People v. Chavez

2025 IL App (1st) 231823-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: February 6, 2025
• Docket: 1-23-1823
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2025 IL App (1st) 231823-U

FOURTH DIVISION Order filed: February 6, 2025

No. 1-23-1823

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County. ) v. ) No. 05 CR 21283 ) JOSE CHAVEZ, ) Honorable ) Michael B. McHale, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.

JUSTICE HOFFMAN delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Rochford concurred in the judgment. Justice Ocasio specially concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The dismissal of the defendant’s successive postconviction petition is affirmed because Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), does not provide cause for a young adult offender to raise a claim under the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution, even when the defendant received a mandatory de facto life sentence.

¶ 2 The defendant, Jose Chavez, appeals the circuit court’s second-stage dismissal of his

successive petition for postconviction relief filed under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act)

(725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2016)), in which he argued that his de facto life sentence for a No. 1-23-1823

crime that he committed when he was 18 years old violated the proportionate penalties clause of

the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11). Because we agree with the circuit court that

Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), does not provide cause for the defendant’s failure to raise

the claim earlier, we affirm the court’s judgment.

¶3 In 2008, the defendant was convicted of first-degree murder for shooting and killing a 13-

year-old boy during a 2005 drive-by shooting. The defendant was 18 years old at the time of the

offense. He received a 58-year prison sentence, comprised of 29 years for first-degree murder and

29 years for personally discharging a firearm. The firearm enhancement was mandatory, and the

defendant’s effective sentencing range was 45 years to life. On appeal, the defendant contested

one issue related to jury selection, and this court affirmed his conviction and sentence. See People

v. Chavez, 402 Ill. App. 3d 1184 (2010) (table) (unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court

Rule 23).

¶4 In 2011 and 2013, the defendant filed two unsuccessful petitions for postconviction relief.

The initial petition raised issues again related to jury selection (see People v. Chavez, 1-11-2581

(2012) (unpublished summary order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23(c))), and the successive

petition raised a claim concerning a note from a jury member expressing safety concerns (see

People v. Chavez, 1-14-1639 (2015) (unpublished summary order under Illinois Supreme Court

Rule 23(c))). Neither raised any issue related to his sentence.

¶ 5 In September 2017, the defendant filed a motion for leave to file a second successive

postconviction petition and a proposed petition, which is the subject of the present appeal. In the

motion and proposed petition, the defendant cited the United States Supreme Court case of Miller

v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), for the proposition that his 58-year sentence was a de facto life

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sentence that was unconstitutional under the eighth amendment of the United States Constitution

(U.S. Const., amend. VIII). Although the defendant stated that his sentence also violated the

Illinois Constitution, he did not articulate why or elaborate on that statement, and his motion and

proposed petition only argued that his sentence violated the eighth amendment.

¶6 The circuit court granted the defendant leave to file the second successive petition, and the

State then filed a motion to dismiss. In that motion, the State asserted that the defendant was not

entitled to relief under Miller because he had already turned 18 prior to his offense, and the State

added an argument that, although not expressly raised in the petition, the defendant’s sentence also

did not violate the Illinois Constitution’s proportionate penalties clause. The defendant then filed

a response disputing the State’s assertion that the age of 18 was a definitive cut-off and adding an

argument that, in the alternative, his sentence violated the proportionate penalties clause. The

defendant then filed a supplemental response alerting the court to two recent appellate court cases

applying Miller to young adults (People v. Ruiz, 2020 IL App (1st) 163145, and People v. Johnson,

2020 IL App (1st) 171362), which was followed by an amended supplemental response further

discussing new cases applying Miller and elaborating on his earlier assertion that this sentence

violated the proportionate penalties clause. Along with the amended supplemental response, the

defendant also submitted an expert evaluation of his adolescent development.

¶7 After waiting for a ruling from the supreme court in People v. Moore, 2023 IL 126461,

the circuit court granted the State’s motion to dismiss. The court found that the defendant could

not establish cause for his proportionate penalties claim, citing Moore’s holding that, because it

does not apply to young adults, Miller “does not provide cause for a young adult to raise a claim

under the proportionate penalties clause.” Id. ¶ 40. This appeal follows.

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¶8 The Act contemplates that only one petition be filed, and a successive petition may only

be filed if the defendant “first obtains permission from the court and demonstrates to the court

cause and prejudice for not having raised the alleged errors in his or her initial postconviction

petition.” People v. Bailey, 2017 IL 121450, ¶ 15. To establish cause, the defendant must “allege

facts to explain why the claims being asserted in the successive petition could not have been raised

in the initial postconviction petition.” Id. ¶ 48. Although the cause-and-prejudice analysis is

usually conducted by the court alone in determining whether the defendant should be granted leave

to file a successive petition, the State may relitigate either cause or prejudice in a motion to dismiss

after leave to file has been granted. Id. ¶ 26. When a postconviction petition has been dismissed

without an evidentiary hearing, our review is de novo. People v. Sanders, 2016 IL 118123, ¶ 31.

¶9 On appeal, the defendant abandons his eighth amendment claim and instead focuses on his

claim that his sentence violates the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution.

Although the State argues that the defendant forfeited this claim by not raising it in his petition

and by instead raising it for the first time in his response to its motion to dismiss, we need not

decide that issue because we conclude that, regardless of forfeiture, the defendant has not

demonstrated cause for his failure to raise the claim in his initial petition.

¶ 10 The defendant asserts that he has cause for failing to bring the claim earlier because the

claim is based on the Supreme Court’s ruling in Miller, which came after the filing of his initial

petition. While it is true that Miller was not previously available to the defendant, our supreme

court held in People v. Dorsey, 2021 IL 123010, ¶ 74, that “Miller’s announcement of a new

substantive rule under the eighth amendment does not provide cause for a defendant to raise a

claim under the proportionate penalties clause.” See also Moore, 2023 IL 126461, ¶ 40 (“As Miller

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does not directly apply to young adults, it also does not provide cause for a young adult offender

to raise a claim under the proportionate penalties clause.”); People v. Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 93

(“Miller does not present new proportionate penalties clause principles with respect to

discretionary sentencing of young adult offenders.”).

¶ 11 The defendant acknowledges the supreme court’s rulings in Dorsey, Clark, and Moore but

argues instead that they do not foreclose his proportionate penalties claim because they concerned

discretionary sentences, whereas his de facto life sentence was mandatory. He reasons that young-

adult offenders who received discretionary life sentences cannot establish cause because “Illinois

courts have long recognized the differences between persons of mature age and those who are

minors for purposes of sentencing” (Dorsey, 2021 IL 123010, ¶ 74) and offenders receiving

discretionary sentences, therefore, already had the ability to argue for consideration of their youth

at sentencing prior to Miller. On the other hand, the defendant argues that young-adult offenders

like himself who received mandatory de facto life sentences had no opportunity or basis on which

to make a youth-based sentencing argument prior to Miller and its progeny because Illinois courts

had consistently rejected youth-based proportionate penalties challenges to mandatory life

sentences raised by young adults. See, e.g., People v. Griffin, 368 Ill. App. 3d 369 (2006); People

v. Winters, 349 Ill. App. 3d 747 (2004); People v. McCoy, 337 Ill. App. 3d 518 (2003).

¶ 12 For support, the defendant cites the case of People v. Garcia, 2024 IL App (2d) 210488-B,

¶ 16, in which the Second District held that a defendant’s postconviction claim that “the

proportionate penalties clause forbids mandatory life sentences (whether natural or de facto)

without the possibility of parole for young adult offenders who from a developmental standpoint

should be treated as juveniles—is certainly not ‘indisputably meritless.’ ” However, we are not

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persuaded that Garcia dictates a ruling in the defendant’s favor. That appeal was a review of the

first-stage summary dismissal of an initial postconviction petition, and the court was, therefore,

tasked with determining whether the defendant’s claim was based on an “ ‘indisputably meritless

legal theory or a fanciful factual allegation.’ ” Id. ¶ 10 (quoting People v. Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d 1, 16

(2009)). Whether Miller provides cause for a successive petition raising such a claim was not at

issue, and the Second District’s conclusion that the defendant’s claim in that case was not

indisputably meritless is not the same as saying that it has merit and warrants relief; rather, the

court merely found that the defendant had an arguable basis for the claim.

¶ 13 Further, both this district and the Fourth District have reviewed this issue in the context of

successive postconviction petitions and rejected the argument that our supreme court precedent

allows for a distinction between young adults who received discretionary sentences and those who

received mandatory sentences. See People v. Horshaw, 2024 IL App (1st) 182047-B, ¶¶ 45-63;

People v. Merriweather, 2023 IL App (1st) 220440-U, ¶ 21 (unpublished order under Supreme

Court Rule 23); People v. Leach, 2024 IL App (4th) 230298, ¶¶ 85-88.

¶ 14 In Horshaw, we acknowledged that there was an “inherent tension” between pre-Miller

cases like Griffin, McCoy, and Winters rejecting proportionate penalties claims brought by young-

adult offenders and “the interpretation of Moore that Miller cannot provide cause for proportionate

penalties challenges for young adults regardless of whether the life sentence is mandatory or

discretionary.” 2024 IL App (1st) 182047-B, ¶ 60. Nevertheless, we ultimately concluded that

supreme court precedent did not allow for a distinction between mandatory and discretionary

sentences for proportionate penalties claims brought by young-adult offenders. Rather, that

precedent instead indicated that such a claim “should be viewed as nothing more than an extension

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of proportionate penalties claims that have existed all along and that defendant did not need Miller

or Miller-related proportionate penalties precedent to raise the claim now at issue.” Id. ¶ 62.

¶ 15 In Merriweather, we held that the distinction between discretionary and mandatory life

sentences was “irrelevant” and that Illinois cases such as Moore holding that Miller and its progeny

do not provide cause for a young-adult offender to raise a proportionate penalties claim in a

successive petition “apply to both claims involving discretionary life sentences and those involving

a mandatory life sentence.” 2023 IL App (1st) 220440-U, ¶ 21. Additionally, in Leach the Fourth

District noted that “nothing in Moore suggested a distinction between discretionary and mandatory

sentences,” and it recognized Moore’s statement that “ ‘Miller did not change the law applicable

to young adults.” (Emphasis in original.) 2024 IL App (4th) 230298, ¶¶ 86-87 (quoting Moore,

2023 IL 126461, ¶ 42). Instead, the panel in Leach concluded that the defendant’s argument that a

distinction existed between discretionary and mandatory sentences for young adults relied on

“selective reading” of the caselaw. Id. ¶ 87.

¶ 16 We agree with the decisions in Horshaw, Leach, and Merriweather that it is clear from the

supreme court’s decisions in Dorsey and Moore that Miller does not provide cause for a young-

adult offender who received a de facto life sentence to raise a proportionate penalties claim in a

successive postconviction petition, regardless of whether the sentence was mandatory or

discretionary. As plainly stated in Moore, “Miller did not change the law applicable to young

adults” (2023 IL 126461, ¶ 42) and “does not provide cause for a young adult offender to raise a

claim under the proportionate penalties clause” because it “does not apply directly to young adults”

(id. ¶ 40). Accordingly, the circuit court did not err in finding that the defendant did not

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demonstrate cause. Because the defendant failed to establish cause, we need not address prejudice

(see id.), and we affirm the dismissal of the defendant’s petition.

¶ 17 Affirmed.

¶ 18 JUSTICE OCASIO, specially concurring:

¶ 19 I concur in the decision of the court. The Illinois Supreme Court has made it crystal clear

that Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), does not provide cause for a defendant to raise a

challenge to his sentence under the state constitution (see Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11) in a successive

postconviction petition. People v. Hilliard, 2023 IL 128186, ¶ 28 (citing People v. Dorsey, 2021 IL

123010, ¶ 74).

¶ 20 I write separately only to echo the observation in Horshaw that, as a practical matter, this

leaves defendants in Chavez’s position with no avenue for relief to which they may be entitled. See

People v. Horshaw, 2024 IL App (1st) 182047-B, ¶¶ 60-61. In Illinois, rehabilitative potential is not

merely one aspect of proportionality in sentencing. It is an express constitutional goal. See Ill. Const.

1970, art. I, § 11 (“All penalties shall be determined both according to the seriousness of the offense

and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship.” (Emphasis added.)); see also

People v. Clemons, 2012 IL 107821, ¶¶ 36-40 (explaining that the rehabilitation clause provides

greater restrictions on sentencing than the eighth amendment and Illinois’s analogous proportionality

requirement). By definition, a mandatory life sentence defeats that objective by foreclosing any

opportunity for release and re-entry into society based on demonstrated rehabilitation. Chavez’s claim

in this case is based on his right to be sentenced with the objective of rehabilitation in mind—a right

that our state’s fundamental law guarantees. It is deeply troubling that our decision leaves him no

way to vindicate it.

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