People v. Bellafant

Michigan Court of Appeals

People v. Bellafant

307 N.W.2d 422, 105 Mich. App. 788

CourtMichigan Court of Appeals

DecidedApril 23, 1981

DocketDocket 48816

StatusPublished

Cited by10 cases

This text of 307 N.W.2d 422 (People v. Bellafant) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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People v. Bellafant, 307 N.W.2d 422, 105 Mich. App. 788 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981).

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Per Curiam.

Defendant appeals as of right his June 18, 1979, bench trial conviction of assaulting a prison employee. MCL 750.197c; MSA 28.394(3). On August 31, 1979, defendant was sentenced to a term of nine months to four years imprisonment, this sentence to be served consecutively to the one that he was serving at the time of the assault.

Defendant first argues that his conviction violates double jeopardy because he had already been required to forfeit earned good time as a result of the same assault. Prior panels of this Court have considered this issue and found it to be lacking in merit. Pfefferle v Corrections Comm, 86 Mich App 366, 373; 272 NW2d 563 (1976), People v Bachman, 50 Mich App 682; 213 NW2d 800 (1973), lv den 392 Mich 776 (1974).

Similarly, we reject defendant’s argument that the statute under which he was convicted violates the title-object clause of the Michigan Constitution. Const 1963, art 4, § 24. This Court considered this argument in People v Wingo, 95 Mich App 101, 105; 290 NW2d 93 (1980), and found that "Section 197c of the penal code does not embrace an object that is not expressed in * * * [its] title”.

We have considered defendant’s contention that the prison assault statute applies only to assaults that are made during an attempt to escape from prison. However, we are not persuaded by this argument. The clear language of the statute unambiguously expresses a legislative intention contrary to defendant’s argument. People v Boyd, 102 Mich App 112; 300 NW2d 760 (1980). Where the Legislature makes its intent known through the clear and explicit language of a statute, this Court [791]*791must enforce that intent. Cronin v Minster Press, 56 Mich App 471; 224 NW2d 336 (1974).

We also disagree with defendant’s contention that he is entitled to resentencing because he was not present at an in-chambers sentencing conference.

We do not find the in-chambers conference to be a crucial step in the criminal process requiring defendant’s presence. The record reveals that the defendant was given the right of allocution prior to the imposition of sentence. Therefore, we find no error. People v Briggs, 94 Mich App 723, 727; 290 NW2d 66 (1980), People v Worden, 91 Mich App 666; 284 NW2d 159 (1979).

Affirmed.

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Per Curiam.

Defendant appeals as of right his June 18, 1979, bench trial conviction of assaulting a prison employee. MCL 750.197c; MSA 28.394(3). On August 31, 1979, defendant was sentenced to a term of nine months to four years imprisonment, this sentence to be served consecutively to the one that he was serving at the time of the assault.

Defendant first argues that his conviction violates double jeopardy because he had already been required to forfeit earned good time as a result of the same assault. Prior panels of this Court have considered this issue and found it to be lacking in merit. Pfefferle v Corrections Comm, 86 Mich App 366, 373; 272 NW2d 563 (1976), People v Bachman, 50 Mich App 682; 213 NW2d 800 (1973), lv den 392 Mich 776 (1974).

Similarly, we reject defendant’s argument that the statute under which he was convicted violates the title-object clause of the Michigan Constitution. Const 1963, art 4, § 24. This Court considered this argument in People v Wingo, 95 Mich App 101, 105; 290 NW2d 93 (1980), and found that "Section 197c of the penal code does not embrace an object that is not expressed in * * * [its] title”.

We have considered defendant’s contention that the prison assault statute applies only to assaults that are made during an attempt to escape from prison. However, we are not persuaded by this argument. The clear language of the statute unambiguously expresses a legislative intention contrary to defendant’s argument. People v Boyd, 102 Mich App 112; 300 NW2d 760 (1980). Where the Legislature makes its intent known through the clear and explicit language of a statute, this Court [791]*791must enforce that intent. Cronin v Minster Press, 56 Mich App 471; 224 NW2d 336 (1974).

We also disagree with defendant’s contention that he is entitled to resentencing because he was not present at an in-chambers sentencing conference.

We do not find the in-chambers conference to be a crucial step in the criminal process requiring defendant’s presence. The record reveals that the defendant was given the right of allocution prior to the imposition of sentence. Therefore, we find no error. People v Briggs, 94 Mich App 723, 727; 290 NW2d 66 (1980), People v Worden, 91 Mich App 666; 284 NW2d 159 (1979).

Affirmed.

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307 N.W.2d 422, 105 Mich. App. 788, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-bellafant-michctapp-1981.

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