2026 IL App (1st) 250788-U No. 1-25-0788 Order filed May 8, 2026 Sixth Division
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________ THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County. ) v. ) No. 15 CR 9396 ) DEANGELO CAMPBELL, ) Honorable ) Alfredo Maldonado, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.
JUSTICE HYMAN delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice C.A. Walker and Justice Gamrath concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: Defendant’s facial constitutional challenge to his conviction for aggravated unlawful use of a weapon fails under the Second Amendment of the United States Constitution and the test in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022) .
¶2 Deangelo Campbell appeals from the denial of his pro se petition for relief from judgment
filed under section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West
2024)). He argues that the provision of the aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW) statute No. 1-25-0788
under which he was convicted is facially unconstitutional because it violates the second
amendment of the United States Constitution and the test set forth in New York State Rifle & Pistol
Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022). We affirm.
¶3 Background
¶4 After a 2016 bench trial, Campbell was found guilty of AUUW predicated on possessing a
firearm without a valid Firearm Owner’s Identification (FOID) card and a concealed carry license
(CCL). See 720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(1), (3)(A-5), (3)(C) (West 2014). Evidence reflected that officers
saw Campbell retrieve a firearm from his waistband and throw it into a car. A certification from
the Illinois State Police Department established that Campbell did not have a valid FOID card or
CCL at the time of the offense. Campbell was sentenced to one year in prison. We affirmed on
direct appeal. See People v. Campbell, 2019 IL App (1st) 161640.
¶5 In 2024, Campbell filed a pro se section 2-1401 petition alleging that his AUUW
conviction should be vacated under People v. Aguilar, 2013 IL 112116. The circuit court denied
relief, stating that Campbell’s case was not an “Aguilar issue.”
¶6 Analysis
¶7 Campbell argues that the provision of the AUUW statute under which he was convicted is
facially unconstitutional under the Second Amendment and Bruen.
¶8 As a threshold matter, Campbell failed to raise the facial Bruen challenge in the circuit
court. Ordinarily, a defendant “who fails to raise an issue before the trial court forfeits the issue”
on appeal. People v. Rodriguez, 2021 IL App (1st) 200173, ¶ 58. But, “[w]hen a statute is declared
facially unconstitutional and void ab initio, it means that the statute was constitutionally infirm
from the moment of its enactment and, therefore, unenforceable.” People v. Thompson, 2015 IL
-2- No. 1-25-0788
118151, ¶ 32. Moreover, “a judgment based on a statute that is facially unconstitutional is void,”
and challenges based on a void statute are “not subject to forfeiture” or “any other ordinary
procedural bar.” In re N.G., 2018 IL 121939, ¶¶ 43, 57.
¶9 This is so even when a defendant raises a facial challenge for the first time on appeal from
the denial of a section 2-1401 petition that raised different claims, as Campbell did. See People v.
Doehring, 2024 IL App (1st) 230384, ¶ 14 (permitting facial Bruen challenge for first time on
appeal from denial of section 2-1401 petition); see also People v. McTizic, 2025 IL App (1st)
240467-U, ¶ 5 (same). Therefore, Campbell may raise the facial Bruen challenge.
¶ 10 A presumption exists that all statutes are constitutional, and a defendant carries a “heavy
burden” in rebutting that presumption by “clearly establish[ing] that [the statute] violates the
constitution.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Rizzo, 2016 IL 118599, ¶ 23. Courts
have a duty to uphold the constitutionality of a statute whenever possible, “resolving any doubts
in favor of the statute’s validity.” Id. A facial challenge requires a showing that “the statute is
unconstitutional under any set of facts, i.e., the specific facts related to the challenging party are
irrelevant.” Id. ¶ 24. If a situation exists in which the statute can be validly applied, a facial
challenge fails. Id. We review a statute’s constitutionality de novo. Id. ¶ 23.
¶ 11 AUUW Statute and Bruen Decision
¶ 12 Campbell was convicted of violating section 24-1.6(a)(1), (3)(A-5), (3)(C) of the AUUW
statute, which provides that “[a] person commits the offense of aggravated unlawful use of a
weapon when he or she knowingly carries on or about his or her person *** any pistol, revolver,
*** or other firearm” without a “currently valid license under the Firearm Concealed Carry Act”
and “a currently valid [FOID] Card.” 720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(1), (3)(A-5), (3)(C) (West 2014).
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¶ 13 The FOID Card Act provides that “no person may acquire or possess any firearm ***
within this State without *** a [FOID] card previously issued *** by the Department of State
Police.” 430 ILCS 65/2(a)(1) (West 2014). The FOID card application must include evidence that
an applicant, among other things, (i) is an Illinois resident, (ii) is at least 21 years of age, (iii) has
not been convicted of a felony, (iv) has not been a patient in a mental health facility in the five
years preceding the application or suffers from an intellectual disability, (v) is not subject to an
order prohibiting the possession of a firearm, and (vi) has not been convicted of battery, assault,
aggravated assault, or other similar offense where a firearm was used or convicted of domestic
battery, aggravated domestic battery, or a similar offense. Id. § 65/4(a)(2).
¶ 14 The Firearm Concealed Carry Act mandates that an individual shall be issued a CCL if (i)
the individual completes an application and provides the information and documents require; (ii)
is at least 21 years old, (3) has been issued a currently valid FOID card, (iv) has not been convicted
of an offense involving the threat of force or violence or alcohol or drugs within five years of the
application, (v) is not the subject of a pending warrant or prosecution, (vi) has not been subject to
court-ordered alcohol or drug treatment, (vii) has completed firearms training and education, (viii)
paid the fees, and (ix) does not pose a danger to themselves or others. 430 ILCS 66/10(a), 25, 30
(West 2014). An individual must possess the CCL “at all times the licensee carries a concealed
firearm,” absent certain exceptions. Id. § 66/10(g).
¶ 15 The second amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “[a] well regulated
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2026 IL App (1st) 250788-U No. 1-25-0788 Order filed May 8, 2026 Sixth Division
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________ THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County. ) v. ) No. 15 CR 9396 ) DEANGELO CAMPBELL, ) Honorable ) Alfredo Maldonado, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.
JUSTICE HYMAN delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice C.A. Walker and Justice Gamrath concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: Defendant’s facial constitutional challenge to his conviction for aggravated unlawful use of a weapon fails under the Second Amendment of the United States Constitution and the test in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022) .
¶2 Deangelo Campbell appeals from the denial of his pro se petition for relief from judgment
filed under section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West
2024)). He argues that the provision of the aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW) statute No. 1-25-0788
under which he was convicted is facially unconstitutional because it violates the second
amendment of the United States Constitution and the test set forth in New York State Rifle & Pistol
Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022). We affirm.
¶3 Background
¶4 After a 2016 bench trial, Campbell was found guilty of AUUW predicated on possessing a
firearm without a valid Firearm Owner’s Identification (FOID) card and a concealed carry license
(CCL). See 720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(1), (3)(A-5), (3)(C) (West 2014). Evidence reflected that officers
saw Campbell retrieve a firearm from his waistband and throw it into a car. A certification from
the Illinois State Police Department established that Campbell did not have a valid FOID card or
CCL at the time of the offense. Campbell was sentenced to one year in prison. We affirmed on
direct appeal. See People v. Campbell, 2019 IL App (1st) 161640.
¶5 In 2024, Campbell filed a pro se section 2-1401 petition alleging that his AUUW
conviction should be vacated under People v. Aguilar, 2013 IL 112116. The circuit court denied
relief, stating that Campbell’s case was not an “Aguilar issue.”
¶6 Analysis
¶7 Campbell argues that the provision of the AUUW statute under which he was convicted is
facially unconstitutional under the Second Amendment and Bruen.
¶8 As a threshold matter, Campbell failed to raise the facial Bruen challenge in the circuit
court. Ordinarily, a defendant “who fails to raise an issue before the trial court forfeits the issue”
on appeal. People v. Rodriguez, 2021 IL App (1st) 200173, ¶ 58. But, “[w]hen a statute is declared
facially unconstitutional and void ab initio, it means that the statute was constitutionally infirm
from the moment of its enactment and, therefore, unenforceable.” People v. Thompson, 2015 IL
-2- No. 1-25-0788
118151, ¶ 32. Moreover, “a judgment based on a statute that is facially unconstitutional is void,”
and challenges based on a void statute are “not subject to forfeiture” or “any other ordinary
procedural bar.” In re N.G., 2018 IL 121939, ¶¶ 43, 57.
¶9 This is so even when a defendant raises a facial challenge for the first time on appeal from
the denial of a section 2-1401 petition that raised different claims, as Campbell did. See People v.
Doehring, 2024 IL App (1st) 230384, ¶ 14 (permitting facial Bruen challenge for first time on
appeal from denial of section 2-1401 petition); see also People v. McTizic, 2025 IL App (1st)
240467-U, ¶ 5 (same). Therefore, Campbell may raise the facial Bruen challenge.
¶ 10 A presumption exists that all statutes are constitutional, and a defendant carries a “heavy
burden” in rebutting that presumption by “clearly establish[ing] that [the statute] violates the
constitution.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Rizzo, 2016 IL 118599, ¶ 23. Courts
have a duty to uphold the constitutionality of a statute whenever possible, “resolving any doubts
in favor of the statute’s validity.” Id. A facial challenge requires a showing that “the statute is
unconstitutional under any set of facts, i.e., the specific facts related to the challenging party are
irrelevant.” Id. ¶ 24. If a situation exists in which the statute can be validly applied, a facial
challenge fails. Id. We review a statute’s constitutionality de novo. Id. ¶ 23.
¶ 11 AUUW Statute and Bruen Decision
¶ 12 Campbell was convicted of violating section 24-1.6(a)(1), (3)(A-5), (3)(C) of the AUUW
statute, which provides that “[a] person commits the offense of aggravated unlawful use of a
weapon when he or she knowingly carries on or about his or her person *** any pistol, revolver,
*** or other firearm” without a “currently valid license under the Firearm Concealed Carry Act”
and “a currently valid [FOID] Card.” 720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(1), (3)(A-5), (3)(C) (West 2014).
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¶ 13 The FOID Card Act provides that “no person may acquire or possess any firearm ***
within this State without *** a [FOID] card previously issued *** by the Department of State
Police.” 430 ILCS 65/2(a)(1) (West 2014). The FOID card application must include evidence that
an applicant, among other things, (i) is an Illinois resident, (ii) is at least 21 years of age, (iii) has
not been convicted of a felony, (iv) has not been a patient in a mental health facility in the five
years preceding the application or suffers from an intellectual disability, (v) is not subject to an
order prohibiting the possession of a firearm, and (vi) has not been convicted of battery, assault,
aggravated assault, or other similar offense where a firearm was used or convicted of domestic
battery, aggravated domestic battery, or a similar offense. Id. § 65/4(a)(2).
¶ 14 The Firearm Concealed Carry Act mandates that an individual shall be issued a CCL if (i)
the individual completes an application and provides the information and documents require; (ii)
is at least 21 years old, (3) has been issued a currently valid FOID card, (iv) has not been convicted
of an offense involving the threat of force or violence or alcohol or drugs within five years of the
application, (v) is not the subject of a pending warrant or prosecution, (vi) has not been subject to
court-ordered alcohol or drug treatment, (vii) has completed firearms training and education, (viii)
paid the fees, and (ix) does not pose a danger to themselves or others. 430 ILCS 66/10(a), 25, 30
(West 2014). An individual must possess the CCL “at all times the licensee carries a concealed
firearm,” absent certain exceptions. Id. § 66/10(g).
¶ 15 The second amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “[a] well regulated
Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear
Arms, shall not be infringed.” U.S. Const. amend. II. This amendment protects an individual’s
right to keep and bear arms for self-defense and was made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth
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Amendment. Bruen, 597 U.S. at 17; McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010). Like
most rights, “the right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited.” District of Columbia
v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008).
¶ 16 In Bruen, the Supreme Court assessed the constitutionality of a New York law mandating
that individuals prove “proper cause exists” for obtaining a license to carry a firearm outside the
home. Bruen, 597 U.S. at 12. The Court articulated a two-part test for assessing the
constitutionality of firearms regulations. First, the court must analyze whether “the Second
Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct.” Id. at 24. If so, that conduct is
presumptively protected. Id. The government must then “justify its regulation by demonstrating
that it is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” Id.
¶ 17 Right to Publicly Carry
¶ 18 Campbell argues that the right to publicly carry a firearm is covered under the plain text of
the Second Amendment. And the provision of the AUUW statute under which he was convicted
contradicts the historical tradition of firearms regulation. Campbell maintains that the provision is
facially unconstitutional due to (1) the onerous burden placed on an individual to be issued a FOID
card before obtaining a CCL and (2) the criminalization of possessing a firearm without a license.
¶ 19 Campbell acknowledges that our supreme court’s decision in People v. Thompson, 2025
IL 129965, binds this court in holding that “Bruen itself stands for the proposition that Illinois’s
nondiscretionary, ‘shall-issue’ firearm licensing regime does not violate the second amendment
[and] the AUUW statute’s ban on unlicensed public carriage, coupled with the requirements to
obtain CCLs and FOID cards, is not facially unconstitutional under the second amendment.”
Thompson, 2025 IL 129965, ¶ 3. Campbell argues, however, that Thompson was wrongly decided.
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¶ 20 While Campbell’s conduct of publicly carrying a firearm falls within the scope of the
Second Amendment protections (Bruen at 32; see also Aguilar, 2013 IL 112116, ¶ 20), our
supreme court held that “the United States Supreme Court’s express endorsement of shall-issue
licensure obviates the need for this court to apply the historical-tradition component of the Bruen
analysis to defendant’s facial challenge to section 24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A-5) and its enforcement of
CCL and FOID card licensure.” Thompson, 2025 IL 129965, ¶¶ 44, 53. Thompson controls this
case, and forecloses the arguments Campbell makes on appeal. See Yakich v. Aulds, 2019 IL
123667, ¶ 13 (“[Illinois c]ircuit and appellate courts are bound to apply [the Illinois supreme]
court’s precedent to the facts of the case before them under the fundamental principle of stare
decisis.”).
¶ 21 Following Thompson, we find that Illinois’s shall-issue licensing scheme and section 24-
1.6(a)(1), (3)(A-5), (3)(C) of the AUUW statute are not unconstitutional, and we reject Campbell’s
facial challenge. See People v. Torres, 2025 IL App (1st) 232253-U, ¶ 18 (holding that Thompson
controls and rejecting defendant’s argument on appeal); People v. Wright, 2025 IL App (1st)
241047-U, ¶ 14 (same).
¶ 22 While this appeal was pending, the State moved for summary disposition, which was taken
with the case. In light of this order, the motion for summary disposition is denied as moot.
¶ 23 Affirmed.
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