People v. Beck

2021 IL App (4th) 190287-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: March 23, 2021
• Docket: 4-19-0287
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE 2021 IL App (4th) 190287-U FILED This Order was filed under March 23, 2021 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is NO. 4-19-0287 Carla Bender not precedent except in the 4th District Appellate limited circumstances allowed IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL under Rule 23(e)(1).

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of v. ) Champaign County JOHN W. BECK, ) No. 08CF1944 Defendant-Appellant. ) ) Honorable ) Roger B. Webber, ) Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE HOLDER WHITE delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Harris and Steigmann concurred in the judgment.

ORDER ¶1 Held: The appellate court granted OSAD’s motion to withdraw and vacated the trial court’s judgment.

¶2 In November 2018, defendant, John W. Beck, filed a “Petition Nunc Pro Tunc,”

arguing he was entitled to additional sentencing credit towards a 25-year sentence imposed in

August 2009. The trial court addressed defendant’s motion on the merits but ultimately denied it

after finding defendant received the proper amount of sentencing credit. Defendant appealed.

Defendant’s appointed appellate counsel, the Office of the State Appellate Defender (OSAD),

has filed a motion to withdraw on the basis no meritorious argument can be raised on appeal. For

the reasons discussed below, we grant OSAD’s motion and vacate the trial court’s judgment.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND ¶4 On June 14, 2007, defendant was arrested on federal bank robbery charges, and

on December 21, 2007, he was sentenced to 151 months in federal prison. In October 2008,

while defendant was serving his federal sentence, the State charged defendant with armed

robbery (720 ILCS 5/18-2(b) (West 2006)), alleging he robbed a lumber store in June 2007. On

November 19, 2008, the State filed a detainer against defendant. On August 7, 2009, defendant

pleaded guilty to the armed robbery charge and was sentenced to 25 years’ imprisonment, with

the sentence to run concurrently with his federal sentence. Defendant received 262 days of

sentencing credit, which represented the time from the filing of the detainer to the entry of the

guilty plea.

¶5 In November 2018, defendant filed the instant “Petition Nunc Pro Tunc,” arguing

the court erred by awarding him only 262 days of credit. According to defendant, he should have

received 784 days of credit because he was in custody from June 14, 2007, the date he was

arrested on federal charges, to August 7, 2009, the date he pleaded guilty to the State charge. The

State filed a response to defendant’s motion in which it argued defendant was not entitled to

credit for time spent in custody on an unrelated charge and in a different jurisdiction. The court

agreed with the State and denied defendant’s request for additional sentencing credit. Defendant

filed a motion to reconsider, which the court also denied.

¶6 This appeal followed.

¶7 II. ANALYSIS

¶8 OSAD contends, in part, it can raise no meritorious argument on appeal because

the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear defendant’s cause and, as a result, the court’s order must

be vacated. Whether a court possessed jurisdiction is a question of law reviewed de novo. See,

e.g., Vines v. Village of Flossmoor, 2017 IL App (1st) 163339, ¶ 8, 90 N.E.3d 996.

-2- ¶9 Generally, absent a timely postjudgment motion, a trial court loses jurisdiction to

reconsider and modify its judgment after expiration of the 30-day period following entry of the

final judgment. People v. Bailey, 2014 IL 115459, ¶ 14, 4 N.E.3d 474; see also People v.

Flowers, 208 Ill. 2d 291, 303, 802 N.E.2d 1174, 1181 (2003) (“Normally, the authority of a trial

court to alter a sentence terminates after 30 days.”). One exception to the 30-day limitation

allows a court to enter a nunc pro tunc order at any time “to correct a clerical error or a matter of

form so that the record conforms to the judgment actually rendered.” Holwell ex rel. Holwell v.

Zenith Electronics Corp., 334 Ill. App. 3d 917, 922, 779 N.E.2d 435, 440 (2002). However, “[a]

nunc pro tunc order may not be used to cure a jurisdictional defect, supply omitted judicial

actions, or correct a judicial error under the pretense of correcting a clerical error.” Harreld v.

Butler, 2014 IL App (2d) 131065, ¶ 13, 24 N.E.3d 786.

¶ 10 Here, although defendant labeled his motion as a “Petition Nunc Pro Tunc,” he

really sought to correct an alleged judicial error. Defendant did not argue that he was actually

awarded 784 days of sentence credit but due to a clerical error only 262 days were reflected in

the final judgment. Instead, defendant argued he received only 262 days of sentence credit as a

result of judicial error. Because defendant’s motion asked the court to modify his sentence well

beyond the relevant 30-day period, the court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the merits of his

motion and should have dismissed the proceeding. Accordingly, we must vacate the trial court’s

judgment and remand with directions to dismiss the proceedings for lack of jurisdiction. See

Bailey, 2014 IL 115459, ¶ 29 (“After concluding that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to address

the merits of defendant’s motion to vacate, [the appellate court] should have vacated the trial

court’s judgment and ordered that defendant’s motion be dismissed.”).

¶ 11 III. CONCLUSION

-3- ¶ 12 For the reasons stated, we grant OSAD’s motion, vacate the trial court’s

judgment, and remand with directions to dismiss these proceedings for lack of jurisdiction.

¶ 13 Judgment vacated and cause remanded with directions.

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