Black, J.
Plaintiff-claimants were and are employees of defendant Calumet Division — Calumet & Hecla, Inc. They applied for unemployment benefits under the Michigan employment security act, alleging (as the issue comes here) eligibility for such benefits starting as of August 12, 1955, and continuing through September 10, 1955. The commission and hearing referee upheld claimants and directed payment accordingly. The appeal board, sitting in review, reversed these rulings and, by way of conclusion of its lengthy findings, ruled as follows:
[615]*615“It is held that the claiments were unemployed because of a work stoppage caused by a labor dispute in the establishment of Calumet Division, Calumet & Hecla, Inc., during the period beginning May 2, 1955, and ending at week ending September 10, 1955, ■and that the claimants are.disqualified from obtaining such benefits for the above-stated period under .section 29, subd (1) (b) of the act.” (CLS .1956, §421.29 [Stat Ann 1957 Cum Supp §17.531].)
Claimants thereupon sued out certiorari in the Ingham circuit to review the appeal board’s determination. The circuit court found no error and entered an order of affirmance. From such order •claimants have appealed to this Court.
The labor dispute viewed in the appeal board’s ■findings threatened and then critically affected the •economic welfare of what is known — in Michigan — ■ as “the Copper Country.” Comprising the counties ■of Houghton aiid Keweenaw and nearby territory, this is Michigan’s remote and geologically historic Keweenaw peninsula. For upwards of a.century the mining of copper and copper-bearing ores has furnished the leading source of employment and business in the area, and defendant Calumet has been the principal employer of copper miners and copper smelters therein. In most of the villages Calumet has provided and now provides necessary public utility services; also police and fire protection. It is in position to cut these services off at will. Here, indeed, will be found the substance of Ernie Ford’s “company town.” Comprehensive, then, is the picture of general economic woe in the copper country when Calumet is “down.” Understandable also is the fact that the labor dispute we are to consider — for the sole purpose of determining whether there is a -“rational basis”
Calumet operates “copper mines, smelters, a refinery, a railroad and other manufacturing installations in Houghton and Keweenaw counties.” Some 1,700 hourly-rated employees in its production and maintenance departments were and are represented by the United Steel Workers of America-CIO, hereinafter referred to as the union. A working contract, agreed upon by the union and Calumet in 1954, was due to espire April 30, 1955. The union desired to-“terminate, reopen, or amend” the contract and served notice to such effect on Calumet. Negotiations were opened in February of the year and continued without fruitful result until May 1st, on which date the union — these claimants participating — voted to strike Calumet. The strike was called for and commenced May 2d, and continued with developing bitterness* until August 10th, on which date the union voted “to reject the final offer” of Calumet. At this juncture the corporate hammerlock was applied to the Copper Country. August 12th (a Friday) Calumet caused to be published, in the Daily Mining Gazette of Houghton (the daily newspaper of the Copper Country), that which counsel refer to as “the liquidation order.” The salutation and pursuing declarations of such order portray graphically the overpowering play of the final hand. They read :
“To The People of the Copper Country:
“This letter is directed to the people of the Copper-Country for the purpose of informing them of the situation confronting the management of Calumet [617]*617& Hecla and to let them know immediately what action the management has found it necessary to take.
# # *
“In the current dispute with the union, we have sought all reasonable means to effect a settlement. "We have endured a long, costly and illegal strike. We have maintained pumping of the mines, we have kept the smelter furnaces hot, and have continued to operate the utilities vital to the communities in which we have operated. We have done these things in the hope that an agreement could be reached.
“As soon as it became possible, we made an offer which was as liberal as possible. There is a limit beyond which it is impossible to go. We have reached that limit. However, a substantial majority of the members of the union saw fit to reject our offer.
“In view of this clear-cut decision by the union, I have no alternative but to exercise the authority voted by the board of directors on May 26, 1955, to liquidate the Calumet Division. Accordingly, the following action is being taken:
“1. All presently employed hourly-rated and salaried employees not essential to the orderly liquidation of the division are being laid off. Those salaried employees who can be employed in other activities of the company will be transferred.
“2. All mine pumping is being terminated.
“3. Copper at the smelter will be refined and shipped and the furnaces shut down.
“4. The inventory of supplies will be sold.
“5. Machinery and equipment will be disposed of.
“6. The proper authorities in the communities will be notified that they must now take over the responsibility for utilities and services, such as pumping-water, and police and fire protection.
“Recognizing- its obligation to its employees and-the community, the management, since 1930, has struggled against terrific odds to continue operations.in the Copper Country. Investments in modern plant and equipment and in people have been made with the hope of reducing costs and maintaining a [618]*618profitable enterprise in this district. While progress, has been made, rising costs have kept pace with, operational improvements and the division has remained marginal. However, we recognize that in addition to our obligation to the employees and the community, we have a very important responsibility to our shareholders (the owners of the company). If we are unable to avoid loss, to say nothing of earning a reasonable return on the investment, it is the-duty of the management to act in the best interests-of the company,
“Calumet & Hecla has had an enviable and honorable record in the Copper Country for over 90 years. It is with heavy hearts that circumstances beyond our control have forced us to this tragic decision which we recognize will seriously affect the lives and fortunes of many innocent and loyal people.
“By authority of the board of directors,
E. R. Lovell, President”
Immediately after publication of the above order Calumet commenced making good the quoted declarations of intent. It definitely intended to go out of business and moved physically to implement that purpose. In the meantime, however, the impact of the order — on the Copper Country — took full effect. Publication being on Friday, the following Monday (August 15th) saw eager public renewal of negotiations toward settlement of the pending labor dispute- and, ere lapse of a week, the strike was hurriedly settled. August 21st a new working contract was-agreed upon and signed by the contenders (yes, on Sunday).
Remaining events, consisting principally of cooperative efforts of all to get the mines and smelters in condition for normal employment and production,* are of little moment except in this: Unlike [619]*619Great A. & P. Tea Co. v. New Jersey Department of Labor & Industry, 29 NJ Super 26 (101 A2d 573) (this is the foremost authority on which claimants rely), no one of these claimants presented himself for work, or otherwise attempted to dissociate himself from the mentioned labor dispute, following publication of the liquidation order. Through the union each continued participation in the quickened if not feverish negotiations leading to “signing up” the following Sunday. Not until after the strike was settled did any one of them claim that he had been discharged by the fact of publication — and partial execution — of the liquidation order. Like Lazarus, all desired “to be fed with the crumbs which fell from the [bargaining] table.” (Luke, 16:21.) Nearly all, when applying for unemployment compensation, cheeked “labor dispute” on the form of application as the assigned reason for unemployment. So, and as the contemplative reader of said section 29 will fairly discern, the real and consequent question is whether these claimants have established, as a matter of law:
(a) That this labor dispute came to an end on August 12th rather than August 21st, and
(b) That the “stoppage of work” caused by such labor dispute came to an end August 12th (or on some date prior to resumption of mining and manufacturing on September 10th), or
(c) That their status, as being “directly involved” in such dispute, ceased August 12th.
First: Commencing with the strike call on May 2d, and continuing without interruption until August 12th, the disqualification of claimants under section 29 was due to a “work stoppage” occasioned by a “labor dispute in the establishment”* in which all [620]*620then were employed. This their counsel concede. The union — with direct involvement of claimants-per said section 29 (1) (b) — struck Calumet for a declared and resolute purpose, that of obtaining “a. new contract” incorporating substantially their demands as made. It is abundantly clear that the union — and the claimants — “meant business,” that is, the union intended by the strike and its week-upon-week and month-upon-month continuity to-force a desired result by attritional process. Calumet, as it turned out, was just as grimly determined to overpower rather than yield. Mighty forces met in pitched battle, each' being ready and able to deal out hurtful and tragic blows without regard for consequential injury to employer, employee, community, or the welfare of this isolated area. From the standpoint of intent neither contender was bluffing. The showdown came when the final blow was struck. Facing more or less permanent unemployment, added to the dire threat of immediate cessation of utility and other “company services,” the union manifestly was compelled to take what it could — in a hurry. So were the appellant claimants. Such considerations, appealing though they may be, provide uo ground on which we of right may overturn a decision made by the appointed administrator of the. employment security act. The reason is that no-error of law appears in rendition of the administrator’s conclusion upon the facts shown in evidence.
If this issue — of changed status as' of August 12thT —had been tried by authority of law to a court and jury, would we not uphold a jury finding that the' claimants remained disqualified, as “directly involved” in a continuing labor dispute, until that dispute was settled?* Would we not, at the same time,' [621]*621note the continued participation of claimants, as-members of the union, in such continued negotiations ; also their omission of any act or declaration of dissociation from such dispute? Finally, would, we not hold that the triers of fact were entitled to-infer from the evidentiary proof that the employer was persuaded, by appeal of claimants themselves (through the union) plus that of others, to abandon its determination to liquidate? Did not the claimants benefit by the course pursued between August 12th and August 21st? May they have that benefit — - niggardly though it may be in their view — and, at the same time, claim benefits accruing on the theory that they, after August 12th, no longer were “directly-involved”? I turn from these questions to controlling authority; controlling because it is the only authority in point.
In Unemployment Compensation Commission of Alaska v. Aragon, 329 US 143 (67 S Ct 245, 91 L ed 136), like questions were presented. The claimants-were regularly employed by the petitioner corporations in the seasonal work of catching and canning-salmon in and near Alaskan waters. It became necessary, on account of termination of the previous-working contract between the companies and the-union representing claimants, that a new contract, for the 1940 season be negotiated. The negotiations commenced March 6, 1950, and “quickly developed into an impasse.” The companies finally notified [622]*622-the union that if operations were to be carried on •during the imminent fishing and canning season, .agreement would have to be reached by April 10th as to the annual Karluk operation and April 12th as to the annual Chignik operation. . Although negotiations proceeded up to such dead-lines, the parties were able to arrive at no point of agreement. Accordingly, on April 22d, the companies “formally announced” (they as here meant what they said) abandonment of 1940 Karluk and Chignik operations. Negotiations continued, however, and a contract was finally executed on May 29th; too late for the 1940 operations.
It is significant that the continuation of negotiations between the companies and union, from and after the dead-line and abandonment dates, was held .as having provided fair support of an administrative finding that claimants’ unemployment was with dis■qualificati'onary result due to the dispute. Pointed .also is the upheld view of the administrative agency (Alaska unemployment compensation commission) that a “labor dispute” continues as “active” during the “continuance of a work stoppage induced by” such dispute.
Aragon is' a leading case, handed down by leading .authority.* It cannot be distinguished either in principle or fact from the case before us. And its text suggests fair need for uniformity of interpretation of these essentially standard provisions of the unemployment compensation laws of the several States, each being “part of the legislative scheme for unemployment compensation induced by the provisions of the social security act of 1935” (see foot[623]*623note 2, p 145 of Aragon’s report) and each being-supported by Federal grants on certificate of the secretary of labor that the given State “has an unemployment compensation law approved * # * under the Federal unemployment tax act” (42 USCA, § 502).
We tried recently to achieve such parity of interpretation by getting Michigan into line with dominant State authority construing other weighted words of said section 29 (Park v. Employment Security Commission, supra). By decision here, I suggest that we continue in similar stride by following-the supreme court’s guide in Aragon.. So, and on strength of Aragon and other citations to follow, I would hold that the Michigan employment security commission is by the act vested with broad and flexible authority to determine when a disqualifying stoppage of work — “existing because of a labor dispute in the establishment” of employment — has come-to an end, and that its appeal board did not in this-case roam beyond the legal boundaries of such authority.
The following connected passage from Aragon (pp 153, 154) is adopted for the purpose of present-decision :
“Respondents urge that, assuming their unemployment was due to a labor dispute, there was no-labor dispute in ‘active progress,’ within the meaning of the act, after the passage of the dead-line dates.. It is argued that when the expeditions were abandoned by the companies, the dispute must necessarily have terminated since ther.e was no possible way in-which negotiations could have brought about a settlement. It should be observed, however, that the record does not reveal that negotiations abruptly terminated with the passing of the last dead-line date. Conferences continued at Seattle in which both the companies and the union were represented. The [624]*624respondents considered the negotiations sufficiently alive to make an offer of terms at least as late as May 29th. Even if it he assumed that at some time within the 8-week period of disqualification the point was reached when all possibility of settlement disappeared, it does not follow that the commission’s finding of a dispute in ‘active progress’ must .be overturned. Here, as in National Labor Relations Board v. Hearst Publications, Inc. (1944), 322 US 111, 131 (64 S Ct 851, 88 L ed 1170), the question presented ‘is one of specific application of a broad statutory term in a proceeding in which the agency administering the statute must determine it initially.’ To sustain the commission’s application of this statutory term, we need not find that its construction is the only reasonable one, or even that it is the result we would have reached had the question arisen in the first instance in judicial proceedings. The ‘reviewing court’s function is limited.’ All that is needed to support the commission’s interpretation is that it has ‘warrant in the record’ and a ‘reasonable basis in law.’ National Labor Relations Board v. Hearst Publications, Inc., supra; Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United States (1939), 307 US 125 (59 S Ct 754, 83 L ed 1147).
“Applying these tests, we are unable to say that the commission’s construction was irrational or without support in the record. The commission apparently views a dispute as ‘active’ during the continuance of a work stoppage induced by a labor dispute. That agency might reasonably conclude that the unemployment resulting from such work stoppage is not of the “involuntary” nature which the statute was ■designed to alleviate, as indicated by the statement of public policy incorporated in the act by the territorial legislature. We see nothing in such a view to require our substituting a different construction rfrom that made by the commission entrusted with the (responsibility of administering the statute.”
[625]*625Similar instances, where the courts have upheld administrative determinations of disqualification under this standard statutory provision, are found as follows:
Buchholz v. Cummins, 6 Ill2d 382 (128 NE2d 900). In this case, during progress of a “labor dispute,” the employing association (of restaurant operators) closed all restaurants in which the plaintiffs, some 225 in number, were employed. The plaintiffs contended that there was a want of evidence sufficient to show that their unemployment was due to a “labor dispute.” The court said (pp 389, 390):
“While the bargaining continued there was a strike at 1 of the member restaurants involved in the negotiations. . In retaliation, the association locked the doors of all their establishments. Bargaining under the aegis of the lockout, the association came to an agreement with the union, the lockout ceased, and the employees returned to work. Plaintiffs earnestly contend that this is all coincidence; that there is no substantial evidence to show that the lockout was caused by their labor dispute with their employers. We cannot agree. True, there is no evidence of the actual subjective intent or reasoning of the association in calling the lockout, but we cannot believe that such evidence is required. We find a full-fledged labor dispute existing between the association and the union, and we find a lockout during the progress of that dispute. The fact that the lockout was triggered by certain vague events at the Palace [Cafeteria] does not alter the situation. If these plaintiffs had walked out because of the dispute at the Palace, could it be said that the strike was not caused by a labor dispute? And, if the plaintiffs, through the union, had called a strike because of the expiration of the contract between the union and the association, could it be said that the strike was not caused by a labor dispute ? The facts of industrial relations reveal that any one of a nuna[626]*626ber of -unrelated events may act as the catalyst to foment a strike or lockout, but the end result is that of one group exerting economic pressure upon another. In such case our legislature has determined that benefits will not be paid under the unemployment compensation act.”
State, ex rel. Employment Security Commission, v. Jarrell, 231 NC 381 (57 SE2d 403). In this case, during the course of a “labor dispute,” the employer posted the following notice:
“Notice to all employees. Pee Dee Mill No. 2 will cease all operations effective as of this date for an indefinite period. All employees are free to seek employment elsewhere.”
The court held (pp 385, 386):
“By posting the notice, the company merely accepted the shut down of the mill as an accomplished fact,-and signified its willingness to terminate its employment relationship with any worker who elected to withdraw from the existing labor dispute and to seek work elsewhere. The notice did not alter the status of any employee who refrained from exercising this option. It certainly did not cause the unemployment of those who were already on strike and who continued on strike until the existing labor dispute ended.”
Schoenwiesner v. Board of Review, Division of Employment Security, 44 NJ Super 377 (130 A2d 648). In this case the “company jumped the gun” by a quick lockout after the union had taken a strike vote and was engaged in the process of putting the strike vote into effect. The court held that a “labor dispute,” within purpose of the statute, includes a “lockout,” citing among numerous authorities Unemployment Compensation Commission of Alaska v. Aragon, supra.
[627]*627Gentile v. Director of Division of Employment Security, 329 Mass 500 (109 NE2d 140). In this case (during pendency of a strike) the employer sent a letter to all employees stating “in effect that if they did not return to work as of a given date they would he replaced.” It was found that “The employees did not treat the letter as terminating the relationship but ‘continued to negotiate through their union in an effort to end the strike” also that the employees did not indicate in any way “to the employer or the union that there was any intention on their part to terminate their employment relationship with Reed and Prince.” A finding of the administrative agency below that claimants were disqualified for benefits on account of their continued involvement in the unabated labor dispute was upheld.
Adkins v. Indiana Employment Security Division, 117 Ind App 132 (70 NE2d 31). In this case, with a “dispute” pending, the employer closed up shop and refused entrance to the claimants when they appeared for work. Negotiations followed and a new working agreement was ultimately executed by the employer and the union (of which claimants were members). The claimants insisted that their unemployment was due to a lockout, rather than a “labor dispute,” and that the disqualificationary provisions of the statute did not apply. The court held (p 142):
“As we view the evidence in this case, it is immaterial whether appellants’ unemployment was caused by a ‘strike’ or a ‘lockout’ for the reason that in either event it is crystal clear that such unemployment was the direct and immediate result of the ‘controversy concerning terms and conditions of employment,’ which arose on November 9,1945, between the employer and employees in the employer’s machine shop, and, therefore, such unemployment was the result of a ‘labor dispute’ within the meaning and [628]*628purview of section 7(f)(3) of the Indiana employment security act.”
Finally, attention is directed to Legacy v. Clarostat Manufacturing Co., 99 NH 483, 486 (115 A2d 424), where the following passages appear:
“The plaintiff’s unemployment began because of a stoppage of work due to a labor dispute and would not have continued ‘but for’ this stoppage. Even authorities taking generally a favorable view of claimants’ rights concede in these circumstances that the stoppage is causal of the unemployment. 17 U of Chi L Rev 294, 313, 315; see, also, 8 Vand L Rev 338. The cases cited by the plaintiff where the courts have held an intervening cause existed are all distinguishable from the situation here as in Unemployment Compensation Commission of Alaska v. Aragon, 329 US 143 (67 S Ct 245, 91 L ed 136), where the employer decided to halt all operations without reference to the labor dispute. * * *
“While the plaintiff concedes the work stoppage may have continued after the termination of the dispute, he contends that as to him it ended when there was work enough for 1 shipping clerk to do. This assumes that the work stoppage is to be determined from the standpoint of the individual employee rather than the operation of the plant as a whole. This is not so as has been previously stated. It is admitted that the work stoppage as to the plaintiff was caused originally by a labor dispute. Because of this dispute the stoppage continued to exist even as to this plaintiff’s individual job until management in the exercise of reasonable judgment rehired him. The weight of authority and we believe the better view reaches this result in similar cases holding that a stoppage of work does not cease until normal operations may reasonably be resumed by the employer. In re Stevenson, 237 NC 528 (75 SE2d [629]*629520), and cases cited; Lawrence Baking Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Commission, 308 Mich 198 (154 ALR 660). Snch operations had not been resumed before the plaintiff’s re-employment on January 17, 1953.”
Second: This appeal stimulates reaffirmance of that which firmly establishes the limited scope of judicial review of administrative decisions. Unless (as in Park v. Employment Security Commission, supra) the reviewing court is able to point out, and then define, some controlling rule of law which, in its application to the findings of the given administrative agency, quite unfounds the conclusion such agency has reached, it is the duty of the court to affirm that the agency has exercised its judgment within the area of discretion entrusted to it by legislative authority. This is the sense to which a majority of this Court is committed (Knight-Morley Corp. v. Employment Security Comm., 350 Mich 397, 411; McCarthy Chevrolet Co. v. Revenue Dept., 351 Mich 558) and it marks the peripheral limit of our function on present review. The bellwether authority is Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United States, 307 US 125 (59 S Ct 754, 83 L ed 1147) (see reliance on Rochester in Aragon and approving quotation of' Rochester in McCarthy Chevrolet Co. v. Revenue Dept., supra, 566). In that case the court repeated (p 146) what it said in Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co. v. United States, 292 US 282, 286, 287 (54 S Ct 692, 78 L ed 1260), that is:
“The judicial function is exhausted when there is found to be a rational basis for the conclusions approved by the administrative body.”
Here we are asked to set aside an administrative determination that these claimants are, under the provisions of said section 29, “disqualified for benefits” as claimed by them. To do so we must seize [630]*630upon one of many related and ultimate facts—that of publication of the “liquidation order” and commencement (just commencement) by the employer of the grim and purposeful process of boarding up and going out of business—as conclusive proof that the “intervening cause”* alleged by claimants was established as a matter of law. This we cannot do. In paraphrase of Aragon, supra, it should be held that the appeal board had a right to conclude that the continued unemployment of claimants resulting from the aforesaid “stoppage of work” was not of the “involuntary” nature which our statute was designed to alleviate, as indicated by the declaration of policy constituting section 2 of the unemployment security act (CL 1948, § 421.2 [Stat Ann 1950 Rev § 17.502]). This but follows the rule of the Federal courts generally on review of administrative decisions under the Taft-IIartley act, that is to say, “the board’s interpretation of the act and the board’s application of it in doubtful situations are entitled to weight” (National Labor Relations Board, v. Denver Building & Construction Trades Council, 341 US 675, 692 [71 S Ct 943, 95 L ed 1284]).
To conclude: This is not a great case. It sets no precedent of new or portentous proportions. No exciting or commotional alarums—real or figmental —will arise from our determination that the appeal board did not misinterpret or reversibly misapply said section 29. Yet this is what lawyers call a hard case; hard in the sense that what was done [631]*631to bludgeon submission of the strikers is likely (as in the antithetic case where strikers are shown as having brought an employer to his knees by brutal and ruthless means) to bend or misshape normal judgment. When, in addition to the coolly purposeful threat of indefinitely continued unemployment throughout the affected area, entire communities face the callous shutting off of main-supplied “company” water and other corporately furnished utility services, there is no fair contest of the right to strike against the right of lockout. And the fact brought here, that some apparently favored employees were promptly certified (by Calumet) for unemployment benefits as hundreds of others were successfully resisted (by Calumet) in their subsequent effort to obtain such benefits, softens the ease not one whit. Thus our meditation since submission of the case has called for constant self-reminder that we sit not as chancellors but as reviewers of claimed legal error on the part of an administrative agency. We cannot do equity, should equity be due (a question not decided of course), as in an equity case. We cannot even express concurrence with the appeal board’s conclusion as an original question. Our function is exhausted, once it is found, as we have found, that the evidentiary record permitted the appeal board to draw such conclusion. Contemplating the record otherwise might lead, however inadvertently, to the writing of bad law in a law case. “It is easier for heaven and earth to pass, than one tittle of the law to fail” (Luke 16:17).
By the noted dissent which at the time so dismayed his erst friend and recent appointer,* Mr. Justice Holmes put these thoughts in the following [632]*632words (Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 US 197, 400, 401 [24 S Ct 436, 48 L ed 679]):
“Great cases, like hard eases, make bad law. For great cases are called great, not by reason of tbeir real importance in shaping the law of the future, but because of some accident of immediate overwhelming interest which appeals to the feelings and distorts the judgment. These immediate interests exercise a kind of hydraulic pressure which makes what previously was clear seem doubtful, and before which even well-settled principles of law will bend. What we have to do in this case is to find the meaning of some not very difficult words. We must try, I have tried, to do it with the same freedom of natural and spontaneous interpretation that one would be sure of if the same question arose upon an indictment for a similar act which excited no public attention, and was of importance only to a prisoner before the court. Furthermore while at times judges need for their work the training of economists or statesmen, and must act in view of their foresight of consequences, yet when their task is to interpret and apply the words of a statute, their function is merely academic to begin with, — to read English intelligently,— and a consideration of consequences comes into play, if at all, only when the meaning of the words used is open to reasonable doubt.”
Reading (intelligently it is hoped) the English of said section 29 as authorizing an administrative ruling that the disqualificationary status of claimants continued over the period of time for which benefits are claimed, I find no error and therefore would affirm, without costs, the circuit court order dismissing certiorari.
Edwards, J., concurred with Black, J.
Rochester Telephone Corp; v. United States, 307 US 125, 146 (59 S Ct 754, 83 L ed 1147).