People v. Mason

2025 IL App (1st) 200387

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: June 20, 2025
• Docket: 1-20-0387
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2025 IL App (1st) 200387-UB

SIXTH DIVISION June 20, 2025

1-20-0387

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ____________________________________________________________________________ IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County. ) v. ) No. 18 CR 5814 ) ) LEVELL MASON, ) Honorable ) Mary Margaret Brosnahan, Petitioner-Appellant. ) Judge Presiding.

PRESIDING JUSTICE TAILOR delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Oden Johnson and C.A. Walker concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: Defendant received an adequate Krankel hearing and counsel complied with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d). Counsel was not ineffective. Counsel did not suffer from a conflict of interest.

¶2 Defendant, Levell Mason, appeals from the circuit court’s order denying his motion to 1-20-0387

withdraw his guilty plea and vacate his sentence. On appeal, he argues (1) the circuit court failed

to conduct an adequate Krankel inquiry into the pro se claims of ineffective assistance of counsel

he made during the middle of a hearing on his motion to withdraw his plea; (2) his counsel did

not strictly comply with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(d) (eff. July 1,

2017)) because she did not amend the pro se motion to include various claims; and (3) his right

to conflict-free counsel was violated where counsel did not withdraw and continued to represent

him during the proceedings on his motion to withdraw his plea after he claimed counsel was

ineffective.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 Mason was charged with one count of burglary and one count of possession of burglary

tools. Mason entered a negotiated plea, pleading guilty to burglary in exchange for a six-year

prison sentence, which was the lowest available sentence because his criminal background

subjected him to mandatory Class X sentencing.

¶5 On July 26, 2018, the circuit court held a plea hearing. The circuit court advised Mason

of the nature of the offense, the applicable sentencing range, his right to a jury trial, the

applicable fines, and the mandatory supervised release (MSR) term he would have to serve upon

release from prison. The circuit court asked Mason if he was being coerced into pleading guilty,

to which he responded that he was “suffering.” Mason explained that he was “emotionally sick,

I’m mentally ill, bipolar. I’m ready to just get on, you know, find a better program for my life

and just ready to go.” He indicated he was receiving medication, specifically Abilify for

“schizophrenic.” Defense counsel informed the circuit court that she did not have any problem

communicating with Mason, who “appears to completely understand everything I’ve said,” but

that he “has been frustrated.” Mason advised the circuit court that he understood what was

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happening and inquired whether he would get help for his mental illness in prison. Mason

acknowledged he was pleading guilty “freely and voluntarily.”

¶6 The circuit court then heard the factual basis for the plea. On April 1, 2018, at 12:07 a.m.,

police officers responded to an alarm at The Children’s Place, a store located at 712 East 87th

Street in Chicago. The store was closed, the doors were locked, and no employees were present.

Police observed a broken window on the outside of the store and a hole in the drywall behind the

broken glass. Officers heard someone moving inside the building and then observed Mason

inside the building moving toward the back of the store. Officers arrested Mason as he exited the

back of the building. Officers also observed that the store’s security system had been tampered

with, although the security camera was still recording. Security camera footage showed Mason

inside the store and moving toward a safe. One of the safe’s keys was inserted in the safe. A

store employee informed police that the key had not been left in the safe but instead had been left

next to the safe. The store manager did not know Mason, and Mason did not have permission or

authority to be in the store after hours. The circuit court found there was a factual basis for the

plea.

¶7 The circuit court, consistent with the plea agreement, sentenced Mason to six years’

imprisonment and three years’ MSR on the robbery count due to Mason’s criminal background,

which included a 2002 conviction for armed robbery, for which he was sentenced to 12 years in

prison; a 2012 conviction for burglary, for which he was sentenced to 3 years in prison; and, a

2014 retail theft conviction, for which he received 13 days in county jail. Mason was advised of

his appeal rights and the necessity for a motion to withdraw the plea.

¶8 Mason filed a pro se motion to reduce sentence. The motion, as it appears in the record

on appeal, bears a file-stamp of August 31, 2018, but is not accompanied by any certificate of

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service; rather, the accompanying notice of filing simply states the motion was filed. The

substance of Mason’s motion argues that the State charged him with burglary even though

nothing was taken from the store and there was “reasonable doubt my charges are excessive due

too off [sic] my background and habitual 6-year class X felon including my mental illness

bipolar [sic].” An accompanying form affidavit contains Mason’s name but is not signed by him

in any manner.

¶9 On September 20, 2018, the circuit court held a status hearing. Defense counsel was

present in court, but Mason was not. The circuit court indicated it would continue the motion for

Mason to be present, and made the following remarks on the record:

“I really think he is asking to vacate his plea based upon everything that’s

in [the motion].” I think in terms of the 30 day time period he is—there is a couple days

off [sic] so I am not going to—I don’t think I am going to knock him out of the box for

being two days late on a 30 day term based on the mail, so we will see what he wants to

do when he is here.

I think he needs to put on the record if it is something that he wants to proceed on

or not.”

¶ 10 On October 18, 2018, Mason told the circuit court that he wanted to withdraw his guilty

plea. The circuit court indicated that, because Mason had already received the minimum sentence

he was entitled to, it would recharacterize his motion to reduce sentence as a motion to withdraw

his guilty plea and order the transcript for review.

¶ 11 On November 19, 2018, Assistant Public Defender (APD) APD Weisberg indicated that

after speaking with Mason she was seeking a continuance to secure his medical records and court

file prior to arguing the motion. The case was continued. On the next court date, APD Weisberg

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notified the court that she had received and was in the process of reviewing the subpoenaed

medical records and was researching the issues Mason brought to her attention. The court

reminded her that it was considering recharacterizing Mason’s pro se motion for reduction of

sentence as a motion to withdraw his plea. The case was continued.

¶ 12 On February 6, 2019, APD Weisberg requested a retroactive behavioral clinical exam

(BCX) to determine Mason’s fitness for trial. On August 22, 2019, the BCX report was received

by the court, in which Dr. Fidel Echevarria, staff psychiatrist with Forensic Clinical Services,

rendered his opinion on Mason’s fitness to stand trial when he pled guilty in 2018. In addition to

interviewing Mason, Dr. Echevarria reviewed Mason’s 2018 medical records when Mason was

initially in custody and received treatment at Cermak Health Services and later that year

transferred to the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC). In his report, Dr. Echevarria stated

it was his opinion to a reasonable degree of medical and psychiatric certainty that Mason was

mentally fit to stand trial during the period of 2018 when he accepted the plea offer of six years

to resolve his case. Dr. Echevarria stated there was nothing in the documents he examined that

showed Mason was experiencing any significant symptoms of a mental disease or any cognitive

issue that would have compromised his understanding and decision-making abilities at the time

of the plea.

¶ 13 On September 5, 2019, APD Weisberg filed a Rule 604(d) certificate and a motion to

withdraw guilty plea. In the Rule 604(d) certificate, APD Weisberg stated that she: (1) had

consulted with Mason in person, by mail, by phone, or by electronic means to ascertain his

contentions of error in entering the plea of guilty and in his sentence, (2) had examined the trial

court file and report of proceedings of the plea and sentence, and (3) had made any amendments

to the motion necessary for the adequate presentation of any defects in those proceedings. In the

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motion to withdraw his guilty plea, APD Weisberg indicated that Mason wished to withdraw his

plea and argued that “his understanding was compromised at the time of the plea.” In support of

the motion, APD Weisberg attached, in part, Mason’s pro se motion and the transcript from the

July 26, 2018, proceedings.

¶ 14 A hearing on the motion to withdraw the guilty plea was held on September 10, 2019.

The State presented the testimony of Dr. Echevarria, who testified consistently with his report.

Dr. Echevarria testified about Mason’s interview, police reports, IDOC treatment records, and

records from Cermak Health Services that he reviewed. During the interview, it was clear that

Mason understood the concept of a plea bargain, the charges against him, and what he pled to.

He understood what a felony was and the sentencing range, including the possibility of an

enhanced sentence. At the time of the interview, Mason was on antidepressant and anti-psychotic

medication, which were the same medications he was on at the time of his plea. These

medications continued to be administered to him throughout his time at Cermak and IDOC as

well. Dr. Echevarria testified that he had established Mason’s baseline understanding as of July

2019, and the records reviewed indicated Mason had not experienced any symptoms of

exacerbation of his illness or any kind of problems at the time he made the decision to accept the

plea. Dr. Echevarria testified that it was his opinion to a reasonable degree of medical certainty

that Mason was fit to stand trial at the time he pled guilty.

¶ 15 APD Weisberg cross-examined Dr. Echevarria regarding the side effects of Mason’s

prescribed medications. He testified that, based on his review of the records, there were no

reports that Mason suffered any side effects or symptoms of cognitive issues from the

medications. Further, while the low dose antidepressant Mason received had a sedative effect, it

was only given to Mason in the evening.

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¶ 16 Mason testified at the hearing that at the time of his plea, he was taking several

medications including antibiotics for a tooth that had been pulled by the dentist. According to

Mason he was having side effects at the time from the medication and “couldn’t think. I was

incompetent or (sic) knowing what I was doing. My actual decision making.” When asked why

he referenced mental illness in his pro se motion to reduce sentence, he responded, “Because I

told you, you know, I was on medication and you didn’t listen to me.” Mason testified that on the

date of the plea, it was APD Weisberg’s decision to accept the plea offer when the State “was

asking to give me six years.” When Mason was asked whether he recalled his conversation in

court with the judge, he responded, “No. I know I was sick. I was depressed. And I wanted to get

it all over with. I was having suicidal thoughts.” Mason denied understanding that he was

pleading guilty. He also stated that he did not recall telling the court he wanted to plead guilty or

having a conversation with the court about his medication for his mental illness, but was aware

of the proceedings from reviewing the transcripts. Mason stated that he wanted to withdraw his

plea because he “didn’t understand” and was “incompetent at the time of all the medication

above that I was taking.” According to Mason, he should have had a psychological evaluation

before he pled guilty.

¶ 17 On cross-examination, Mason testified that he did not remember a discussion with his

attorney about the offer and in fact, did not “remember anything.” All he remembered was letting

his lawyer know that he was on medication. He then clarified that he did let the judge know that

he was on mediation.

¶ 18 After being cross-examined, Mason attempted to present the circuit court with a “motion

to dismiss the counts,” and indicated that he “wanted to relieve [defense counsel] from her

duties,” declaring “ineffective assistance of counsel,” and asserting that she showed prejudice

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and violated his fourteenth amendment rights. He elaborated that defense counsel had not

investigated “to see if I was on medication and what type of medication I was on until after” he

pleaded guilty. The circuit court explained that no investigation was carried out after the plea

because the case was resolved, and an investigation was only done afterward because Mason

filed a motion to reduce sentence, which was recharacterized as a motion withdraw the guilty

plea. The court also noted, and the parties agreed, that in May 2019, in Lake County, a jury

convicted Mason of a 2017 theft from a person offense, and that no fitness issues were raised.

The parties proceeded to argument on Mason’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

¶ 19 Prior to making an argument on the merits of the motion, APD Weisberg addressed

Mason’s ineffective assistance allegations. She stated that she spoke to Mason on both the first

and second court dates, May 7 and June 5, 2018. On the following court date, July 10, 2018, she

had a conversation with Mason about his mental health issues and whether he wanted to go to

Cermak. Mason did not indicate to her that he wanted to go to Cermak, but instead said he would

like an offer from the State. The State made a tentative offer, and the case was continued. On the

next court date, the State formally offered six years for a plea, with no reduced charge given, and

the minimum sentence with his mandatory Class X status. Originally, a date was given for

Mason to consider the offer, but Mason became frustrated and wanted to plead guilty on that

date. APD Weisberg spoke with Mason about the offer, and he decided to plead guilty. APD

Weisberg also discussed the option of trial, and the Class X sentence of six years, served at 50

percent. They reviewed the jury waiver and presentence investigation forms, which Mason

indicated he understood and signed. APD Weisberg felt that Mason was making a free and

voluntary plea and had the case recalled to proceed on the plea.

¶ 20 APD Weisberg then argued Mason’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, noting that

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records had been ordered and Dr. Echevarria issued his report. APD Weisberg argued:

“As to the motion Mr. Mason filed, we would stand on that motion. Certainly, it is

Mr. Mason’s belief that he was, as he said, incompetent. And as he said his decision

making was impaired. He stated that he does not remember anything in terms of the court

proceedings, but did state that he remembered the discussion he had with me prior to the

court proceeding. I’ll note for the record, which I tendered to counsel and your Honor

People v. Jamisson [citation omitted] that indicated psychotropic medication or the use of

psychotropic medication is not equivalent to a bona fide doubt of defendant’s fitness.

And, your honor, I raise that because Mr. Mason indicated that in our initial

conversation we discussed medication and that I told him or I essentially dismissed the

fact that he was on medication. And, your honor, while I do not recall dismissing Mr.

Mason’s words, I did research the matter and found People v. Jamisson, which did

indicate med’s (sic) alone are not enough and so would not constitute a reason for Mr.

Mason not to plead guilty if he so chose to proceed forward and do that.

Your honor, in our motion today Dr. Echevarria testified and he did testify that

Mr. Mason was aware and that he was in an understanding state. And he believed this to

be the case at the time of the plea. I would state though that he did not interview Mr.

Mason back one year ago when this plea took place. And although he says the record did

not identify any reason that Mr. Mason would not have understood at the time there is

obviously no interview to determine his level of understanding. He didn’t question him as

to his level of understanding that one year before. The doctor discussed the anti-

depression and anti-psychotic medications that Mr. Mason was on. He was on those

medications while Mr. Mason was in Cermak, in Cook County Department of

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Corrections while the plea discussion was going forward, while he took the plea.

Similarly, on those same medications in the Illinois Department of Corrections after his

sentence. And now on those medications while he is here in Cook County Department of

Corrections currently being housed.

The doctor did say that the low dose that he was receiving could have or would

have had an impact on the sedation level of Mr. Mason. And, in fact, he would have been

more sedated and this could have caused him certainly to be drowsy perhaps during the

time of the plea itself.

Your Honor, the doctor did believe that he was fit to stand trial at the time of the

plea. However, Mr. Mason insists in his testimony that he was not fit. That he did not

understand. And that his plea was not given freely and voluntarily. Based on that, your

Honor, we would ask you to grant our motion. Thank you.”

¶ 21 On September 10, 2019, the circuit court denied Mason’s motion to withdraw his guilty

plea. The circuit court noted that Mason pleaded guilty on July 26, 2018. With respect to the

timeliness of the motion, the court noted that Mason filed a motion to reduce sentence that was

not file-stamped within 30 days of the plea, but the circuit court

“erred on the side of giving defendant the benefit of the doubt and I found that since we

were dealing with a few days passed [sic] 30 days from the time it hit the clerk’s office

that there was a chance the defendant had mailed it within 30 days. So it was not

dismissed by this court on a technicality, which I believe that I could have done but I

didn’t do that.”

¶ 22 The court also noted that nothing in Mason’s written motion asserted ineffective

assistance of counsel. The court reviewed the plea transcript, including the court’s colloquy with

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Mason about his medication and whether he wanted to proceed with the plea. The court recalled

inquiring with defense counsel whether there were any problems communicating. The court

stated, “It was never any bona fide doubt of this defendant’s fitness in my mind.” The court

noted that neither party sought a BCX at that time. The court also noted, as did defense counsel,

that taking medication for a mental illness does not in and of itself equate to bona fide doubt of

fitness to stand trial. In addition to the transcripts from the original plea hearing and its own

observations, the court considered the exhibits, the common law record, Mason’s own motion

seeking a reduction of his plea to that of a trespass as opposed to seeking to undo the plea, and

Dr. Echevarria’s testimony. Finding Mason was fit at the time of his plea, the court denied the

motion.

¶ 23 Mason’s notice of appeal identified the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea,

and purported to raise various claims, including ineffective assistance of counsel. For reasons

unknown, the notice of appeal was not transmitted to this court. Mason filed a motion for leave

to file a late notice of appeal from the circuit court’s September 10, 2019, order, which this court

granted on March 5, 2020.

¶ 24 On appeal, Mason argued (1) the circuit court failed to conduct an adequate Krankel

inquiry into the pro se claims of ineffective assistance of counsel he made during a hearing on

his motion to withdraw his plea; (2) his counsel did not strictly comply with Illinois Supreme

Court Rule 604(d) because she did not amend the pro se motion to include various claims; and

(3) his right to conflict-free counsel was violated where counsel did not withdraw and continued

to represent him during the proceedings on his motion to withdraw his plea after he claimed

counsel was ineffective.

¶ 25 In our prior decision, we observed that Mason’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea bore a

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file-stamp of August 31, 2018, which was more than 30 days after July 26, 2018, when the

circuit court accepted his guilty plea and sentenced him to six years’ imprisonment. 5 ILCS

70/1.11 (West 2020). Furthermore, nothing in the record demonstrated that his motion was

mailed or, even assuming that it was mailed, when Mason placed his motion in the mail.

Therefore, there was nothing in the record to suggest that Mason’s motion was timely filed for

purposes of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (eff. July 1, 2017). People v. Mason, 2022 IL

App (1st) 200387-U, ¶ 26.

¶ 26 We also noted that the circuit court observed that Mason’s motion was not timely but

stated on the record that it would not penalize Mason-who was incarcerated at the time he filed

the motion-for being a few days late because “there was a chance [Mason] had mailed it within

30 days.” In the absence of any evidence of when Mason placed his motion in the mail system,

we relied on the clerk of the circuit court court’s file-stamped date on the motion itself, which

showed the motion was not filed within 30 days of the circuit court’s sentencing order.

Therefore, based on People v. Cooper, 2021 IL App (1st) 190022, ¶ 4 (remanding the cause to

the circuit court for a determination of whether the defendant timely filed his motion to withdraw

his guilty plea but retaining jurisdiction), we remanded this matter to the circuit court for the

limited purpose of determining the timeliness of Mason’s motion, including when Mason mailed

his original motion.. We retained jurisdiction to consider the timeliness, and assuming the circuit

court’s jurisdiction was established, to consider merits of the court’s decision to deny motion, as

well as the propriety of the circuit court’s Krankel inquiry. Mason, 2022 IL App (1st) 200387-U,

¶ 31.

¶ 27 On remand, the circuit court conducted a hearing on the timeliness of Mason’s motion to

withdraw guilty plea, which was received by the circuit court on August 31, 2018. After hearing

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Mason’s testimony, the circuit court determined that the motion was filed timely and mailed

from the IDOC before August 27, 2018, deadline.

¶ 28 Although we retained jurisdiction in this case, for reasons that do not appear in the

record, the case was not immediately transmitted back to his court following the circuit court’s

ruling on remand. We also note that by the time this case had been remanded to the circuit court

Mason had already served his sentence, including his period of mandatory supervised release.

People v. Roberson, 212 Ill. 2d 430, 435 (2004). Where, as here, the appeal involves the validity

of a sentence, such appeal is rendered moot if the sentence has been served. However, because

Mason challenges his conviction, this case is not moot. See People v. Campbell, 224 Ill. 2d 80,

84 (rejecting State’s argument on mootness where “defendant’s claim clearly calls into question

the validity of his conviction”). That is because a conviction may trigger potentially severe legal,

social, employment, and financial repercussions. See In re Christopher K., 217 Ill. 2d 348, 359

(2005).

¶ 29 Our jurisdiction established, we now turn to the merits of the claims Mason raised in his

opening brief.

¶ 30 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 31 Mason first argues that he is entitled to remand because the trial court failed to conduct

an adequate inquiry into the ineffective assistance of counsel claims he raised during the hearing

on the motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Specifically, Mason argues that at the conclusion of

his testimony at the hearing on his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, he informed the court that

he wanted “to relieve [APD Weisberg] from her duties,” based on counsel’s ineffectiveness.

Mason contends that the court failed to make any inquiry into the ineffectiveness claim as

required by People v. Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181 (1984).

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¶ 32 Our review of the record shows that when Mason asked that his counsel be relieved, the

court informed him that it “can’t do that right now in the middle of a hearing,” Mason responded

that APD Weisberg “show (sic) prejudice” and “violated [his] 14th Amendments.” Mason then

informed the court that he had had “a motion to dismiss the counts.” The court responded, “that’s

not relevant right now because there’s no counts on the table. *** Right now we’re talking about

whether or not I’m going to allow you to vacate the guilty plea from 07/26 of [2018].” Mason

replied:

“Your Honor, she violated my amendments and (Inaudible) due process because

I told her I was on medicine. She said it didn’t mean anything. And then now she asked to

subpoena my medical records from the Cook County Department of Corrections on June

the 13th, which back then July 26th, 2018, it didn’t mean anything. But why would you

all subpoena my medical records from June 13th, 2019 if it didn’t mean anything?

***

And I told her could she call my parents during the investigation and call my

mother. She told me she couldn’t get in contact [with] her. She did no visits in 2018, in

2019, since I’ve been in division 6 or division 10. She did no investigation to see if I was

on medication and what type of medication I was on until after my guilty plea.”

The court replied,

“[APD Weisberg] didn’t do any investigation after your plea of guilty because

you were in my courtroom and I gave it a continuance and I wasn’t supposed to see you

again. And on that day, according to the transcript that I reviewed, I was asked to recall

the case because the State made an offer to you for the minimum of six years and you

wanted to take it.”

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The court then passed the case for argument on the motion to withdraw Mason’s guilty plea.

¶ 33 A Krankel hearing “is triggered when a defendant raises a pro se posttrial claim of

ineffective assistance of trial counsel.” People v. Jolly, 2014 IL 117142, ¶ 29. It “serves the

narrow purpose of allowing the trial court to decide whether to appoint independent counsel to

argue a defendant’s pro se posttrial ineffective assistance claims” and “is intended to promote

consideration of pro se ineffective assistance claims in the trial court and to limit issues on

appeal.” Id. ¶ 41; People v. Patrick, 2011 IL 111666, ¶ 39.

¶ 34 However, the trial court is not automatically required to appoint new counsel when this

type of claim is raised. People v. Ayres, 2017 IL 120071, ¶ 11 (citing Jolly, 2014 IL 117142, ¶

29). Rather, the law requires the trial court to conduct some type of inquiry into the underlying

factual basis, if any, of the pro se posttrial claim of ineffective assistance. Id. An “adequate

inquiry” is one that is “sufficient to determine the factual basis of the claims.” Id. (quoting

People v. Banks, 237 Ill. 2d 154, 213-14 (2010)). A “trial court may consider both the facts and

legal merits of a defendant’s pro se posttrial allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel at the

preliminary inquiry stage.” People v. Roddis, 2020 IL 124352, ¶ 70. In evaluating a pro se claim,

“some interchange between the trial court and trial counsel regarding the facts and circumstances

surrounding the allegedly ineffective representation is permissible and usually necessary.” Ayres,

2017 IL 120071, ¶ 11. The trial court may discuss the allegations with defendant and may base

its determination on its own knowledge of defense counsel’s performance at trial. Id. However,

“[t]here is no set format for how an initial inquiry into a defendant’s pro se allegations of

ineffective assistance of counsel should be conducted.” People v. Flemming, 2015 IL App (1st)

111925-B, ¶ 85. Moreover, a court need not expressly state it is conducting a Krankel inquiry.

People v. Short, 2014 Il App (1st) 121262, ¶ 121.

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¶ 35 If the trial court determines that the claim lacks merit or pertains only to matters of trial

strategy, then the court need not appoint new counsel and may deny the pro se motion. Id.

However, if the allegations show possible neglect of the case, new counsel should be appointed.

Id. The newly appointed counsel can independently evaluate the pro se claim and avoid the

conflict of interest that defendant’s trial counsel would experience in trying to justify his or her

actions contrary to the defendant’s position. Roddis, 2020 IL 124352, ¶ 36. Whether the trial

court properly conducted a Krankel preliminary inquiry presents a legal question that we review

de novo. Id. ¶ 33.

¶ 36 Here, after Mason informed the court that he wanted APD Weisberg removed from his

case due to her ineffectiveness, the court had an exchange with APD Weisberg, who said she

spoke to Mason on the May 7th and June 5th, 2018, court dates. She stated that subsequently, on

July 10, 2018, she had a conversation with Mason about his mental health issues and about

whether he wanted to go to Cermak. Weisburg told the court that Mason did not want to go to

Cermak but instead wanted a plea offer. The State made a tentative offer on that date. The case

was continued to July 26, 2018, and on that date the State offered Mason six years’

imprisonment in exchange for his plea of guilty. APD Weisberg spoke to Mason about the offer

and Mason “decided that he was going to plead guilty” rather than continuing the case for him to

consider the offer. She discussed the option of trial, but Mason indicated that he wanted to plead

guilty on that date. APD Weisberg reviewed the jury waiver and presentence investigation forms

with Mason and he signed both, which indicated he understood and was waiving his rights. APD

Weisberg also relayed that on that court date, “Mr. Mason did mention that he was taking

medication. He did mention his mental illness. And then your Honor proceeded to question him

about that matter.” APD Weisberg further stated that “your Honor questioned me about the

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matter and I indicated my own belief that the plea was going to be made freely and voluntarily”

and that Mason was “knowledgeable and understood the circumstances.”

¶ 37 APD Weisberg then argued the motion to withdraw the guilty plea. She noted that

Mason’s medical records had been ordered and that Dr. Echevarria had issued a report. APD

Weisberg argued that although he did not “remember anything in terms of the court

proceedings,” he did “remember the discussion he had with me prior to the court proceeding.”

She further argued that despite the fact that Dr. Echevarria testified that “Mason was aware and

that he was in an understanding state” at the time of the plea, Dr. Echevarria did not interview

Mason at the time of the plea and “there is obviously no interview to determine his level of

understanding.” APD Weisberg also argued that, “[t]he doctor did say that the low dose that he

was receiving could have or would have had an impact on the sedation level of Mr. Mason. And,

in fact, he would have been more sedated and this could have caused him certainly to be drowsy

perhaps during the time of the plea itself.” She concluded by arguing that “Mason insists in his

testimony that he was not fit. That he did not understand. And that his plea was not given freely

and voluntarily. Based on that, your Honor, we would ask you to grant our motion.”

¶ 38 Contrary to Mason’s arguments, the record shows that although the circuit court did not

mention Krankel, or its requirements, it conducted an adequate preliminary inquiry into Mason’s

allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. Cf. People v. Dean, 2012 IL App (2d) 110505

(noting although the circuit court did not expressly indicate that it was conducting a Krankel

inquiry, the court was in fact conducting such an inquiry, and noting that there was no

requirement that the court expressly so state); People v. Gabrys, 2013 IL App (3d) 110912, ¶ 23

(finding that after the court’s inquiry pursuant to Krankel, the court’s denial of the motion to

withdraw indicated that it felt no further action was necessary on defendant’s allegations of

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ineffective assistance). Nor was the court required to appoint new counsel prior to its preliminary

investigation of Mason’s ineffectiveness claim. See People v. Allen, 391 Ill. App. 3d 412 (2009)

(there is no per se rule that a trial court is required to appoint new counsel when defendant files a

pro se post-trial motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, but the court is required to

conduct a preliminary inquiry to determine if the defendant’s allegations warrant new counsel).

¶ 39 In its preliminary investigation, the court allowed Mason to discuss his allegations that

APD Weisberg failed to listen or take action when he told her he was on medication and failed to

request a psychological evaluation prior to his plea. The court then listened to APD Weisberg’s

recitation of the events leading up to Mason’s plea. The court was aware of Dr. Echevarria’s

testimony that Mason was fit to stand trial at the time of his plea and was capable of knowingly

entering a plea of guilty. The court was also able to use its own knowledge and observations of

counsel’s performance at the time of the plea, as well as during the proceedings on the motion to

withdraw the plea, to assess Mason’s claim. The court recalled inquiring with defense counsel

whether there were any problems communicating. Mason asked specific questions about his

sentence and clarified with the court that he would be serving three years of “parole,” not house

arrest. The court stated, “It was never any bona fide doubt of this defendant’s fitness in my

mind”, stating further that Mason was “completely 100 percent in touch with reality.” The court

noted that neither party sought a BCX at that time. The court also noted, as did defense counsel,

that precedent established that taking medication for a mental illness does not in and of itself

equate to bona fide doubt of fitness to stand trial.

¶ 40 With respect to the merits of Mason’s claim, Mason contradicted himself when he

testified that he was not competent at the plea hearing because he was so medicated that he did

not know what he was doing and did not remember the plea. Yet, he explained to the court that

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on the date of the plea, he told APD Weisberg he was on medication, but she did not listen to

him, that it was APD Weisberg’s decision to plead guilty, not his, and that he did not want to

plead guilty. He also recounted that the prosecution had offered him six years imprisonment in

exchange for his plea. His testimony that he didn’t remember the plea hearing because he was

heavily medicated is belied by his vivid recall of the details of what transpired at the hearing. In

addition, we note that Mason’s decision to plead guilty on July 26, 2018, did not occur in a

vacuum. Rather, at the immediately prior hearing on July 10, 2018, Mason indicated he wanted a

plea offer from the State and the State made a tentative offer, another factor undermining his

contention that he didn’t understand what he was doing when he pled guilty two weeks later.

¶ 41 Considering the exchange in its entirety, the record shows that the trial court conducted

an adequate inquiry into Mason’s ineffectiveness allegations. And after hearing from Mason and

APD Weisberg, along with relying on its own knowledge and observations, the court properly

determined Mason’s ineffectiveness claim lacked merit and did not warrant further investigation.

¶ 42 Mason next argues that APD Weisberg’s facially valid Rule 604(d) (Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(d)

(eff. July 1, 2017)) certificate is rebutted by the record. He argues that despite her certifying

otherwise, APD Weisberg failed to comply with Rule 604(d) in three ways: (a) it was

questionable whether she actually consulted with him on his pro se motion; (b) she failed to

properly amend his pro se motion to include an ineffective assistance of counsel claim; and (c)

she failed to address the timeliness of his pro se motion as raised by the court. The State

responds that Mason’s argument lacks merit because the 604(d) certification that was filed, in

conjunction with the record, shows that APD Weisberg complied with all of requirements of

Rule 604(d). We agree.

¶ 43 Rule 604(d) sets forth the procedure governing a defendant’s appeal from a judgment

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entered upon a guilty plea. In re H.L., 2015 IL 118529, ¶ 7. Rule 604(d) requires counsel

representing a defendant on a motion to reconsider sentence to certify the following:

“[T]he attorney has consulted with the defendant either by mail or in person to

ascertain defendant’s contentions of error in the sentence [and] the entry of the plea of

guilty, has examined the trial court file and report of proceedings of the plea of guilty,

and has made any amendments to the motion necessary for adequate presentation of any

defects in those proceedings.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(d) (eff. July 1, 2017).

¶ 44 “[C]ounsel must strictly comply with ‘each of the provisions of Rule 604(d).’ ” People v.

Gorss, 2022 IL 126464, ¶ 19 (quoting People v. Janes, 158 Ill. 2d 27, 33 (1994)). “[A] facially

valid Rule 604(d) certificate may be refuted by the record.” People v. Curtis, 2021 IL App (4th)

190658, ¶ 37. However, “to prevail on such a claim, a defendant must actually show the record

refutes the certificate.” People v. Higgins, 2023 IL App (4th) 220837, ¶ 53. Where defense

counsel files a facially valid Rule 604(d) certificate and the defendant claims on appeal that his

counsel failed to make necessary amendments to defendant’s posttrial motion, the defendant

must present evidence in the record to rebut the certification. See Curtis, 2021 IL App (4th)

190658, ¶ 41. We review de novo whether counsel strictly complied with the provisions of Rule

604(d). Gorss, 2022 IL 126464, ¶ 10.

¶ 45 The record shows that APD Weisberg filed a Rule 604(d) certificate on September 5,

2019, wherein she stated that she: (1) she consulted with Mason in person, by mail, by phone, or

by electronic means to ascertain his contentions of error in entering the plea of guilty and in his

sentence, (2) she examined the trial court file and report of proceedings of the plea and sentence,

and (3) she made any amendments to the motion necessary for the adequate presentation of any

defects in those proceedings. Insofar as Mason urges us to disregard the properly filed certificate,

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Mason’s arguments are refuted by the record.

¶ 46 Mason’s first claim that it is “questionable at best” that APD Weisberg consulted with

him is refuted by the record. The record shows that on October 5, 2018, APD Weisberg notified

the court that she spoke to Mason and clarified with him that he wanted to withdraw his plea,

despite the fact that he titled his pro se motion as a motion to reduce his sentence. When asked,

Mason confirmed to the court that he wanted to recharacterize his motion as such. On November

19, 2018, APD Weisberg informed the court that she spoke to Mason and requested a

continuance to secure his medical records and court file. On February 6, 2019, counsel requested

a BCX to determine Mason’s fitness at his plea. After receiving the BCX report from Forensic

Clinical Services, which reported that Mason was mentally fit to stand trial when he accepted his

plea, APD Weisberg filed her Rule 604(d) certificate and motion to withdraw his plea. It is clear

from the record that APD Weisberg consulted with Mason and complied with Rule 604(d).

¶ 47 Mason points to his conversation with the court during the hearing on his motion to

withdraw, wherein he complained that counsel “did no visits in 2018, in 2019, since [he’d] been

in division 6 or division 10” as support for his claim that APD Weisberg did not consult with

him. At the hearing, APD Weisberg acknowledged that she had not made visits to the jail prior to

Mason’s plea because trial preparation was delayed pending a plea offer. However, this does not

establish that counsel never consulted or spoke to Mason prior to filing her certificate pursuant to

Rule 604(d) certificate.

¶ 48 Mason also contends APD Weisberg failed to properly amend his motion to withdraw his

guilty plea to include an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in violation of Rule 604(d).

However, Mason only alleged that APD Weisberg was ineffective at the conclusion of his

testimony at the hearing on his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, when he informed the court

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that he wanted “to relieve [APD Weisberg] from her duties. I would like to relieve her from her

duties” based on ineffective assistance of counsel. It is unclear how APD Weisberg would have

known prior to that moment that Mason deemed her ineffective. There is no evidence in the

record that Mason raised this specific issue with APD Weisberg prior to her filing the amended

motion. His argument, that it is “hard to believe” that he did not raise this issue with APD

Weisberg beforehand, is speculative. Hence, we find that this argument does not undermine APD

Weisberg’s compliance with Rule 604(d).

¶ 49 Mason also argues that APD Weisberg’s failure to advance any argument in support of

his motion to withdraw his guilty plea shows that APD Weisberg violated Rule 604(d). Contrary

to his argument, the record shows APD Weisberg did amend the motion to correct any defects in

the prior pleadings. In his pro se motion for reduction in sentence, he argued, in part, reasonable

doubt and that the charges against him were excessive due to his background and then stated

“including my mental illness Biplor (sic).” APD Weisberg amended that motion, providing the

court with a procedural summary of the case; the results of Dr. Echevarria’s BCX, wherein he

opined that Mason was fit to stand trial at the time of his plea; outlined Mason’s disagreement

with Dr. Echevarria’s findings; and argued that Mason wished and should be permitted to

withdraw his plea of guilty. APD Weisberg attached to her motion the plea transcript, Mason’s

pro se motion and Dr. Echevarria’s letter. Mason has failed to identify what other evidence APD

Weisberg should have included that would have further supported his claim.

¶ 50 Mason’s reliance on People v. Bridges, 2017 IL App (2d) 150718, and People v. Cline,

2023 IL App (4th) 220471-U, is unavailing. In Bridges, the defendant pled guilty to aggravated

battery with a firearm. Id. ¶ 1. He later filed a pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing

that counsel was ineffective and he was not mentally competent to enter a plea agreement. Id. ¶

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2. The pro se motion was supported by an affidavit, which included the allegation that the

defendant had been subject to coercion. Id. Counsel filed an amended motion, alleging the

defendant’s plea was under duress and he had not been properly medicated for his bipolar and

attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder at the time of the plea. Id. The amended motion was not

supported by an affidavit. Id. The defendant was not present at a status hearing or when the trial

court heard and denied his motion. Id. ¶ 4.

¶ 51 On appeal, we concluded that although counsel added new allegations to the defendant’s

motion, counsel failed to support those allegations with an affidavit. Id. ¶ 9. Moreover, we found

that counsel failed to present the defendant’s testimony or any evidence to support the motion.

Id. In addition, we found the defendant’s hearing was inadequate stating, “A hearing on a motion

to withdraw a defendant’s guilty plea must be more than a charade performed only to allow an

appeal to proceed.” Id. ¶ 10.

¶ 52 In Cline, 2023 IL App (4th) 220471-U, the defendant pled guilty to one count of being an

armed habitual criminal and one count of theft in two separate cases. Id. ¶¶ 5-6. The State

dropped a total of eight additional charges in both cases and dismissed three other pending cases

in their entirety in exchange for his plea. Id. He received consecutive sentences of 10 years for

being an armed habitual criminal and 4 years for theft. Under truth-in-sentencing provisions, the

armed habitual criminal sentence was required to be served at 85%, while the sentence for theft

was required to be served at 50%. Id. ¶ 7.

¶ 53 With the assistance of plea counsel, the defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty

plea, arguing that he was not aware of the requirement that he serve his first sentence at 85% and

did not contemplate this requirement when he pled guilty. Id. ¶ 8. Plea counsel withdrew and was

replaced by a new attorney. Post-plea counsel did not make any amendments to the motion filed

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by plea counsel, nor did he attach any affidavits in support of the defendant’s claim or present

evidence at the hearing on the motion to withdraw. Id. ¶ 15. On appeal from the trial court’s

denial of the motion to withdraw plea, this court agreed with the defendant that post-plea counsel

failed to strictly comply with Rule 604(d), explaining that counsel,

“failed to provide any legally recognized basis for defendant to withdraw his guilty plea,

such as defendant would not have pled guilty if he was correctly advised as to truth-in-

sentencing or, alternatively, that [plea counsel] provided ineffective assistance of counsel

by either (1) failing to properly advise him as to truth-in-sentencing or (2) incorrectly

advising him as to truth-in-sentencing. This failure was further compounded by [postplea

counsel] not calling defendant or [plea counsel] as witnesses at the hearing on

defendant’s motion.” Id. ¶¶ 18, 22.

¶ 54 Bridges and Cline are inapposite. Here, the record shows that counsel attached the plea

transcript that included Mason’s reference to his mental illness and medications, the results of his

BCX, and his pro se motion, where Mason referenced his mental illness. Furthermore, Mason

was present and testified at the hearing on the motion to withdraw his guilty plea. APD Weisberg

argued in support of the motion to withdraw, cross-examined Dr. Echevarria regarding his

findings, and presented Mason’s testimony. Unlike Bridges and Cline, counsel here strictly

complied with Rule 604(d).

¶ 55 Mason also claims that counsel violated Rule 604(d) when she failed to address the

potential untimeliness issue of his pro se motion in her amended motion and did not attach any

affidavits addressing when Mason mailed the motion, as the court noted it was two days late and

outside the 30-day time period for filing. We need not address this claim as this issue has already

been resolved in Mason’s favor on remand. See People v. Mason, 2022 IL App (1st) 200387-U, ¶

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31.

¶ 56 Finally, Mason argues that APD Weisberg was ineffective or that she labored under a

conflict of interest because she failed to properly amend Mason’s motion to withdraw his guilty

plea and failed to withdraw as appointed counsel after Mason criticized her performance.

¶ 57 When faced with challenges to trial counsel’s effectiveness, we generally apply the two-

prong test established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and adopted in Illinois

in by People v. Albanese, 104 Ill. 2d 504 (1984). To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance

of counsel under Strickland, a defendant must show that (1) counsel’s performance was deficient

and (2) counsel’s actions resulted in prejudice to the defendant. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687;

People v. Evans, 209 Ill. 2d 194, 220 (2004). Under the first prong, a defendant must

demonstrate that his attorney’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.

Evans, 209 Ill. 2d at 220. Under the second prong, prejudice is shown where there is a reasonable

probability that the result would have been different but for counsel’s alleged deficiency. Id.

Failure to satisfy either prong of the Strickland test precludes a finding of ineffective assistance

of counsel. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.

¶ 58 Mason argues that APD Weisberg failed to properly amend his motion to withdraw his

guilty plea with respect to his argument that APD Weisberg failed to strictly comply with Rule

604(d). For the reasons previously discussed, the record shows APD Weisberg properly amended

his motion and strictly complied with Rule 604(d). As a result, Mason cannot establish that APD

Weisberg was ineffective in this regard.

¶ 59 Mason also argues that APD Weisberg was ineffective because she labored under a

conflict of interest at the hearing on Mason’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea and had a duty

to withdraw once he criticized her professional judgment. We disagree.

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¶ 60 Conflict-free representation means that counsel’s assistance to the client is “not diluted

by conflicting interests or inconsistent obligations.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v.

Yost, 2021 IL 126187, ¶ 36. A conflict-of-interest claim is a specific form of an ineffective-

assistance claim, where the defendant is arguing that a conflict rendered counsel’s performance

substandard and that counsel’s substandard performance prejudiced the defendant. In re Br. M.,

2021 IL 125969, ¶ 44. Unlike a traditional Strickland ineffective-assistance claim, when

claiming conflict of interest, a defendant is not required to show that the outcome of a

proceeding was affected; it requires a showing only that counsel’s performance was adversely

affected by the conflict. People v. Austin M., 2012 IL 111194, ¶ 82 (“In actual conflict situations

the accused need not prove prejudice in that the conflict contributed to the conviction, but it is

necessary to establish that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected the lawyer’s

performance.”). We review de novo whether counsel labored under a conflict of interest. People

v. Garcia, 2018 IL App (5th) 150363, ¶ 26.

¶ 61 There are two types of conflicts of interest: per se and actual. Green, 2020 IL 125005, ¶

20. A per se conflict of interest does not require a defendant to establish that counsel’s

performance was affected by the conflict. People v. Hernandez, 231 Ill. 2d 134, 143 (2008).

When a per se conflict exists, automatic reversal of the criminal conviction is required unless the

defendant waived the right to conflict-free counsel. Yost, 2021 IL 126187, ¶ 39 (citing Green,

2020 IL 125005, ¶ 24). “Generally, a per se conflict arises when defense counsel has a

connection to a person or entity that would benefit from an unfavorable verdict for the

defendant.” Id.

¶ 62 Mason argues that a per se conflict of interest arose when APD Weisberg failed to

withdraw after he alleged her ineffectiveness at the post-plea hearing. Illinois case law currently

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recognizes only three categories of per se conflicts of interest: “(1) when defense counsel has a

contemporaneous association with the victim, the prosecution, or an entity assisting the

prosecution; (2) when defense counsel contemporaneously represents a prosecution witness; and

(3) when defense counsel was a former prosecutor who was personally involved in the

prosecution of the defendant.” Id. ¶ 66; Hernandez, 231 Ill. 2d at 143. This case does not involve

any of the three circumstances under which Illinois law has found a per se conflict of interest,

nor does Mason allege that one of these three circumstances existed here. As such, we find that

defense counsel did not harbor a per se conflict of interest.

¶ 63 Mason also argues that APD Weisberg suffered from an actual conflict of interest. If an

asserted conflict falls outside of what is considered a per se conflict, a defendant must show an

actual conflict of interest; that is, they must show prejudice in that counsel’s performance was

adversely affected by a conflict. See Yost, 2021 IL 126187, ¶ 66; People v. Green, 2020 IL

125005, ¶¶ 24, 38. “To establish an actual conflict, a defendant must do more than proffer

speculative allegations and conclusory statements.” People v. Zirko, 2021 IL App (1st) 162956, ¶

22.

¶ 64 Mason argues that an actual conflict of interest arose when, instead of making a closing

argument on the motion to withdraw his guilty plea, APD Weisberg defended her actions to the

court. Mason claims that her failure to advocate for him illuminates the conflict she labored

under, ultimately depriving him of effective assistance of counsel on his motion to withdraw his

guilty plea.

¶ 65 Mason’s pro se motion for reduction of sentence did not contain a claim that counsel was

ineffective. Mason’s motion to withdraw his plea did not contain a claim of ineffective assistance

of counsel. As previously discussed, Mason made an oral complaint about counsel’s performance

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during the hearing on the motion to withdraw. At this point, a Krankel inquiry was triggered,

which was separate from the issues raised in Mason’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The

court conducted a preliminary inquiry into Mason’s allegations, and APD Weisberg responded to

the allegations, reminding the court of what transpired on the dates leading up to Mason’s plea,

the discussions she had with Mason prior to taking his plea, and her observations at that time that

Mason was making a free and voluntary plea. After the preliminary Krankel inquiry, the court

did not appoint new counsel because the underlying claim of ineffective assistance had no merit.

At that point, argument on Mason’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea commenced. During

argument, APD Weisberg highlighted that Dr. Echevarria’s interview with Mason occurred a

year after his plea, that the medications Mason was taking at the time of his plea could have had

a sedative effect, and that Mason testified that he did not understand the proceedings. APD

Weisberg’s explanation to the court regarding Mason’s allegations focused on her performance

prior to Mason’s plea and did not undermine her ability to effectively advocate for Mason on his

motion to withdraw his guilty plea. At no point during these proceedings did an actual conflict

arise.

¶ 66 Mason’s reliance on People v. Willis, 134 Ill. App. 3d 123, 131 (1985), is unavailing.

There, the defendant filed a pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea and motion for

appointment of counsel. His assistant public defender filed an amended motion to withdraw the

plea, noting that defendant had alleged that counsel was ineffective at the plea hearing because

the defendant didn’t understand what happened on the date of the plea due to the medication he

was taking, and counsel allowed the State to formulate a sentence based on an incorrect rap

sheet. Defense counsel represented the defendant at the hearing on the motions, where the

defendant asked his counsel several questions regarding an incorrect “rap sheet” that had not

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been clarified before he entered his plea. Counsel responded to the questions. The defendant then

testified that his counsel told him to accept the plea offer because, based on his criminal record,

the trial court would be justified in imposing a greater sentence. The trial court denied the

motions.

¶ 67 On appeal, the defendant argued that he was entitled to a new hearing because he was

represented by the same attorney against whom he asserted a claim of ineffective assistance. In

finding a per se conflict of interest on that basis, we stated that the need to appoint other counsel

“should have been glaringly apparent during the course of the hearing,” and the “issue raised was

one which required preparation and presentation of evidence” to develop certain facts. Id. at 133.

¶ 68 Willis is distinguishable for two reasons. First, Willis predates the Illinois Supreme

Court’s decision in Hernandez, 231 Ill. 2d at 143, which clearly limited the circumstances of

what constitutes a per se conflict of interest, none of which is applicable here. Second, as

previously discussed, Mason did not make an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in his

motion for reduction of sentence, nor was one included in his motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

Unlike counsel in Willis, APD Weisberg had no way of knowing that Mason would raise this

claim at the conclusion of his testimony at the hearing on the motion to withdraw his plea and

therefore had no reason to withdraw.

¶ 69 This case is also distinguishable from People v. Salamie, 2023 IL App (2d) 220312,

which Mason cited in his motion for leave to cite supplemental authority. In Salamie, the

defendant argued that the denial of her motion to withdraw her guilty plea should be vacated

because her counsel was operating under an actual conflict of interest on her motion to withdraw.

In essence, counsel argued that he was ineffective in that he provided the defendant with

incorrect legal advice, and absent that incorrect advice, the defendant would not have accepted

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the State’s plea offer. We found that counsel’s conflict of arguing his own ineffectiveness

adversely affected his performance because he was reluctant to cast blame on himself or anyone

else and failed to include relevant evidence in the form of email conversations between himself

and the defendant. Id. ¶ 69-7. Therefore, we remanded for the appointment of conflict-free

counsel and new postplea proceedings.

¶ 70 Unlike counsel in Salamie, APD Weisberg did not operate under an actual conflict of

interest. There is no evidence here that APD Weisberg provided Mason with incorrect legal

advice on which Mason relied in choosing to plead guilty. If anything, the record shows that

Mason was actively seeking a plea offer on both the July 10 and July 26 court dates.

Furthermore, as previously discussed, APD Weisberg’s performance was not affected. She

zealously argued Mason’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Accordingly, we find that APD

Weisberg did not labor under an actual conflict of interest. Consequently, Mason’s claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel based on a conflict of interest fails.

¶ 71 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 72 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

¶ 73 Affirmed.