatory firearm enhancement. Id. ¶¶ 1,

3. The Minniefield court held that Miller’s unavailability in 2007, when the defendant filed his first

postconviction petition, constituted cause for his filing a second petition. Id. ¶ 31. However, the

Hilliard court included Minniefield among other appellate court decisions that had “infirm[ly]”

held, contrary to Dorsey, that Miller’s prior unavailability constituted “cause.” See Hilliard, 2023

IL 128186, ¶ 28. Hilliard’s critique of Minniefield’s “cause” analysis lends additional support for

our rejection of defendant’s arguments in this case.

¶ 90 We conclude that, pursuant to Dorsey, Clark, Moore, and Haines, the prior

unavailability of the Miller line of cases does not provide cause for defendant to bring his

proportionate penalties claim.

¶ 91 2. Postconviction Counsel’s Failure To Bring the Claim in the Initial Petition

Does Not Establish “Cause” or “Prejudice”

¶ 92 Alternatively, defendant argues that his postconviction counsel rendered

- 21 - unreasonable assistance when he failed to adopt defendant’s pro se motion to supplement his initial

postconviction petition with the proportionate penalties claim and, accordingly, constitutes cause

to bring the claim in a successive petition. We disagree.

¶ 93 a. Reasonable Assistance of Postconviction Counsel

¶ 94 The Act confers upon defendants a statutory right to reasonable assistance of

counsel. People v. Perkins, 229 Ill. 2d 34, 42, 890 N.E.2d 398, 402 (2007). The supreme court has

held that reasonable assistance requires postconviction counsel to perform only the specific duties

set forth in Illinois Supreme Court Rule 651(c) (eff. July 1, 2017). People v. Greer, 212 Ill. 2d 192,

204-05, 817 N.E.2d 511, 519 (2004). Rule 651(c) requires postconviction counsel to (1) consult

with the defendant to ascertain his contentions of deprivations of constitutional rights, (2) examine

the record, and (3) make any amendments to the pro se petition necessary for an adequate

presentation of the defendant’s claims. Id. at 205.

¶ 95 “Fulfillment of the third obligation under Rule 651(c) does not require

postconviction counsel to advance frivolous or spurious claims on defendant’s behalf.” Id. “If

amendments to a pro se postconviction petition would only further a frivolous or patently

nonmeritorious claim, they are not ‘necessary’ within the meaning of the rule.” Id. In fact, “the

mere filing of an amended petition by counsel under such circumstances would appear to violate

the proscriptions of Supreme Court Rule 137,” which provides that an attorney’s signature on a

pleading certifies that the pleading is “well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law.”

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

¶ 96 b. Defendant’s Sentence Did Not Violate the Proportionate Penalties Clause

¶ 97 In the present case, postconviction counsel was not required to amend defendant’s

petition to allege the proportionate penalties claim because that claim lacks merit. Put another way,

- 22 - had postconviction counsel amended the petition to allege that defendant’s 60-year sentence

violated the proportionate penalties clause because it amounted to a de facto life sentence imposed

without consideration of defendant’s youth and its attendant characteristics, that claim would fail

because the trial court did consider defendant’s youth and its attendant characteristics when

imposing the sentence.

¶ 98 At sentencing, the trial court considered two PSI reports—one prepared in

September 2005, when defendant was 23 years old, and the other prepared in February 2001, when

defendant was 18 years old. The 2001 PSI contained information from a juvenile court social

history report prepared in 1998, when defendant was 15 or 16 years old. (The record lacks the

precise date the report was prepared, whether before or after defendant’s birthday in 1998.) As we

earlier recounted, the reports that the trial court considered contained detailed information about

defendant’s (1) age, (2) relationship with his parents during his childhood, (3) education,

(4) history of juvenile delinquency, (5) health as a child, (6) substance abuse issues as a juvenile,

and (7) treatment he received for those issues.

¶ 99 Without repeating the details of the reports, which we have already set forth (supra

¶¶ 16-25), we note that the trial court was aware that defendant had a troubled childhood, abused

alcohol as a child, did not attend school past the eighth grade, and lacked “structure or behavioral

guidelines within [his] home of origin.” At defendant’s sentencing hearing, the court was aware

that defendant grew up with a father who was jailed for drugs, his brother was convicted of a

firearms-related offense, and defendant had a brain tumor removed at the age of 12. We point out

these three specific facts in particular because defendant alleged them in his motion for leave to

file a supplemental petition as facts unique to him that justify treating him as a juvenile rather than

an adult for sentencing purposes. The problem for defendant is that the court was already aware of

- 23 - these facts when it sentenced him.

¶ 100 Furthermore, at his sentencing hearing, defendant declined to present any evidence

in mitigation, although he had the opportunity to do so.

¶ 101 During arguments at sentencing, both the State and defendant’s counsel highlighted

defendant’s youth. The State recited defendant’s history of delinquency and quoted from the 1998

social investigation report prepared for the juvenile court. Defendant’s counsel argued that

defendant was a “young man” who acted in self-defense and asked for the minimum sentence.

¶ 102 When ruling, the trial court specifically stated that it “considered the defendant’s

age” and that defendant was “a young person” who had “a lot of life ahead of him.” The court

referred to defendant’s brain tumor that was removed at age 12 and noted there was no evidence

the tumor had anything to do with defendant’s commission of the crime. The court also referred to

defendant’s history of juvenile delinquency.

¶ 103 All of the above establishes that defendant’s youth and childhood circumstances

were not only considered but also emphasized and highlighted by the trial court and the parties

during defendant’s sentencing hearing.

¶ 104 Nonetheless, youth—or rehabilitative potential—is not the only focus of a

proportionate penalties analysis. The proportionate penalties clause requires that “[a]ll penalties

shall be determined both according to [(1)] the seriousness of the offense and [(2)] with the

objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship.” (Emphasis added.) Ill. Const. 1970, art.

I, § 11. A defendant’s sentence violates the proportionate penalties clause when the penalty is

“cruel, degrading, or so wholly disproportionate to the offense committed as to shock the moral

sense of the community.” (Emphasis added and internal quotation marks omitted.) People v.

Williams, 2012 IL App (1st) 100126, ¶ 48.

- 24 - ¶ 105 In this case, the trial court properly considered both (1) defendant’s young age and

childhood circumstances and (2) the seriousness of the offense, calling it “the most aggravating

factor.” As the court described the offense, defendant chased and shot an unarmed man multiple

times in the back as he ran for his life. According to the evidence, Blaylock told defendant he did

not want to fight and even held his hands up in the air in submission before turning to run away.

Physical evidence supported witness testimony that defendant continued to fire his gun while

Blaylock’s brother was lifting him into a car to drive him to the hospital. The shooting took place

during the evening hours in a residential area where multiple eyewitnesses unrelated to the offense

were located.

¶ 106 Defendant’s sentence does not shock the moral sense of the community; instead, it

is the callousness and coldness of defendant’s crime that shocks the moral sense of the community.

Furthermore, as the State points out, our supreme court has specifically rejected the argument that

the 25-year firearm enhancement for first degree murder shocks the moral sense of the community

or violates the proportionate penalties clause. People v. Sharpe, 216 Ill. 2d 481, 525, 839 N.E.2d

492, 519 (2005). In Sharpe, the supreme court rejected the defendant’s argument that “the [firearm]

enhancements to the murder statute violate the proportionate penalties clause because they do not

serve the purpose of ‘restoring the offender to useful citizenship.’ ” Id. (quoting Ill. Const. 1970,

art. I, § 11). Moreover, the court observed that “in fixing a penalty for an offense, the possibility

of rehabilitation is not given greater weight or consideration than the seriousness of the offense.”

Id.

¶ 107 Defendant argues that Sharpe does not relate to this case because it did not involve

a juvenile or young adult offender. Nonetheless, Sharpe is consistent with the legislature’s

decision, when enacting section 5-4.5-105(b) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-

- 25 - 4.5-105(b) (West 2004)), (1) to allow sentencing courts the discretion to decline to impose

mandatory firearm enhancements when sentencing juveniles but (2) not to extend that same

discretion when sentencing young adults. In other words, the legislature determined that, for the

purposes of the mandatory firearm enhancements, young adults would be treated as adults and not

juveniles. As the supreme court noted in Hilliard, “The legislature’s determination of a particular

punishment for a crime in and of itself is an expression of the general moral ideas of the people.”

Hilliard, 2023 IL 128186, ¶ 38. In Illinois, “[t]he distinction between a juvenile and adult remains

significant. The Supreme Court has clearly and consistently drawn the line between juveniles and

adults for the purpose of sentencing at the age of 18.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. ¶ 39.

¶ 108 We also specifically note that, just prior to defendant shooting and killing Blaylock,

he had served an adult prison sentence for a felony drug offense; although defendant was a young

adult when he committed murder, he was not a first-time adult offender. Defendant’s 2½-year

adult incarceration just prior to committing intentional murder does not militate in favor of his

potential for rehabilitation.

¶ 109 In this case, the trial court considered defendant’s youth and possibility of

rehabilitation along with the seriousness of the offense. Defendant’s sentence was therefore Miller-

compliant. Moreover, the sentence imposed of 35 years for murder plus 25 years for the use of a

firearm to commit the murder is not (1) wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense or

(2) shocking to the moral sense of the community. Accordingly, defendant’s sentence did not

violate the proportionate penalties clause and postconviction counsel did not render unreasonable

assistance by failing to bring the meritless claim in defendant’s initial petition. Therefore,

defendant has failed to establish either (1) cause or (2) prejudice resulting from his counsel’s

failure to bring the claim in the initial petition. For the same reason (defendant’s proportionate

- 26 - penalties claim lacks merit), he has failed to show that he was prejudiced by his alleged inability

to bring the claim earlier due to Miller and Harris’s unavailability. As a result, the trial court

properly denied defendant leave to file his successive petition.

¶ 110 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 111 For the reasons stated, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

¶ 112 Affirmed.

- 27 - People v. Leach, 2024 IL App (4th) 230298

Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Winnebago County, No. 03-CF- 2076; the Hon. Joseph G. McGraw, Judge, presiding.

Attorneys James E. Chadd, Catherine K. Hart, and Austin Wright, of State for Appellate Defender’s Office, of Springfield, for appellant. Appellant:

Attorneys J. Hanley, State’s Attorney, of Rockford (Patrick Delfino, David for J. Robinson, and Luke NcNeill, of State’s Attorneys Appellate Appellee: Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People.

- 28 -