2026 IL App (2d) 240675-U No. 2-24-0675 Order filed July 7, 2026
NOTICE: This order was filed under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not precedential except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
SECOND DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
ERNESTO VALLE, Defendant-Appellant
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Kane County. Honorable Robert K. Villa, Judge, Presiding. No. 06-CF-2062
JUSTICE McLAREN delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Birkett and Mullen concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The trial court’s second-stage dismissal of defendant’s successive postconviction petition is affirmed where 1) defendant failed to establish cause for not raising his youth-based proportionate penalties claim to his mandatory de facto life sentence in an earlier proceeding, and 2) defendant did not establish cause for his failure to raise the claim of a coerced confession in his initial postconviction petition. Trial court is affirmed.
¶2 A jury found defendant Ernesto Valle guilty of first degree murder of Jessie Lozano. At the
time of the offense, defendant was nearly 19 years old. The trial court sentenced defendant to a
minimum mandatory life sentence of 45 years in prison. This sentence comprised of 20 years for
first degree murder (the minimum) and 25 years for personally discharging a firearm to cause
Lozano’s death (the minimum). We affirmed defendant’s conviction and sentence of imprisonment, but vacated a fee imposed by the trial court. People v. Valle, 405 Ill. App. 3d 46, 61 (2010) (Valle
I).
¶3 In 2011 defendant filed a post-conviction petition that the trial court summarily dismissed
and which we affirmed on appeal. People v. Valle, 2013 IL App (2d) 110756-U (Valle II). On April
11, 2019, defendant filed a motion for leave to file a successive petition for postconviction relief
on the grounds that (1) defendant’s sentence violated the proportionate penalties clause of the
Illinois Constitution as applied to defendant, and (2) the trial court erred in admitting his coerced
confession at trial. The court granted leave, advanced the petition to the second stage and appointed
counsel. Defendant waived his right to counsel and proceeded pro se. On October 9, 2024, the trial
court granted the State’s motion to dismiss. Defendant appeals here from that dismissal and
contends that his cause should be remanded for an evidentiary hearing because his pleadings made
a substantial showing that his de facto life sentence, as applied to him, violated the proportionate
penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. Defendant also argues that the trial court erred when
it dismissed his successive petition because he established cause and prejudice for failing to raise
his claim of a coerced confession in his initial postconviction petition. We affirm.
¶4 I. BACKGROUND
¶5 The pertinent facts from the trial are set forth in Valle I. We summarize briefly.
¶6 Defendant was arrested as a suspect on August 12, 2006, for the shooting death of Jessie
Lozano. The police interrogated defendant at length over the course of the night and day following
his arrest. The police used tactics that included several instances of deception and occasional use
of a highly aggressive tone. Ultimately, defendant made inculpatory statements that were recorded.
He admitted ties to the Latin Kings gang. Defendant described being in a car with two other people
with Kings affiliations, Hector and Chris. Defendant told the police that he got out of the car with
-2- a gun and shot at a moving car. Defendant made contradictory statements about whether he shot
the moving car before or after he was at a party. He expressed uncertainty about where the shooting
occurred and the kind of gun he used.
¶7 Before trial, defendant moved to exclude his recorded inculpatory statements, alleging that
the statements were coerced. After a hearing, the trial court denied defendant’s motion.
¶8 At trial, the State primarily presented defendant’s recorded statements and the testimony
of Chris (whom the State did not charge) and Hector (who had pleaded guilty to conspiracy to
murder, under an agreement to testify against defendant). According to Chris and Hector, on the
night of the shooting the three were at a party together. Defendant talked to “Ric Dog” and someone
passed defendant a gun. Defendant said that he wanted to get his “crown.” The three left the party
and drove off, with defendant giving directions as Hector drove. Chris fell asleep in the car.
¶9 Hector drove to a place where he thought a party was going on because he saw cars going
in and out of the driveway. Defendant asked if Hector had seen “that truck” or “that SUV.” Hector
saw a big pickup truck. He started looking for a place to park. Defendant said, “pull over.” The
same truck drove head-on toward them. Defendant got out of the car, with his gun out, and ran
toward the truck. When defendant reached the intersection, he shot at the truck three to five times.
Defendant got back in the car and said that “he got him.” Hector drove away fast and returned
them to the party. On the way, defendant told Hector that the person had been “snitching.” When
they got back to the party, defendant told Ric Dog that he got him. Ric Dog told them they were
“shorties” (associate members) and had “come home.” Hector said that defendant would have
earned his crown based on the shooting. Defendant gave the gun back to the person who had it
originally. After about half an hour, defendant left the party with Hector and went to defendant’s
house.
-3- ¶ 10 The jury found defendant guilty of the murder and of having discharged the firearm.
Defendant filed a posttrial motion, challenging, among other things, the admission of the
inculpatory statements. The court denied the motion.
¶ 11 A presentence investigation report (PSI) indicated that defendant committed the offense
when he was two weeks from his 19th birthday. Defendant had no health or psychological issues
and denied any family history of substance abuse, or physical, mental, or sexual abuse. The PSI
included a statement by defendant. He asserted his innocence, claimed he was depressed and felt
helpless but had a supportive family. Regarding the inculpatory statements he made while in
custody, defendant stated that he felt helpless, he was confused, threatened, pressured, and was
tricked by the police. He claimed that he told them what they wanted to hear so that he could get
released. The PSI indicated that defendant had two pending class 4 felonies charges for mob action
and a class A misdemeanor charge for battery that occurred in jail pending sentencing. The court
also received two victim impact statements from the victim’s mother.
¶ 12 A sentencing hearing followed. The court reviewed the PSI. The State argued that the trial
court should sentence defendant to 49 or 50 years’ imprisonment. Defense counsel argued that
defendant should be sentenced to the minimum of 45 years’ imprisonment because due to his
young age, he is not likely to reoffend, and any sentence would deter others. Lastly, defense
counsel stated, “At his young age he has a chance to get back into society and be a benefit to
society.”
¶ 13 Before imposing the sentence, the court stated that he considered the evidence presented at
trial, the PSI, and the financial impact of incarceration. In aggravation, the court stated that the
sentence was necessary to deter others from committing the same crime and that defendant
committed an offense related to the activities of an organized gang. The court stated there were no
-4- factors in mitigation. The court then sentenced defendant to the minimum allowed by law, 45 years’
imprisonment; 20 years for first degree murder (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(a) (West 2006) (providing
a range of 20 to 60 years)); and a consecutive term of 25 years for personally discharging the
firearm that caused the victim’s death (see id. § 5-8-1(a)(1)(d)(iii) (providing a range of 25 years
to natural life)).
¶ 14 Defendant appealed, challenging only the propriety of the admission of his videotaped
inculpatory statements on the basis that they were involuntary, and a $100 fine imposed at
sentencing. We upheld the admissibility of the videotaped statements. Valle I, 405 Ill. App. 3d at
59-61.
¶ 15 In April 2011 defendant filed a postconviction petition under the Post-Conviction Hearing
Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2010)). The trial court summarily dismissed defendant’s
petition and we affirmed. Valle II, 2013 IL App (2d) 110756-U, ¶¶ 8-12, 18.
¶ 16 In April 2019 defendant sought leave to file a successive postconviction petition. The trial
court appointed counsel and advanced the petition to the second stage. Counsel filed an amended
successive postconviction petition, but defendant terminated counsel.
¶ 17 In December 2022 defendant, pro se, filed a supplemental successive postconviction
petition (successive petition). Defendant challenged his 45-year sentence under the eighth
amendment of the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. VIII) and the proportionate
penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11) and claimed that the trial
court erred when it admitted his videotaped inculpatory statements. Defendant asserted that Miller
v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and its Illinois progeny provided a new substantive rule
regarding considerations of defendant’s youth when sentenced. He acknowledged that he was not
-5- a juvenile offender at the time of the offense but argued that his youth should have been considered
at sentencing.
¶ 18 Defendant supplemented his successive petition with a report prepared by Dr. James
Garbarino. Garbarino opined that “as an 18 year old who experienced significant adversity,
[defendant] exhibits a kind of ‘adolescence squared.’ *** [But defendant] was not one of the rarest
cases of ‘irreparable corruption’ where rehabilitation and positive transformation are impossible.”
Garbarino stated that the “Miller issues” applied to defendant and that defendant’s dysfunctional
family, witnessing of community violence and substance-abusing of his peers, had a negative
influence on him that exacerbated his problems with making good decisions and managing his
emotions. Garbarino opined that defendant had a strong support system and rehabilitative
potential, and recommended resentencing with the court to reconsider defendant’s youth at the
time of the offense.
¶ 19 Garbarino also stated:
“[Defendant] claims that his confession to the fatal shooting of Jesse Lozano was false and
was coerced by members of the Aurora Police Department. While I am not in a position
professionally to verify this claim, I can assert with confidence that this claim is
psychologically and socially plausible.” (Emphasis in original.)
Garbarino then summarized research and cases that indicate police tactics may lead to coerced
false confessions from young adults. Garbarino opined: “[Defendant’s] account of his confession
to the crime in 2006, contains all the elements identified in research as the conditions in which
coerced false confessions by young males occur.”
¶ 20 The trial court granted the State’s motion to dismiss. Defendant now appeals from the trial
court’s dismissal and urges us to reverse the trial court and remand the case for a third-stage
-6- evidentiary hearing. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the dismissal of defendant’s successive
petition.
¶ 21 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 22 Defendant argues that the trial court erred when it dismissed his successive petition at the
second-stage of postconviction proceedings because he satisfied the cause and prejudice test and
made a substantial showing that 1) his mandatory natural life sentence was unconstitutional, as
applied to him under the Illinois proportionate penalties clause, and 2) his confession was not
voluntary and he did not knowingly waive his Miranda rights.
¶ 23 The Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2022)) allows a defendant to raise a claim that
his sentence violates his constitutional rights. People v. Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 38. Because the
Act is not a substitute for an appeal, but rather, a collateral attack on a final judgment, issues that
were not presented in an original postconviction petition are forfeited and issues that were
previously raised and addressed on direct appeal are barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Clark,
2023 IL 127273, ¶ 38 (citing 725 ILCS 5/122-3 (West 2022)).
¶ 24 Consistent with these principles, the Act contemplates the filing of only one petition
without leave of court and codifies the cause-and-prejudice test as the prerequisite to obtaining
such relief. 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2022). To obtain leave, the defendant must establish cause
by identifying an objective factor that impeded his ability to raise a specific claim during his initial
postconviction proceedings and prejudice by demonstrating that the claim not raised earlier so
infected the trial that the resulting conviction or sentence violated due process. Id.
¶ 25 If, as here, the trial court grants leave to file a successive petition, the petition is docketed
for second-stage proceedings, where the defendant must make a substantial showing of a
constitutional violation. People v. Cotto, 2016 IL 119006, ¶ 27. At the second stage, the State may
-7- file responsive pleadings and seek dismissal of the petition on any ground, including procedural
default. People v. Bailey, 2017 IL 121450, ¶ 26. This permits the State to, once again, argue that
dismissal is proper because the petitioner failed “to prove cause and prejudice for not having raised
the claims in the initial postconviction petition.” Id. Our review of the trial court’s second-stage
dismissal of a petition is de novo. People v. Johnson, 2024 IL App (1st) 220419, ¶ 65.
¶ 26 Successive postconviction petitions are highly disfavored because they impede the finality
of criminal convictions that undermines “the deterrent effect of our criminal laws.” People v.
Montanez, 2023 IL 128740, ¶ 73. The legislature designed the Act to allow defendants to file only
one petition under the statute. 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2022); Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 39 (“the
legislature generally intended to limit a petitioner to the filing of only one petition under the
Postconviction Act.”). Therefore, a defendant filing a successive postconviction petition must first
obtain leave of court. 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2022).
¶ 27 To obtain leave to file a successive postconviction petition, a defendant must show “cause”
and “prejudice.” Id. A failure to establish either prong is fatal to the claim. People v. Montanez,
2023 IL 128740, ¶ 77. “[C]ause” is “an objective factor that impeded [the defendant’s] ability to
raise a specific claim during his or her initial post-conviction proceedings.” 725 ILCS 5/122-
1(f)(1) (West 2022). “[P]rejudice” requires a showing that “the claim not raised during his or her
initial post-conviction proceedings so infected the trial that the resulting conviction or sentence
violated due process.” Id. § 122-1(f)(2).
¶ 28 When, as here, the trial court granted defendant leave to file a successive petition, it
effectively advanced the successive petition to the second stage of postconviction proceedings.
People v. Johnson, 2019 IL App (1st) 153204, ¶ 32. The State moved to dismiss defendant’s
successive petition pursuant to section 122-5 of the Act. 725 ILCS 5/122-5 (West 2022). The State
-8- sought dismissal of defendant’s successive petition based on defendant’s failure to prove cause and
prejudice for not having raised the claims in the initial postconviction petition. We review a trial
court’s dismissal of a postconviction petition at the second stage de novo. People v. Addison, 2023
IL 127118, ¶ 17. We may affirm a trial court’s judgment on any basis supported by the record.
People v. Howard, 2021 IL App (2d) 190695, ¶ 21.
¶ 29 A. Defendant’s Proportionate Pentalties Claim
¶ 30 Defendant contends that he satisfied the cause and prejudice test for his claim that his
mandatory de facto life sentence violates the proportionate penalties clause 1) because the legal
basis for his claim was not previously available until the United States Supreme Court decided
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479 (2012) (holding “life in prison without possibility of parole
for juvenile offenders” violates the eighth amendment of the United States Constitution) and
related Illinois cases, and 2) because he presented previously unavailable evidence that his brain
was more like that of a juvenile than an adult.
¶ 31 The eighth amendment and the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution
(Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11) are generally read coextensively. See, e.g., People v. Patterson, 2014
IL 115102, ¶ 101; People v. Nichols, 2018 IL App (2d) 150779, ¶ 20. Under the proportionate
penalties clause all penalties must “be determined both according to the seriousness of the offense
and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11;
People v. Spencer, 2025 IL 130015, ¶ 42. A sentence violates the proportionate penalties clause
when, inter alia, the penalty imposed is “‘cruel, degrading, or so wholly disproportionate to the
offense as to shock the moral sense of our community.’” People v. Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 51
(quoting People v. Leon Miller, 202 Ill. 2d 328, 338 (2002)).
-9- ¶ 32 The mandate set forth in the proportionate penalties clause provides a check on both 1) the
judiciary, which imposes sentences on defendants within the limits prescribed by the legislature,
and 2) the legislature, which sets statutory penalties. People v. Spencer, 2025 IL 130015, ¶ 42. The
legislative power to prescribe necessarily includes the authority to prescribe mandatory sentences,
even if those sentences restrict the judiciary’s discretion. People v. Hilliard, 2023 IL 128186, ¶ 21.
To be clear, defendant does not argue that his sentence fails to comport with the sentencing statutes
at issue. Rather, defendant argues that he established cause because he lacked legal support for his
proportionate penalties claim until 2012 when the United States Supreme Court decided Miller.
Defendant also maintains that he lacked new evidence to support his claim.
¶ 33 To establish cause, a defendant must identify an objective factor that prevented him from
raising his constitutional claim in his initial postconviction petition. People v. Wrice, 2012 IL
111860, ¶ 48; 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2022). That is, the defendant must articulate why he
could not have discovered the claim earlier by exercising due diligence. People v. Vidaurri, 2023
IL App (1st) 200857, ¶ 73.
¶ 34 We hold that defendant cannot make such a showing. Pursuant to our supreme court’s
decisions in Clark, 2023 IL 127273, and People v. Moore, 2023 IL 126461, we conclude that the
trial court properly dismissed defendant’s successive petition because he failed to show cause for
not raising his as-applied proportionate penalties sentencing challenge on direct appeal or in his
initial postconviction petition. “Illinois cases have long held the proportionate penalties clause
require[s] the circuit court to take into account the defendant’s youth and mentality in fashioning
an appropriate sentence.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 92
(collecting cases dating to 1972).
- 10 - ¶ 35 Further, Miller did not change the law applicable to sentences imposed on young adult
offenders, i.e., 18- to 20-year-olds. Spencer, 2025 IL 130015, People v. Moore, 2023 IL 126461,
¶ 44; People v. Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 58 (“[T]he Supreme Court has clearly and consistently
drawn the line between juveniles and adults for the purpose of sentencing at the age of 18.”). In
Moore, our supreme court held that Miller directly applies only to juveniles and does not apply to
young adults. Moore, 2023 IL 126461, ¶ 38. As such, Miller does not provide cause for a young
adult offender to raise a claim under the proportionate penalties clause in a successive
postconviction petition. Id. ¶ 42.
¶ 36 Defendant asserts that Moore does not apply to him because Moore held that Miller only
applied to discretionary sentences; whereas defendant’s sentence was mandatory. We disagree with
defendant’s argument.
¶ 37 In People v. Horshaw, 2024 IL App (1st) 182047-B, the appellate court concluded that
supreme court precedent did not allow for a distinction between mandatory and discretionary
sentences for proportionate penalties claims brought by young-adult offenders. Rather, that
precedent indicated that such a claim “should be viewed as nothing more than an extension of
proportionate penalties claims that have existed all along and that defendant did not need Miller
or Miller-related proportionate penalties precedent to raise the claim now at issue.” Id. ¶ 62.
¶ 38 Additionally, in People v. Leach, 2024 IL App (4th) 230298, the appellate court noted that
“nothing in Moore suggested a distinction between discretionary and mandatory sentences,” and
it recognized Moore’s statement that “‘Miller did not change the law applicable to young adults.”
(Emphasis in original.) Id. ¶¶ 86-87 (quoting Moore, 2023 IL 126461, ¶ 42). Instead, the appellate
court in Leach concluded that the defendant’s argument that a distinction existed between
- 11 - discretionary and mandatory sentences for young adults relied on “selective reading” of the
caselaw. Id. ¶ 87.
¶ 39 Further, People v. Merriweather, 2023 IL App (1st) 220440-U, is persuasive. Merriweather
held that the distinction between discretionary and mandatory life sentences was “irrelevant” and
that Illinois cases such as Moore holding that Miller and its progeny do not provide cause for a
young-adult offender to raise a proportionate penalties claim in a successive petition “apply to both
claims involving discretionary life sentences and those involving a mandatory life sentence.” Id.
¶ 21.
¶ 40 We agree with the decisions in Horshaw, Leach, and Merriweather that it is clear from the
supreme court’s decisions in Dorsey and Moore that Miller does not provide cause for a young-
adult offender who received a de facto life sentence to raise a proportionate penalties claim in a
successive postconviction petition, regardless of whether the sentence was mandatory or
discretionary. As plainly stated in Moore, “Miller did not change the law applicable to young
adults” (2023 IL 126461, ¶ 42) and “does not provide cause for a young adult offender to raise a
claim under the proportionate penalties clause” because it “does not apply directly to young adults”
(id. ¶ 40). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in finding that the defendant did not demonstrate
cause as to his proportional penalties claim. Because the defendant failed to establish cause, we
need not address prejudice (see id.).
¶ 41 In support of his contention that he established cause, defendant cites, People v. Green-
Hosey, 2025 IL App (2d) 240284, pet. for leave to appeal granted, No. 131560 (filed Sept. 24,
2025), which is distinguishable. First, in Green-Hosey we reviewed an initial postconviction
petition that advanced to a third-stage hearing. Id. ¶¶ 16-21. There is an important distinction
between a proportionate penalties claim raised in an initial postconviction petition and one asserted
- 12 - for the first time in a successive petition. Moore, 2023 IL 126461, ¶ 42 (the “defendant had the
essential legal tools to raise his present proposed claim under the proportionate-penalties clause
when he filed his previous postconviction petitions.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) (citation
omitted). Because Miller did not change the law applicable to young adults, it did not provide
cause for the proportionate penalty challenges advanced in Moore’s and Williams’s proposed
successive postconviction petitions.
¶ 42 Defendant cites People v. Harris, 2018 IL 121932, to support his contention that “emerging
adults’ proportionate penalties claims that challenge de facto life sentences are legally cognizable.”
However, in Harris, our supreme court stated, “defendant in this case was 18 years old at the time
of his offenses. In addition, our supreme court clearly reiterated its conclusion that “Miller only
applies to juveniles and does not apply to emerging adults.” People v. Spencer, 2025 IL 130015,
¶ 32. Here, defendant was nearly 19 years old – not a juvenile – and, therefore, Miller does not
apply to his circumstances.
¶ 43 Defendant relies on People v. Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, and People v. House, 2018 IL
121932, to support his argument that Miller’s holding is extended to young adults. However, these
cases are wholly irrelevant to defendant’s situation. In 2023 in Clark, our supreme court explained:
“this court has not foreclosed ‘emerging adult’ defendants *** from raising as-applied
proportionate penalties clause challenges to life sentences based on the evolving science on
juvenile maturity and brain development. *** [However, Thompson and Harris] addressed the
possibility of a defendant raising a Miller-based challenge with respect to mandatory life sentences
in initial postconviction petitions” (emphasis in original)) Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 88. See also
People v. Horshaw, 2024 IL App (1st) 182047-B, ¶ 62; see also e.g. People v. Brewer, 2025 IL App
(1st) 240088, ¶¶ 29-30, People v. Minniefield, 2025 IL App (1st) 240463-U, ¶ 54; People v. Handy,
- 13 - 2025 IL App (1st) 231568-U, ¶ 58; People v. Davis, 2025 IL App (1st) 231499-U, ¶¶ 19, 24. Here,
defendant raised as-applied proportionate penalties challenge for the first time in a successive
postconviction petition. Therefore, Thompson and House, are not dispositive, here.
¶ 44 In addition, we reject defendant’s argument that he established cause because he presented
new, previously unavailable factual evidence that shows his brain was immature and more similar
to that of a juvenile’s than an adult’s. Defendant cannot establish the necessary cause because our
courts have long recognized the differences between juvenile and young adult offenders. See
People v. Dorsey, 2021 IL 123016, ¶ 74; Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶¶ 92-94; People v. Moore, 2023
IL 126461, ¶ 42; Hilliard, 2023 IL 128186, ¶ 28.
¶ 45 In Dorsey, a juvenile offender sought leave to file a successive postconviction petition,
challenging his 76-year aggregate prison sentence based on Miller. The Dorsey court held “that
Miller’s announcement of a new substantive rule under the eighth amendment [did] not provide
cause for [the] defendant to raise a claim under the proportionate penalties clause.” Dorsey, 2021
IL 123016, ¶ 74. “Illinois courts have long recognized the differences between persons of mature
age and those who are minors for purposes of sentencing. Thus, Miller’s unavailability prior to
2012 at best deprived defendant of ‘some helpful support’ for his state constitutional law claim,
which is insufficient to establish ‘cause.’ ” Id.
¶ 46 Following Dorsey, Illinois courts have continued to hold that sentencing claims based on
youth are not novel and do not support a finding of cause. In Clark, the supreme court considered
the proportionate penalties claim of a 24-year-old defendant suffering from mental health issues.
Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 1. Applying the cause-and-prejudice test, the supreme court found that
the defendant could not establish cause because case law was clear that the new rule set forth in
Miller “‘does not provide cause for a defendant to raise a claim under the proportionate penalties
- 14 - clause’ in a successive postconviction petition.” Id. ¶ 92 (quoting Dorsey, 2021 IL 123010, ¶ 74).
In applying Dorsey to young adult offenders, the Clark court observed that “Illinois courts were
also aware that ‘less than mature age can extend into young adulthood—and they have insisted
that sentences take into account that reality of human development.’” Id. ¶ 93 (quoting People v.
Haines, 2021 IL App (4th) 190612, ¶ 47). The court found that the defendant “‘had the essential
legal tools to raise his present proposed claim under the proportionate-penalties clause’ when he
filed his previous postconviction petitions.” Id. (quoting Haines, 2021 IL App (4th) 190612, ¶ 49).
The supreme court concluded that, “citing the Miller line of cases does not satisfy the ‘cause’ prong
of the cause-and-prejudice test for raising a proportionate penalties claim in a successive
postconviction petition, as Miller’s unavailability does nothing to explain why defendant neglected
to raise the proportionate penalties clause claim in his prior postconviction proceedings.” Id. ¶ 94;
see Moore, 2023 IL 126461, ¶ 42 (“As Miller did not change the law applicable to young adults,
it does not provide cause for the proportionate penalties challenges advanced in [the defendants’]
proposed successive postconviction petitions.”); People v. Hilliard, 2023 IL 128186, ¶ 28
(recognizing its holding in Moore that Miller protections do not apply to discretionary sentences
or adults).
¶ 47 Here, defendant had “the essential legal tools” to raise his present claim under the
proportionate penalties clause when he filed his previous postconviction petition. Clark, 2023 IL
127273, ¶ 93. in Clark, our supreme court clarified that “Illinois cases have long held that the
proportionate penalties clause required the circuit court to take into account the defendant's ‘youth’
and ‘mentality’ in fashioning an appropriate sentence” and that “[a]s far back as 1894, this court
recognized that ‘[t]here is in the law of nature, as well as in the law that governs society, a marked
distinction between persons of mature age and those who are minors’ ” and “ ‘[t]he habits and
- 15 - characters of the latter are, presumably, to a large extent as yet unformed and unsettled.’ ” Id. ¶ 92
(quoting People ex rel. Bradley v. Illinois State Reformatory, 148 Ill. 413, 423 (1894)). In addition
Miller did not establish cause for offenders with intellectual disabilities to raise new challenges to
their sentences under the proportionate penalties clause, because “[l]ong before Miller, Illinois law
recognized the reduced culpability of defendants with intellectual disabilities.” Id. ¶ 62.
¶ 48 We hold that defendant has failed to show cause to prevail on his successive postconviction
claim. As Miller did not change the law applicable to sentences imposed on young adult offenders,
it does not provide cause for defendant to prevail on his claim raised here. Moore, 2023 IL 126461,
¶ 44; see also Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 72. Based on the foregoing, we affirm the trial court’s
dismissal of defendant’s successive postconviction petition. As our ruling on cause disposes of this
claim, we need not address whether defendant adequately established prejudice. See id. ¶ 94.
¶ 49 B. Defendant’s Inculpatory Statements Claim
¶ 50 Presently, defendant raises the same issue regarding his inculpatory statements that were
previously raised and definitively settled by judicial decisions. On direct appeal, defendant argued
that the trial court erred when it admitted his videotaped inculpatory statements. He contended his
statements were involuntary due to his age, lack of experience with the criminal justice system,
his intellect, intoxication, and fatigue, and the subterfuge, trickery, and coercion of the police. Valle
I, 405 Ill. App. 3d at 58, 55. We held the trial court’s “finding that defendant lacked any special
susceptibility to the police tactics [was not] against the manifest weight of the evidence.” Id. at 58.
Defendant renewed his claim in his writ of habeas corpus in federal court where it was rejected
again. Valle v. Butler, 707 Fed. Appx. 391, 392, 397 (7th Cir. 2017). Accordingly, further litigation
on the claim that his inculpatory statements were inadmissible because they were involuntary is
barred by the res judicata doctrine. People v. Montanez, 2023 IL 128740, ¶ 104.
- 16 - ¶ 51 The effect of the res judicata doctrine may be relaxed only if defendant satisfies the cause
prong of the cause and prejudice test, i.e., establish the existence of an objective factor, “external
to the defense,” that “impeded the defendant’s ability to raise a specific claim at the initial
postconviction proceeding.” (Emphasis added.) Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 60.
¶ 52 Based on our review of defendant’s successive petition and the record before us, we
conclude that defendant cannot establish cause. Defendant failed to demonstrate any objective
factor that impeded his ability to raise the claim in his original initial postconviction petition.
¶ 53 Defendant maintains that he established cause by presenting a 2018 article that discusses
the increasing skepticism of the “Reid Method,” as an effective police interrogation tactic.
Contrary to defendant’s assertion, the information contained in the article is not new. More than
50 years ago the United State Supreme Court was openly critical of the “Reid Method.” Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 449-455 (1966).
¶ 54 Defendant also asserts that Garbarino’s report establishes cause. However, Garbarino’s
report does not support defendant’s claim that his inculpatory statements were involuntary. In his
report, Garbarino stated that he reviewed defendant’s claim that his videotaped statement was false
and coerced due to his age and life experiences. Garbarino then stated that he was “not in a position
to professionally verify” defendant’s claim that his inculpatory statement was coerced and false.
Garbarino stated only that defendant’s claim was “psychologically and socially plausible.”
¶ 55 At the time defendant filed his initial postconviction petition, he had the essential legal
tools required to raise his claim. See Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 93. Even if the report and article
could have provided “some helpful support” for defendant’s claim, he was not precluded from
raising his claim in his initial postconviction petition and therefore defendant is unable to establish
cause. Dorsey, 2021 IL 123010, ¶ 74.
- 17 - ¶ 56 Because defendant cannot satisfy the cause prong of the cause-and-prejudice test, the trial
court properly granted the State’s motion to dismiss defendant’s successive postconviction
¶ 57 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 58 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Kane County.
¶ 59 Affirmed.
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