People v. Label

43 Cal. App. 3d 766, 119 Cal. Rptr. 522, 1974 Cal. App. LEXIS 1354
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
DecidedNovember 22, 1974
DocketCrim. 12140
StatusPublished
Cited by21 cases

This text of 43 Cal. App. 3d 766 (People v. Label) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering California Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
People v. Label, 43 Cal. App. 3d 766, 119 Cal. Rptr. 522, 1974 Cal. App. LEXIS 1354 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974).

Opinion

Opinion

GOOD, J. *

A jury found appellant guilty of violating section 11912 (now 11352) of the Health and Safety Code (unlawful administration of a restricted dangerous drug). Judgment entered, he was sentenced to prison for the term prescribed by law. He appealed.

The charge arose out of the following facts:

Rebecca Rickel (18 years of age) was arrested on November 6, 1972 for possession of dangerous drugs (barbiturates (“yellows”) and codeine). While in custody, she apparently adopted a cooperative attitude and wrote a statement of her activities during the weekend preceding her arrest. She also responded to interrogation by several officers and her statements were taken down in shorthand. She executed an affidavit that was either written by her or prepared by the sheriff’s office from the information secured at the interrogation. The affidavit, dated November 10, alleged that appellant had *770 given her an intravenous injection of barbiturates on November 4 at a cabin at Lakecrest Cottages, Clear Lake Park, that was rented by appellant and one David Johnson (a codefendant who apparently entered a negotiated plea to secure a sentence concurrent with one still outstanding in Oregon). This affidavit was used in procuring a search warrant and was incorporated in the form for affidavits for search warrant used in Lake County. Therein it is recited that Ms. Rickel was personally present and sworn by the issuing magistrate, a judge of the superior court.

A search of the cabin discovered needles and hypodermic syringes in a waxed paper bag and “some tablets” under the front bottom of the refrigerator, where the affidavit stated she had seen David Johnson place them. A rent receipt issued to appellant and Johnson was also found. After the first witness had testified and at the commencement of the afternoon session of the first day of trial, appellant moved to suppress all evidence that was seized pursuant to the search. It was argued that the warrant was issued solely upon the affidavit of Ms. Rickel and that in the absence of an affirmative showing of her reliability there was no probable cause for the search. The motion was denied.

I

Appellant contends that Rickel was an accomplice as a matter of law and that the trial court erred in not giving sua sponte instructions concerning the necessity of corroboration of accomplice testimony. We find no merit in this contention because section 1111 of the Penal Code defines an accomplice as “one who is liable to prosecution for the identical offense charged against the defendant on trial in the cause in which the testimony of the accomplice is given.” Rickel could no more be charged with “administering” than a buyer of marijuana or other restricted substance may be charged with “selling.” The purchaser is not an accomplice of the ■seller either as to illegal possession or as to sale. (People v. Galli (1924) 68 Cal.App. 682, 684-685 [230 P. 20]; People v. Mimms (1952) 110 Cal.App. 2d 310, 314 [242 P.2d 331]; People v. Hernandez (1968) 263 Cal.App.2d 242, 247-248 [69 Cal.Rptr. 448].) Hernandez points out that purchasers could not be prosecuted for selling a forbidden narcotic to themselves (p. 248).

In Health and Safety Code section 11352 (“every person who . . . sells, furnishes, administers, or gives away” etc.) it is obvious that the word “administers” is used as defined in Webster’s Third International Dictionary: “2a: to mete out; Dispense.” One cannot “sell’’ or “give away” to him *771 self. Although one can “furnish” himself with an article and diabetics and persons suffering from allergies “administer” prescribed insulin or allergens to themselves, in the context of the section and its place in the penal provisions designed to control illicit substances we cannot believe that the Legislature intended to proscribe the self-administration of such substances and used “furnish” and “administer” as intransitives rather than in the same transitive sense that necessarily applies to the companion words, “sell” and “give away.” The fact that we have never heard of a prosecution based upon self-administration of a controlled substance indicates that the construction here adopted is the construction given to the section by peace officers in its application since it was originally enacted. If a defendant were so charged, we believe that, as to him, the language of the section would be deemed unconstitutionally vague and uncertain (cf. 1 Witkin, Cal. Crimes (1963) p. 23) and that the construction we here adopt would be required by the rule that “When language which is reasonably susceptible of two constructions is used in a penal law ordinarily that construction which is more favorable to the offender will be adopted.” (People v. Ralph (1944) 24 Cal.2d 575, 581 [150 P.2d 401].)

In People v. Galli, supra, 68 Cal.App. at page 685, in discussing the Connecticut counterpart of Penal Code section 31, the court quotes with approval the following language: “The ‘abetting’ intended by it is a positive act in aid of the commission of the [defined] offense—a force, physical or moral, joined with that of the perpetrator in producing it. . . . The abettor, within the meaning of the statute, must stand in the same relation to the crime as the criminal—approach it from the same direction, touch it at the same point.” The recipient of the injection is not a participant in the criminal act of administering in the same sense that the willing, if “passive,” participant in sexual crimes participates in the proscribed act (clearly forbidden to both participants) and is therefore subject to prosecution, as held in People v. Bond (1955) 136 Cal.App.2d 572 [289 P.2d 44], People v. Siegel (1934) 2 Cal.App.2d 620 [38 P.2d 450] and People v. Cox (1951) 102 Cal.App.2d 285 [227 P.2d 290]. In addition to the cases cited supra holding that the purchaser of narcotics is not an accomplice to either the sale or possession of the seller, analogous conclusions were reached in abortion cases where the aborted woman has been held not to be an accomplice even though she procured the purchase of a catheter and other paraphernalia required by a defendant abortionist. (People v. Alvarez (1946) 73 Cal.App.2d 528 [166 P.2d 896]; cf. People v. Wilson (1944) 25 Cal.2d 341 [153 P.2d 720]; People v. Clapp (1944) 24 Cal.2d 835 [151 P.2d 237].)

*772 II

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Bluebook (online)
43 Cal. App. 3d 766, 119 Cal. Rptr. 522, 1974 Cal. App. LEXIS 1354, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-label-calctapp-1974.