(PC) KasenzangaKhona v. Cano

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: March 12, 2024
• Docket: 1:23-cv-01764
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 SHAKAZULU SIGIDI Case No.: 1:23-cv-001764-SKO KASENZANGAKHONA, 12 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO Plaintiff, DENY PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR 13 INJUNCTIVE RELIEF v. 14 (Doc. 10) L. CANO, et al., 15 14-DAY OBJECTION PERIOD Defendants. 16 Clerk of the Court to Assign District Judge

17 18 Plaintiff Shakazulu Sigidi KasenzangaKhona is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis 19 in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 20 I. INTRODUCTION 21 Plaintiff filed his complaint on December 26, 2023. (Doc. 1.) 22 On January 22, 2024, Plaintiff filed a document titled “Writ of Mandate.” (Doc. 10.) 23 Plaintiff contends inmates cannot transfer “when 90 days to parole.” (Id. at 2.) He alleges “there 24 are 2 issues in front of the District Judge and or Magistrate.” (Id.) Plaintiff states that the first 25 issue “is removal of vio. Administrative Determinant. The removal can only be overcome by an 26 Inmate sustaining no violence for 7 years and an Inmates parole are within 5 years.” (Id.) Plaintiff 27 identifies the second issue as transfer. (Id.) He contends “transfer to a Minimum Support Facility 1 and regulations that demonstrates more programming at lower level Minimum Support 2 Facilities.” (Id.) 3 Plaintiff seeks relief from the Court “to give [him] (i.e., VAD-removed, transfer, …) what 4 [he has] earned.” (Id.) Citing to the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Plaintiff asserts he 5 should have his “vio removed and transfer to a (MSF), as all others who remained disciplinary 6 free, self-help groups, college degrees, Role Model, and no criminal showing throughout the 7 almost nine years incarcerated.” (Id.) He contends he is “doing everything within reason to obtain 8 better programming, in conjunction with better opportunities,” once he paroles on May 23, 2024. 9 (Id.) Plaintiff states the “deadline to prohibit transfer is on 2-23-2024” and asks the Court to grant 10 relief. (Id.) 11 II. DISCUSSION 12 A. The All Writs Act 13 The All Writs Act provides that: 14 (a) The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective 15 jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law. 16 (b) An alternative writ or rule nisi may be issued by a justice or judge of a court which has jurisdiction. 17 18 28 U.S.C. § 1651. The All Writs Act does not confer original jurisdiction on federal courts. 19 Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 29 (2002). Instead, the All Writs Act is a 20 residual source of authority to issue writs that are not otherwise covered by a statute. Where a 21 statute specifically addresses the particular issue at hand, it is that authority, and not the All Writs 22 Act, that is controlling. Pennsylvania Bureau of Corrs. v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 474 U.S. 34, 43 23 (1985); In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 94 F.3d 539, 546 n.9 (9th 24 Cir. 1996). Thus, even if jurisdiction is properly pled, to the extent that a plaintiff seeks an 25 injunction or a writ of mandamus under the All Writs Act, such relief should be granted “only in 26 the most critical and exigent circumstances [] when” the legal rights at issue are indisputably 27 clear.” Brown v. Gilmore, 533 U.S. 1301, 1302 (2001) (quoting Ohio Citizens for Responsible 1 of mandamus may be issued under the All Writs Act, “[m]andamus is a ‘drastic and extraordinary 2 remedy reserved for really extraordinary causes.’” Hernandez v. Tanninen, 604 F.3d 1095, 1099 3 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist. of Columbia, 542 U.S. 367, 380 4 (2004)). 5 Here, critical and exigent circumstances do not exist as the legal rights at issue are not 6 indisputably clear for the reasons discussed below. Brown, 533 U.S. at 1302. 7 B. Injunctive Relief 8 The Court construes Plaintiff’s January 22, 2024 to be a request for a preliminary 9 injunction. 10 “A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.” 1 Winter 11 v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008) (citation omitted). “A plaintiff seeking a 12 preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to 13 suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his 14 favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Id. at 20. 15 Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and in considering a request for 16 preliminary injunctive relief, the Court is bound by the requirement that as a preliminary matter, it 17 have before it an actual case or controversy. City of L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983); 18 Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 19 464, 471 (1982). If the Court does not have an actual case or controversy before it, it has no 20 power to hear the matter in question. Id. Requests for prospective relief are further limited by 18 21 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, which requires that the Court find 22 the “relief [sought] is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation 23 of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the 24 Federal right.” See also Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 333 (2000) (the PLRA “establishes 25 standards for the entry and termination of prospective relief in civil actions challenging conditions 26

27 1 “The standard for a [temporary restraining order] is the same as for a preliminary injunction.” Rovio Entm’t Ltd. v. Royal Plush Toys, Inc., 907 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1092 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (citing Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). 1 at prison facilities”). 2 Furthermore, the pendency of this action does not give the Court jurisdiction over prison 3 officials in general. Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 491-93 (2009); Mayfield v. 4 United States, 599 F.3d 964, 969 (9th Cir. 2010). The Court's jurisdiction is limited to the parties 5 in this action and to the viable legal claims upon which this action is proceeding. Summers, 555 6 U.S. at 491-93; Mayfield, 599 F.3d at 969. 7 A “federal court may issue an injunction [only] if it has personal jurisdiction over the 8 parties and subject matter jurisdiction over the claim; it may not attempt to determine the rights of 9 persons not before the court.” Zepeda v. U.S. I.N.S., 753 F.2d 719, 727 (9th Cir. 1983). “[A]n 10 injunction must be narrowly tailored ‘to affect only those persons over which it has power,’ . . . 11 and to remedy only the specific harms shown by the plaintiffs, rather than ‘to enjoin all possible 12 breaches of the law.’” Price v. City of Stockton, 390 F.3d 1105, 1117 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting 13 Zepeda, 753 F.2d at 727, 728 n.1). 14 dismissed. 15 C. Analysis 16 The Likelihood of Success on the Merits 17 Plaintiff does not establish he is likely to succeed on the merits of his claim. In deciding 18 whether a preliminary injunction should issue, the likelihood of success on the merits is the most 19 important factor for the court to consider. Disney Enterprises, Inc. v. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d 20 848, 856 (9th Cir. 2017). Here, Plaintiff’s complaint has been screened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 21 1915A(a), and the Court found that Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief 22 can be granted. (Doc 12 at 4-13.) Plaintiff was granted leave to file an amended complaint, curing 23 the deficiencies identified by the Court. Therefore, although Plaintiff’s complaint has been 24 screened, the likelihood of success on the merits cannot be determined. 25 Plaintiff has not stated any cognizable claim2 and any first amended complaint will require 26 further screening by the Court. Thus, Plaintiff has not demonstrated he is likely to succeed on the 27 2 Moreover, the plausibility or cognizability of Plaintiff’s claims does not mean his claims are likely to succeed on the merits. That is typically a determination for a later date. 1 merits of his claims. Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. 2 Irreparable Harm 3 Plaintiff does not demonstrate irreparable harm. Plaintiff seeks an injunction permitting 4 his transfer to another facility pending his parole in May 2024. However, in Meachum v. Fano, 5 427 U.S. 215 (1976), the United States Supreme Court explicitly held that prisoners do not have a 6 constitutional right to be housed at a particular prison within a state's prison system. See also 7 Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 530 (9th Cir. 1985) (“An inmate's liberty interests are sufficiently 8 extinguished by his conviction so that the state may change his place of confinement even though 9 the degree of confinement may be different and prison life may be more disagreeable in one 10 institution than in another”). (See also Doc. 12 at 8-9.) Because Plaintiff has no right to be housed 11 at lower-level minimum support facility, Plaintiff cannot demonstrate irreparable harm. Winter, 12 555 U.S. at 20. 13 To the extent Plaintiff contends the existence of a violence administrative determinant 14 (“VAD”) in his file amounts to irreparable harm, Plaintiff does not allege named Defendants 15 Cano, Cunning, De La Torree, and/or Lazano have the authority to expunge the VAD. “[T]the 16 pendency of the present action does not automatically give the Court jurisdiction over all prison 17 officials in general or over the expungement of rule violations from prisoner files at a given 18 institution.” Aubert v. Madruga, No. 1:13-CV-01659-AWI-EPG (PC), 2016 WL 2866419, at *7-8 19 (E.D. Cal. May 17, 2016), report and recommendation adopted, 2016 WL 4494478 (E.D. Cal. 20 Aug. 25, 2016) (denying injunctive relief because the court lacks jurisdiction to compel non-party 21 prison officials to expunge rule violations from plaintiff's central file solely based on the 22 pendency of a lawsuit against defendant prison officials in their official capacity where 23 defendants lack authority to expunge plaintiff's rule violations); Clifford v. Rachal, No. CV 19- 24 5605-DOC (KK), 2019 WL 3781603, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2019) (finding the court lacks 25 jurisdiction to compel non-party prison officials to remove the RVR's and Counseling Chrono 26 from Plaintiff's Central File). (See also Doc. 12 at 13.) Therefore, even assuming without finding 27 the existence of the VAD in Plaintiff’s file amounts to irreparable harm, it is unclear that the 1 other document from Plaintiff’s central file. Summers, 555 U.S. at 491-93 (the court's jurisdiction 2 is limited to the parties in this action). 3 The Balance of Equities and the Public Interest 4 Plaintiff makes no demonstration that the balance of equities tips in his favor or that the 5 injunction he seeks is in the public’s interest. Even assuming Plaintiff had met these two Winter 6 factors, he has not met all four required factors. Winter; 555 U.S. at 20. 7 III. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 8 The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to randomly assign a district judge to this action. 9 Further, for the reasons stated above, the Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s request 10 for injunctive relief (Doc. 10) be DENIED. 11 These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the district judge assigned to 12 this case, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 14 days of the date of service of these 13 Findings and Recommendations, a party may file written objections with the Court. The 14 document should be captioned, “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and 15 Recommendations.” Failure to file objections within the specified time may result in waiver of 16 rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. 17 Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)). 18 IT IS SO ORDERED. 19

20 Dated: March 12, 2024 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto . UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 21

22 23 24 25 26 27