25CA1194 Peo in Interest of SS 05-21-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA1194 Adams County District Court No. 20JV264 Honorable Emily Lieberman, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Appellee,
In the Interest of S.S., a Child,
and Concerning S.D. and M.S.,
Appellants.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division VI Opinion by JUDGE YUN Grove and Schock, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced May 21, 2026
Heidi Miller, County Attorney, Deborah Kershner, Assistant County Attorney, Westminster, Colorado, for Appellee
Sheena Knight, Guardian Ad Litem
The Morgan Law Office, Kristofr P. Morgan, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellant S.D.
Robin Tieman, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Boulder, Colorado, for Appellant M.S. ¶1 S.D. (mother) and M.S. (father) appeal the judgment
terminating their parent-child legal relationships with S.S. (the
child). We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 This case has a lengthy history and one previous appeal.
People in Interest of S.S., (Colo. App. No. 22CA1012, March 30,
2023) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)) (S.S. I). The parents
have five children, each of whom was separately involved in
dependency and neglect proceedings with county departments in
Adams and Arapahoe counties and in Delaware.
¶3 Because the division in S.S. I set forth the history of the case,
we repeat only the facts and procedural history relevant to this
appeal.
¶4 As pertinent here, in S.S. I, the parents appealed the
termination judgment. A division of this court reversed the
judgment as to mother, concluding that the record did not establish
that the Department made reasonable accommodations as required
by the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). The division
affirmed the judgment as to father but remanded for an evidentiary
hearing on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. On
1 remand, the juvenile court determined father had received
ineffective assistance and vacated the termination judgment.
¶5 Shortly thereafter, the Adams County Human Services
Department (the Department) again moved to terminate the parents’
parental rights. At that time, the parents were living in Delaware.
Following an eight-day hearing, the court terminated both parents’
parental rights.1
II. Termination Criteria and Standard of Review
¶6 The juvenile court may terminate parental rights if it finds, by
clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child was adjudicated
dependent or neglected; (2) the parent has not complied with an
appropriate, court-approved treatment plan or the plan has not
been successful; (3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the parent’s conduct
or condition is unlikely to change within a reasonable time.
§ 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2025.
¶7 The question of whether a juvenile court properly terminated
parental rights is a mixed question of fact and law. People in
1 At the time of the second termination hearing, parental rights
were terminated as to children M.J. and R.S., while the cases involving Ma.S. and G.S. were ongoing.
2 Interest of S.R.N.J-S., 2020 COA 12, ¶ 10. Thus, we review the
court’s factual findings for clear error but review de novo its legal
conclusions based on those findings. Id.
¶8 “The credibility of the witnesses; the sufficiency, probative
value, and weight of the evidence; and the inferences and
conclusions to be drawn from the evidence are within the discretion
of the [juvenile] court.” People in Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO
14, ¶ 15. We therefore do not reweigh the evidence or substitute
our judgment for that of the juvenile court. People in Interest of
K.L.W., 2021 COA 56, ¶ 62.
III. Father’s Arguments
¶9 Father contends that the juvenile court erred by finding that
(1) he did not substantially comply with his treatment plan; (2) the
Department made reasonable efforts; and (3) he could not become
fit within a reasonable time. Each of these contentions is addressed
in turn.
A. Treatment Plan Compliance
¶ 10 We first address father’s contention that the juvenile court
erred by finding that he did not substantially comply with his
treatment plan. We disagree.
3 1. Applicable Law
¶ 11 A treatment plan is considered successful only if it renders the
parent fit. People in Interest of C.A.K., 652 P.2d 603, 611 (Colo.
1982). Partial compliance, or even substantial compliance, may not
result in a successful plan that renders the parent fit. People in
Interest of D.M.W., 752 P.2d 587, 588 (Colo. App. 1987). It is the
parent’s responsibility to ensure compliance with, and the success
of, the treatment plan. People in Interest of A.H., 736 P.2d 425, 428
(Colo. App. 1987).
2. Analysis
¶ 12 Father’s treatment plan required him to: (1) meet the child’s
needs in a safe and stable home; (2) cooperate with the Department
and other professionals; (3) ensure the child had a sober caregiver
able to meet his needs; (4) work with in-home service providers;
(5) undergo a domestic violence assessment and participate in
treatment; and (6) participate in substance use monitoring,
complete substance use and mental health assessment, and follow
all recommendations.
¶ 13 The juvenile court acknowledged that father complied with
certain aspects of his treatment plan and found that he had
4 • “mostly” cooperated with the Department, though he
had previously been inconsistent in communicating with
caseworkers;
• completed an online parenting class and a combined
mental health and substance use diagnosis evaluation;
• finished domestic violence curriculum, though concerns
about the safety of the parents’ relationship remained;
• demonstrated “months of sobriety at one time in [the]
case,” but had not maintained sobriety for nearly a year
before the termination hearing; and
• enrolled in mental health services.
¶ 14 Ultimately, the court found that father made “insufficient
progress on his treatment plan” because he was not able “to
mitigate the issues related to substance use and mental health,”
and had only “recently begun to consistently engage in services.”
Notably, the court found that father did not consistently attend
mental health treatment. Despite a period of sobriety, the evidence
showed that father continued to use substances and “doesn’t wish
to maintain sobriety and continues to disagree that [substance use]
impacts the safety of [the child].”
5 ¶ 15 The court further observed that the “most current information”
regarding the family home indicated it was unsafe for the child.
And while the court acknowledged that the Department did not
refer father to in-home services in Delaware, it found that this was
because the Department “appropriately prioritized” mental health
and substance use services.
¶ 16 On appeal, father points us to the favorable evidence in the
record and claims he “was substantially compliant with the
treatment plan.” However, his argument would require us to
reweigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the
juvenile court, which we cannot do. See People in Interest of S.Z.S.,
2022 COA 133, ¶ 29. Additionally, father disregards the court’s
finding that, even considering his compliance with certain aspects
of the treatment plan, the plan was not successful in rehabilitating
him. And because compliance alone is insufficient to render a
parent fit, we reject father’s argument. See C.A.K., 652 P.2d at 611
(“The fact that an individual fulfills the tasks and duties
enumerated in the treatment plan does not mean that the
individual will be able to meet his responsibilities as a parent.”).
6 ¶ 17 To the extent that father argues the Department should have
modified his treatment plan after he moved out of state, he does not
argue his treatment plan was inappropriate. Even still, the court
found the treatment plan appropriate and capable of success,
stating that any “failure to amend the treatment plan as
circumstances changed in [the] case [did] not render it
inappropriate.” And the caseworker testified that because the
original concerns persisted, and the only change was father’s state
of residence, the treatment plan was not modified after the first
termination judgment was vacated.
¶ 18 Accordingly, we decline to disturb the juvenile court’s finding
that father did not comply with his treatment plan.
B. Reasonable Efforts
¶ 19 Father next contends that the Department did not make
reasonable efforts because it failed to (1) provide adequate referrals
for services in Delaware; (2) remain in contact with him for six
months; (3) facilitate in-home services; (4) assist with
transportation; and (5) provide in-person family time and
continuous access to virtual family time. We perceive no basis for
reversal.
7 1. Applicable Law
¶ 20 Before a juvenile court may terminate parental rights under
section 19-3-604(1)(c), the county department of human services
must make reasonable efforts to rehabilitate parents and reunite
families. §§ 19-3-100.5(1), 19-1-103(114), 19-3-208,
19-3-604(2)(h), C.R.S. 2025. “Reasonable efforts” is defined as the
“exercise of diligence and care” to reunify parents with their
children. § 19-1-103(114).
¶ 21 Services provided in accordance with section 19-3-208 satisfy
the reasonable efforts standard. § 19-1-103(114). Among the
services required under section 19-3-208 are screening,
assessments, and individual case plans for the provision of services;
home-based family and crisis counseling; information and referral
services to available public and private assistance resources; family
time; and placement services. § 19-3-208(2)(b).
¶ 22 The juvenile court should consider whether the services
provided were appropriate to support the parent’s treatment plan,
People in Interest of S.N-V., 300 P.3d 911, 915 (Colo. App. 2011), by
“considering the totality of the circumstances and accounting for all
services and resources provided to a parent to ensure the
8 completion of the entire treatment plan,” People in Interest of
My.K.M. v. V.K.L., 2022 CO 35, ¶ 33. But it is the parent’s
responsibility to utilize the services to comply with the plan. People
in Interest of J.C.R., 259 P.3d 1279, 1285 (Colo. App. 2011). And
the court may consider a parent’s unwillingness to participate in
treatment when determining whether the department made
reasonable efforts. See People in Interest of A.V., 2012 COA 210,
¶ 12.
¶ 23 Whether the department satisfied its obligation to make
reasonable efforts is a mixed question of fact and law. People in
Interest of A.S.L., 2022 COA 146, ¶ 8. We review the juvenile
court’s factual findings for clear error and will not disturb them if
they have record support. Id.; see also People in Interest of I.J.O.,
2019 COA 151, ¶ 6. However, we review de novo the juvenile
court’s legal determination of whether the department satisfied its
reasonable efforts obligation based on those findings. A.S.L., ¶ 8.
¶ 24 The juvenile court found that father’s lack of engagement —
and the difficulty connecting with out-of-state providers rather than
9 any lack of effort by the Department — impeded his successful
reunification with the child.
¶ 25 Specifically, the court cited father’s inconsistent
communication with the Department, his refusal to work with
alternative service providers, his insistence that he had completed
his treatment plan, and the Delaware providers’ failure to respond
promptly to the Department’s inquiries. The record supports the
court’s findings.
¶ 26 First, father asserts that, aside from one inconveniently
located service provider, the Department failed to offer any referrals
or services after he relocated to Delaware. Two Department
caseworkers acknowledged that arranging referrals and services for
out-of-state parents is more challenging than for those in-state,
often requiring a service navigator to investigate and identify nearby
options. However, after relocating to Delaware, father quickly
reported that he already had mental health and substance use
services in place. It later emerged that his chosen provider was run
by his sister, raising potential conflicts of interest. The Arapahoe
County caseworker repeatedly raised those concerns with father;
however, he consistently reported he did not want to seek treatment
10 elsewhere. Still, the caseworker, in coordination with all
departments involved, recommended five alternative providers, but
father declined to switch services. See A.V., ¶ 12 (the Department’s
obligation to make reasonable efforts does not include making
efforts it knows to be futile).
¶ 27 Later, father switched to a service agency unaffiliated with his
family, reportedly offering therapy, substance use treatment, and
urinalysis testing. And this was again an agency that father located
on his own, without assistance from the Department. At that time,
father also began reporting to caseworkers that he was participating
in services and had completed all requirements of his treatment
plan. This information proved difficult to verify because providers
did not timely respond to information requests. Nevertheless, one
caseworker reported that she had no reason to doubt father’s
self-report that he was accessing services. Another caseworker
further opined, and the court agreed, that because father was
already involved in treatment services, it was not a good use of
Department resources to investigate alternative service providers.
11 ¶ 28 Father also contends that caseworker S.L. failed to contact
him for roughly six months.2 Initially, we acknowledge the
concerns about caseworker S.L.’s efforts during the case. Most
notably, S.L. could not recall portions of her interactions with the
family, did not consistently follow the Department’s notetaking
procedures, and incorrectly asserted that the Department did not
have the same reasonable efforts standards for out-of-state parents.
See I.J.O., ¶¶ 15-16 (services for an out-of-state parent are included
in the Department’s obligation to provide reasonable services). S.L.
also agreed that there were likely months she went without
contacting the family.
¶ 29 The juvenile court acknowledged that the Department could
have taken additional steps or “done better” during the case,
particularly during caseworker S.L.’s assignment. Yet, the court
credited S.L’s testimony that when she attempted contact, the
parents either failed to respond or actively avoided her.
2 Caseworker I.V. was the original caseworker until the first
termination. S.L. was assigned after the remand and worked with the family for four months before I.V. resumed the role.
12 Considering the totality of the Department’s efforts, the court
concluded that reasonable efforts were made. See A.M., ¶ 15.
¶ 30 True, the Department did not refer father to an in-home or life
skills service provider. However, caseworker S.L. testified that the
Department prioritized father’s substance use treatment before
making referrals for additional services like in-home or life skills
support. See My.K.M., ¶ 33 (a department has “discretion to
prioritize certain services or resources to address a family’s most
pressing needs in a way that will assist the family’s overall
completion of the treatment plan”).
¶ 31 Father also asserts that the Department did not provide bus
passes after his move, but the record contains no evidence of such
requests. Even still, the Department supplied gas cards, and a
Delaware caseworker reported that father could access free
transportation services through Medicaid.
¶ 32 We are also unpersuaded by father’s argument that the
Department failed to make reasonable efforts by not providing
in-person family time. The juvenile court found that once father
moved out of state, the Department was not obligated to provide
13 in-person family time and determined it was not feasible on a
regular basis given the lack of available funding and resources.
¶ 33 Caseworker S.L. inquired about funding for in-person family
time, but reported the request was denied because the Department
did not have confirmation that he was progressing in his treatment
plan. She further noted that the Department’s limited funding had
to be divided among all families it served.
¶ 34 Lastly, we reject father’s argument that the Department failed
in its duty to provide reasonable efforts due to inconsistencies in
virtual family time shortly before the second termination hearing.
For much of the case, virtual family time was consistently provided.
¶ 35 True, in the months before the second termination hearing,
the family’s access to virtual family time was disrupted. The court
found that these disruptions were due to circumstances beyond the
caseworker’s control, but caseworker I.V. “worked diligently to
rectify the situation” and successfully reinstated and increased
family time visits. Caseworker I.V. explained that though family
time referrals were in place, difficulties connecting with the family
time supervisor, changes in family time providers, and scheduling
14 barriers caused interruptions. Thus, the inconsistencies were not
the result of the Department’s lack of efforts.
¶ 36 Accordingly, based on the foregoing, we discern no error in the
juvenile court’s determination that the Department made
reasonable efforts to rehabilitate father and reunite him with the
child.
C. Fit within a Reasonable Period of Time
¶ 37 Finally, father argues that even if he was unfit at the time of
the termination hearing, the juvenile court erred by finding that he
could not become fit within a reasonable time. We discern no error.
1. Applicable Law
¶ 38 “An unfit parent is one whose conduct or condition renders
[the parent] unable or unwilling to give a child reasonable parental
care.” S.Z.S., ¶ 23. At a minimum, reasonable parental care
requires that a parent provide nurturing and protection adequate to
meet the child’s physical, emotional, and mental health needs.
S.R.N.J.-S., ¶ 9.
¶ 39 A reasonable time is not an indefinite time but must be
considered based on the physical, mental, and emotional conditions
and needs of the child. S.Z.S., ¶ 25. When determining whether a
15 parent may become fit within a reasonable time, “the court may
consider whether any change has occurred during the proceeding,
the parent’s social history, and the chronic or long-term nature of
the parent’s conduct or condition.” Id. at ¶ 24. Partial or even
substantial compliance with a treatment plan does not necessarily
render a parent fit. K.B., ¶ 26.
¶ 40 If a parent has made little to no progress on a treatment plan,
the court is not required to allow the parent additional time for
compliance. See S.Z.S., ¶ 24. When, as here, a child is under six
years old, the court must consider the expedited permanency
planning (EPP) provisions, which require that the child be placed in
a permanent home as expeditiously as possible. §§ 19-1-102(1.6),
19-1-123, 19-3-702(5)(c), C.R.S. 2025.
¶ 41 The juvenile court determined that father’s conduct and
condition were unlikely to change within a reasonable time. The
court acknowledged that father had made “some progress,” but
emphasized that nearly five years had elapsed since the child was
removed from the home in an EPP case and “there continue[d] to be
significant child protection concerns.”
16 ¶ 42 Father contends that he could become fit within a reasonable
time by again asserting that he substantially complied with his
treatment plan and the Department failed to provide reasonable
efforts. But, as detailed above, the record does not support those
arguments.
¶ 43 Still, father relies on testimony from Arapahoe County
caseworker who believed father was sober at the time of the second
termination hearing. But the juvenile court considered this
testimony and found the caseworker lacked complete information
regarding father’s sobriety. See A.M., ¶ 15.
¶ 44 Accordingly, in light of our conclusions above, the record
supports the juvenile court’s findings that father was unlikely to
become fit within a reasonable time.
IV. Mother’s Argument
¶ 45 Mother asserts that the juvenile court erred by terminating her
parental rights because the Department failed to make reasonable
efforts and provide appropriate ADA accommodations.3 We
disagree.
3 It is undisputed that the ADA applies to mother.
17 A. Applicable Law
¶ 46 As discussed above, the county department of human services
must make reasonable efforts to rehabilitate parents and reunite
19-3-604(2)(h). In evaluating whether the department made
reasonable efforts, the juvenile court should consider whether the
services provided were appropriate to support the parent’s
treatment plan. S.N-V., 300 P.3d at 915. This evaluation involves
“considering the totality of the circumstances and accounting for all
completion of the entire treatment plan.” My.K.M., ¶ 33.
¶ 47 If a parent has a qualifying disability under the ADA, the
juvenile court must also consider whether the department provided
reasonable accommodations for that disability when assessing
whether reasonable efforts were made. See People in Interest of
S.K., 2019 COA 36, ¶ 34; see also § 19-3-208(2)(g) (noting that
services provided under section 19-3-208 must comply with the
ADA). “[W]hat constitutes a reasonable accommodation will vary
from case to case based on the child’s health and safety needs, the
18 nature of the parent’s disability, and the available resources.” S.K.,
¶ 39.
B. Analysis
¶ 48 Mother principally contends that the Department did not
make reasonable efforts because it failed to consistently provide
virtual family time and did not provide any in-person family time
after the parents relocated to Delaware.
¶ 49 The juvenile court found that the Department made
reasonable efforts and provided appropriate accommodations under
the ADA. The court concluded that, once the family relocated, the
Department was not obligated to provide in-person family time. It
recognized that regular in-person visits were not feasible due to the
Department’s funding limitations and the substantial resources
such arrangements would demand for a single family. And, as
described above, the court further determined that “[w]hile family
time was non-existent for nearly four months,” caseworker I.V.
“worked diligently to rectify that situation, which was largely out of
her control.” The record supports the court’s findings.
¶ 50 As mother notes, caseworker I.V. acknowledged that in-person
family time would have better enabled her to demonstrate parenting
19 skills and receive real-time parent coaching. However, the
caseworker also opined that, after mother moved to Delaware,
providing in-person family time was not reasonable given the
Department’s limited resources.
¶ 51 Mother further contends that the Department “failed to
provide meaningful virtual visits” between her and the child. It is
undisputed that virtual family time was inconsistently provided in
the months leading up to the termination hearing. Caseworker I.V.
acknowledged that the lack of virtual family time was a significant
issue. Although she attempted to address the problem, persistent
challenges — including difficulties connecting with the provider,
miscommunications, the child’s illnesses, scheduling conflicts, and
a change in providers — ultimately resulted in a four-month gap
with no virtual family time. Nevertheless, she sought to mitigate
these barriers by reaching out to other resources around the
county, arranging family time at the child’s school, and personally
supervising a family time visit. The record therefore demonstrates
that the challenges with virtual family time arose primarily from
factors beyond the Department’s control, rather than from a lack of
effort on its part.
20 ¶ 52 To the extent mother contends she was not provided with
appropriate accommodations for her disability, we decline to
address this argument because it is insufficiently developed. On
appeal, she does not identify any specific accommodations or
services that should have been provided to better ensure the
success of her treatment plan. See People v. Simpson, 93 P.3d 551,
555 (Colo. App. 2003) (“We decline to consider a bald legal
proposition presented without argument or development . . . .”).
¶ 53 Accordingly, because the record supports the juvenile court’s
findings, we discern no basis for reversal.
V. Disposition
¶ 54 The judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE GROVE and JUDGE SCHOCK concur.