2026 IL App (2d) 250574-U No. 2-25-0574 Order filed March 3, 2026
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
SECOND DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RENZO CHAVEZ JR., Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Kane County. Honorable Julie Yetter & Thomas St. Jules, Judges, Presiding. No. 25-CF-2818
JUSTICE HUTCHINSON delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Schostok and Birkett concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: There was no error in the circuit court’s pretrial detention determination based on defendant’s dangerousness; defendant is a repeat felon and street gang member, he was charged with a detainable offense, and no condition short of his pretrial detention would mitigate the danger he presents.
¶2 Defendant, Renzo Chavez Jr., appeals from an order detaining him prior to trial on two
counts of home invasion. 720 ILCS 5/19-6(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 2024). The appellate defender has
declined to file argument on defendant’s behalf and, after examining the record and defendant’s
motion for relief, we affirm.
¶3 Pursuant to 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1 (West 2024), the State may seek pretrial detention based
on the defendant’s dangerousness or risk of willful flight. Here, the State’s petition to detain proceeded under the allegation of defendant’s dangerousness, and the parties proceeded by way of
proffer. Under the dangerousness standard, the State must prove by clear and convincing evidence
that (1) “the proof is evident or the presumption great” that the defendant has committed a
detainable offense or forcible felony (such as home invasion), (2) “the defendant poses a real and
present threat to the safety of any person or persons or to the community;” and (3) “no condition
or combination of conditions” can mitigate that threat. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e) (West 2024). Where
parties to a pretrial detention hearing proceed solely by proffer, our review is de novo. People v.
Morgan, 2020 IL 130626, ¶ 51.
¶4 At the pretrial detention hearing, the State proffered the following information. We begin
with defendant’s background and criminal history, which is significant for a person who is only
20 years old. Defendant is a documented member of the Latin Kings street gang in the Elgin area.
As a juvenile, in case 24-JD-132, defendant was sentenced to terms in the Illinois Department of
Corrections (IDOC) for unlawful possession of a firearm by a street gang member (720 ILCS 5/24-
1.8(a) (West 2022)) and aggravated battery (id. § 12-3.05(a)). In addition, at the time defendant
was arrested in this case, he was subject to an arrest warrant in case 25-CM-1800 for aggravated
assault with a firearm (id. § 12-2(c)(1)) for threatening one of his neighbors in Elgin with a pistol.
As a felon, of course, defendant could not lawfully possess any firearm. See 430 ILCS 65/2(a)(1),
4(a)(2)(ii) (West 2024). Defendant is also wanted on an arrest warrant in Cook County, in case 25-
MC-3003589, for robbery (720 ILCS 5/18-1(a) (West 2024)), and subject to extradition there. That
brings us to the present offense in Kane County, case 25-CF-2818.
¶5 On November 28, 2025, the victim, Victor Jiminez, was returning to his home in an
apartment building in Elgin. Jiminez walked past a group of five people, roughly ages 14 to 20,
who were smoking and drinking alcohol on the stairs. The group began to harass Jiminez as he
-2- tried to get past them and followed him as he headed to his apartment. After a brief scuffle, Jiminez
made it into his apartment and closed the door. Defendant then kicked in the door, breaking the
doorframe and doorknob, and attacked Jiminez. Another young man, one Giovanny Hita-Watson,
also entered the apartment, holding a knife. Jiminez fought back and struck the attackers. The two
young men fled the scene and the police were called. Jiminez was able to identify Hita-Watson
and defendant from photo lineups. Defendant’s identification was made easier by his face tattoo
of a five-pointed star. Elgin police arrested defendant the following day.
¶6 In response, defense counsel proffered that defendant could stay with his mother at a
different address in Elgin not associated with either of the two pending cases. In addition, counsel
noted that defendant has two children to support financially.
¶7 The circuit court, Judge Thomas St. Jules, found clear and convincing evidence that
defendant had committed a detainable offense, that he presents a danger to the community, and
that no pretrial release conditions would mitigate the threat he poses. See 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a).
In particular, the court noted that GPS tracking and electronic home monitoring could not keep a
gun out of his hands or prevent him from attacking another person on their way home. Defendant
filed a motion for relief, which was heard and denied by Judge Julie Yetter. Defendant timely
appealed.
¶8 As the appellate defender declined to file a memorandum, our review is confined to the
claims raised in defendant’s motion for relief (see Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(h)(2), (h)(7) (eff. Apr. 15,
2024)), which merit little discussion. The motion for relief is largely boilerplate, filed by the county
public defender. It makes broad assertions, such as claiming that the evidence was not clear and
convincing and that the court failed to consider alternatives to custody. Such a motion is unlikely
to be persuasive, particularly as it fails to suggest defendant is (somehow) not dangerous or even
-3- allege how any particular pretrial release condition would be adequate to address the harm he
poses. While the evidence is only preliminary at this stage of the proceedings, even reviewed de
novo, it paints a clear and convincing picture of defendant’s dangerousness and the unsuitability
of pretrial conditions to address that danger short of confinement.
¶9 The motion for relief makes a minor point that Hita-Watson, and not defendant, was the
one accused of using a knife during the home invasion, not defendant. That is true enough,
however, the statutory authority requires the court to consider, based on the specific articulable
facts of the case, only whether the crime “involv[ed] a weapon ***.” 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(g)(1).
We do not suggest all parties to a crime should be treated equally for the purposes of pretrial
detention, similar to the rubric of accountability (720 ILCS 5/5-2(c) (West 2024)), but by using a
variation of the word “involved” it is clear that section 110-6.1 recognizes that a weapon is no less
dangerous simply because it is wielded by a co-offender, rather than by the defendant personally.
¶ 10 We note, too, that the motion for relief does not dispute any aspect of the State’s proffer of
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2026 IL App (2d) 250574-U No. 2-25-0574 Order filed March 3, 2026
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
SECOND DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RENZO CHAVEZ JR., Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Kane County. Honorable Julie Yetter & Thomas St. Jules, Judges, Presiding. No. 25-CF-2818
JUSTICE HUTCHINSON delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Schostok and Birkett concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: There was no error in the circuit court’s pretrial detention determination based on defendant’s dangerousness; defendant is a repeat felon and street gang member, he was charged with a detainable offense, and no condition short of his pretrial detention would mitigate the danger he presents.
¶2 Defendant, Renzo Chavez Jr., appeals from an order detaining him prior to trial on two
counts of home invasion. 720 ILCS 5/19-6(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 2024). The appellate defender has
declined to file argument on defendant’s behalf and, after examining the record and defendant’s
motion for relief, we affirm.
¶3 Pursuant to 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1 (West 2024), the State may seek pretrial detention based
on the defendant’s dangerousness or risk of willful flight. Here, the State’s petition to detain proceeded under the allegation of defendant’s dangerousness, and the parties proceeded by way of
proffer. Under the dangerousness standard, the State must prove by clear and convincing evidence
that (1) “the proof is evident or the presumption great” that the defendant has committed a
detainable offense or forcible felony (such as home invasion), (2) “the defendant poses a real and
present threat to the safety of any person or persons or to the community;” and (3) “no condition
or combination of conditions” can mitigate that threat. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e) (West 2024). Where
parties to a pretrial detention hearing proceed solely by proffer, our review is de novo. People v.
Morgan, 2020 IL 130626, ¶ 51.
¶4 At the pretrial detention hearing, the State proffered the following information. We begin
with defendant’s background and criminal history, which is significant for a person who is only
20 years old. Defendant is a documented member of the Latin Kings street gang in the Elgin area.
As a juvenile, in case 24-JD-132, defendant was sentenced to terms in the Illinois Department of
Corrections (IDOC) for unlawful possession of a firearm by a street gang member (720 ILCS 5/24-
1.8(a) (West 2022)) and aggravated battery (id. § 12-3.05(a)). In addition, at the time defendant
was arrested in this case, he was subject to an arrest warrant in case 25-CM-1800 for aggravated
assault with a firearm (id. § 12-2(c)(1)) for threatening one of his neighbors in Elgin with a pistol.
As a felon, of course, defendant could not lawfully possess any firearm. See 430 ILCS 65/2(a)(1),
4(a)(2)(ii) (West 2024). Defendant is also wanted on an arrest warrant in Cook County, in case 25-
MC-3003589, for robbery (720 ILCS 5/18-1(a) (West 2024)), and subject to extradition there. That
brings us to the present offense in Kane County, case 25-CF-2818.
¶5 On November 28, 2025, the victim, Victor Jiminez, was returning to his home in an
apartment building in Elgin. Jiminez walked past a group of five people, roughly ages 14 to 20,
who were smoking and drinking alcohol on the stairs. The group began to harass Jiminez as he
-2- tried to get past them and followed him as he headed to his apartment. After a brief scuffle, Jiminez
made it into his apartment and closed the door. Defendant then kicked in the door, breaking the
doorframe and doorknob, and attacked Jiminez. Another young man, one Giovanny Hita-Watson,
also entered the apartment, holding a knife. Jiminez fought back and struck the attackers. The two
young men fled the scene and the police were called. Jiminez was able to identify Hita-Watson
and defendant from photo lineups. Defendant’s identification was made easier by his face tattoo
of a five-pointed star. Elgin police arrested defendant the following day.
¶6 In response, defense counsel proffered that defendant could stay with his mother at a
different address in Elgin not associated with either of the two pending cases. In addition, counsel
noted that defendant has two children to support financially.
¶7 The circuit court, Judge Thomas St. Jules, found clear and convincing evidence that
defendant had committed a detainable offense, that he presents a danger to the community, and
that no pretrial release conditions would mitigate the threat he poses. See 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a).
In particular, the court noted that GPS tracking and electronic home monitoring could not keep a
gun out of his hands or prevent him from attacking another person on their way home. Defendant
filed a motion for relief, which was heard and denied by Judge Julie Yetter. Defendant timely
appealed.
¶8 As the appellate defender declined to file a memorandum, our review is confined to the
claims raised in defendant’s motion for relief (see Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(h)(2), (h)(7) (eff. Apr. 15,
2024)), which merit little discussion. The motion for relief is largely boilerplate, filed by the county
public defender. It makes broad assertions, such as claiming that the evidence was not clear and
convincing and that the court failed to consider alternatives to custody. Such a motion is unlikely
to be persuasive, particularly as it fails to suggest defendant is (somehow) not dangerous or even
-3- allege how any particular pretrial release condition would be adequate to address the harm he
poses. While the evidence is only preliminary at this stage of the proceedings, even reviewed de
novo, it paints a clear and convincing picture of defendant’s dangerousness and the unsuitability
of pretrial conditions to address that danger short of confinement.
¶9 The motion for relief makes a minor point that Hita-Watson, and not defendant, was the
one accused of using a knife during the home invasion, not defendant. That is true enough,
however, the statutory authority requires the court to consider, based on the specific articulable
facts of the case, only whether the crime “involv[ed] a weapon ***.” 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(g)(1).
We do not suggest all parties to a crime should be treated equally for the purposes of pretrial
detention, similar to the rubric of accountability (720 ILCS 5/5-2(c) (West 2024)), but by using a
variation of the word “involved” it is clear that section 110-6.1 recognizes that a weapon is no less
dangerous simply because it is wielded by a co-offender, rather than by the defendant personally.
¶ 10 We note, too, that the motion for relief does not dispute any aspect of the State’s proffer of
defendant’s juvenile and adult criminal history, and that he is currently charged for threatening
another person with a firearm. This is after defendant has already served a term in prison for illegal
firearm possession (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(g)(2)(A)), to say nothing of the robbery charge in Cook
County.
¶ 11 Finally, to the extent defendant asserted that the police synopsis and reports were
insufficient to demonstrate that the proof was evident or presumption great that he committed a
detainable weapons offense, we reject the assertion. It is well-settled that a police synopsis alone
is sufficient to sustain the State’s burden at a detention hearing. See, e.g., People v. Horne, 2023
IL App (2d) 230382, ¶¶ 22-24.
-4- ¶ 12 “Evidence is clear and convincing if it leaves no reasonable doubt in the mind of the trier
of fact as to the truth of the proposition in question.” Chaudhary v. Department of Human Services,
2023 IL 127712, ¶ 74; see also People v. Morales, 2024 IL App (2d) 230597 ¶ 15. Here, the
evidence amply demonstrated defendant’s pattern of escalating criminality and violence. In sum,
based on the specific articulable facts of the case, we determine that clear and convincing evidence
showed defendant committed a detainable offense (home invasion), that he poses a real and present
threat to the community, and that no less restrictive conditions could appropriately address the
danger he presents. We therefore affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Kane County.
¶ 13 Affirmed.
-5-