People v. Deleon

2025 IL App (1st) 211454

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: March 6, 2025
• Docket: 1-21-1454
• Status: Published

Opinion

2025 IL App (1st) 211454 First District Third Division March 6, 2025 No. 1-21-1454 ) THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of Cook County. Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) No. 97 CR 12501 v. ) ) The Honorable MIGUEL DELEON, ) Gregory Paul Vasquez, ) Judge Presiding. Defendant-Appellant. ) )

JUSTICE REYES delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justices Martin and D.B. Walker concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

¶1 In 1998, following a bench trial, 17-year-old defendant Miguel Deleon was convicted of

first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West 1996)) and attempted first degree murder (id.

§§ 8-4, 9-1(a)(1)) and was sentenced to a mandatory life term for the murder and a consecutive

30-year term for the attempted murder. The statute providing for the mandatory life term,

however, was later found unconstitutional, and defendant was consequently resentenced,

receiving an extended-term 100-year sentence for the murder in addition to the consecutive

30-year term for the attempted murder. After the United States Supreme Court issued its

decision in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), defendant’s sentence was again vacated,

and the trial court was ordered to conduct a new sentencing hearing in light of the principles

concerning juvenile culpability set forth in Miller. Defendant was ultimately resentenced to a

60-year term for the murder and a consecutive 20-year term for the attempted murder.

Defendant now appeals, contending that his sentence is unconstitutional, as it violates the No. 1-21-1454

eighth amendment of the United States Constitution and the proportionate penalties clause of

the Illinois Constitution. Alternatively, defendant claims that, even if his sentence is

constitutional, it is nevertheless excessive where the trial court failed to properly consider the

mitigating factors concerning his youth. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

¶2 BACKGROUND

¶3 Trial and Prior Appeals

¶4 As noted, in 1998, defendant was convicted of first degree murder and attempted first

degree murder after a bench trial. The evidence at trial established the following, as set forth

by our supreme court in one of defendant’s prior appeals (see People v. Deleon, 227 Ill. 2d

322, 325-27 (2008)).

¶5 Defendant was a member of the Imperial Gangsters, a rival gang of the Latin Kings. On

the afternoon of April 4, 1997, defendant met with some of his fellow gang members in “the

Jungle,” a neighborhood located near the intersection of Mannheim Road and Crown Road in

Franklin Park. Defendant was providing “security” for the Imperial Gangsters that day, which

meant he carried a firearm in the event of an altercation with the Latin Kings. At some point,

defendant and his cohorts noticed a red Ford Mustang driving westward on Crown Road. As

the vehicle bore a Stone Park registration sticker and contained a “crown air freshener,” the

Imperial Gangsters surmised that it belonged to a Latin King. When someone yelled “flakes,”

a term meaning “rival gang member,” defendant and another Imperial Gangster ran through an

apartment complex to intercept the Mustang on Schiller Street. When the Mustang appeared

on Schiller Street, defendant and one of his fellow gang members stepped into the street and

stopped the vehicle. An altercation ensued, and, from a distance of three feet, defendant fired

two shots through the driver’s side windshield. One of those shots hit the driver, Jose Sanchez,

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in the chest. Sanchez sped away toward Mannheim Road, passing an ice cream truck

surrounded by children. Defendant continued firing at Sanchez, and seven-year-old Juana

Nieto, who was standing beside the ice cream truck, was shot and killed. A three-year-old boy

and the ice cream truck driver also sustained injuries.

¶6 The trial court found defendant guilty of the first degree murder of Nieto and the attempted

first degree murder of Sanchez. At the same time, the trial court acquitted defendant of the

attempted first degree murders of the three-year-old boy and the ice cream truck driver, both

of whom sustained wounds during the shooting. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court

imposed a mandatory life term for the first degree murder conviction, based on the fact that

defendant was 17 years old at the time of the offense and the victim was under the age of 12.

See 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) (West 1996). For the attempted first degree murder

conviction, the trial court imposed a consecutive sentence of 30 years in prison. See id. § 5-8-

4(a).

¶7 Defendant appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, and this court affirmed.

See People v. DeLeon, 1 No. 1-99-0028 (2000) (unpublished order under Illinois Supreme

Court Rule 23). Defendant then filed a pro se postconviction petition challenging the

constitutionality of his mandatory life sentence, based on the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision

in People v. Wooters, 188 Ill. 2d 500 (1999), which invalidated the public act enacting the

relevant sentencing provision. The trial court summarily dismissed the petition, but we

reversed on appeal, finding that Wooters required defendant’s sentence to be vacated, and

1 We note that defendant’s last name is alternatively spelled both as “DeLeon” and as “Deleon.” We adopt the spelling used in his appellate brief.

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remanded the matter to the trial court for resentencing. See People v. DeLeon, No. 1-01-2469

(2003) (unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23).

¶8 Following a resentencing hearing, the trial court found that there was sufficient evidence

presented at trial to support an extended-term sentence based on the victim’s age at the time of

her murder. Accordingly, the trial court sentenced defendant to a 100-year term for the murder,

in addition to the previously-imposed consecutive 30-year term for the attempted murder,

which it did not revisit on resentencing. Defendant appealed, and we affirmed. See People v.

DeLeon, No. 1-04-2934 (2006) (unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23).

Defendant appealed the appellate decision to the Illinois Supreme Court, which affirmed the

appellate court judgment. See Deleon, 227 Ill. 2d 322.

¶9 Defendant filed another pro se postconviction petition in 2008, which was denied, followed

by a motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition, which was similarly denied.

Defendant appealed the latter order, and we granted the State Appellate Defender’s motion for

leave to withdraw as counsel pursuant to Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987), and

affirmed the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion. See People v. DeLeon, No. 1-09-0561

(2010) (unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23).

¶ 10 In 2014, defendant again sought leave to file a successive postconviction petition, arguing

that his 130-year sentence violated the eighth amendment of the United States Constitution and

the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution, based on the United States

Supreme Court’s decision in Miller. The trial court granted defendant leave to file his

successive postconviction petition and defendant was appointed counsel. The State moved to

dismiss the petition, claiming that Miller did not apply to the case, as defendant was not

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sentenced to a mandatory life sentence. The trial court granted the State’s motion to dismiss,

and defendant appealed.

¶ 11 On appeal, we found that the Illinois Supreme Court’s recent decision in People v. Holman,

2017 IL 120655, instructed that the rationale of Miller applied to discretionary sentences of

life without parole for juvenile defendants. 2 We further determined that the record did not

demonstrate that the trial court had made a finding that defendant was permanently incorrigible

or that it had considered defendant’s youth or its attendant characteristics, as required by

Miller. We accordingly found that we were required to vacate defendant’s sentence and remand

for resentencing. See People v. Deleon, 2018 IL App (1st) 153253-U.

¶ 12 Resentencing Hearing

¶ 13 Following remand, the trial court conducted a new sentencing hearing on October 7, 2021.

At the hearing, the parties stipulated that defendant had received five major disciplinary tickets

between 1999 and 2006. 3 The parties further stipulated that, in 2015, defendant received

another two major disciplinary tickets for an incident in which defendant was attempting to

manipulate another inmate into conducting a staff assault. According to the investigation

conducted by the prison, defendant was a “known member” of the Imperial Gangsters and

“acts as their family representative.” As such, when defendant felt that another inmate had

violated the Imperial Gangsters’ laws, he “gave the inmate the ultimatum to assault staff, be

the target of an assault, or check into protective custody.” Finally, the parties stipulated that,

in 2017, defendant received a major ticket for gang-related actions, which determined that

2 We note that the Illinois Supreme Court subsequently overruled Holman in People v. Wilson, 2023 IL 127666, ¶ 42, in light of the United States Supreme Court’s further clarification of the Miller analysis in Jones v. Mississippi, 593 U.S. 98 (2021). 3 The parties additionally stipulated that defendant received disciplinary tickets in 2018 and 2019, but the stipulation does not indicate whether these were major tickets.

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defendant had elected to hold the leadership position of the “Latin Folk Assistant Institutional

Coordinator” with the Latin Folk street gang. One of the consequences of this ticket was the

revocation of two months of good-time credit.

¶ 14 With respect to defendant’s criminal history, the parties stipulated that defendant had two

prior juvenile adjudications for aggravated assault and battery, both in 1995, for which his

sentences of probation were satisfactorily terminated.

¶ 15 The parties additionally presented witness testimony concerning mitigation and

aggravation. The State presented a victim impact statement from Nieto’s sister on behalf of her

family, as well as testimony from a representative of the Illinois Department of Corrections,

who testified that an inmate would be able to reclaim lost good-time credit through good

behavior. In mitigation, the defense called Helen Skinner, an attorney working as a private

mitigation specialist. Skinner testified that she had prepared a mitigation report with respect to

defendant’s resentencing, which the trial court admitted into evidence.

¶ 16 In the report, Skinner related that defendant had a troubled childhood, with a mother who

was only 14 years old at the time of his birth and a stepfather who was abusive, both of whom

also abused drugs and alcohol. Defendant’s biological father was not involved in his life after

his stepfather objected to his presence, and defendant and his older brother were raised in fear

of their stepfather. Defendant’s stepfather encouraged defendant to fight and, after defendant

began junior high, his uncle introduced him to gang life, which involved violence and drugs.

Defendant eventually joined the Imperial Gangsters gang, where he was known as “Scrappy”

for his willingness to fight.

¶ 17 Skinner’s report further indicated that, after his incarceration, defendant turned his life

around, earning his GED, completing certificate programs, and successfully engaging in

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several employment opportunities, rising to the level of becoming a barber and working

alongside the institutional staff. Defendant also sought treatment for his mental health,

including meeting with a psychiatrist and participating in support groups. Defendant

additionally converted to Islam.

¶ 18 In addition to Skinner’s testimony and report, defendant gave a statement in allocution,

which he primarily directed to Nieto’s family, expressing his remorse for the crime.

¶ 19 Finally, a presentence investigation report (PSI) revealed that defendant reported that he

was raised by his mother and, later, stepfather, and was close with both. His father had little

involvement in defendant’s life, but defendant used drugs with him from an early age.

Defendant reported that he “did not have a good childhood” and did not have a stable home

life, as they moved frequently. He indicated that, while his stepfather provided food and

shelter, he also physically and emotionally abused defendant. Defendant ran away from home,

but “would always return.” It was only during his years in prison that defendant had become

close to his stepfather. In the PSI, defendant’s mother confirmed that her husband “was very

strict and could be abusive.” She further reported that she was “ ‘young and a mess’ ” when

her children were young and that defendant had “ ‘been through a lot.’ ”

¶ 20 Defendant reported that he had graduated from high school in Northlake, despite being

expelled for fighting during his sophomore year, and was an “average” student who did not

have a relationship with his teachers or other students. He also obtained a GED while in prison

and completed several certificate programs while incarcerated. Prior to his arrest, he had been

employed at a fast food restaurant for several months.

¶ 21 Defendant reported that he had been involved with the Imperial Gangsters from the age of

16 to 20, but denied any current gang involvement. He indicated that he felt pressure to become

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involved with gang activity and was “ ‘mislead [sic], while looking for a father figure’ ” at a

time when his maturity level was “ ‘very low.’ ” He also engaged in gang activities due to the

“ ‘consequences’ ” he would experience if he did not.

¶ 22 Defendant began taking psychotropic medication in 2017, while suffering with depression,

anxiety, and sleep issues, and currently was prescribed medication to help him sleep. He

reported beginning to drink alcohol from age 9 or 10, and drank daily. Defendant reported that

alcohol caused problems in his family and with legal issues, and he believed that alcohol and

drugs played a “ ‘huge’ ” role in the current offense. Defendant also reported using drugs at a

very early age, beginning with the use of marijuana with his father at approximately eight years

old; this activity led to his mother and stepfather stopping visits with his father. Defendant also

used cocaine and LSD on a regular basis beginning at the age of 12.

¶ 23 Defendant reported that he “takes no pride in any criminal behavior” and was concerned

about others’ problems. With respect to the current offense, defendant reported that “ ‘he has

a ton of remorse and daily wishes he could take it back,’ ” further reporting that “ ‘he is haunted

daily and he wishes he could go back and trade places with the victim’s families.’ ” 4

¶ 24 After the parties had presented evidence and argument in mitigation and aggravation, the

trial court indicated that it would not be making an immediate sentencing decision in order to

give the matter proper consideration. On November 9, 2021, the parties came before the trial

court for its ruling, in which it ultimately resentenced defendant to 60 years for the first degree

murder and a consecutive 20 years for the attempted murder. The trial court informed the

parties that “[e]very day I thought about this case,” examining defendant’s exhibits “a lot,”

4 In addition to the updated PSI, defendant’s two previous PSIs were also admitted into evidence, as were the trial transcript and the transcripts from his prior sentencing hearings.

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while also considering “the other side,” namely, what it would be like to have a child or

grandchild killed while buying ice cream. The trial court indicated that it had considered

defendant’s age, impetuosity, and level of maturity at the time of the offense, including his

ability to appreciate the risks and consequences of his actions and the presence of any cognitive

or developmental disabilities. The trial court further indicated that it had considered whether

defendant had been subjected to outside pressure, which had been argued by the defense, and

considered defendant’s family, home environment, and social and educational background,

including any history of parental neglect, physical abuse, or other childhood trauma. The trial

court observed that “[i]t’s the rare case where we have someone who doesn’t have that in their

background. But nonetheless, I did think about it.” The trial court also stated that it considered

defendant’s potential for rehabilitation, noting that “generally speaking, most defendants

probably do have the potential for rehabilitation.” Finally, the trial court indicated that it had

considered the circumstances of the offense, but “didn’t dwell on how horrible it would have

been to be out there on that day.”

¶ 25 The trial court stated that it “gave a lot of thought to this defendant’s degree of participation

and his specific role in the offense,” as well as whether there was any planning by defendant,

“even though it may not have been the best thought out plan for an offense.” The trial court

also considered whether defendant was meaningfully able to participate in his defense and

“didn’t see any evidence that he wasn’t.” The trial court additionally considered defendant’s

prior criminal history.

¶ 26 The trial court noted that it had considered defendant’s statement in allocution, but

observed that “on a bare, cold transcript it might appear to have more remorse than I was

perceiving by the defendant’s demeanor in court. *** I was not impressed by his performance

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on his right of allocation [sic] or his statement of regret.” The trial court accepted that defendant

had not intended to kill Nieto, but noted that the intended victim—Sanchez—was not

mentioned in defendant’s statement. Although the trial court indicated that it was not “holding

it against the defendant that he didn’t mention” Sanchez, it nevertheless observed that the fact

that there was a second—intended—victim who had sustained a severe bodily injury “can

influence a sentence.” Accordingly, the trial court sentenced defendant to 60 years for the

murder and a consecutive 20 years for the attempted murder.

¶ 27 Defendant filed a motion to reconsider sentence, which was denied, and this appeal

follows.

¶ 28 ANALYSIS

¶ 29 On appeal, defendant primarily contends that his 80-year sentence violates both the United

States and Illinois Constitutions. As can be observed from the procedural posture of this case,

the law underlying the applicable sentencing scheme has shifted substantially since 1998, when

defendant was initially sentenced. More specifically, as relevant to the instant appeal, the law

concerning the sentencing of juveniles has undergone dramatic changes, even since the time

of defendant’s resentencing hearing. 5 Accordingly, we begin with an overview of the legal

landscape surrounding the matter.

5 The United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Jones, 593 U.S. 98, on April 22, 2021, which was several months prior to defendant’s resentencing hearing on October 7, 2021. The parties, however, did not discuss Jones—or its possible impact—during the hearing. Moreover, the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision in Wilson, 2023 IL 127666, which more directly impacted the Miller analysis as relevant to defendant’s case, was not issued until approximately 18 months after defendant’s resentencing.

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¶ 30 Juvenile Sentencing and the Eighth Amendment

¶ 31 Beginning in 2005, the United States Supreme Court issued a series of decisions in which

it recognized that “children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of

sentencing” with respect to the eighth amendment of the United States Constitution. Miller,

567 U.S. at 471. In Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005), the Supreme Court held that

the eighth amendment prohibited the imposition of the death penalty for juvenile offenders

under the age of 18. Subsequently, in Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74 (2010), the Supreme

Court similarly held that the eighth amendment prohibited a minor from being sentenced to

life without parole for a nonhomicide offense. Two years later, in Miller, the United States

Supreme Court expanded that decision, finding that the eighth amendment to the federal

constitution “forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of

parole for juvenile offenders,” even in homicide cases. Miller, 567 U.S. at 479.

¶ 32 These cases relied on three “significant gaps” between juveniles and adults. Id. at 471.

First, juveniles lack maturity and have an underdeveloped sense of responsibility, leading to

recklessness, impulsivity, and risk-taking. Id. Second, juveniles are vulnerable to negative

influences and outside pressures, including from their families and peers, owing to their limited

control over their environment and inability to extricate themselves from negative settings. Id.

Finally, a juvenile’s nature is less “ ‘well formed’ ” than an adult’s, meaning that “his traits are

‘less fixed’ and his actions less likely to be ‘evidence of irretrievabl[e] deprav[ity].’ ” Id.

(quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 570). Thus, in Miller, the Supreme Court found that mandatory

sentences of life without parole were impermissible, as “[s]uch mandatory penalties, by their

nature, preclude a sentencer from taking account of an offender’s age and the wealth of

characteristics and circumstances attendant to it.” Id. at 476. While the Miller Court expressly

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left open the possibility of a trial court imposing a sentence of life without parole for a juvenile

offender in homicide cases, the Supreme Court instructed that “we require it to take into

account how children are different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably

sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.” Id. at 480.

¶ 33 As a result of the decision in Miller, the Illinois legislature enacted section 5-4.5-105 of

the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105 (West 2016)), which imposed a new

sentencing scheme for defendants who were under the age of 18 when they committed their

offenses. Under the statute, the sentencing court is required to consider a number of “additional

factors in mitigation” before sentencing any such defendant. Id. § 5-4.5-105(a). The legislature

subsequently also enacted a statute providing for parole review with respect to offenses

committed by defendants who were under the age of 21. See 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-115 (West

2020).

¶ 34 In Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 206 (2016), the Supreme Court found that

Miller “announced a substantive rule that is retroactive in cases on collateral review.” In doing

so, the Montgomery Court explained that Miller “did more than require a sentencer to consider

a juvenile offender’s youth before imposing life without parole; it established that the

penological justifications for life without parole collapse in light of ‘the distinctive attributes

of youth.’ ” Id. at 208 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 472). As such, “[e]ven if a court considers

a child’s age before sentencing him or her to a lifetime in prison, that sentence still violates the

Eighth Amendment for a child whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity.”

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. The Montgomery Court further reiterated that “Miller,

it is true, did not bar a punishment for all juvenile offenders, as the Court did in Roper or

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Graham. Miller did bar life without parole, however, for all but the rarest of juvenile offenders,

those whose crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility.” Id. at 209.

¶ 35 In Holman, based in part on the analysis in Montgomery, the Illinois Supreme Court

interpreted Miller to apply to discretionary life sentences in addition to mandatory life

sentences, finding that “Miller contains language that is significantly broader than its core

holding” (Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 38), as “[n]one of what the Court said is specific to only

mandatory life sentences” (id.). Specifically, our supreme court found that “a juvenile

defendant may be sentenced to life imprisonment without parole, but only if the trial court

determines that the defendant’s conduct showed irretrievable depravity, permanent

incorrigibility, or irreparable corruption beyond the possibility of rehabilitation. The court may

make that decision only after considering the defendant’s youth and its attendant

characteristics.” Id. ¶ 46. Additionally, while our supreme court had previously found that a

“mandatory term-of-years sentence that cannot be served in one lifetime” was the functional

equivalent of a mandatory sentence of life without parole for purposes of the Miller analysis

(People v. Reyes, 2016 IL 119271, ¶ 9), our supreme court later clarified that a sentence of

over 40 years operated as a de facto life sentence, which triggered the protections of Miller

(People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶ 41). Accordingly, under Illinois law, “to prevail on a

claim based on Miller and its progeny, a defendant sentenced for an offense committed while

a juvenile must show that (1) the defendant was subject to a life sentence, mandatory or

discretionary, natural or de facto, and (2) the sentencing court failed to consider youth and its

attendant circumstances in imposing the sentence.” Id. ¶ 27. It was this law which governed

defendant’s resentencing in the case at bar.

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¶ 36 In 2021, however, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Jones v.

Mississippi, 593 U.S. 98, 105 (2021), in which it made clear that Miller applied only to

mandatory—not discretionary—life sentences and that “[i]n a case involving an individual

who was under 18 when he or she committed a homicide, a State’s discretionary sentencing

system is both constitutionally necessary and constitutionally sufficient.” The Jones Court also

clarified that the trial court was not required to make a finding of permanent incorrigibility

before sentencing a juvenile homicide offender to life without parole. Id. at 106. The Supreme

Court noted that, in Miller, it had stated that a discretionary sentencing procedure “would itself

help make life-without-parole sentences ‘relatively rar[e]’ for murderers under 18.” Id. at 112

(quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 484 n.10). The Jones Court further observed that “if the sentencer

has discretion to consider the defendant’s youth, the sentencer necessarily will consider the

defendant’s youth, especially if defense counsel advances an argument based on the

defendant’s youth.” (Emphasis in original.) Id. at 114. Thus, the Supreme Court rejected any

requirement of a finding of permanent incorrigibility, either implicit or explicit, before a trial

court could sentence a juvenile homicide offender to life without parole. Id. at 113, 118.

¶ 37 In light of Jones, the Illinois Supreme Court subsequently overruled its decision in Holman,

finding that its requirement that the trial court make a finding of permanent incorrigibility was

directly at odds with the holding in Jones. People v. Wilson, 2023 IL 127666, ¶ 42.

¶ 38 Applicability of Miller

¶ 39 In the instant case, defendant contends that his 80-year sentence was unconstitutional,

where it did not comport with the requirements of Miller. As an initial matter, however, we

must consider the State’s claims that defendant does not fall under the protections of Miller.

The State maintains that Miller is inapplicable where (1) defendant’s sentence was

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discretionary, not mandatory; (2) defendant is eligible for good-time credit, which renders his

sentence effectively a 40-year sentence; and (3) defendant is eligible for parole, which provides

for an opportunity for release prior to serving a de facto life sentence. 6 We agree.

¶ 40 First, the State correctly observes that defendant’s sentence was discretionary, not

mandatory. Defendant was subject to a sentencing range of 20 to 60 years for the first degree

murder (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-20(a) (West 2020)) 7 and 6 to 30 years for the attempted first degree

murder (id. § 5-4.5-25(a)). Accordingly, defendant’s possible aggregate sentence ranged from

a minimum of 26 years to a maximum of 90 years. Both the United States Supreme Court and

the Illinois Supreme Court have made it clear that Miller applies only to mandatory sentences

of life without parole. See Jones, 593 U.S. at 105; Wilson, 2023 IL 127666, ¶ 38; see also

People v. Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 71 (“In Jones, *** the Court clarified that the holding in

Miller does not apply to discretionary life sentences where the sentencing court does have

discretion to consider youth and attendant characteristics at sentencing.”). Indeed, in Jones, the

United States Supreme Court expressly held that “[i]n a case involving an individual who was

under 18 when he or she committed a homicide, a State’s discretionary sentencing system is

both constitutionally necessary and constitutionally sufficient.” Jones, 593 U.S. at 105. Here,

the sentencing range applicable to defendant’s offenses would have permitted the trial court to

6 The State also claims that defendant’s sentence is not a de facto life sentence because the Illinois Department of Corrections website indicates that he will be released on August 5, 2033, which is less than 40 years after his “custody date” of November 25, 1996. We reject this argument, however, as defendant correctly observes that there is no information as to how this date is calculated. Indeed, our own search of the Illinois Department of Corrections website reveals that it now lists defendant’s “Projected Parole Date” as June 15, 2033, suggesting that the date has changed since the State visited the website, further demonstrating the uncertainty as to the date’s calculation. See Internet Inmate Status, Ill. Dep’t of Corr., https://www.idoc.state.il.us/subsections/search/inms_print.asp?idoc=K69997 (last visited Feb. 27, 2025) [https://perma.cc/CCE3-DBRH]. 7 We note that defendant was eligible for an extended-term sentence, as Nieto was under the age of 12 at the time of her death (see 730 ILCS 5/5-8-2, 5-5-3.2(b)(3)(i) (West 2020)), but the State did not seek an extended-term sentence, nor did the trial court impose one.

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sentence defendant to a term of less than 40 years—i.e., less than a de facto life sentence. See

Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶ 41. As the trial court had the discretion to sentence defendant to a

term that did not constitute a de facto life sentence, we cannot find that defendant’s sentencing

was subject to the protections of Miller. See People v. Anderson, 2024 IL App (1st) 220864,

¶ 12; People v. Merriweather, 2022 IL App (4th) 210498, ¶ 32 (“Under Jones and Illinois law,

as long as the trial court considers the factors set forth in section 5-4.5-105(a) in exercising its

discretion, it may sentence a juvenile offender to a prison term greater than 40 years and not

violate the eighth amendment.”).

¶ 41 We find unpersuasive defendant’s contention that the fact that the trial court observed that

“most defendants probably do have the potential for rehabilitation” means that Wilson and

Jones are “not controlling” and that defendant “was categorically precluded from receiving a

life sentence without a meaningful chance of parole.” First, the trial court’s comment was made

when it was “generally speaking” and was not necessarily a finding that this defendant had the

potential for rehabilitation such that imposition of an 80-year sentence was impermissible.

Additionally, the Jones Court made clear that “[t]he key assumption of both Miller and

Montgomery was that discretionary sentencing allows the sentencer to consider the defendant’s

youth, and thereby helps ensure that life-without-parole sentences are imposed only in cases

where that sentence is appropriate in light of the defendant’s age.” Jones, 593 U.S. at 111-12.

While the Jones Court recognized that different factfinders could weigh the defendant’s youth

differently, it nevertheless found that “the key point remains that, in a case involving a

murderer under 18, a sentencer cannot avoid considering the defendant’s youth if the sentencer

has discretion to consider that mitigating factor.” Id. at 115. Thus, “unless a sentencing court

‘expressly refuses as a matter of law to consider the defendant’s youth (as opposed to, for

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example, deeming the defendant’s youth to be outweighed by other factors or deeming the

defendant’s youth to be an insufficient reason to support a lesser sentence under the facts of

the case)’ [citation], a discretionary sentencing scheme, in itself, satisfies Miller’s requirement

that sentencing courts account for youth and its attendant circumstances.” Wilson, 2023 IL

127666, ¶ 38. Here, we cannot find that the trial court’s general reference to one of the

mitigating factors indicates that the trial court refused, as a matter of law, to consider

defendant’s youth or otherwise “categorically precluded” defendant from receiving an 80-year

sentence.

¶ 42 Next, the State correctly observes that the availability of good-time credit means that

defendant’s 80-year sentence is effectively a 40-year sentence, which is not a de facto life

sentence for purposes of Miller. See Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶ 41. Our supreme court has

instructed that, in considering whether a statutory scheme provides the opportunity for release

short of a de facto life sentence, the availability of good-time credit is relevant. See People v.

Dorsey, 2021 IL 123010, ¶ 49. Under section 3-6-3(a)(2.1) of the Unified Code of Corrections

(730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)(2.1) (West 2020)), defendant is eligible for one day of sentence credit

for each day of his imprisonment. Accordingly, defendant’s 80-year sentence, with good-time

credit, is effectively a 40-year sentence and he therefore does not fall within the protections of

Miller. See People v. Thompson, 2022 IL App (1st) 200463, ¶ 38.

¶ 43 We do not find persuasive defendant’s contention that his sentence remains a de facto life

sentence since he previously had two months of good-time credit revoked. First, defendant has

the ability to regain any lost good-time credit. See 730 ILCS 5/3-3-2(b), 3-6-3(c) (West 2020).

More importantly, our supreme court has instructed that “[i]t is the sentencing scheme that

must afford a youthful offender a realistic opportunity for release” (emphasis in original)

17 No. 1-21-1454

(Dorsey, 2021 IL 123010, ¶ 58), not the amount of credit actually earned. Thus, in Dorsey, the

supreme court found:

“From our review of the Illinois good-conduct scheme, it is clear that defendant

(1) must be awarded day-for-day credit, (2) is entitled to keep it as long as it is not

revoked because he commits a disciplinary offense, (3) is afforded procedures that

protect against arbitrary revocation of credit, and (4) may enforce constitutional

protections through judicial review. That the Department of Corrections may

determine—after adhering to the foregoing due-process procedures—that defendant’s

misconduct in prison may warrant revocation of previously awarded credit does not

alter that the legislature provided him a meaningful opportunity to demonstrate

rehabilitation and obtain release before he spends more than 40 years in prison.” Id.

¶ 61.

Similarly, here, the fact that defendant may or may not have sentencing credits revoked has no

bearing on the fact that the applicable sentencing scheme allows him a meaningful opportunity

to obtain release after 40 years.

¶ 44 Finally, the State contends that the availability of parole removes defendant’s case from

the protections of Miller. As noted, in 2019, the legislature enacted a statute providing for

parole review with respect to offenses committed by defendants who were under the age of 21.

See 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-115 (West 2020). With respect to defendants who were convicted of

first degree murder, the statute provides for two opportunities for parole, one after 20 years of

incarceration, and then one 10 years later. Id. § 5-4.5-115(b), (m).

¶ 45 The United States Supreme Court has expressly indicated that “[a] State may remedy a

Miller violation by permitting juvenile homicide offenders to be considered for parole, rather

18 No. 1-21-1454

than by resentencing them.” Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 212. Such an option “ensures that

juveniles whose crimes reflect[ ] only transient immaturity—and who have since matured—

will not be forced to serve a disproportionate sentence in violation of the Eighth Amendment.”

Id. Moreover, the Illinois Supreme Court in Dorsey drew an analogy between good-time credit

and the availability of parole in determining that the latter provided a meaningful opportunity

for a juvenile offender’s release. See Dorsey, 2021 IL 123010, ¶ 53 (“flatly reject[ing]” the

notion that “good-conduct credit is not like parole because obeying prison rules does not

demonstrate rehabilitation”). As such, nearly all of the appellate courts that have considered

the matter have concluded that the availability of parole under section 5-4.5-115 renders Miller

inapplicable. See, e.g., People v. Cavazos, 2023 IL App (2d) 220066, ¶ 60; People v. Kendrick,

2023 IL App (3d) 200127, ¶ 43; People v. Elliott, 2022 IL App (1st) 192294, ¶ 56; People v.

Beck, 2021 IL App (5th) 200252, ¶ 26. But see People v. Gates, 2023 IL App (1st) 211422,

¶¶ 38-49 (finding de facto life sentence, despite availability of parole under section 5-4.5-115).

¶ 46 Defendant, however, contends that section 5-4.5-115 does not provide him a meaningful

opportunity for release, as he is entitled to only two requests for parole, 10 years apart, before

being precluded from ever seeking parole in the future. He therefore claims that the theoretical

availability of parole does not remove his case from the protections of Miller. We note that this

issue is presently pending before the Illinois Supreme Court, which will presumably resolve

the matter. See People v. Spencer, 2023 IL App (1st) 200646-U, appeal allowed, No. 130015

(Ill. Nov. 29, 2023). As we agree with the State’s previous arguments concerning the

applicability of Miller, we have no need to opine as to whether the presence of section 5-4.5-

115 affects the nature of defendant’s sentences for purposes of the Miller analysis.

19 No. 1-21-1454

¶ 47 Defendant’s Miller-Compliant Sentencing

¶ 48 Despite our conclusion that Miller is inapplicable to defendant’s sentencing, we

nevertheless find that the trial court in the instant case complied with its requirements in

resentencing defendant. As noted, after the decision in Miller, the legislature enacted section

5-4.5-105 of the Unified Code of Corrections, which requires a sentencing court to consider a

list of specific factors prior to sentencing any defendant under the age of 18. These factors are

similar to those identified by the Miller Court as relevant to the matter of juvenile sentencing.

See Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 45 (noting that section 5-4.5-105 “requires the trial court to

consider factors taken from the Supreme Court’s list”); People v. Clark, 2024 IL 127838, ¶ 73

(the “clear purpose” of section 5-4.5-105(a) is “to require courts sentencing juvenile offenders

to consider the many differences between juvenile offenders and adults”).

¶ 49 Specifically, section 5-4.5-105(a) requires a sentencing court to consider the following

factors in mitigation:

“(1) the person’s age, impetuosity, and level of maturity at the time of the offense,

including the ability to consider risks and consequences of behavior, and the presence

of cognitive or developmental disability, or both, if any;

(2) whether the person was subjected to outside pressure, including peer pressure,

familial pressure, or negative influences;

(3) the person’s family, home environment, educational and social background,

including any history of parental neglect, physical abuse, or other childhood trauma;

(4) the person’s potential for rehabilitation or evidence of rehabilitation, or both;

(5) the circumstances of the offense;

20 No. 1-21-1454

(6) the person’s degree of participation and specific role in the offense, including

the level of planning by the defendant before the offense;

(7) whether the person was able to meaningfully participate in his or her defense;

(8) the person’s prior juvenile or criminal history; and

(9) any other information the court finds relevant and reliable, including an

expression of remorse, if appropriate. However, if the person, on advice of counsel[,]

chooses not to make a statement, the court shall not consider a lack of an expression of

remorse as an aggravating factor.” 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105(a) (West 2020). 8

¶ 50 In addition to the presence of the above statutory factors, the trial court in this case would

have been exceptionally aware of the necessity of considering defendant’s youth and its

attendant characteristics by virtue of the procedural posture of the litigation. The matter came

before the trial court for resentencing specifically due to the necessity of considering the Miller

factors—based on the law at the time, we found in our prior decision that the trial court that

had imposed defendant’s 130-year sentence “made no finding that [defendant] was

permanently incorrigible and did not consider the factors set forth in Miller and Holman.”

Deleon, 2018 IL App (1st) 153253-U, ¶ 33. Accordingly, we vacated defendant’s prior

sentence and remanded for resentencing “in accordance with section 5-4.5-105 of the Code.”

Id. ¶ 36. The trial court was therefore informed that its resentencing needed to include

consideration of defendant’s youth. As a result, in sentencing defendant, the trial court

expressly considered each of the above sentencing factors prior to sentencing defendant to a

total of 80 years.

8 We note that section 5-4.5-105(a) has since been amended to include several additional factors. See Pub. Act 103-191, § 10 (eff. Jan. 1, 2024) (amending 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105).

21 No. 1-21-1454

¶ 51 In this case, then, defendant was sentenced under a sentencing scheme that gave the trial

court discretion to consider defendant’s youth, and the record reveals that the trial court did

not refuse, as a matter of law, to consider defendant’s youth but did, in fact, consider

defendant’s youth and its attendant characteristics, as set forth in section 5-4.5-105(a). We

accordingly cannot find that defendant’s sentence was unconstitutional under the eighth

amendment of the United States Constitution. See Wilson, 2023 IL 127666, ¶ 44.

¶ 52 We similarly cannot find that defendant’s sentence violates the proportionate penalties

clause of the Illinois Constitution. The proportionate penalties clause requires that all penalties

“be determined both according to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of

restoring the offender to useful citizenship.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11. Among other

circumstances, a defendant’s sentence violates the proportionate penalties clause where “the

penalty imposed is ‘cruel, degrading, or so wholly disproportionate to the offense as to shock

the moral sense of the community.’ ” Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 51 (quoting People v. Miller,

202 Ill. 2d 328, 338 (2002) (Leon Miller)). There is no specific definition of a “cruel” or

“degrading” sentence, as the “moral sense” of the community changes over time, in light of

evolving standards of decency and fairness. Id. The proportionate penalties clause, however,

is broader than the protections of the eighth amendment. See People v. Clemons, 2012 IL

107821, ¶¶ 39-40.

¶ 53 Defendant’s argument on this point consists of challenging the youth parole statute,

contending that it is “widely inconsistent” with those of other states, as well as being

“inconsistent with Illinois’s own trend in recent changes that have been made in the way

juveniles are tried and sentenced in Illinois” (emphasis in original). Whether or not defendant

has a meaningful opportunity for parole, however, does not determine whether defendant’s

22 No. 1-21-1454

sentence violated the proportionate penalties clause in this case. Here, defendant received a

discretionary sentence of 80 years—which, after good-time credit, is less than a de facto life

sentence—after the trial court expressly considered the statutory factors in mitigation. This

sentence was well-supported by the record, as we explain further below, and we therefore

cannot find that defendant’s sentence violated the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois

Constitution.

¶ 54 Excessive Sentence

¶ 55 Finally, defendant argues in the alternative that, even if his sentence was not

unconstitutional, it was nevertheless excessive. “Illinois courts have long recognized that the

imposition of a sentence is left to the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be altered

upon review absent an abuse of that discretion.” People v. Etherton, 2017 IL App (5th) 140427,

¶ 15. The trial court’s sentence is given great deference, as “the trial court is in the best position

to consider the defendant’s credibility, demeanor, general moral character, mentality, social

environment, habits, and age.” Id.

¶ 56 As noted, in sentencing a defendant, the trial court is required to consider factors in

aggravation and mitigation, including the specific factors listed in section 5-4.5-105(a), when

the defendant is under the age of 18. Not all mitigating factors apply in all cases, and “the trial

court need not articulate each factor it considers in rendering the sentence for a juvenile

offender.” Merriweather, 2022 IL App (4th) 210498, ¶ 31. In determining whether the trial

court based its sentence on appropriate aggravating and mitigating factors, “ ‘a court of review

should consider the record as a whole, rather than focusing on a few words or statements by

the trial court.’ ” Id. (quoting People v. Dowding, 388 Ill. App. 3d 936, 943 (2009)).

23 No. 1-21-1454

¶ 57 In this case, the trial court was presented with a great deal of evidence at the sentencing

hearing. Specifically, the State presented a victim impact statement from Nieto’s sister on

behalf of her family, as well as testimony from a representative of the Illinois Department of

Corrections regarding the opportunity for defendant to regain his previously revoked good-

time credit. The parties also stipulated as to defendant’s disciplinary record while incarcerated,

which included several tickets related to gang activity, as well as defendant’s limited criminal

history prior to the instant offense. In mitigation, the defense presented the testimony of

mitigation specialist Helen Skinner, as well as her mitigation report, which related defendant’s

troubled childhood and his behavior since being incarcerated. Defendant also made a statement

of allocution, expressing remorse for the crime. Finally, the trial court was also presented with

defendant’s PSI, which encompassed much of the same detail as in the mitigation report.

¶ 58 After the parties presented their evidence and made arguments in aggravation and

mitigation, the trial court adjourned the proceedings. Before rendering its decision, the trial

court explained that “one of the reasons I didn’t go right to sentencing right after the last word

was uttered by the defense is because I wanted time to think about this.” The trial court further

informed the parties that “[e]very day I thought about this case.” The trial court then listed

each of the statutory factors in turn and expressly stated that it had considered each factor.

With respect to defendant’s statement in allocution, the trial court noted that it had considered

it, but observed that “on a bare, cold transcript it might appear to have more remorse than I

was perceiving by the defendant’s demeanor in court. *** I was not impressed by his

performance on his right of allocation [sic] or his statement of regret.” It then sentenced

defendant to 60 years for the murder and 20 years for the attempted murder.

24 No. 1-21-1454

¶ 59 We cannot find that this sentence represented an abuse of the trial court’s discretion.

Despite defendant’s contention, the sentencing proceedings were not “brief.” The trial court

conducted a full resentencing hearing, then adjourned specifically for the purpose of processing

all of the information presented at that hearing before determining an appropriate sentence.

While the trial court did not set forth its reasoning as to each factor in detail, it was not required

to do so, and its decision not to do so does not indicate a lack of consideration. See

Merriweather, 2022 IL App (4th) 210498, ¶ 31 (“[T]he trial court need not articulate each

factor it considers in rendering the sentence for a juvenile offender, and that omission does not

mean the trial court did not consider all relevant factors.”). Defendant in this case is clearly

unhappy with the balancing of the factors by the trial court and believes that his mitigating

evidence should have been afforded more weight. It is not our purview, however, to reweigh

the evidence on appeal, as the trial court was in a better position to determine an appropriate

sentence based on the particular facts and circumstances. See id. ¶ 32. Here, the trial court’s

determination that an 80-year sentence was warranted fell squarely within the sentencing range

and was amply supported by the evidence. We therefore cannot find that the trial court’s

sentence was excessive.

¶ 60 CONCLUSION

¶ 61 For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. Defendant’s

sentence does not violate the eighth amendment of the United States Constitution or the

proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution, nor was the sentence excessive.

¶ 62 Affirmed.

25 No. 1-21-1454

People v. Deleon, 2025 IL App (1st) 211454

Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 97-CR- 12501; the Hon. Gregory Paul Vasquez, Judge, presiding.

Attorneys James E. Chadd, Douglas R. Hoff, and Stephen L. Gentry, of for State Appellate Defender’s Office, of Chicago, for appellant. Appellant:

Attorneys Kimberly M. Foxx, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Enrique for Abraham, Su Wang, and David H. Iskowich, Assistant State’s Appellee: Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.