2026 IL App (1st) 220373-B
FIFTH DIVISION January 23, 2026
IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
No. 1-22-0373
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County. ) v. ) No. 01 CR 12003 ) TONY CAMPBELL, ) Honorable ) Kenneth J. Wadas, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE MIKVA delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justices C.A. Walker and Tailor concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION ¶1 After this court vacated his initial 140-year sentence, defendant Tony Campbell was
resentenced in 2009 to 110 years in prison for first degree murder and armed robbery, offenses
committed when he was just 17 years old. Under the statutory sentencing scheme then in place,
the shortest sentence the court could impose on remand was just over 50 years.
¶2 Since then, the law governing juvenile sentencing has changed significantly. In 2012, the
United States Supreme Court held in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 465, 479 (2012), that a
mandatory sentence of life without parole for a juvenile violates the eighth amendment’s
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments. Several years later, our own supreme court held in
People v. Reyes, 2016 IL 119271, ¶ 10, that the same is true where a juvenile has received a lengthy No. 1-22-0373
term-of-years sentence that is the functional equivalent of a natural life sentence.
¶3 Based on these authorities, in 2019, Tony sought leave to file a successive postconviction
petition challenging the constitutionality of his 110-year sentence. The circuit court denied his
motion. It agreed that Tony had received a de facto life sentence but concluded that his
resentencing hearing, held three years before Miller was decided, had nevertheless been Miller-
compliant.
¶4 The State acknowledges on appeal that because the minimum sentence available by statute
was a de facto life sentence, the sentencing scheme applied here “violated the Eighth Amendment
under Miller.” It urges us to conclude, however, that this was harmless because Tony received well
above the minimum sentence. The State’s rationale, in other words, is that it is clear from the
record that even if the trial judge had been given the discretion to impose something less than a
life sentence, he would not have done so.
¶5 But as our supreme court recently reemphasized in People v. Wilson, 2023 IL 127666, the
core takeaway from Miller and the cases that have followed it is that sentencing a child to die in
prison must be an exercise of real discretion. Crucially, the sentencing court must have the ability
to impose something less than a life sentence. Where, as here, the minimum sentence available is
a sentence deemed by our supreme court to be the legal and functional equivalent of a natural life
sentence, there can be no constitutionally significant exercise of discretion.
¶6 We reverse the circuit court’s denial of Tony’s motion for leave to file a successive
postconviction petition, vacate his sentence, and remand for resentencing.
¶7 I. BACKGROUND
¶8 A. Charges, Pretrial Proceedings, and Trial
¶9 The State alleged that 17-year-old Tony and 18-year-old Melvin Gaddy shot and killed
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their mutual friend, Garvey Bernard, and robbed him of $3500. Mr. Gaddy pleaded guilty and was
sentenced to 25 years in prison. Tony was offered but declined a sentence below the mandatory
minimum sentence.
¶ 10 Tony was allowed to represent himself at trial. The evidence, summarized at length in our
earlier decisions, consisted of Tony’s statement to the police and the testimony of two
eyewitnesses. It generally showed that, just before his death, Mr. Bernard had boasted about a
$3500 insurance settlement he received from a car accident, prompting three of his friends—Tony,
Mr. Gaddy, and a third individual—to form a plan to rob him. On April 10, 2001, they brought
Mr. Bernard to the alley outside Mr. Gaddy’s apartment, where Tony was also living. Mr. Gaddy
and Tony went up to the apartment on the pretense of getting a magazine that listed cars for sale.
They returned with a gun, and Tony told Mr. Bernard to “give it up.” When Mr. Bernard ran, Tony
began shooting him. Mr. Gaddy then took the money from Mr. Bernard’s pockets and scaled a
nearby fence, while Tony stood over Mr. Bernard and shot him again. The medical examiner
testified that Mr. Bernard was shot a total of 11 times.
¶ 11 The jury found Tony guilty of first degree murder and armed robbery. It also found that he
had personally discharged the firearm that caused Mr. Bernard’s death.
¶ 12 B. Initial Sentencing and First Direct Appeal
¶ 13 The public defender was reappointed to represent Tony at sentencing and presented two
witnesses in mitigation: Tony’s mother, Bonnie Campbell, and his sister, Tamika Campbell
Thompson.
¶ 14 Ms. Campbell testified that Tony’s father “never had any part of [his] life” and never
provided them with financial support. His stepfather was cruel to Tony and Tony’s sister and
“didn’t accept them because they weren’t his own.” Ms. Campbell eventually ended the
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relationship because of this. Tony also had a hard time academically and socially. He was picked
on by his classmates. Ms. Campbell explained that when Tony went to live with his friend, Melvin
Gaddy, Mr. Gaddy’s influence on his life was “[v]ery bad.” Tony was afraid to go home some
nights because Mr. Gaddy would be “high or drunk” and “very violent.” She described her son as
“always sweet and very polite and well mannered.” He never disrespected her, and she had never
seen him be violent.
¶ 15 Ms. Thompson, who was three years older than Tony, agreed that her brother was picked
on in school and added that she often had to intercede on his behalf. Tony never joined a gang, but
he used to run home crying because gang members chased him and aggressively tried to recruit
him. Like her mother, Ms. Thompson had also never seen Tony behave violently.
¶ 16 According to the pretrial investigation report, Tony’s mother and father were never
married, and he rarely saw his father growing up. Tony’s stepfather, a security officer for the
Chicago Housing Authority, physically abused him. Tony was expelled from school at the end of
ninth grade because of excessive absenteeism. He explained that it was a “ ‘bad school’ with a lot
of ‘gang bangers.’ ” Tony was diagnosed with dyslexia and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder
(ADHD) in third grade and placed in special education classes. He first consumed alcohol when
he was 12 years old and began smoking marijuana when he was 14. Tony reported that, while
incarcerated, he had spent time working in the law library and attending church services. He had
one prior juvenile adjudication for a drug offense and no prior adult criminal convictions.
¶ 17 Defense counsel asked the court for leniency, arguing that Tony’s refusal to join gangs,
despite his difficult upbringing, demonstrated that he had rehabilitative potential. The State
conversely asked the court for a harsh sentence, citing the brutal nature of the crime. The
sentencing judge, concluding that none of the statutory factors in mitigation applied, sentenced
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Tony to 140 years in prison—an aggregate sentence consisting of the maximum sentences of 60
years for first degree murder and 30 years for armed robbery, plus a 50-year firearm enhancement.
¶ 18 Defense counsel moved for reconsideration, arguing among other things that the sentence
was excessive in light of Tony’s background and youth. The court denied the motion, calling Tony
a “cold-blooded murderer” and stating that 140 years in prison was “maybe not enough.”
¶ 19 On direct appeal, we remanded for resentencing based on the fact that the sentencing judge
had indicated on the record that he viewed Tony as a convicted felon. The trial court had
improperly based this on the fact that Tony had been adjudicated delinquent and was serving a
period of juvenile probation. People v. Campbell, 378 Ill. App. 3d 1119 (2008) (table)
(unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23).
¶ 20 C. Resentencing on Remand and Second Direct Appeal
¶ 21 Tony was resentenced on March 25, 2009. The sentencing judge noted at the start of the
hearing that he had not been able to find a copy of the pretrial investigation report in the record.
He said to defense counsel, “[l]et me have a copy. I will give it back to you in a second.” Defense
counsel asked the judge to also consider a two-page letter Tony had written, in which he expressed
remorse and said he had taken a wrong turn but asked the court to believe that he would “never
leave that road again.” The judge refused to consider the letter.
¶ 22 The State introduced victim impact statements from Garvey Bernard’s parents and
presented no other evidence or testimony. It argued that Tony had killed his friend for money, a
gruesome act for which he deserved the maximum sentence the judge could impose.
¶ 23 Defense counsel summarized the testimony of Tony’s mother and sister from his initial
sentencing hearing but did not recall them as witnesses. The family was poor, counsel argued, and
their poverty was what motivated Tony to commit this impulsive crime.
5 No. 1-22-0373
¶ 24 Tony’s counsel initially represented to the court that he was 18 at the time of his offenses;
she was corrected on the record by her client. Tony’s decision not to accept a plea deal and to
represent himself at trial, counsel posited, demonstrated “that immaturity causes people to make
bad decisions.” She argued that Tony had matured while incarcerated and noted that there were no
reports of any incidents he had been involved in while in prison. Counsel asked the court for the
minimum sentence of 51 years, which she observed was already “in effect, a life sentence.”
¶ 25 Tony spoke at length in allocution. He began by saying, “I truly am sorry for the loss of
Garvey Bernard’s family and the life of Garvey Bernard.” Although he still maintained that he was
not the one who pulled the trigger, he accepted responsibility “for receiving blood money” and for
failing to report Mr. Gaddy to the police. He explained to the court that he felt he owed Mr. Gaddy
loyalty for taking him in off the streets and that he also “kind of feared [Mr. Gaddy].” Although
he was “not good with speeches,” Tony told the court, “if I could go back, if I had the power, I
would go back and save that man’s li[f]e.” Tony felt he could be a productive citizen. If given the
chance, he said he would speak out to those who, like he had, were “hanging with the wrong
people.” He believed that he was well positioned to reach young people with the message of what
he had learned from his mistakes.
¶ 26 The court asked if Tony had anything else to say before chastising all present for not even
“bother[ing] to mention the victim’s name” during the “whole record of the sentencing hearing.”
The court noted that the facts of the case were “pretty outrageous,” and that Tony had been
convicted as a principle and his co-defendant as an accomplice.
¶ 27 The judge then reviewed the statutory factors in mitigation that are applicable to all
defendants, regardless of age, and noted which ones he believed were applicable:
“Factors in mitigation: The defendant’s criminal conduct neither caused nor
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threatened serious physical harm to another. Not applicable.
The defendant did not contemplate that his criminal conduct would cause or
threaten serious physical harm to another. Not applicable. The exact opposite, actually.
The defendant acted under a strong provocation. Not applicable.
There were substantial grounds tending to excuse or justify the defendant’s criminal
conduct though failing to establish a defense. Not applicable.
The defendant and his criminal conduct was induced or facilitated by someone
other than the defendant. To some extent I guess this is true. Two people together may
commit a crime that one person alone may not, and that is the situation in this case.
Number six, victim compensation. Of course not applicable.
The defendant has no history of prior delinquency or criminal activity. For the most
part, that is true.
The defendant’s criminal conduct was the result of circumstances unlikely to recur.
The defendant actually claims that he would never commit another armed robbery or shoot
a guy 11 times, killing him again. I am not certain that that is true.
The character and attitudes of the defendant indicate that he is unlikely to commit
another crime. Again, these two factors in mitigation relate to rehabilitative potential, and
the defendant claims that he does have rehabilitative potential. But I am inclined to give
some points for rehabilitative potential, but there is still a big question mark in my mind
whether the defendant actually does have the ability to rehabilitate himself and not commit
another crime of this nature.
The other factors in [mitigation] 11, 12 and 13 are not applicable.”
¶ 28 He did the same for the statutory factors in aggravation:
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“Factors in aggravation. Number one, of course, applicable, the defendant’s
conduct caused or threatened serious harm.
Number two, the defendant received compensation for committing the offense.
Inherent, of course, in the offense of felony murder, which the jury convicted the defendant
of and which the defendant vacated the judgment for that offense on a one act one crime
theory. Nevertheless, the defendant walked away from the murder scene with money in his
pocket.
The defendant has a history of prior delinquency or criminal activity. Not really
applicable. Number four, number five, number six are not applicable.
The sentence is necessary to deter others from committing the same crime.
Applicable.
The other factors in aggravation are not applicable that are outlined in the statute.”
¶ 29 The judge reduced Tony’s initial sentence of 140 years to 110 years in prison: 50 years for
first degree murder, 25 years for armed robbery, and 35 years as a firearm enhancement. The judge
noted that he was “factoring in [Tony’s] rehabilitative potential as well as the seriousness of the
offense, the deterrent effect requirement and the fact that [Tony] had virtually no criminal
background at the time of the offense.”
¶ 30 We affirmed that sentence in a second direct appeal, rejecting Tony’s argument that the
court had again relied on an improper sentencing factor. People v. Campbell, 405 Ill. App. 3d 1195
(2011) (table) (unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23).
¶ 31 D. Postconviction Proceedings
¶ 32 We affirmed the summary dismissal of Tony’s initial postconviction petition, which raised
no sentencing errors, in 2014. People v. Campbell, 2014 IL App (1st) 120577-U, ¶¶ 28-29.
8 No. 1-22-0373
¶ 33 On September 22, 2016, our supreme court held in Reyes that the protections afforded by
Miller apply where a juvenile offender is sentenced to a lengthy term-of-years sentence that is a
de facto life sentence. Reyes, 2016 IL 119271, ¶ 10. On January 10, 2019, Tony filed a pro se
motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition relying on Miller and Reyes. And on
April 18, 2019, while the petition was still pending, our supreme court made clear in People v.
Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶ 40, that any sentence greater than 40 years is a de facto life sentence.
¶ 34 The circuit court denied Tony’s petition on January 27, 2022. The judge—who had also
served as the sentencing judge—acknowledged that Tony’s 110-year sentence was a de facto life
sentence and that “the only issue [was therefore] whether his sentencing hearing complied with
Miller.” Citing the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Jones v. Mississippi, 593 U.S. ___,
141 S. Ct. 1307 (2021), he concluded that “a sentence of life without parole is constitutional for a
juvenile convicted of murder so long as the [sentencing judge] had the discretion to impose a
different sentence.” The judge noted that he had exercised his discretion to give Tony a sentence
that was “considerably higher than the minimum” and maintained that he had also “heard and
considered arguments about [Tony’s] youth based upon the same Eighth Amendment principles
which would eventually provide the basis of the holding in Miller.” In the judge’s view, Tony’s
resentencing hearing was thus “Miller-compliant,” and Tony was “not entitled to a new hearing
for a more in-depth consideration of his youth.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
¶ 35 II. JURISDICTION
¶ 36 The circuit court denied Tony’s motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition
on January 27, 2022, and Tony filed a timely notice of appeal from that ruling on February 18,
2022. We have jurisdiction over this appeal, pursuant to article VI, section 6, of the Illinois
Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 6) and Illinois Supreme Court Rule 651(a) (eff. July 1,
9 No. 1-22-0373
2017), governing appeals from final judgments in postconviction proceedings.
¶ 37 III. ANALYSIS
¶ 38 The Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1(a)(1) (West 2018)) allows a
criminal defendant to challenge his or her conviction by establishing that “in the proceedings
which resulted in [the] conviction there was a substantial denial of his or her rights under the
Constitution of the United States or of the State of Illinois or both.” The Act contemplates the
filing of only one postconviction petition. Id. § 122-1(f); People v. Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d 444,
456 (2002). Claims that were decided on direct appeal or in an earlier postconviction proceeding
are generally barred by the doctrine of res judicata, and claims that could have been, but were not,
raised in earlier proceedings are forfeited. People v. Blair, 215 Ill. 2d 427, 443-44 (2005). Because
successive postconviction petitions are disfavored (People v. Bailey, 2017 IL 121450, ¶ 39), a
defendant seeking to file one must demonstrate either “cause and prejudice” for failing to raise a
claim earlier or actual innocence (People v. Edwards, 2012 IL 111711, ¶¶ 22-23). We review a
circuit court’s denial of leave to file a successive petition de novo. Bailey, 2017 IL 121450, ¶ 13.
¶ 39 Here, Tony sought leave under the cause-and-prejudice exception to the general rule
against the filing of successive postconviction petitions. Section 122-1(f) of the Act, which codifies
that exception, provides that a prisoner shows cause by “identifying an objective factor that
impeded his or her ability to raise a specific claim during his or her initial post-conviction
proceedings” and prejudice by “demonstrating that the claim not raised *** so infected the trial
that the resulting conviction or sentence violated due process.” 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2018).
For the reasons that follow, we believe that Tony has shown both cause and prejudice for the filing
of a successive petition.
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¶ 40 A. Cause
¶ 41 The State makes no argument regarding cause, focusing instead on prejudice. To show
cause, Tony relies on recent case law governing the sentencing of juvenile offenders, which has
evolved considerably since he was resentenced in 2009 and since his initial postconviction petition
was summarily dismissed in early 2012. The cornerstone of this line of cases is the eighth
amendment to the United States Constitution, which prohibits excessive punishment, and its
application to the states through the fourteenth amendment. U.S. Const., amends. VIII, XIV. The
United States Supreme Court held in Miller, 567 U.S. at 465, that a sentencing scheme mandating
life without parole for juveniles violates the eighth amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishments because it deprives the court of the ability to consider the “diminished culpability and
heightened capacity for change” inherent in youth. Id. at 479.
¶ 42 In 2016, the Illinois Supreme Court extended Miller’s holding to include mandatory
de facto life sentences—sentences so long that they are the functional equivalent of life without
parole (Reyes, 2016 IL 119271, ¶ 9)—and discretionary life sentences (People v. Holman, 2017
IL 120655, ¶ 40). And, as noted above, in 2019, the court defined a de facto life sentence as any
sentence exceeding 40 years (Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶ 40).
¶ 43 Here, Miller had not yet been decided when Tony was resentenced on remand in 2009 or
when the circuit court dismissed his initial postconviction petition in 2012. And Reyes and Buffer,
which extended Miller’s protections to individuals like Tony, who received de facto life sentences,
would not be decided for several additional years. We agree with Tony that these facts establish
cause for the filing of a successive postconviction petition. As we said in People v. Ross, 2020 IL
App (1st) 171202, ¶ 21, even if a petitioner who had received a de facto life sentence had attempted
a Miller claim in his initial postconviction petition, “it would have been rejected” because it was
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not until Reyes was decided that his “claim became mature enough so that it could be raised in that
context.”
¶ 44 B. Prejudice
¶ 45 We must next decide whether Tony has demonstrated prejudice by showing that his eighth-
amendment rights were violated at his resentencing. Although Tony was sentenced before Miller
was decided, the United States Supreme Court held in Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190,
212 (2016), that Miller had announced a new substantive rule of constitutional law having
retroactive effect.
¶ 46 Tony submits three reasons why Miller was violated here: (1) the judge had no discretion
to sentence him to anything other than a de facto life sentence, (2) the judge failed to meaningfully
consider the youth-specific factors that three years later would be set out in Miller, and (3) the
judge made no finding that Tony was permanently incorrigible.
¶ 47 When our initial decision in this appeal was about to be filed, our supreme court issued its
opinion in People v. Wilson, 2023 IL 127666. While that case raises significant questions about
Tony’s second and third arguments, it fully supports his contention that, under Miller and its
progeny, a sentencing court is constitutionally required to have the discretion to impose on a
juvenile something other than a life sentence without the possibility of parole. Because we agree
with Tony that the fact that the sentencing court here had no discretion to sentence him to anything
less than a de facto life sentence requires reversal, we have no need to reach his other two
arguments.
¶ 48 The petitioner in Wilson was a juvenile who had been given a de facto life sentence of 55
years for murder, to be served at 100%, and an additional 4 years for armed robbery. Id. at ¶ 15.
He sought leave to file a successive postconviction petition on the basis that this sentence had been
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imposed without the sentencing court first “making a finding of permanent incorrigibility or
specifically addressing the attendant characteristics of youth discussed in Miller.” Id. ¶ 1. The
appellate court accepted this claim and granted him leave—based on Miller, Holman, and Buffer.
Id. ¶ 20. Our supreme court reversed, finding that the rule announced in Holman, which extended
the Miller line of cases to discretionary sentences “no longer accurately reflects eighth amendment
law.” Id. ¶ 41. It relied on the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Jones, 593 U.S. ___, 141
S. Ct 1307, which rejected the requirement that either an express or implicit finding of permanent
incorrigibility must be made before a sentencing judge imposed a discretionary life sentence
without the possibility of parole on a juvenile. Id. ¶¶ 33-42.
¶ 49 Key to the result in Wilson, where the court affirmed the circuit court’s denial of the
petitioner’s motion for leave, was its observation that there was “no dispute that [he] was sentenced
under a sentencing scheme that granted the sentencing court the discretion to consider [his] youth
and attendant circumstances and to impose less than a de facto life sentence.” (Emphasis added.)
Id. ¶ 44. As the Wilson court makes clear, this is the discretion that Miller requires a sentencing
court to have when sentencing a defendant who was a juvenile at the time the crime was committed.
So long as the court had this discretion and “it is clear from the record that [it] did not refuse, as a
matter of law, to consider [the defendant’s] youth,” the Eighth Amendment is complied with.
Id. ¶¶ 42, 44.
¶ 50 There is no dispute that this discretion was lacking at both of Tony’s sentencing hearings.
The sentencing scheme applied to Tony, with good-conduct credit available only on the armed
robbery charge, mandated that he receive no less than 51 years in prison, well in excess of the
definition of a de facto life sentence established in Buffer. The sentencing judge thus had no
discretion to give Tony any sentence that was not a de facto life sentence.
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¶ 51 The State candidly acknowledges that this constituted a violation of Tony’s eighth
amendment rights under Miller. It contends, however, that this Miller violation was harmless error.
The State’s position is that a Miller-compliant sentencing scheme is not required where the
sentence imposed is so far above the statutory minimum that one can surmise that the discretion
to impose something less than a life sentence would have made no difference. We reject this
argument.
¶ 52 As Tony points out in his reply brief, the State cites no case applying a harmless error
analysis in this context. The cases it does cite are all federal cases holding that where a sentencing
court “makes an informed and individualized judgment [citation], to sentence a defendant well
above any mandatory minimum applicable to his case, *** any error in the identification of the
applicable mandatory minimum [is] harmless.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) United States
v. Dominguez, 393 F. App’x 773, 779 (2d Cir. 2010).
¶ 53 At issue here, however, is more than just a misapprehension of the applicable minimum
sentence. Yes, under Miller and Buffer, the minimum sentence is constitutionally required to be
something less than 40 years. But our supreme court’s recent decision in Wilson confirms that
Miller guarantees not just a different sentencing range but also mandates that the sentencing court
have the discretion to impose something less than a life sentence without the possibility of parole.
Wilson, 2023 Il 127666, ¶¶ 27, 44.
¶ 54 The holding in Miller is rooted in society’s growing awareness that even brutal crimes may
be, and frequently are, the product of the transient characteristics of youth. As the Supreme Court
said there, “the distinctive attributes of youth diminish the penological justifications for imposing
the harshest sentences on juvenile offenders, even when they commit terrible crimes.” (Emphasis
added.) Miller, 567 U.S. at 472. The Court in Miller declined to consider whether a “categorical
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bar” on life without parole for juveniles was appropriate (id. at 480), but the essence of that opinion
was that courts must have the discretion “to take into account how children are different, and how
those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.” Id. As Miller
makes clear, consideration of the transient characteristics of youth is only meaningful if the
sentencing court has the discretion to give the juvenile offender a sentence that will offer him or
her an opportunity for life after prison.
¶ 55 Although the court here exercised a degree of discretion by choosing a sentence between
50 years in prison and statutory natural life, our supreme court’s holding in Buffer—that any
sentence greater than 40 years is the legal equivalent of a natural life sentence—reveals that
exercise of discretion to be meaningless under Miller. Where the minimum sentence available is
more than 40 years, there is simply no constitutionally significant choice to be made.
¶ 56 We recognized this in People v. Griffin, 2021 IL App (1st) 170649-U, ¶ 44, where the
sentencing court was required to impose three consecutive sentences of 20 years, for a total of 60
years in prison. We noted that because “[f]or a juvenile defendant in Illinois, there is no difference
in the eyes of the law between a 60-year sentence and a natural-life sentence,” the court was
“[b]oxed in.” Id. ¶¶ 44-45. “[E]ven if [it] could consider [the] defendant’s youth and its attendant
characteristics, it could not give him any relief.” Id. ¶ 44. There, as here, “[s]ince the statutory
scheme gave the court no discretion to sentence [the] defendant to anything other than a de facto
natural life sentence, the sentencing scheme, as applied to [that] defendant, conflict[ed] with Buffer
and Miller and violate[d] the eighth amendment.” Id. ¶ 45. This analysis in Griffin is confirmed by
our supreme court’s recognition in Wilson that the critical question is whether the sentencer has
discretion to consider the mitigating qualities of youth and impose a punishment that is less than
life in prison. Wilson, 2023 IL 127666, ¶ 40.
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¶ 57 In sum, where both the United States Supreme Court and our own supreme court have
repeatedly identified the exercise of real discretion as the essential requirement of Miller, we are
wholly unpersuaded that we may entertain a harmless error analysis in its absence.
¶ 58 Even if we were convinced that harmless error could be asserted under these circumstances,
we would not find its requirements met here. “[T]he test for determining if a constitutional error
is harmless is whether it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not
contribute to the verdict obtained” (People v. Thurow, 203 Ill. 2d 352, 368 (2003)), or, in this case,
the sentenced imposed. Thus, application of the harmless error doctrine here would only be
appropriate if the State had shown us, beyond a reasonable doubt, that under a constitutionally
permissible sentencing scheme allowing the court to choose—based on the Miller criteria—
between a sentence that was the equivalent of a life sentence without the possibility of parole and
one that was not, Tony would still have received a life sentence. This showing is simply not made
on this record.
¶ 59 One factor that Miller requires a court to consider before it imposes a life sentence is “the
juvenile defendant’s degree of participation in the homicide and any evidence of familial or peer
pressures that may have affected him.” Significant evidence was presented here that Tony, who
had never experienced a positive male influence, felt beholden to his older co-defendant, Mr.
Gaddy, and that his fear of Mr. Gaddy and desire to demonstrate his loyalty may well have
influenced his conduct. This evidence undercuts any showing by the State that Tony would still
have received a life sentence under Miller.
¶ 60 In addition, as the United States Supreme Court observed in Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 208,
209, after Miller, sentencing a child to life without parole will be “excessive for all but the rare
juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption” or “permanent incorrigibility.”
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(Internal quotation marks omitted.) While it appears clear now, following Jones and Wilson, that
a finding of permanent incorrigibility is not required before a court chooses to impose a
discretionary life sentence on a juvenile (Jones, 593 U.S. at ___, 141 S. Ct. at 1318; Wilson, 2023
IL 127666, ¶ 42), rehabilitative potential is a core concern of Miller. See Miller, 567 U.S. at 473
(noting that life without parole “reflects an irrevocable judgment about [an offender’s] value and
place in society” that is “at odds with a child’s capacity for change” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
¶ 61 After noting that Tony’s ability to completely turn his life around was “still a big question”
the sentencing judge stated on the record that he was “inclined to give some points for rehabilitative
potential.” And when the judge ultimately decided to reduce Tony’s sentence by 30 years, he
specifically noted that one of the things he had “factor[ed] in” was Tony’s rehabilitative potential.
The sentencing court’s recognition that Tony had rehabilitative potential undercuts any suggestion,
let alone provides proof beyond a reasonable doubt, that a trial court exercising the sentencing
discretion that Miller requires would have given him a life sentence.
¶ 62 Because the sentencing scheme here mandated a de facto life sentence, Tony’s eighth
amendment rights were not honored. We conclude that he has established both cause and prejudice
for the filing of his successive postconviction petition, and the circuit court’s order denying him
leave to do so is reversed.
¶ 63 C. Remedy
¶ 64 When we reverse an order denying a motion for leave to file a successive postconviction
petition, the usual remedy is to remand the case for further postconviction proceedings. See, e.g.,
People v. Wrice, 2012 IL 111860, ¶ 87 (remanding for appointment of postconviction counsel and
second-stage proceedings). Where no factual development of the record is necessary to determine
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that a Miller violation has occurred, however, the proper remedy is instead “to vacate [the]
defendant’s sentence and to remand for a new sentencing hearing.” Buffer, 2019 IL 122327,
¶¶ 45-47 (remanding for resentencing following reversal of the summary dismissal of a
postconviction petition alleging a Miller violation). That is true here, and we therefore remand this
case for a new sentencing hearing.
¶ 65 D. Assignment to a New Judge on Remand
¶ 66 In our initial decision resolving this appeal, filed on June 2, 2023, we remanded to the
presiding judge of the criminal division of the circuit court to reassign this case to a different judge
for resentencing. We did this with little discussion or explanation. The State petitioned for leave
to appeal that aspect of our decision to the Illinois Supreme Court and, with the petition still
pending, our supreme court remanded to us for the limited purpose of explaining the rationale for
our directive to order reassignment. We did so, in a modified opinion filed on October 13, 2023.
People v. Campbell, 2023 IL App (1st) 220373.
¶ 67 In that modified decision, we noted that Illinois Supreme Court Rule 366(a)(5) (eff. Feb.
1, 1994) had been interpreted to include the power to order that a case be reassigned to a different
judge on remand. Id. ¶ 67 (citing Eychaner v. Gross, 202 Ill. 2d 228, 279 (2002)). And although
Rule 366 was contained in the civil appeal rules, we concluded that it had a counterpart in Rule
615(b)(2), which is a part of the criminal appeal rules, and which provides that the appellate court
may “set aside, affirm, or modify any or all of the proceedings subsequent to or dependent upon
the judgment or order from which the appeal is taken” (Ill. Sup. Ct. R. 615(b)(2) (eff. Jan. 1,
1967)). Id.
¶ 68 The State’s position was that the only valid basis for reassignment on remand in a criminal
case was a finding of bias or actual prejudice on the part of the trial judge. While that was clearly
18 No. 1-22-0373
one important basis for reassignment (see Eychaner, at 279-81), we concluded in our modified
decision that factors other than bias might, in rare cases, also require reassignment. Id. ¶¶ 68-69
(citing People v. Heider, 231 Ill. 2d 1, 25 (2008) (ordering remand “to remove any suggestion of
unfairness”) and People v. Robinson, 2021 IL App (1st) 171371, ¶ 61 (ordering remand “to avoid
the appearance of any impropriety” and “[o]ut of an abundance of caution”)). We observed that
Federal intermediate appellate courts had long considered such factors. Id. ¶ 70 (citing Manley v.
Rowley, 847 F.3d 705, 712 (2017)).
¶ 69 As we explained in our modified decision, the transcript of Tony’s resentencing hearing
indicated that, even had he possessed the discretion to do so, the sentencing judge would not have
considered giving Tony anything less than a de facto life sentence. Id. ¶ 74. We also questioned
whether this judge, who in other cases had expressed an aversion to applying the more lenient
juvenile sentencing standards that are now required (see People v. McKinley, 2020 IL App (1st)
191907, ¶¶ 80, 90), could reasonably be expected to fairly consider modifying the sentence in this
case in light of those new standards. Id. ¶¶ 75-76. We concluded that reassignment was necessary
to remove any doubt regarding the fairness of what would be the third, and hopefully final,
sentencing hearing on the same criminal charges. Id. ¶ 79. We noted that, even if our supreme
court were to hold that actual bias was the only basis on which we could order reassignment on
remand, “reassignment here would still be supported by the record.” Id. ¶ 78.
¶ 70 On August 28, 2025, our supreme addressed the question of when this court may order that
a criminal case be reassigned to a new judge on remand in People v. Class, 2025 IL 129695. The
court denied the State’s petition for leave to appeal in this case on November 26, 2025, and
remanded for us to vacate that portion of our modified opinion ordering reassignment on remand
and to consider that issue once more, this time in light of Class. We do so now.
19 No. 1-22-0373
¶ 71 The court recognized in Class that Rule 615(b) does give this court the authority in criminal
cases to direct that a new judge be assigned on remand Id. ¶ 31. But it concluded that the
circumstances under which we may do so are particularly limited where, as in Class and in this
case, the remand to a different judge is ordered sua sponte and in a case that is before the court on
a successive petition under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West
2016)). In these circumstances, remand to a different judge is appropriate only were “the record
on appeal clearly reveals bias, the probability of bias, or prejudice on the part of the trial judge.”
Id. ¶ 37. Our supreme court went on to define bias and prejudice for these purposes quite narrowly.
¶ 72 We had concluded that the circuit court judge in Class was biased based on his
demonstrated hostility to the postconviction claims advanced by the petitioner in that case. Id. ¶ 43.
Our supreme court rejected that notion of bias in favor of a narrower definition that looked to
whether the court’s decision was derived from an extrajudicial source or displayed such “a high
degree of favoritism or antagonism as to make fair judgment impossible.” Id. ¶ 44. The court
provided three examples of circumstances in which it had found bias, the probability of bias, or
prejudice in a postconviction proceeding: (1) where the judge had knowledge outside the record
of the truth or falsity of the allegations, such that he or she might be called as a material witness,
(2) where the judge had “a direct, personal, or pecuniary interest in the case,” and (3) where the
case “involve[d] a possible temptation such that the average person, acting as judge, could not hold
the balance nice, clear, and true between the State and petitioner.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Id. ¶ 45.
¶ 73 Here, as in Class, none of these very specific circumstances are present. Nor does the record
support a finding that the trial judge’s decision was derived from an extrajudicial source or
displayed an attitude that made fair judgment “impossible.” Thus, under the standard articulated
20 No. 1-22-0373
in Class for a sua sponte reassignment on remand in a successive post-conviction proceeding,
reassignment is not supported by the record in this case.
¶ 74 IV. CONCLUSION
¶ 75 We reverse the denial of Tony’s motion for leave to file a successive postconviction
petition, vacate his 110-year sentence, and remand this case for resentencing.
¶ 76 Reversed and remanded.
21 No. 1-22-0373
People v. Campbell, 2023 IL App (1st) 220373
Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 01-CR- 12003, the Hon. Kenneth J. Wadas, Judge presiding.
Attorneys James E. Chadd, Douglas R. Hoff, and Joseph Michael Benak, for of State Appellate Defender’s Office, of Chicago, for appellant. Appellant:
Attorneys Kimberly M. Foxx, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Enrique for Abraham, David H. Iskowich, and Retha Stotts, Assistant Appellee: State’s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.