TRAYNOR, J.
Defendants appeal from judgments convicting them of the crime of abortion and from an order denying their motions for a new trial. Their convictions were based on the testimony of Thelma Huntley, who underwent the illegal operation, and of Alice Huntley and Alice Thurman, her mother-in-law and sister-in-law, who were present during the operation, which took place in Thelma Huntley’s home.
Defendants attack the judgments on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions. They claim that all three witnesses were accomplices and that their testimony therefore needed corroboration under section 1111 of the Penal Code, which provides: “A conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice unless it be corroborated by such other evidence as shall tend to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense; and the corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows the commission [837] of the offense or the circumstances thereof. An accomplice is hereby defined as one who is liable to prosecution for the identical offense charged against the defendant on trial in the cause in which the testimony of the accomplice is given.”
The court instructed the jury that the testimony of one accomplice is not corroborated by that of another. (People v. Creegan, 121 Cal. 554 [53 P. 1082]; People v. Sternberg, 111 Cal. 3 [43 P. 198]; People v. Bunkers, 2 Cal.App. 197 [84 P. 364, 370]; see 8 Cal.Jur. 180.) The question whether the two women present at the operation were accomplices of defendants was left to the jury. The court instructed the jury that Thelma Huntley’s testimony needed corroboration under section 1108 of the Penal Code, which provides that upon a trial for abortion the testimony of the woman who underwent the operation must be corroborated. The court refused, however, to instruct the jury that Thelma Huntley’s testimony needed corroboration by evidence from a source other than an accomplice. Since the court did not impose that condition, the jury was in effect instructed that the testimony of an accomplice was acceptable as corroboration of Thelma Huntley’s testimony. It was therefore free to base its verdict of guilty on the testimony of the three women, even if it regarded Thelma Huntley’s mother-in-law and sister-in-law as accomplices, provided that Thelma Huntley was not herself an accomplice. The court’s refusal to instruct the jury that Thelma Huntley’s testimony needed corroboration by evidence other than testimony of an accomplice can therefore be approved only if she was not an accomplice.
The question whether a woman who submits to an illegal operation is an accomplice of the defendant on trial for the abortion must be determined according to the definition of an accomplice in section 1111 of the Penal Code as one “who is liable to prosecution for the identical offense charged against the defendant on trial.” This definition was written into the law by the Legislature in 1915 (Stats. 1915, p. 760) after this court, in construing section 1111, which formerly did not include a definition of an accomplice, held that accomplices are persons who participate in the commission of a crime, either by committing the act directly, aiding in its commission, or advising and encouraging its commission. (People v. Coffey, 161 Cal. 433, 439 [119 P. 901, 39 L.R.A. N.S. 704].) Under [838] this construction of the section one who cooperated in any manner with the defendant in committing the crime was an accomplice, whether or not the act of the accomplice was a separate offense. This court stated, therefore, that one is an accomplice in the sense of section 1111 “because of what he had done and not because of the form of punishment which the law may mete out for his acts,” and that “Wherever the law has denounced as a separate crime the particular act of participation by an accessory or accomplice, the sole logical and legal effect is not to destroy the relationship of accomplice, but merely to effect a modification of section 31. . . .” (People v. Coffey, supra, p. 443.) Accordingly, a woman was an accomplice if she submitted to an abortion knowingly and cooperated with the person who performed it {People v. Coffey, supra, p. 446), although then as now her cooperation made her punishable for the separate offense specified in section 275 of the Penal Code.
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TRAYNOR, J.
Defendants appeal from judgments convicting them of the crime of abortion and from an order denying their motions for a new trial. Their convictions were based on the testimony of Thelma Huntley, who underwent the illegal operation, and of Alice Huntley and Alice Thurman, her mother-in-law and sister-in-law, who were present during the operation, which took place in Thelma Huntley’s home.
Defendants attack the judgments on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions. They claim that all three witnesses were accomplices and that their testimony therefore needed corroboration under section 1111 of the Penal Code, which provides: “A conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice unless it be corroborated by such other evidence as shall tend to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense; and the corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows the commission [837] of the offense or the circumstances thereof. An accomplice is hereby defined as one who is liable to prosecution for the identical offense charged against the defendant on trial in the cause in which the testimony of the accomplice is given.”
The court instructed the jury that the testimony of one accomplice is not corroborated by that of another. (People v. Creegan, 121 Cal. 554 [53 P. 1082]; People v. Sternberg, 111 Cal. 3 [43 P. 198]; People v. Bunkers, 2 Cal.App. 197 [84 P. 364, 370]; see 8 Cal.Jur. 180.) The question whether the two women present at the operation were accomplices of defendants was left to the jury. The court instructed the jury that Thelma Huntley’s testimony needed corroboration under section 1108 of the Penal Code, which provides that upon a trial for abortion the testimony of the woman who underwent the operation must be corroborated. The court refused, however, to instruct the jury that Thelma Huntley’s testimony needed corroboration by evidence from a source other than an accomplice. Since the court did not impose that condition, the jury was in effect instructed that the testimony of an accomplice was acceptable as corroboration of Thelma Huntley’s testimony. It was therefore free to base its verdict of guilty on the testimony of the three women, even if it regarded Thelma Huntley’s mother-in-law and sister-in-law as accomplices, provided that Thelma Huntley was not herself an accomplice. The court’s refusal to instruct the jury that Thelma Huntley’s testimony needed corroboration by evidence other than testimony of an accomplice can therefore be approved only if she was not an accomplice.
The question whether a woman who submits to an illegal operation is an accomplice of the defendant on trial for the abortion must be determined according to the definition of an accomplice in section 1111 of the Penal Code as one “who is liable to prosecution for the identical offense charged against the defendant on trial.” This definition was written into the law by the Legislature in 1915 (Stats. 1915, p. 760) after this court, in construing section 1111, which formerly did not include a definition of an accomplice, held that accomplices are persons who participate in the commission of a crime, either by committing the act directly, aiding in its commission, or advising and encouraging its commission. (People v. Coffey, 161 Cal. 433, 439 [119 P. 901, 39 L.R.A. N.S. 704].) Under [838] this construction of the section one who cooperated in any manner with the defendant in committing the crime was an accomplice, whether or not the act of the accomplice was a separate offense. This court stated, therefore, that one is an accomplice in the sense of section 1111 “because of what he had done and not because of the form of punishment which the law may mete out for his acts,” and that “Wherever the law has denounced as a separate crime the particular act of participation by an accessory or accomplice, the sole logical and legal effect is not to destroy the relationship of accomplice, but merely to effect a modification of section 31. . . .” (People v. Coffey, supra, p. 443.) Accordingly, a woman was an accomplice if she submitted to an abortion knowingly and cooperated with the person who performed it {People v. Coffey, supra, p. 446), although then as now her cooperation made her punishable for the separate offense specified in section 275 of the Penal Code.
In view of this construction of section 1111 as it was formerly worded, the Legislature added the definition of an accomplice to the section, repudiating the definition established under the former law. Under the statutory definition, the mere fact that the witness is punishable for his cooperation with the defendant in the illegal transaction does not make him an accomplice. It is necessary to determine whether sections 31 and 971 of the Penal Code or other provisions of the criminal law subject the witness to prosecution under the provisions that the defendant is accused of violating, or whether the acts of the witness participating in the transaction constitute a separate and distinct offense. If a statutory provision so defines a crime that the participation of two or more persons is necessary for its commission, but prescribes punishment for the acts of certain participants only, and another statutory provision prescribes punishment for the acts of participants not subject to the first provision, it is clear that the latter are criminally liable only under the specific provision relating to their participation in the criminal transaction. The specific provision making the acts of participation in the transaction a separate offense supersedes the general provision in section 31 of the Penal Code that such acts subject the participant in the crime of the accused to prosecution for its commission. (Cal. Code Civ. Proc., § 1859; Carpenter v. Coast Surety Corp., 25 Cal.App. [839]*8392d 209, 212 [77 P.2d 294]; Imperial County v.. Garey, 61 Ca.App. 439, 444 [215 P. 89]; Marshall v. Williams, 85 Cal.App. 507, 511 [259 P. 970]; Merchants Nat. Bank v. Continental Nat. Bank, 98 Cal.App. 523, 533 [277 P. 354]; Talcott v. Harbor Commissioners, 53 Cal. 199.) Thus section 275 of the Penal Code prescribing punishment for a woman who submits to an illegal operation precludes the application of section 31 of the Penal Code under which she would be punishable as principal for the crime of abortion. As the court stated in People v. Vedder, 98 N.Y. 630, 631: “The statute plainly contemplates two persons as cooperating in the commission of the crime, the one being the guilty person against whom the penalties of the statute are directed, and the other, the subject upon whose body the crime is committed. It then proceeds to define the respective crimes committed by the respective persons participating in the act, and pronounces different penalties for the respective offenses. It is quite clear that the woman spoken of in the statute is not regarded as one of the persons who could be guilty of the crime described in the 294th section (abortion), and that she could not therefore be indicted under that section.” (See, also, People v. Blank, 283 N.Y. 526 [29 N.E.2d 73]; Dunn v. People, 29 N.Y. 523 [86 Am.Dec. 319]; State of Minnesota v. Tennyson, 212 Minn. 158 [2 N.W.2d 833, 139 A.L.R. 987]; 1 C.J.S. 323.) For similar reasons the giver and receiver of a bribe (People v. Davis, 210 Cal. 540, 557 [293 P. 32]), and the perjurer and the suborner (People v. Layman, 117 Cal.App. 476, 479 [4 P.2d 244]; People v. Nickell, 22 Cal.App2d 117, 124 [70 P.2d 659]) are no longer accomplices under section 1111. (See, also, In re Morton, 179 Cal. 510, 513 [177 P. 453]; People v. Burness, 53 Cal.App.2d 214 [127 P.2d 623]; People v. Gordon, 41 Cal.App.2d 226 [106 P.2d 208]; People v. Williams, 7 Cal.App.2d 600 [46 P.2d 796].) Since section 275 of the Penal Code covers all acts committed by Thelma Huntley in connection with the abortion, she was subject to prosecution for an offense distinct from the crime of abortion for which the defendants were on trial and was therefore not an accomplice within the meaning of section 1111 of the Penal Code. (People v. Wilson, 54 Cal.App.2d 434, 447 [129 P.2d 149]; see, 139 A.L.R. 993).
The requirement of corroboration under section 1108 of [840] the Penal Code relates to the testimony of any woman on whom an abortion was performed, whether she voluntarily submitted to the operation or was induced to do so by force or fraud. The section is designed to protect the defendant against possible injustice where his statement and that of the woman conflict. (See, 7 Wigmore, Evidence [1940], §2061, p. 346.) Since this section has no bearing on the question whether the woman is an accomplice, its requirement of corroborating testimony cannot be construed as excluding the testimony of an accomplice for the corroboration of the woman’s testimony.
The judgments and order appealed from are affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., and Edmonds, J., concurred.