2025 IL App (1st) 240511-U No. 1-24-0511 Order filed September 16, 2025 Second Division
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________ THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County. ) v. ) No. 96 CR 4234 ) ANTOINE MASON, ) Honorable ) William B. Raines and Defendant-Appellant. ) Laura Ayala-Gonzalez, ) Judges, presiding.
PRESIDING JUSTICE VAN TINE delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Ellis and D.B. Walker concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: We affirm the dismissal of defendant’s successive postconviction petition due to his failure to demonstrate the cause prong of the cause-and-prejudice test. Defendant could have raised his age-based proportionate penalties challenge to his sentences earlier, either on direct appeal or in his initial postconviction petition.
¶2 Defendant Antoine Mason appeals from the trial court’s dismissal of his successive petition
under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (the Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2020)).
Defendant’s successive postconviction petition argued that his aggregate 85-year sentence for first No. 1-24-0511
degree murder and attempted first degree murder violates the proportionate penalties clause of the
Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. 1, § 11) because he was 19 years old at the time of the
offenses and had a difficult childhood. For the following reasons, we affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 A. Trial, Sentencing, and Direct Appeal
¶5 Following a November 1998 bench trial, the trial court found defendant guilty of first
degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West 1994)) premised on accountability and attempted first
degree murder (id. §§ 8-4(a), 9-1(a)(1)) premised on direct culpability. The trial evidence
established that, during a gang-related confrontation in Chicago on July 31, 1994, defendant shot
William Thurman nonfatally in the thigh. Defendant’s accomplice shot and killed a six-year-old
bystander, which was the basis for defendant’s accountability for first degree murder
¶6 The court held defendant’s sentencing hearing on February 10, 1999. Relevant here, in
mitigation, defense counsel argued that defendant “got off to” a “terrible start” in life because his
parents were “in and out of prison” throughout his childhood. Defense counsel also contended that
defendant was only 25 years old at the time of sentencing and should have “some sort of life” upon
his release from prison. The trial court sentenced defendant to consecutive terms of 60 years for
first degree murder and 25 years for attempted first degree murder. The court took “into
consideration the personal history of this defendant; certainly his age, his age now as well as at the
time of this offense” along with his “social history.” The court noted that, during the presentence
investigation, defendant described his childhood as “all right” and stated that “[h]e did not
experience physical or sexual, mental abuse in any way.”
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¶7 On direct appeal, defendant argued that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance and
that his mandatory consecutive sentences were unconstitutional under Apprendi v. New Jersey,
530 U.S. 466 (2000). This court initially affirmed defendant’s convictions but vacated his
consecutive sentences pursuant to Apprendi and ordered that his sentences run concurrently.
People v. Mason, 318 Ill. App. 3d 314, 320 (2000). The supreme court issued a supervisory order
requiring this court to reconsider in light of People v. Wagener, 196 Ill. 2d 269 (2001). People v.
Mason, 195 Ill. 2d 589 (2001). Upon reconsideration, this court affirmed defendant’s convictions
but held that his consecutive sentences were not unconstitutional under Apprendi and affirmed
them. People v. Mason, 324 Ill. App. 3d 762, 768 (2001).
¶8 B. Initial Postconviction Petition
¶9 In 2001, defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition challenging the evidentiary and
legal bases of the State’s accountability theory at trial. The petition also reiterated defendant’s
argument that his consecutive sentences were abuses of the trial court’s discretion and
unconstitutional under Apprendi.
¶ 10 The State moved to dismiss defendant’s postconviction petition, arguing that it was not the
proper means to challenge the legal or evidentiary sufficiency of the State’s accountability theory;
rather, defendant should have raised those issues on direct appeal.
¶ 11 In 2002, defendant, represented by counsel, filed an amended postconviction petition,
which argued that (1) trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to cite legal authority
in his motion for a new trial, (2) appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to
challenge an evidentiary ruling at trial, the sufficiency of the evidence, and trial counsel’s
ineffectiveness, and (3) the trial court violated defendant’ sixth amendment (U.S. Const., amend.
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VI) rights when it admitted the transcript of a grand jury witness’s testimony as substantive
evidence.
¶ 12 The State moved to dismiss defendant’s amended petition, arguing that (1) trial counsel’s
failure to cite legal authority in his motion for a new trial was immaterial as the trial court
presumptively knew the law, (2) defendant framing certain issues as claims of ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel was merely an attempt to avoid forfeiture of issues he could have
raised on direct appeal, and (3) defendant’s claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel
failed on the merits.
¶ 13 In 2006, the trial court granted the State’s motion to dismiss.
¶ 14 Defendant appealed the dismissal of his postconviction claim that his sentences were
unconstitutional under Apprendi. People v. Mason, No. 1-06-2205 (2009) (unpublished summary
order under Illinois Supreme court Rule 23(c)). This court affirmed. Id.
¶ 15 C. Successive Postconviction Petition
¶ 16 On August 4, 2020, defendant filed a pro se motion for leave to file a successive
postconviction petition based on a line of federal and state cases governing life sentences imposed
on juvenile defendants, beginning with Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012).
¶ 17 Defendant argued that his aggregate 85-year sentence violated the eighth amendment to
the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. VIII) and the proportionate penalties clause of
the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. 1, § 11) pursuant to Miller and related Illinois
authority. Defendant contended that he was 19 years old when he committed the offenses and the
trial court imposed a de facto life sentence of 85 years. Defendant acknowledged that the trial court
considered his age at sentencing. However, he argued that the court did not consider the
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characteristics of youth highlighted in Miller or how those characteristics affected his conduct in
this case. In addition, defendant pointed to recent scientific research indicating that the brains of
young adults continue to develop through their mid-20s, particularly the parts of the brain “that
govern impulsivity, judgment, planning for the future, foresight of consequences, and other
characteristics that make people morally culpable.” Defendant attached as exhibits several legal
journal and news articles from 2015, 2016, and 2019 discussing such research in the context of
juvenile sentencing.
¶ 18 Defendant sought leave to file his successive postconviction petition under the cause-and-
prejudice test, which requires a successive postconviction petitioner to show (1) a reason he could
not have raised his claim earlier and (2) a violation of his right to due process. See 725 ILCS 5/122-
1(f) (West 2020). As to cause, defendant argued that Miller and related Illinois case law did not
exist at the time of his initial postconviction petition or sentencing. As to prejudice, defendant
contended that he was harmed by serving an unconstitutional 85-year sentence.
¶ 19 The trial court advanced defendant’s successive postconviction petition to the second stage
under the misapprehension that it was his initial postconviction petition. Specifically, on
November 6, 2020, the court stated that “[b]ecause of the delay in filing,” the court would “advance
this to the second stage.”
¶ 20 At a hearing on March 12, 2021, the court stated that “[t]he second stage is because of the
pandemic and we lost that 90 day window for—This is a successive petition.” An assistant state’s
attorney advised the court that “on a successive petition there is no 90 day window.” The court
agreed and explained that it “didn’t know [the petition] was successive until [the court] just looked
at it. So there is no 90 day window.” This discussion referred to the Act’s provision that a trial
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court has 90 days to determine whether an initial postconviction petition is frivolous or patently
without merit, and if the court fails to do so, the petition automatically advances to the second
stage. See 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1 (West 2020); People v. McDonald, 373 Ill. App. 3d 876, 881
(2007).
¶ 21 The Office of the Public Defender then appeared on defendant’s behalf. Defense counsel
did not amend defendant’s pro se petition; rather, counsel filed a certificate pursuant to Supreme
Court Rule 651(c) (eff. July 1, 2017) attesting that he consulted with defendant, reviewed the
record, and supplemented the pro se petition with defendant’s affidavit.
¶ 22 In a 26-page handwritten affidavit, defendant described his traumatic childhood. Defendant
attested that, when he was a child, older relatives frequently beat him, sometimes causing injuries
that required stitches. A family friend and one of defendant’s cousins sexually abused him.
Defendant’s mother used crack cocaine and disappeared for days at a time. On several occasions,
police raided defendant’s house and arrested his parents while he was present.
¶ 23 Defendant also attested that he began using drugs and became involved in gang violence
when he was in elementary school. He spent two months in juvenile detention in connection with
a gang-related shooting that he witnessed. Thereafter, police harassed and beat him because they
believed he was a gang member. Defendant joined the Vice Lords street gang and was involved in
frequent gang violence. Defendant was expelled from two elementary schools and many of his
teachers physically abused him. He was in juvenile detention from November 1988 to July 1992
after police arrested him with a firearm following a gang-related altercation on a school bus. After
his release, he began selling cannabis and crack cocaine, although he was unsuccessful as a drug
dealer. Defendant was arrested for drug offenses and spent time in jail but received probation. He
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was also arrested for vehicle theft. Defendant was 19 years old when he was arrested in this murder
and attempted murder case. He described himself as “young and dumb” and “cowered down by
peer pressure” at the time of these offenses. However, defendant attested that the “days of [his]
immaturity” were “[l]ong gone.” He practiced conflict resolution and hoped to spend the rest of
his life with his mother and grandchildren.
¶ 24 The State moved to dismiss defendant’s successive postconviction petition, arguing that
defendant could not raise an eighth amendment challenge to his sentence under Miller because
Miller applied only to juveniles under 18 years of age. The State also argued that defendant did
not receive a de facto life sentence because day-for-day good time credit would result in him
serving 42 ½ years in prison, not 85. Finally, the State argued that defendant could not meet the
cause-and-prejudice test because in People v. Clark, 2023 IL 127273, our supreme court held that
the unavailability of Miller and related authority at the time of sentencing does not establish cause
for raising a proportionate penalties challenge to a sentence in a successive postconviction petition.
¶ 25 Defendant did not file a response to the State’s motion to dismiss.
¶ 26 The trial court held oral argument on the State’s motion to dismiss on February 28, 2024.
The State reiterated the arguments it made in its motion and contended that the trial court should
not have granted defendant leave to file his successive postconviction petition.
¶ 27 Defendant conceded that Miller did not apply to him and explained that he was only
challenging his sentence under the proportionate penalties clause, not the eighth amendment.
Defendant contended that Illinois case law allowed a defendant who, like him, was 19 years old at
the time of the offense to challenge his de facto life sentence under the proportionate penalties
clause. Defendant also argued that his sentence was a de facto life sentence because even if he
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served only half of it, he would still serve 42 ½ years, and any sentence over 40 years is a de facto
life sentence. Finally, defendant argued that he demonstrated cause and prejudice for filing a
successive postconviction petition because the Illinois case law on which he relied did not exist
until years after his initial postconviction petition was dismissed.
¶ 28 The trial court granted the State’s motion to dismiss. The court found that defendant did
not satisfy the cause-and-prejudice test, so “[l]eave should have never been granted” for defendant
to file his successive postconviction petition.
¶ 29 Defendant timely appealed.
¶ 30 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 31 Defendant contends that his sentences totaling 85 years for offenses committed when he
was 19 years old violate the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution, which
provides that “[a]ll penalties shall be determined both according to the seriousness of the offense
and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11.
¶ 32 A. The Post-Conviction Hearing Act
¶ 33 The Act allows a defendant to raise a claim that his conviction or sentence resulted from a
substantial denial of his constitutional rights. Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 38. Generally, a defendant
may file only one postconviction petition. Id. ¶ 39. To obtain leave to file a successive
postconviction petition, a defendant must fulfill the cause-and-prejudice test set out in section 122-
1(f) of the Act, which provides
“Leave of court [for filing a successive postconviction petition] may be granted
only if a petitioner demonstrates cause for his or her failure to bring the claim in his or her
initial post-conviction proceedings and prejudice results from that failure. For purposes of
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this subsection (f): (1) a prisoner shows cause by identifying an objective factor that
impeded his or her ability to raise a specific claim during his or her initial post-conviction
proceedings; and (2) a prisoner shows prejudice by demonstrating that the claim not raised
during his or her initial post-conviction proceedings so infected the trial that the resulting
conviction or sentence violated due process.” 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2020).
The trial court conducts the cause-and-prejudice analysis based on the pleadings and determines
whether the defendant has alleged facts setting out a prima facie case of cause and prejudice. Clark,
2023 IL 127273, ¶ 47. A defendant must establish both elements of the test to obtain leave to file
a successive postconviction petition. Id.
¶ 34 If a trial court grants leave to file a successive postconviction petition, the petition advances
to second-stage proceedings. People v. Robinson, 2020 IL 123849, ¶ 43. At the second stage, the
defendant may request counsel and the State may file responsive pleadings. 725 ILCS 5/122-4,
122-5 (West 2020). The trial court must determine whether the petition makes a substantial
showing of a constitutional violation. People v. Sanders, 2016 IL 118123, ¶ 37. If the petition does
not make such a showing, the trial court must dismiss it. People v. Dupree, 2018 IL 122307, ¶ 28.
If the petition makes such a showing, it advances to the third stage for an evidentiary hearing. Id.
¶¶ 28-29.
¶ 35 We will begin by conducting the cause-and-prejudice test because it is the first step in
successive postconviction proceedings. 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2020). The trial court
mistakenly advanced defendant’s successive postconviction petition to the second stage without
conducting the cause-and-prejudice test, which was error. See People v. Thames, 2021 IL App
(1st) 180071, ¶ 85. However, that error does not hinder our review. We may review cause and
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prejudice on an appeal from a second-stage dismissal because the State can seek dismissal based
on the defendant’s failure to establish cause and prejudice at any stage in postconviction
proceedings. People v. Johnson, 2019 IL App (1st) 153204, ¶ 37 (“even though the trial court
advanced the petition to the second stage and made no cause and prejudice findings, we will review
whether defendant established cause and prejudice”). Moreover, our review is de novo regardless
of whether the trial court denied defendant leave to file the successive petition due to his failure to
show cause and prejudice (see People v. Bailey, 2017 IL 121450, ¶ 13) or dismissed the petition
at the second stage due to defendant’s failure to make a substantial showing of a constitutional
violation (see Sanders, 2016 IL 118123, ¶ 31). De novo review means that we perform the same
analysis that a trial court would perform. People v. Van Dyke, 2020 IL App (1st) 191384, ¶ 41.
¶ 36 B. Cause
¶ 37 To establish cause, a defendant must identify an objective factor that prevented him from
raising his constitutional claim in his initial postconviction petition. People v. Wrice, 2012 IL
111860, ¶ 48; 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2020). That is, the defendant must articulate why he
could not have discovered the claim earlier by exercising due diligence. People v. Vidaurri, 2023
IL App (1st) 200857, ¶ 73.
¶ 38 The “cause” that defendant asserts is a combination of factual allegations, case law, and
scientific research. Defendant contends that his affidavit describing his difficult childhood is
“new” information that “was not presented at his sentencing hearing.” Defendant argues that this
“new” information shows his youthful characteristics at the time of the offenses and, when
considered in light of new case law and scientific research, means that his sentence violates the
proportionate penalties clause.
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¶ 39 1. Defendant’s Affidavit
¶ 40 First, we reject defendant’s contention that his affidavit describing his childhood is “newly
discovered” information that constitutes cause for filing a successive postconviction petition.
Defendant’s memory of his own childhood has always been available to him. There is no reason
defendant could not have raised his childhood as a mitigating factor in sentencing decades ago. To
some degree, he did. At the 1999 sentencing hearing, defendant’s attorney cited his difficult
childhood, his parents’ serial incarcerations, and his young age as mitigating factors. The fact that
defendant’s affidavit raises these same issues in more detail does not establish cause. See Clark,
2023 IL 127273, ¶ 63 (information that was available to the defendant and the court at the time of
sentencing is not cause to raise a proportionate penalties challenge in a successive postconviction
petition); People v. Mobley, 2022 IL App (1st) 201255-U, ¶¶ 23, 37, 39 (the defendant’s own
affidavit describing his upbringing did not fulfill the cause-and-prejudice test). “[D]efendant
merely seeks a second chance at requesting the court to give additional weight to his” difficult
childhood as a mitigating factor. See Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 63. To the extent defendant argues
that, at the sentencing hearing, his attorney did not effectively present his difficult childhood, or
the trial court misunderstood the nature of his upbringing, he could have raised those issues on
direct appeal. Therefore, defendant’s affidavit does not establish cause.
¶ 41 2. Miller and Related Case Law
¶ 42 Defendant also cannot establish cause based on the development of case law. A defendant
who was 19 years old at the time of the offense can raise a proportionate penalties challenge to a
life sentence based on the evolving science on juvenile maturity and brain development. Id. ¶ 87.
However, defendant has always been able to raise an age-based proportionate penalties claim. The
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proportionate penalties clause has existed since 1970 and “Illinois cases have long held the
proportionate penalties clause required the circuit court to take into account the defendant’s youth
and mentality in fashioning an appropriate sentence.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. ¶ 92
(collecting cases dating back to 1972). Even prior to Miller and the Illinois authority it produced,
defendant has always “had the tools to construct a claim that his sentence violated the proportionate
penalties clause because the sentencing judge did not take into account (1) his youth and (2) how
his particular neurobiological development affected his maturity and decision-making.” See
People v. Leach, 2024 IL App (4th) 230298, ¶ 83. Defendant could have raised his proportionate
penalties claim on direct appeal or in his initial postconviction petition.
¶ 43 Because age-based proportionate penalties challenges to sentences have been available in
Illinois for decades, our supreme court has held that Miller and the case law it produced do not
constitute cause for a defendant to raise a proportionate penalties claim in a successive
postconviction petition. Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 67; see also People v. Spencer, 2025 IL 130015,
¶ 31; People v. Moore, 2023 IL 126461, ¶ 40; People v. Dorsey, 2021 IL 123010, ¶ 74. Similarly,
“this court has universally *** conclude[d] that cause has not been established based on the prior
unavailability of Miller and its progeny.” People v. French, 2022 IL App (1st) 220122, ¶ 27; see
also People v. Willis, 2025 IL App (1st) 232204, ¶ 28 (the defendant forfeited any proportionate
penalties challenge to his sentence because he could have raised that challenge in a prior
proceeding, even before Miller). Therefore, defendant has failed to establish cause based on the
development of case law.
¶ 44 The cases that defendant cites to argue that Miller’s unavailability at the time of sentencing
establishes cause are no longer good law. See, e.g., People v. Ruiz, 2020 IL App (1st) 163145
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(abrogation recognized by People v. Hilliard, 2023 IL 128186, ¶ 28); People v. Minniefield, 2020
IL App (1st) 170541 (same).
¶ 45 Defendant also cites People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, which holds that “a prison sentence
of 40 years or less imposed on a juvenile offender does not constitute a de facto life sentence in
violation of the eighth amendment.” Id. ¶ 41. Buffer does not apply to defendant because he was
not a juvenile at the time of the offenses. Moreover, Buffer does not apply to proportionate
penalties clause claims. People v. Haynes, 2024 IL App (4th) 230222-U, ¶ 27. Therefore, the
development of case law following Miller does not establish cause.
¶ 46 3. New Scientific Research
¶ 47 The only arguably new information that defendant’s successive petition presents is
scientific research on young adult brain development, which did not exist at the time of sentencing
or his initial postconviction petition. Defendant contends that this research supports a conclusion
that his mental functioning was more like that of a juvenile at the time of the offenses. However,
this court has repeatedly rejected that argument. See, e.g., People v. White, 2020 IL App (5th)
170345, ¶ 24 (“a flat allegation as to evolving science on juvenile maturity and brain development
is simply insufficient” to “overcome the high bar for leave to file a successive postconviction
petition”); People v. Robinson, 2025 IL App (1st) 231419-U, ¶ 63 (new neuroscientific research
does not constitute cause because Illinois courts have long recognized that fully developed adults
are different from still-developing young adults).
¶ 48 Defendant’s argument on this point is speculative. General studies about young adult brain
development do not establish that this defendant functioned at the level of a juvenile in 1994,
especially where there is no indication defendant suffers from cognitive or developmental
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impairment. See White, 2020 IL App (5th) 170345, ¶ 24. The “allegations relating to [defendant’s]
family history do not rise to the level of special circumstances that would provide a compelling
reason to advance his successive postconviction petition.” See id. Moreover, no expert has opined
that defendant’s traumatic childhood engendered in him the juvenile traits that are relevant to
sentencing under Miller. Cf. People v. Garcia, 2024 IL App (2d) 210488-B, ¶ 16 (the
postconviction petitioner “submitted a lengthy report from a developmental psychologist who
observed that defendant had many of the traits that, per Miller, the sentenc[ing]” court must
consider).
¶ 49 Finally, defendant’s attestations about his maturation in prison do not change our
conclusion. The fact that defendant is more mature now at 50 years old than he was at 19 is
unsurprising, and it does not mean that he could not have raised his proportionate penalties claim
earlier. Defendant was always 19 years old at the time of the offenses, always had access to his
own memories about his childhood (memories that were likely fresher when he was 19 than now),
and was always legally able to challenge his sentence under the proportionate penalties clause.
Accordingly, we find that defendant failed to establish the cause prong of the cause-and-prejudice
test and should not have been granted leave to file his successive postconviction petition.
¶ 50 Because we find that defendant failed to establish cause, we need not address prejudice.
See People v. Morrow, 2019 IL App (1st) 161208, ¶ 57 (“we may uphold the denial of leave to
file the claim if defendant has failed to establish either prong” of the cause-and-prejudice test).
Defendant has forfeited any arguments regarding prejudice anyway, as his briefs do not address
that prong. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). We can affirm the second-stage dismissal
of defendant’s successive postconviction petition “on any grounds substantiated by the record,
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regardless of the trial court’s reasoning” (People v. Snow, 2012 IL App (4th) 110415, ¶ 17), and
we do so here.
¶ 51 We affirm the dismissal of defendant’s successive postconviction petition due to his failure
to establish cause.
¶ 52 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 53 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.
¶ 54 Affirmed.
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