2023 IL App (3d) 200127
Opinion filed April 26, 2023 ____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ILLINOIS, ) of the 21st Judicial Circuit, ) Kankakee County, Illinois. Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) Appeal No. 3-20-0127 v. ) Circuit No. 11-CF-642 ) DANNIE L. KENDRICK JR., ) The Honorable ) Kathy S. Bradshaw Elliott, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding. ____________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE HETTEL delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Presiding Justice Holdridge and Justice McDade concurred in the judgment and opinion. ____________________________________________________________________________
OPINION
¶1 At the age of 19, defendant Dannie L. Kendrick Jr. was charged with murder (720 ILCS
5/9-1(a)(2), (3) (West 2010)) and armed robbery (id. § 18-2(a)(2)). Prior to trial, defendant sought
to exclude evidence of certain statements he made to police. The trial court partially denied the
motion, allowing the jury to hear statements defendant made about his prior criminal activity and
parole status. The jury found defendant guilty. At defendant’s sentencing hearing, an expert in
developmental psychology testified that defendant was capable of rehabilitation primarily due to
his age at the time of his offenses. After concluding that defendant lacked rehabilitative potential, the trial court sentenced defendant to 60 years in prison. On appeal, defendant argues (1) the trial
court erred in admitting other-crimes evidence, (2) his sentence is unconstitutional, and (3) the trial
court erred in finding he lacked rehabilitative potential.
¶2 I. BACKGROUND
¶3 On November 30, 2011, the State charged defendant, a 19-year-old, with first degree
murder (id. § 9-1(a)(2), (3)), armed robbery (id. § 18-2(a)(2)), and unlawful possession of a
weapon by a felon (id. § 24-1.1(a)). The indictment alleged that defendant shot and killed Joseph
Buckner while robbing him.
¶4 Between 2013 and 2018, defendant filed five motions to quash his arrest and/or suppress
statements he made to police. Following hearings on each motion, the trial court denied them. In
May 2019, defendant filed a motion in limine seeking to have various statements redacted from
his interviews with police. The trial court partially granted and partially denied the motion,
ordering some statements redacted but allowing statements defendant made about breaking into
people’s homes and being on parole to be admitted into evidence and heard by the jury. Defendant
filed a motion to sever the unlawful possession of a weapon charge from the other charges against
him. The trial court granted that motion, and the case proceeded to a jury trial on the murder and
armed robbery charges.
¶5 Defendant’s trial took place over six days. The evidence at trial established that the victim,
Joseph Buckner, lived on the 600 block of South Lincoln Avenue in Kankakee. On November 25,
2011, Buckner was shot several times in front of his house between 7:50 p.m. and 7:52 p.m. Police
found Buckner lying face down on the sidewalk about two blocks from his home with gunshot
wounds to his chest, thigh, and thumb. Buckner died as a result of those gunshot wounds. The
police found five .380-caliber shell casings in front of Buckner’s house.
2 ¶6 Four days after Buckner’s murder, three officers from the Kankakee Police Department
interviewed defendant. Sergeant Steven Hunter interviewed defendant first. During that interview,
defendant denied any involvement in Buckner’s murder. Next, Detective Avery Ivey interviewed
defendant, and defendant continued to deny killing Buckner. During that interview, defendant
made the following statement:
“I break into people’s houses, I ain’t going to lie. I break into somebody’s house. I
won’t shoot nobody. I won’t kill nobody. You know what I’m saying. That ain’t
what I do. You know what I’m saying. I would rather catch you gone and I can get
away from it and I’m gone. You know what I’m saying.”
Later, Detective Randy Hartman interviewed defendant. Defendant initially denied his
involvement in Buckner’s murder but eventually admitted that he shot Buckner.
¶7 Defendant told Hartman his cousin, Ricky Kendrick (Ricky), came up with the idea to rob
Buckner because Ricky knew Buckner had money. Ricky waited across the street while defendant
committed the robbery. Defendant approached Buckner’s car and told Buckner to get out of the
vehicle and give him money. Buckner gave defendant $250 and then grabbed defendant’s gun.
Defendant shot Buckner in the leg, and Buckner grabbed the gun again, so defendant shot him
several more times, hitting him in the abdomen. Defendant ran toward his uncle’s house, and
Buckner ran in the opposite direction. Defendant said the gun he used was a .380-caliber that
belonged to his cousin David Kendrick (David). Defendant told Hartman he did not intend to kill
Buckner and only used the gun as a “scare tactic.”
¶8 Defendant told Hartman that he and Ricky had broken into houses on “random streets” in
the past but this was his first time “ever shooting a person ever killing a person.” Defendant also
3 mentioned to Hartman that he has a parole officer. The video recordings of Ivey’s and Hartman’s
interviews with defendant were admitted into evidence and played for the jury.
¶9 Ricky Kendrick testified that the State initially charged him with Buckner’s murder, but he
pled guilty to armed robbery, and the State dismissed the murder charge against him. Ricky
testified that on the night of November 25, 2011, he was with defendant. He had a .45-caliber
pistol, and defendant had a .380-caliber pistol. He and defendant planned to burglarize a specific
house that night but then decided not to. As they were walking, Ricky saw Buckner exiting his
vehicle. Defendant told Ricky he wanted to rob Buckner. Ricky told defendant not to because
Ricky knew and “loved” Buckner. Ricky walked across the street while defendant walked toward
Buckner’s car. Ricky heard defendant tell Buckner to “get the f*** out the car.” Ricky then heard
approximately five gunshots and ran toward his mother’s house. Defendant caught up to Ricky
and told him he shot Buckner because he reached for his gun.
¶ 10 Issaclerome Watson testified he has been a barber in Kankakee for many years and has cut
defendant’s hair several times. On November 25, 2011, Watson received a phone call from David
at 8:04 pm asking him to cut defendant’s hair. Watson agreed, and defendant arrived at his barber
shop around 8:20 pm.
¶ 11 Dr. Melissa Russano, an expert in social cognitive psychology and investigative
interviewing, interrogations, and confessions, testified that false confessions are not uncommon
and that individuals under 21 years of age account for 49% of false confessions. She reviewed
defendant’s confession and saw significant known risk factors that increased the likelihood of a
false confession, including the defendant’s age, investigator tunnel vision, investigators lying or
bluffing about evidence, investigators implying leniency or harsher punishment, and isolation.
4 ¶ 12 Defendant’s uncle, Andre Beals, testified that defendant was at his house the evening of
November 25, 2011, until about 6 p.m. or 7 pm, when he left with Megail Waters. Ricky and David
left an hour or two after defendant.
¶ 13 The jury found defendant guilty of murder and armed robbery. Defendant’s presentence
investigation report revealed that as a juvenile defendant was adjudicated delinquent for resisting
a peace officer and criminal trespass to a residence. As an adult, defendant was convicted of
unlawful possession of a controlled substance and resisting a peace officer. Defendant did not have
a consistent and stable home as a child, living at various times with his mother, father, aunt, and
grandmother. He also lived at a shelter, a foster home, and detention centers. His mother struggled
with alcoholism, housing issues, and schizophrenia. The Illinois Department of Children and
Family Service (DCFS) was involved in defendant’s life at the age of three for abuse and neglect.
His father was frequently incarcerated. Both his father and aunt were abusive to defendant.
Defendant began selling crack and using marijuana at age 13. Defendant had a history of leaving
substance-abuse facilities before completing treatment.
¶ 14 On February 21, 2020, the court held a sentencing hearing. Dr. James Garbarino, an expert
in developmental psychology, testified that he interviewed defendant once for approximately two
hours. Based on that interview, Garbarino determined that throughout his childhood and until the
time of his crime, defendant “was dealing with major issues of adversity which are known to
undermine positive development and increase the likelihood of a variety of problems, including
violent behavior.” According to Garbarino, research shows that “adversity slows down the
development of [the] brain.” In addition, defendant experienced significant “psychological
maltreatment which creates emotional issues and behavioral issues that can disrupt normal
adolescent development.” Garbarino believed defendant’s adversity and psychological
5 maltreatment undermined his ability to think clearly and clouded his ability to have positive social
interactions with others.
¶ 15 In Garbarino’s experience, almost all youthful offenders are capable of rehabilitation
because the brain is not fully developed until age 25. Garbarino determined defendant’s likelihood
of rehabilitation was “very, very encouraging” based on his actions while in jail, including
becoming an avid reader and committing to medication. According to Garbarino, those actions
show defendant is engaging in positive behavior, “rather than just sitting around, or getting in
trouble, or self-defeating behavior.” Garbarino opined that if given additional resources, which are
available in prison, defendant “will continue to flourish and will—will undergo this process of full
rehabilitation and transformation.” Based on his interactions with defendant, Garbarino concluded
that defendant’s “rehabilitation potential will continue to progress” and that defendant is “a good
candidate for rehabilitation and potential release in his lifetime.”
¶ 16 Garbarino discussed the principles set out in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 469 (2012),
and opined that they should be applied to young adults, not just juveniles. He testified:
“[N]ow clearly the movement around the country is to bring the sentencing in—
into closer approximation to what the science told them then and should tell them
now, and that is that 18 is an artificial limit. So, for example, in California they
have instructed—the legislation instructs parole boards to apply these principles up
to age 23.”
¶ 17 Defendant testified that he matured during the eight years he spent in jail and that
meditation has enabled him to better address his problems. He stated he has better control of his
emotions and is better at dealing with stress and anger. He had read more than 2000 books in jail.
6 He believes he can be a positive influence in the world and wants to be a social worker to help stop
others from “destroying their own life or somebody else’s.”
¶ 18 The trial court then summarized the evidence, noting that “defendant was 19 years of age
when this murder occurred” and that defendant was “the only shooter.” The court stated:
“Dr. Garbarino testified, however, we’re in Illinois. We’re not in Florida. And he’s
a developmental researcher, a clinical psychologist. And I can appreciate that, but
the evidence is what it is in this case.”
The court acknowledged that different sentencing rules apply to juveniles, referencing People v.
Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, and People v. Lopez, 2019 IL App (3d) 170798. The court stated it
“look[ed] at all the evidence in mitigation and aggravation.” In aggravation, the court mentioned
defendant’s criminal history and that he “walked away” from drug rehabilitation treatment “many
times.” With respect to defendant’s potential for rehabilitation, the court stated: “[W]hen I look at
your rehabilitation, the likelihood of that, I do not find it great.” The court entered an order
sentencing defendant to 60 years in prison for first degree murder, followed by 3 years of
mandatory supervised release.
¶ 19 Defendant filed a motion to reconsider his sentence, arguing that it was excessive and that
the court erred by failing to consider the mitigating factors of youth addressed in Miller, such as
his difficult childhood and his potential for rehabilitation. At the hearing on the motion, the court
stated that it “looked at [defendant’s] age, which was 19.” The court also stated that it “looked at
the rehabilitative potential” and concluded: “I do not see the potential for rehabilitation.” The court
mentioned aggravating factors, including defendant’s criminal record and his lack of remorse. The
court noted that because defendant was 19 years old at the time of the offense, “he actually doesn’t
fall under Miller.” The court denied defendant’s motion to reconsider.
7 ¶ 20 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 21 A. Other-Crimes Evidence
¶ 22 Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion in limine to redact
incriminating other-crimes evidence from his videotaped statements to police. He contends that it
was improper for the jury to hear his statements about robbing houses in the past and having a
parole officer.
¶ 23 “Evidence that a defendant has committed crimes other than the one for which he is on trial
may not be admitted for the purpose of demonstrating his propensity to commit crimes.” People
v. Adkins, 239 Ill. 2d 1, 22-23 (2010). “Such evidence, however, may be admitted for a proper
purpose such as proving modus operandi, intent, identity, motive, or absence of mistake.” Id. at
23.
¶ 24 The admissibility of evidence is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court, and
the court’s decision will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of that discretion. Id. The erroneous
admission of other-crimes evidence requires reversal “only if the evidence was ‘a material factor
in the defendant’s conviction such that, without the evidence, the verdict likely would have been
different.’ ” Id. (quoting People v. Hall, 194 Ill. 2d 305, 339 (2000)). If the erroneous admission
of other-crimes evidence was unlikely to have influenced the jury, reversal is not
warranted. People v. Foreman, 2019 IL App (3d) 160334, ¶ 31. Where there is overwhelming
evidence of the defendant’s guilt, the improper admission of other crimes evidence is harmless.
See People v. Gonzalez, 379 Ill. App. 3d 941, 951 (2008).
¶ 25 Here, the State contends defendant’s statements regarding his prior criminal activity were
admissible to show defendant’s motive. “[P]roof of other crimes is admissible to establish
motive.” People v. Johnson, 368 Ill. App. 3d 1146, 1157 (2006) (citing People v. Coleman, 158
8 Ill. 2d 319, 333 (1994), and People v. Hale, 326 Ill. App. 3d 455, 465 (2001)). However, no
evidence of motive was necessary in this case in light of defendant’s confession and Ricky’s
testimony. In his statement to Detective Hartman, defendant admitted that he shot Buckner in the
course of a robbery. Ricky’s testimony corroborated that defendant shot Buckner while robbing
him. Thus, there was no need for the State to admit evidence that defendant had robbed homes on
prior occasions or was on parole to establish defendant’s intent to rob Buckner.
¶ 26 Nevertheless, the admission of the other-crimes evidence was harmless because the
evidence against defendant was overwhelming. Defendant admitted in his videotaped statement to
Hartman that he robbed Buckner and shot him because Buckner grabbed his gun. Ricky’s
testimony was consistent with defendant’s videotaped statement. Ricky testified that defendant
walked to Buckner’s car and told Buckner to “get the f*** out the car.” After that, Ricky heard
approximately five gunshots and ran. Defendant told Ricky he had to shoot Buckner because he
reached for his gun. Based on the overwhelming evidence against defendant, the trial court’s
erroneous admission of other crimes evidence was unlikely to have influenced the jury; thus, we
will not reverse defendant’s conviction on that basis. See Foreman, 2019 IL App (3d) 160334,
¶ 31; Gonzalez, 379 Ill. App. 3d at 951.
¶ 27 B. Constitutionality of Defendant’s Sentence
¶ 28 Defendant argues that his 60-year prison sentence violates the proportionate penalties
clause of the Illinois Constitution both on its face and as applied to him because he was 19 years
old at the time of his crimes.
¶ 29 1. Miller and Its Progeny
9 ¶ 30 While defendant does not raise an eighth amendment claim, a review of eighth amendment
jurisprudence, particularly the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Miller, 567 U.S. 460,
helps explain defendant’s proportionate penalties clause claim.
¶ 31 The eighth amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits “cruel and unusual
punishments.” U.S. Const., amend. VIII. “The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and
unusual punishment ‘guarantees individuals the right not to be subjected to excessive
sanctions.’ ” Miller, 567 U.S. at 469 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005)).
In Miller, the United States Supreme Court found that a mandatory sentence of life without parole
for offenders under 18 years old “violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on ‘cruel and
unusual punishments.’ ” Id. at 465. The Supreme Court held that a sentencing court could impose
a sentence of life without parole on a juvenile only if, prior to sentencing, the court considers
factors relevant to youth and its attendant circumstances, including (1) the defendant’s
“chronological age and its hallmark features—among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and failure
to appreciate risks and consequences,” (2) the defendant’s “family and home environment that
surrounds him—and from which he cannot usually extricate himself—no matter how brutal or
dysfunctional,” (3) the circumstances of the offense, “including the extent of his participation in
the conduct and the way familial and peer pressures may have affected him,” (4) “incompetencies
associated with youth—for example, his inability to deal with police officers or prosecutors
(including on a plea agreement) or his incapacity to assist his own attorneys,” and (5) “the
possibility of rehabilitation.” Id. at 477-78.
¶ 32 Miller applies to both an actual sentence of life without parole and a “term of years that is
the functional equivalent of life without the possibility of parole.” See People v. Reyes, 2016 IL
119271, ¶ 9. A de facto life sentence, which is the functional equivalent of life without parole, is
10 more than 40 years. See Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶¶ 40-41. Miller applies only to mandatory, not
discretionary, de facto life sentences. People v. Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 72. Where a court has
discretion to sentence the defendant to 40 years or less but imposes a sentence in excess of 40
years, Miller does not apply. Id.
¶ 33 Offenders who are 18 years old or older cannot challenge their sentences under the eighth
amendment and the Miller line of cases. People v. Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 61. “As a result,
Illinois courts typically consider the sentencing claims of young adults under the proportionate
penalties clause [of the Illinois Constitution] rather than the eighth amendment.” People v. Jones,
2021 IL App (1st) 180996, ¶ 14.
¶ 34 The proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution provides that “[a]ll penalties
shall be determined both according to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of
restoring the offender to useful citizenship.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11. It “requires the balancing
of the twin goals of retribution and rehabilitation, which requires a careful consideration of all the
factors in aggravation and mitigation, including defendant’s age and mental health.” People v.
Savage, 2020 IL App (1st) 173135, ¶ 64. “[T]he proportionate penalties clause goes further than
the eighth amendment in offering protection against oppressive penalties.” Id. ¶ 65.
¶ 35 2. Legislation in Response to Miller
¶ 36 In February 2015, House Bill 2471 (99th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Bill 2471, 2015 Sess.)
was introduced in the Illinois General Assembly and ultimately enacted as Public Act 99-69,
adding section 5-4.5-105 to the Unified Code of Corrections (Unified Code). Pub. Act 99-69 (eff.
Jan. 1, 2016) (adding 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105). “This statute provides a new sentencing scheme for
defendants under the age of 18 when they committed their offenses.” Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶ 36.
Before imposing any sentence, the sentencing court must consider several “additional factors in
11 mitigation in determining the appropriate sentence.” 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105(a) (West 2020). The
list of factors “is taken from and is consistent with Miller’s discussion of a juvenile defendant’s
youth and its attendant characteristics.” Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶ 36.
¶ 37 In January 2017, House Bill 531 (100th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Bill 531, 2017 Sess.) was
introduced in the Illinois General Assembly and was enacted as Public Act 100-1182, adding
section 5-4.5-110 to the Unified Code. Pub. Act 100-1182 (eff. June 1, 2019) (adding 730 ILCS
5/5-4.5-110); see Pub. Act 101-288 (eff. Jan. 1, 2020) (renumbering 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-110 as 730
ILCS 5/5-4.5-115). This legislation was enacted in response to emerging case law to address
“youthful offenders under the age of 21.” People v. Green, 2022 IL App (1st) 200749, ¶ 41. Section
5-4.5-115 creates parole review for offenders under the age of 21 at the time of the offense. 730
ILCS 5/5-4.5-115(b) (West 2020). Under this statute, a person convicted of first degree murder is
eligible for parole after serving 20 years if he was under 21 years old at the time of the offense and
was sentenced after the law took effect. Id. In determining if a defendant should be granted parole,
the Prisoner Review Board panel must “consider the diminished culpability of youthful offenders,
the hallmark features of youth, and any subsequent growth and maturity of the youthful offender
during incarceration.” Id. § 5-4.5-115(j).
¶ 38 These statutes are “a remedial response to the constitutional issues recognized in Miller for
both juveniles and young adults.” People v. Elliott, 2022 IL App (1st) 192294, ¶ 56. By enacting
these statutes, “[t]he legislature has taken significant steps in implementing Miller protections.”
People v. Montanez, 2022 IL App (1st) 191930, ¶ 59.
¶ 39 3. Defendant’s As-Applied Challenge
¶ 40 An as-applied constitutional challenge requires a showing that the statute violates the
constitution as it applies to the facts and circumstances of the challenging party. People v.
12 Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶ 36 (citing People v. Garvin, 219 Ill. 2d 104, 117 (2006)). A young
adult, who is at least 18 but younger than 21 years of age, may rely on the evolving science
regarding brain development to support an as-applied challenge to a life sentence under the
proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. People v. Walker, 2022 IL App (1st)
201151, ¶ 27 (citing Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶¶ 43-44, and Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶¶ 59-
61); People v. Wilson, 2022 IL App (1st) 192048, ¶ 87. Miller and its progeny establish that a
defendant raising a claim under the proportionate penalties clause must show that he (1) was under
21 years of age at the time of the offense, and (2) received a mandatory natural or de facto life
prison sentence. See Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶¶ 72-73, 86-88; People v. Hilliard, 2021 IL App
(1st) 200112, ¶ 25.
¶ 41 In assessing whether a de facto life sentence has been imposed, the court must consider the
defendant’s “earliest opportunity for release.” People v. Dorsey, 2021 IL 123010, ¶ 54 (citing
Reyes, 2016 IL 119271, ¶ 10, and People v. Patterson, 2014 IL 115102, ¶ 108). If a defendant has
a meaningful opportunity to obtain release before serving more than 40 years in prison, he has not
received a de facto life sentence. See People v. Thompson, 2022 IL App (1st) 200463, ¶¶ 44-47;
People v. Brakes, 2021 IL App (1st) 181737, ¶¶ 34-38.
¶ 42 “While release is not promised, the opportunity for parole provides a meaningful
opportunity for release.” People v. Beck, 2021 IL App (5th) 200252, ¶ 22. Section 5-4.5-115(b) of
the Unified Code “affords defendant[s] a meaningful opportunity for release based on [their]
maturity and rehabilitation before a de facto life sentence of over 40 years’ imprisonment.” Id.
¶ 26. When section 5-4.5-115(b) of the Unified Code applies, the defendant’s sentence is “not a
de facto life sentence since [the defendant] is eligible for parole.” Elliott, 2022 IL App (1st)
13 192294, ¶ 56. Thus, a defendant who is sentenced after June 1, 2019, may not raise an as-applied
constitutional challenge to his sentence under the proportionate penalties clause. See id. ¶¶ 55-56.
¶ 43 Here, the trial court sentenced defendant, who was 19 years old at the time of crimes, to 60
years in prison on February 21, 2020. The statutory minimum sentence in this case was 45 years:
20 years for the murder and 25 years for the mandatory firearm enhancement. See 730 ILCS 5/5-
4.5-20 (West 2010) (providing a range of 20 to 60 years imprisonment for first degree murder); id.
§ 5-8-1(a)(1)(d)(iii) (providing a mandatory add-on of 25 years to natural life if the defendant
discharges a firearm and causes “great bodily harm, permanent disability, permanent
disfigurement, or death to another person”). Because the trial court was required to sentence
defendant to a prison term of more than 40 years, defendant’s sentence would have constituted a
mandatory de facto life sentence under Miller if it had been imposed prior to June 1, 2019. See
Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 72.However, defendant was sentenced after June 1, 2019, so he is
eligible for parole review after serving 20 years of his prison term. See 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-115(b)
(West 2020). As such, defendant has a reasonable opportunity to obtain release well before serving
more than 40 years in prison and, therefore, did not receive a de facto life sentence. See Thompson,
2022 IL App (1st) 200463, ¶ 44; Elliott, 2022 IL App (1st) 192294, ¶ 56; Beck, 2021 IL App (5th)
200252, ¶ 26; Brakes, 2021 IL App (1st) 181737, ¶ 38. Because defendant did not receive a
de facto life sentence, he cannot establish that his sentence violates the proportionate penalties
clause. See Elliott, 2022 IL App (1st) 192294, ¶ 56; Hilliard, 2021 IL App (1st) 200112, ¶ 25.
Thus, defendant’s as-applied constitutional challenge fails.
¶ 44 4. Defendant’s Facial Challenge
¶ 45 “Where a statute or ordinance is constitutional as applied to a party, a facial challenge will
also fail since there is necessarily at least one circumstance in which the statute or ordinance is
14 constitutional.” People v. Rodriguez, 2018 IL App (1st) 141379-B, ¶ 87. If a court finds a sentence
does not violate the proportionate penalties clause as applied to the defendant, it need not address
the defendant’s facial challenge. Id. Since we have found that defendant’s as-applied challenge
fails, we need not address his facial challenge. See id.
¶ 46 C. Appropriateness of Defendant’s Sentence
¶ 47 Finally, defendant argues that we should remand for resentencing because the trial court
erred in finding he lacked rehabilitative potential. He contends the trial court was required to accept
the testimony of his expert witness, Garbarino, who opined defendant was a good candidate for
rehabilitation because the State failed to present any contradictory expert testimony.
¶ 48 “It is well settled that a trial judge’s sentencing decisions are entitled to great deference
and will not be altered on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.” People v. Jackson, 375 Ill. App.
3d 796, 800 (2007). We are to grant such deference because the sentencing court “is in the best
position to ‘analyze the acts constituting the crime and a defendant’s credibility, demeanor, general
moral character, mentality, social environments, habits, age, and potential for rehabilitation.’ ”
People v. Tijerina, 381 Ill. App. 3d 1024, 1039 (2008) (quoting People v. Ramos, 353 Ill. App. 3d
133, 137 (2004)). The sentencing court is also in the best position to “judge the credibility of the
witnesses and the weight of the evidence at the sentencing hearing.” Ramos, 353 Ill. App. 3d at
137.
¶ 49 “[I]t is presumed that the trial court considered all mitigating factors, including
rehabilitative potential, and the burden is upon the defendant to show the contrary.” People v.
Connery, 296 Ill. App. 3d 384, 391 (1998). It is within the trial court’s discretion to determine
what significance to give to each aggravating and mitigating factor. People v. Lampley, 2011 IL
App (1st) 090661-B, ¶ 40 (citing People v. Saldivar, 113 Ill. 2d 256, 272 (1986)). A reviewing
15 court must not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court simply because it would have
weighed the factors differently. Jackson, 375 Ill. App. 3d at 800-01.
¶ 50 The seriousness of the crime is “the most important factor in determining an appropriate
sentence.” People v. Decatur, 2015 IL App (1st) 130231, ¶ 12. While rehabilitation potential is a
factor in sentencing, the sentencing court is not required to give it greater weight than other factors,
including the seriousness of the crime. See Connery, 296 Ill. App. 3d at 391-92; People v. Babiarz,
271 Ill. App. 3d 153, 164 (1995). Unless the sentence is grossly disproportionate to the nature of
the offense committed, it should be affirmed. Tijerina, 381 Ill. App. 3d at 1039. In determining if
a sentence is excessive, the reviewing court may consider the defendant’s eligibility for parole.
See Elliott, 2022 IL App (1st) 192294, ¶ 59.
¶ 51 “The purpose of the aggravation and mitigation phase of the sentencing hearing is to insure
that the discretion of the sentencing authority is exercised in an informed manner, based upon the
evidence at hand and not on extraneous influences; on reason not caprice.” People v. Boclair, 129
Ill. 2d 458, 493 (1989). The credibility and weight to give unrebutted testimony of a party’s expert
at a sentencing hearing are determinations for the sentencing court as the trier of fact. Id. (citing
People v. Wright, 111 Ill. 2d 128, 154 (1985)); People v. Oaks, 169 Ill. 2d 409, 467
(1996), abrogated on other grounds by In re G.O., 191 Ill. 2d 37 (2000). The trial court may reject
expert testimony regarding the presence of a mitigating factor even if it is unrebutted. See Oaks,
169 Ill. 2d at 467.
¶ 52 Here, a review of the record establishes that the trial court considered all mitigating and
aggravating factors, including defendant’s rehabilitative potential, and “look[ed] at all the evidence
in mitigation and aggravation” when sentencing defendant. Mitigating evidence included
Garbarino’s testimony. Garbarino testified that defendant’s potential for rehabilitation was good
16 because of his age when he committed his crimes; however, the trial court found defendant’s
criminal history, repeated failures to complete substance-abuse treatment, and lack of remorse
made him unlikely to be rehabilitated. The trial court, which presided over defendant’s case for
over eight years, was in the best position to analyze defendant’s potential for rehabilitation. See
Tijerina, 381 Ill. App. 3d at 1039. The trial court was not required to accept Garbarino’s opinion,
based on one two-hour interview, that defendant was a good candidate for rehabilitation. See Oaks,
169 Ill. 2d at 467; see also Boclair, 129 Ill. 2d at 493 (it is for the trial court to determine the
credibility and weight to give unrebutted expert testimony).
¶ 53 Additionally, the trial court was not required to weigh more heavily defendant’s
rehabilitation potential than any other mitigating or aggravating factor, including the seriousness
of the crime. See Connery, 296 Ill. App. 3d at 391-92; Babiarz, 271 Ill. App. 3d at 164. Here,
defendant intentionally shot a man several times in cold blood in front of his home, causing his
death. The trial court noted that the evidence showed defendant was “the only shooter.” Under
these facts and circumstances, defendant’s sentence of 60 years in prison is not grossly
disproportionate to the nature of his offense. That defendant is eligible for parole review in 20
years further militates against finding his sentence is excessive. See Elliott, 2022 IL App (1st)
192294, ¶ 59. Accordingly, we affirm defendant’s sentence.
¶ 54 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 55 The judgment of the circuit court of Kankakee County is affirmed.
¶ 56 Affirmed.
17 People v. Kendrick, 2023 IL App (3d) 200127
Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Kankakee County, No. 11-CF- 642; the Hon. Kathy S. Bradshaw Elliot, Judge, presiding.
Attorneys James E. Chadd, Thomas A. Karalis, and Dimitri Golfis, of State for Appellate Defender’s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant. Appellant:
Attorneys Jim Rowe, State’s Attorney, of Kankakee (Patrick Delfino, for Thomas D. Arado, and Korin I. Navarro, of State’s Attorneys Appellee: Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People.