Penn Builders, Inc. v. Blair County

153 A. 433, 302 Pa. 300, 75 A.L.R. 850, 1931 Pa. LEXIS 658
CourtSupreme Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedNovember 25, 1930
DocketAppeal, 17
StatusPublished
Cited by17 cases

This text of 153 A. 433 (Penn Builders, Inc. v. Blair County) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Penn Builders, Inc. v. Blair County, 153 A. 433, 302 Pa. 300, 75 A.L.R. 850, 1931 Pa. LEXIS 658 (Pa. 1930).

Opinion

Opinion by

Mr. Justice Sadler,

The secretary of highways deemed it expedient to make a diversion from Route 55 where it passes through plaintiff’s land in Blair County, thus removing a dangerous and inconvenient curve, and resulting in a relocation of the road for a short distance. By so doing the cost of maintenance would be lessened, and an easier *303 passageway for the traveling public secured. Acting in pursuance of the authority granted by the Sproul Highway Act of May 31, 1911 (P. L. 468, section 8), as amended in 1921 (April 6, P. L. 107), a map was prepared, establishing the lines of the land condemned, approved by the governor, and duly recorded. By the certificate it appeared the ultimate width of the right of way was fixed at one hundred feet, the center line being definitely designated and marked. Reference was made in the paper filed to eight sheets showing the character of work presently contemplated throughout the entire taking. One referred to, indicating the construction through plaintiff’s property, showed that at this time but thirty-three feet would be improved and macadamized, though the official certificate fixed one hundred feet as the amount appropriated. Entry was made upon the land and the new roadway built.

Without statutory provision, no claim could have been made by the landowner for the loss sustained (Snively v. Washington Twp., 218 Pa. 249; Lenhart v. Wright, 286 Pa. 351), but section 16 of the Act of 1911, supra, as amended in 1921, directed that notice be given to the county commissioners of the new lines adopted, and, by the legislation referred to, the municipality represented by them was made liable for damages resulting. No agreement for compensation was reached, and the title holder of the property presented a petition to the court of quarter sessons for the appointment of viewers to determine the value of the land condemned. Basing their report on the taking of 100 feet, as shown by the map of record, though the new construction occupied but one-third of that width, an award of $10,500 was made. Exceptions were filed by the county raising two questions of fact properly the subject of an appeal, and a third which attacked the legality of the assessment on the ground that the basis of recovery should have been limited to the thirty-three feet built upon. As this objection went to the validity of the entire report, the ques *304 tion was properly considered preliminarily by he court below: Act of April 18, 1905, P. L. 198. It beld that the right to recover was limited to the strip actually occupied by the new construction, and that the award could not be based on a taking of the width as fixed in the certificate of the secretary of highways and approved by the governor. The report was therefore set aside without prejudice on the part of the petitioner to proceed again to have an assessment of damages based on the amount of land presently paved. From tbe final order so made this appeal was taken.

Tbe State undoubtedly has the power to condemn property for a new highway, and the legislature may direct, as it has done, for the payment by the county of the damages resulting. A like power exists where land is appropriated in effecting a divergence from a fixed route for convenience under the legislation above referred to. By the Sproul Act of 1911, entry for this purpose was allowed upon filing the proper plans, but the compensation was directed to be paid by the State (section 16) ; all loss occurring by the taking under the particular map filed to be assessed in one proceeding: May v. Westmoreland Co., 98 Pa. Superior Ct. 488. The Amending Act of 1921, supra, also expressly provided for the fixing of the width by the certified and recorded plan, transferring to the county the liability for the damages recoverable. Having fixed the extent of the appropriation in this case in terms at 100 feet, the landowner could demand compensation, when a part was entered on, as if tbe entire strip marked on the map bad been occupied by tbe new construction; for, having condemned land to that width, the State may in the future use it for highway purposes without further liability. It is immaterial, — unless later legislation hereafter referred to necessarily leads to a different conclusion,— that tbe present actual occupation is of but a portion of tbe whole taken: Lenhart v. Wright, supra.

*305 The same rule applies where property is seized under the power of eminent domain by railroad companies. If, in the first instance, but one track is built and used on a portion of the right of way condemned, the owner is nevertheless entitled to recover for all the land appropriated. The resolution of the board of directors of the corporation determines the location for which compensation may be asked: Foley v. Beech Creek Extension R. R. Co., 283 Pa. 588; Beale v. P. R. R. Co., 86 Pa. 509. As was said in Wadhams v. L. & B. R. R. Co., 42 Pa. 303, 310: “The legislature made no attempt to distinguish between damages caused by the location and those caused by the construction of the railroad. It is one injury. Where the railroad has been located, the land has been taken and appropriated for the public use, the right of the landowner to sue for his damages is complete, and he may recover all which may be caused by the location, and by the subsequent construction. He can have but one action. The damages cannot be severed, and seem rity for one is therefore security for all.”

It is, however, urged that the ultimate width of 100 feet designated in the recorded plan is a mere plotting of land for highway purposes which may be needed at some future time, and was so marked solely for the protection of the public, thus preventing the recovery of damages for structures which may be hereafter erected on the portion beyond the occupied 33 feet. It may be conceded that if the appropriation as designated on the map was merely a paper plotting, unaccompanied by an entry on any part, no damages could be secured until an actual occupation occurs, or acts equivalent thereto take place. Philadelphia Parkway Opening, 295 Pa. 538, and Penna. Hospital v. Phila., 254 Pa. 392, 245 U. S. 20, are illustrations of the generally accepted rule so holding. Philadelphia Parkway, 250 Pa. 257, and Caplan’s App., 293 Pa. 483, show facts disclosing unusual conditions, which led to the making of exceptions to the well established principle ordinarily controlling. *306 In the present instance, there is a direct appropriation by a duly authorized and recorded certificate of 100 feet, and an entry thereon, though but 33 feet has actually been macadamized to this date.

Realizing the probable necessity of hereafter building wider roadsj an attempt has been made by the legislature to set aside, by mere plotting, land which may at some time be required for highway purposes, thus giving notice that no buildings may be constructed in such spaces, except at the owner’s peril. If he does so, then, as provided by the Act of 1921, supra, when necessity requires the actual occupation, no damages can be recovered based on their destruction. The recorded map now in question, and which must control in determining the extent of the land taken, definitely fixes the lines and widths presently to be appropriated.

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Bluebook (online)
153 A. 433, 302 Pa. 300, 75 A.L.R. 850, 1931 Pa. LEXIS 658, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/penn-builders-inc-v-blair-county-pa-1930.