Peo in Interest of SS

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: March 5, 2026
• Docket: 25CA1425
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

25CA1425 Peo in Interest of SS 03-05-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA1425 Weld County District Court No. 22JV128 Honorable W. Troy Hause, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of S.S. a Child,

and Concerning M.K.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division I Opinion by JUDGE J. JONES Lum and Meirink, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced March 5, 2026

Bruce T. Barker, County Attorney, David S. Anderson, Assistant County Attorney, Greeley, Colorado, for Appellee

Jenna L. Mazzucca, Guardian Ad Litem

Ainsley E. Baum, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant ¶1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, M.K. (mother)

appeals the juvenile court’s judgment allocating parental

responsibilities for S.S. (the child) to Z.S. (father). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In August 2022, following receipt of a referral raising concerns

that the then-four-year-old child had been abused by father, the

Weld County Department of Human Services entered into a safety

plan with the family. The parents agreed that the child would

remain in mother’s care pending further assessment. The

caseworker then determined that the allegations had previously

been assessed and deemed unfounded. But because of the ongoing

volatility in mother and father’s relationship, they agreed to place

the child with child’s maternal grandparents.

¶3 In September 2022, the Department filed a petition in

dependency or neglect alleging that the parents’ unstable

relationship negatively impacted the child’s emotional wellbeing.

Less than one month later, maternal grandparents notified the

Department that they couldn’t continue their kinship placement,

and the Department placed the child with father. The child

remained in father’s care for the pendency of the case.

1 ¶4 Approximately eight months after the Department filed the

petition, mother entered a no-fault admission, and the juvenile

court adjudicated the child dependent or neglected. The court then

adopted a treatment plan for mother requiring her to (1) maintain

contact with the caseworker; (2) learn and use parenting skills to

establish a healthy attachment with the child; (3) address her

mental health problems; (4) maintain appropriate housing for the

child; and (5) demonstrate the financial ability to provide for the

child’s basic needs. In September 2023, after the Department

received referrals reporting concerns about mother’s substance use,

the juvenile court adopted an amended treatment plan requiring

mother to complete a substance abuse evaluation and submit to

drug testing.

¶5 Subsequently, the child’s guardian ad litem (GAL) moved to

allocate parental responsibilities to father, and the Department and

father joined in the request. Almost three years after the

Department filed the petition, the court allocated sole decision-

making responsibility to father, named him the primary custodian,

and accorded mother eight hours of supervised parenting time per

week.

2 II. Continuance

¶6 Mother contends that the juvenile court erred by denying her

counsel’s request for a continuance. We aren’t persuaded.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶7 The Colorado Children’s Code directs courts to “proceed with

all possible speed to a legal determination that will serve the best

interests of the child.” § 19-1-102(1)(c), C.R.S. 2025. Thus, when

ruling on a motion to continue, the juvenile court “should balance

the need for orderly and expeditious administration of justice

against the facts underlying the motion and the child’s need for

permanency.” People in Interest of R.J.B., 2021 COA 4, ¶ 11.

¶8 When, as in this case, a child is under six years old at the time

a petition in dependency or neglect is filed, the expedited

permanency planning (EPP) provisions of the Children’s Code

provide that a juvenile court can’t grant a continuance unless the

moving party establishes (1) good cause for the continuance and (2)

that the continuance will serve the child’s best interests. § 19-3-

104, C.R.S. 2025.

¶9 We review the denial of a continuance for an abuse of

discretion. See C.S. v. People in Interest of I.S., 83 P.3d 627, 638

3 (Colo. 2004). We won’t disturb the juvenile court’s decision absent

a showing that it was manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or

based on a misapplication or misconstruction of the law. People in

Interest of E.B., 2022 CO 55, ¶ 14.

¶ 10 We review procedural due process claims de novo. R.J.B.,

¶ 26. But a parent isn’t entitled to relief on a due process claim

absent a showing of harm or prejudice. People in Interest of J.A.S.,

160 P.3d 257, 262 (Colo. App. 2007).

B. Additional Background

¶ 11 Two weeks before the allocation of parental responsibilities

(APR) hearing — set for December 20, 2024 — mother filed a

forthwith motion to continue based on the Department’s alleged

failure to provide requested discovery. The juvenile court granted

the motion and continued the APR hearing to April 7, 2025.

¶ 12 Five days before the April hearing, mother filed a forthwith

motion to resolve discovery disputes, alleging that the Department

hadn’t updated its prior disclosures and had objected to several of

mother’s propounded document requests. One day before the

hearing, mother filed a motion in limine asking the court to exclude

evidence of mother’s drug test results.

4 ¶ 13 Given the limited time between the filings and the start of the

hearing, the juvenile court didn’t rule on the motions prior to the

hearing. Thus, at the start of the April hearing, the parties’

attorneys argued these outstanding issues. At that time, mother’s

attorney requested a continuance or, if the court denied that

request, a limitation on the Department’s presentation of evidence

to “the discovery that ha[d] been produced and that we had

available to prepare for cross-examination.” Mother’s attorney also

notified the court that, despite “diligent efforts,” he had been unable

to secure the testimony of the parent-child interactional (PCI)

evaluator.

¶ 14 The juvenile court denied the requested continuance but

clarified that if, during the hearing, mother’s counsel demonstrated

prejudice based on the lack of disclosure, the court would

reconsider. The court also limited the Department’s presentation of

evidence to the records and reports disclosed to mother and

accepted testimony regarding her drug test results only as a basis

for the experts’ opinions, not for the truth of the matter asserted.

¶ 15 Because mother’s counsel hadn’t finished presenting evidence

by the end of the day on April 7, 2025, the court continued the

5 hearing to June 9, 2025. Mother’s counsel didn’t call, or attempt to

call, any additional witnesses on the second day.

C. Analysis

¶ 16 The juvenile court didn’t abuse its discretion by limiting the

presentation of evidence in lieu of granting mother’s counsel’s

requested continuance. See C.S., 83 P.3d at 638. The case had

been open for over two-and-a-half years, the APR hearing had

already been continued once, the EPP provisions applied, and

mother’s counsel didn’t provide any reason for finding that a delay

would serve the child’s best interests. See § 19-3-104. The court’s

ruling reflects that it appropriately balanced the reasons for

mother’s attorney’s request with the need to conclude the hearing in

a timely manner. See R.J.B., ¶ 11; People in Interest of T.E.M., 124

P.3d 905, 908 (Colo. App. 2005) (“In ruling on the motion [to

continue], the trial court should balance the need for orderly and

expeditious administration of justice against the facts underlying

the motion, while considering the child’s need for permanency.”).

¶ 17 Mother asserts that the court’s denial of the requested

continuance deprived her of a meaningful opportunity to be heard,

thereby violating her right to due process, because it forced her to

6 proceed without rulings on her two pretrial motions, “critical”

discovery from the Department, and expert witness testimony from

the PCI evaluator.

¶ 18 First, mother’s counsel’s request for a continuance related

only to the discovery dispute, not the motion in limine. See People

in Interest of V.W., 958 P.2d 1132, 1134 (Colo. App. 1998) (declining

to address an argument raised for the first time on appeal). In any

event, as noted above, the court ruled on both of the pretrial

motions, limited the scope of the Department’s evidence, and

allowed mother’s counsel to renew the continuance request upon a

demonstration of prejudice. Mother’s attorney’s only assertion of

prejudice during the APR hearing related to the Department’s

failure to disclose documentation of its conversations with the GAL.

But mother doesn’t explain how this information was relevant to the

proceeding or might have changed its outcome. J.A.S., 160 P.3d at

262.

¶ 19 Further, mother doesn’t explain why she wasn’t able to secure

the PCI evaluator’s appearance in the nine months between the

setting of the initial APR hearing and the final day of the hearing.

See R.J.B., ¶ 35 (refusing to consider a “bald assertion” presented

7 “without argument or development”). And while mother generally

asserts that the PCI evaluator would have revealed “discrepancies”

in the caseworker’s testimony about mother’s treatment plan

compliance and presented her observations and opinions about the

child’s best interests, mother’s counsel didn’t make any offer of

proof or provide any specifics allowing us to discern how “the

termination proceedings would have been affected in any

appreciable way” by the PCI evaluator’s testimony. E.B., ¶ 22

(citing People in Interest of C.G., 885 P.2d 355, 358 (Colo. App.

1994)).

¶ 20 Because mother has failed to demonstrate any actual

prejudice resulting from the juvenile court’s orders, we conclude

that her due process claim must fail. See J.A.S., 160 P.3d at 262.

III. Scope of Expert Testimony

¶ 21 Mother contends that the juvenile court erred by allowing the

caseworker to testify beyond the scope of her expertise. We

disagree.

¶ 22 Once a witness is qualified as an expert, “the witness’s expert

opinion testimony must still be limited to the scope of his or her

8 expertise.” People v. McFee, 2016 COA 97, ¶ 88. “Whether opinion

testimony is within a particular witness’s expertise generally is a

matter addressed to the sound discretion of the court.” People v.

Watson, 53 P.3d 707, 711 (Colo. App. 2001). A court abuses its

discretion when its ruling is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or

unfair, or based on a misapplication or misconstruction of the law.

E.B., ¶ 14.

B. Analysis

¶ 23 The Department offered the caseworker as an expert in “child

protection casework.” Mother’s counsel didn’t object to her being

qualified as an expert in “casework as it relates to identifying

services” but asked for a “limitation on any opinions as it relates to

any treatments that were associated with the treatment plan.”

Based on the caseworker’s education and training experience, the

court qualified her as an expert in child protection casework. The

court also informed the parties’ attorneys that if they believed the

caseworker was providing an opinion outside of her expertise, it

would address any objection at that time.

¶ 24 On appeal, mother doesn’t contend that the caseworker lacked

either the education or experience to testify in the area of “child

9 protection casework” or that the court abused its discretion by

qualifying her as an expert in that area. Instead, she asserts that

the juvenile court erred by refusing to limit the scope of the

caseworker’s testimony. Specifically, mother argues that because

her individual therapist, qualified by the court as an expert in

mental health treatment, testified that mother completed her

therapeutic treatment objectives, the court erred by allowing the

caseworker to testify regarding mother’s “overall compliance with

her treatment plan.”

¶ 25 First mother’s therapist and the caseworker had separate and

distinct roles. The caseworker worked to rehabilitate mother and

reunify the family by developing a treatment plan, making referrals,

monitoring mother’s overall treatment plan progress, and working

to achieve permanency for the child. In contrast, as mother’s

treatment provider, her therapist focused on mother’s specific

therapeutic objectives — he lacked knowledge and expertise

regarding mother’s comprehensive treatment plan objectives and

overall progress towards those objectives.

¶ 26 Moreover, in forming her opinion regarding mother’s treatment

plan progress, the caseworker acknowledged the report from

10 mother’s therapist that mother had completed the therapy required

by the treatment plan. Even so, the caseworker opined that mother

hadn’t successfully completed the treatment plan objective because

she hadn’t shown any meaningful behavioral changes. And this

testimony, focusing on mother’s treatment plan progress in relation

to the child’s needs, was squarely within her role as an expert in

child protection casework.

¶ 27 Mother doesn’t point us to any case law requiring a

caseworker to agree with a treatment provider regarding a parent’s

treatment plan progress, describing the scope of an expert’s

testimony in child protection casework, or holding that such

testimony may not include opinions about a parent’s overall

treatment plan compliance. And we are aware of none. Nor are we

persuaded that the caseworker’s testimony about mother’s overall

treatment plan compliance in this case exceeded the scope of her

expertise.

¶ 28 Finally, to the extent mother asserts that her therapist was in

a better position to opine about any meaningful behavioral change,

it was within the juvenile court’s sole province, as the fact finder, to

11 determine the weight and probative effect of the evidence. See Reid

v. Pyle, 51 P.3d 1064, 1068 (Colo. App. 2002).

¶ 29 For these reasons, we conclude that the juvenile court didn’t

abuse its discretion by allowing the caseworker to testify about

mother’s overall treatment plan compliance.

IV. Allocation of Parental Responsibilities

¶ 30 Mother contends that, considering her treatment plan

compliance, the juvenile court erred by allocating sole decision-

making responsibilities to father and limiting her parenting time to

eight supervised hours per week. We disagree.

¶ 31 The Colorado Children’s Code authorizes a juvenile court to

enter an order allocating parental responsibilities and addressing

parenting time when it maintains jurisdiction in a case involving a

dependent or neglected child. § 19-1-104(5)-(6), C.R.S. 2025.

¶ 32 When allocating parental responsibilities in a dependency and

neglect proceeding, the court must consider the legislative purposes

of the Children’s Code under section 19-1-102. People in Interest of

J.G., 2021 COA 47, ¶ 18. The overriding purpose of the Children’s

Code is to protect a child’s welfare and safety by providing

12 procedures to serve the child’s best interests. L.G. v. People, 890

P.2d 647, 654 (Colo. 1995). Therefore, if a court allocates parental

responsibilities, it must do so in accordance with the child’s best

interests, focusing on the protection and safety of the child and not

the parents’ custodial interests. People in Interest of H.K.W., 2017

COA 70, ¶ 13.

¶ 33 Whether and on what terms an APR should be ordered are

within the juvenile court’s sound discretion. See In re Parental

Responsibilities Concerning B.R.D., 2012 COA 63, ¶ 15. It is for the

juvenile court, as the trier of fact, to determine the sufficiency,

probative effect, and weight of the evidence, and to assess the

credibility of witnesses. People in Interest of A.J.L., 243 P.3d 244,

249-50 (Colo. 2010). When there is record support for the court’s

findings, its resolution of conflicting evidence is binding on review.

B.R.D., ¶ 15.

¶ 34 In allocating parental responsibilities, the juvenile court found

that mother didn’t substantially comply with her treatment plan

and had unresolved mental health and substance abuse problems

which adversely affected her ability to parent the child. Finding

13 that the child would be emotionally endangered by unsupervised

time with mother, the court granted mother eight hours of

supervised parenting time per week.

¶ 35 The record supports the court’s findings. Mother’s mental

health and substance abuse evaluator reported concerns about

mother’s substance use. And the family time supervisor described

ongoing concerns with mother’s inability to regulate her emotions

during visits, which distressed the child.

¶ 36 Additionally, as discussed above, the caseworker testified that

mother had not completed the substance use and mental health

objectives of her treatment plan. The case was opened, in part, due

to concerns that mother influenced the child to make abuse

allegations against father. And after more than two-and-a-half

years, mother continued to make “inappropriate comments” and

exhibit “coaching-like” behavior during family time. For example,

about one month before the hearing, mother told the child that she

wanted to become a substitute teacher at the child’s school so that

she “could see [the child] whenever she wanted” and said that she

would “kill whoever she need[ed] to so that she [could] see [the

child].” The caseworker also observed that mother hadn’t

14 demonstrated sobriety. For these reasons, the caseworker opined

that unsupervised time with mother would endanger the child.

¶ 37 Even so, mother asserts that based on her treatment plan

compliance, including the lack of safety concerns during her family

time, consistent family time attendance, completion of her

therapeutic treatment plan, and voluntary participation in ongoing

individual therapy, the juvenile court erred by not ordering joint

decision-making responsibility and an equal parenting time

schedule. But this argument essentially asks us to reweigh the

evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the juvenile court,

which we can’t do. People in Interest of K.L.W., 2021 COA 56, ¶ 62.

It is exclusively within the juvenile court’s purview to resolve

conflicting evidence. B.R.D., ¶ 15; see also A.J.L., 243 P.3d at 250

(“[I]t is important to defer to the [juvenile] court, particularly when it

hears contradictory testimony on material issues . . . .”). And the

juvenile court’s weighing of the evidence led it to explicitly conclude

that unsupervised contact with mother would be harmful to the

child.

¶ 38 Moreover, a parent’s treatment plan compliance is not

determinative of how the court should allocate parental

15 responsibilities. See People in Interest of L.B., 254 P.3d 1203, 1208

(Colo. App. 2011) (explaining that an APR must be determined in

accordance with the child’s best interests, and a finding of parental

unfitness isn’t required before allocating parental responsibilities

for a dependent or neglected child). In entering its orders, the

juvenile court focused on the child’s best interests, giving

paramount consideration to her emotional needs and conditions.

See H.K.W., ¶ 13.

¶ 39 We also reject mother’s argument that the record doesn’t

support the APR order because there were “significant safety

concerns” regarding father’s ability to care for the child. To support

this contention, mother relies on testimony from a hearing other

than the APR hearing, which we don’t consider. See Boulder Plaza

Residential, LLC v. Summit Flooring, LLC, 198 P.3d 1217, 1222

(Colo. App. 2008) (declining to consider evidence on appeal that a

party failed to introduce at trial). And during the APR hearing,

mother confirmed that she didn’t have “any ongoing concerns”

about father and the child.

¶ 40 In sum, the record supports the juvenile court’s findings, and

its APR based on those findings was neither a misapplication of the

16 law nor manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair. Accordingly,

we don’t see any error. See E.B., ¶ 14; B.R.D., ¶ 15.

V. Disposition

¶ 41 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE LUM and JUDGE MEIRINK concur.