(PC) Foster v. Baker

Opinion

7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9

10 RICKY TYRONE FOSTER, Case No. 1:23-cv-01097-JLT-EPG (PC) 11 Plaintiff, 12 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO v. 13 1) DISMISS FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL CHRISTOPHER BAKER, et al., 14 CLAIM WITHOUT PREJUDICE BECAUSE Defendants. PLAINTIFF IS BARRED BY 15 COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL FROM CHALLENGING EXHAUSTION ON THE 16 SAME FACTS; AND 17 2) DECLINE TO EXERCISE 18 SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION OVER THE REMAINING CONTRACT CLAIM 19 AND REMAND THE CASE TO SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF 20 KINGS 21 OBJECTIONS, IF ANY, DUE WITHIN 30 DAYS 22 23 Plaintiff Ricky Tyrone Foster is a state prisoner proceeding pro se in this case removed 24 by Defendants from state court to this Court. Plaintiff’s complaint asserts two causes of action: 25 a breach of contract claim related to a purported stipulation regarding the issue of exhaustion, 26 and a constitutional intentional tort claim of excessive force. 27 For the reasons stated below, the Court recommends that Plaintiff’s federal 28 constitutional claim be dismissed without prejudice because Plaintiff is barred by collateral 1 estoppel from asserting exhaustion. Plaintiff previously litigated the issue of exhaustion in this 2 Court regarding the same claim against the same defendants in Foster v. Baker, No. 1:18-cv- 3 01511-DAD-SAB (E.D. Cal.) (Foster I), and there has been no material change in the facts 4 regarding exhaustion since the entry of judgment in that case. 5 The Court also recommends declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the 6 remaining breach of contract claim and remanding it to state court. 7 I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT 8 The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA) requires courts to screen complaints 9 brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a 10 governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court also screens complaints brought by 11 persons proceeding in forma pauperis. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Plaintiff’s complaint, or any 12 portion thereof, is subject to dismissal if it is frivolous or malicious, which encompasses 13 duplicative cases where a complaint merely repeats pending or previously litigated claims. See 14 28 U.S.C. § 1915A; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i); Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1105 15 n.2 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing earlier version of § 1915(e)); see also Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 16 25, 30 (1992) (recognizing Congress’s concern regarding IFP litigants “filing frivolous, 17 malicious, or repetitive lawsuits”) (emphasis added). 18 II. BACKGROUND 19 A. Underlying Incident 20 According to Plaintiff’s allegations, in August of 2017, prison guards at California State 21 Prison-Corcoran C. Baker, J. Navarro, and John Does 1 and 2 failed to protect Plaintiff from an 22 assault by inmate Abella out of retaliation against Plaintiff. (ECF No. 1 at 11–12). 23 B. Prior State Mandamus Petition 24 According to Plaintiff, Plaintiff timely filed grievances related to this incident in 25 September of 2017. ECF No. 38 at 33, Foster I. After receiving no response to his grievances 26 related to the August 2017 incident, on January 12, 2018, Plaintiff filed a Petition for Writ of 27 Mandamus in Kings County Superior Court, Case number 18C-0031. ECF No. 38 at 31–38, 28 Foster I. Plaintiff asked that the state court direct respondents, Warden of CSP-Corcoran and 1 CDCR, to either respond to his grievances or waive the exhaustion so that plaintiff can litigate 2 his claim in state or federal court. Id. at 34–35. 3 In his Answer, CSP-Corcoran warden, represented by the Office of Attorney General, 4 acknowledged that Plaintiff seeks a waiver of “exhaustion requirement to allow him to pursue a 5 civil claim in state or federal court.” Case Management Statement, Apr. 23, 2020, ECF No. 36 6 at 8, Foster I. Respondent then submitted a proposed order to the court dismissing Plaintiff’s 7 petition, which stated “Foster’s administrative remedies are exhausted with respect to the 8 appeal at issue in this petition (Log Nos. Cal-17–01322 and COR-17–04927).” Proposed Order, 9 July 1, 2020, ECF No. 36 at 14–15, Foster I. After holding a hearing, on July 9, 2020, the state 10 court issued the proposed order in its entirety, crossing out only the word “proposed” in the 11 title, and entered judgment for respondent, dismissing Plaintiff’s petition. Signed Order, ECF 12 No. 38 at 44–45, Foster I. 13 C. Foster I Case 14 On July 30, 2018, Plaintiff filed case number 18C-0240 in Kings County Superior Court 15 against defendants Christopher Baker, J. Navarro, and Does 1 to 2, for violating his federal 16 constitutional rights in August of 2017. See Complaint, ECF No. 1 at 7, Foster I. Plaintiff 17 alleged that defendants retaliated against him and failed to intervene while Plaintiff was 18 assaulted by another inmate. (Id.) In October of 2018, defendants removed that case to federal 19 court, where it became Foster v. Baker, No. 1:18-cv-01511-DAD-SAB (E.D. Cal.) (Foster I), 20 case. 21 In February of 2020, defendants in Foster I case, represented by the Office of Attorney 22 General, moved for summary judgment on the ground that Plaintiff failed to exhaust available 23 administrative remedies for his claims before filing his suit. Defendants eventually prevailed on 24 their argument, and on July 19, 2021, the district court granted defendants’ motion, dismissed 25 Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to exhaust, and entered judgment in Defendants’ favor. ECF 26 Nos. 39, 40, Foster I. 27 28 1 In its order adopting the Findings and Recommendations and dismissing Plaintiff’s 2 complaint for failure to exhaust, the District Judge addressed Plaintiff’s arguments regarding 3 the state court’s previous order in the mandamus petition, as follows: 4 Plaintiff has attached to his objections an order wherein the state court did state in cursory fashion that plaintiff had administratively exhausted 5 the inmate appeal at issue in this case. (Id. at 45.) That state court order issued in the context of the dismissal of plaintiff’s writ of mandate as 6 moot because the state court concluded prison officials had responded to 7 his administrative appeal at all three levels of review. (Id.) However, it is unclear what analysis was done by and whether the cancellation appeal 8 was considered by the state court in making the statement in question. 9 Most importantly, neither that state court order nor plaintiff’s objections rebut the Ninth Circuit authority which appears to control the resolution 10 of the issue presented here. Cortinas, 754 Fed. App’x. at 527 (Because under California Code of Regulations, Title 15 § 3084.6(a)(3) and (e) an 11 inmate can appeal a cancellation decision separately pursuant to the rules 12 in § 3084.6(c), and if inmate prevails, cancelled inmate appeal can be considered at the discretion of the appeals coordinator, “Cortinas could 13 have appealed his cancellation decision, this case is distinguishable from Sapp, and the improper cancellation of his appeal did not render 14 administrative remedies effectively unavailable to him.”) (citing Wilson 15 v. Zubiate, 718 F. App’x 479, 482 (9th Cir. 2017)); see also Felde v. Wilkins, No. 1:19-cv-00339-NONE-HBK, 2021 WL 1241075, at *4 16 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2021); Belton v. Houston, No. ED CV 19–01179-PA (DFM), 2021 WL 785146, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2021), report and 17 recommendations adopted by 2021 WL 784961 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 18 2021) Therefore, the court is not persuaded to depart from the analysis set forth in the pending findings and recommendations. 19 Order Adopting Findings and Recommendations, ECF No. 39, Foster I. 20 D. The Instant Case 21 On April 28, 2023, Plaintiff again filed a complaint against the same defendants—CSP- 22 Corcoran prison guards Christopher Baker, J. Navarro, and Does 1 to 2—in Kings County 23 Superior Court, alleging two claims. (ECF No. 1 at 5). 24 First, Plaintiff alleges a breach of contract claim by defendants based on defendants 25 asserting inconsistent positions in concurrent federal and state proceedings in 2020. 26 Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that defendants’ counsel—Office of Attorney General in both 27 cases—breached the state-court stipulation in federal court by moving for summary judgment 28 1 in Foster I against Plaintiff on the ground that he failed to exhaust administrative remedies 2 when the attorneys had had represented to state court that Plaintiff had exhausted such 3 remedies. (ECF No. 1 at 7). 4 For his second claim, Plaintiff alleges the intentional tort action against defendants 5 C. Baker, J. Navarro, and John Does 1 and 2 based on the allegation that they violated his 6 federal constitutional rights when they failed to protect Plaintiff from an assault by inmate 7 Abella out of retaliation against Plaintiff. (Id. 8–16). 8 After being served with the complaint, Defendants Christopher Baker and J. Navarro 9 again removed the case to federal court and requested that this Court screen the complaint. (Id. 10 at 1–2). 11 E. Order to Show Cause 12 Upon this court’s review of the complaint for screening purposes, the Court issued an 13 Order for Plaintiff to Show Cause why this case should not be dismissed as barred by collateral 14 estoppel. (ECF No. 5). From the face of Plaintiff’s complaint, it appeared that Plaintiff 15 improperly sought to relitigate a final order from Foster I, because Plaintiff was asserting the 16 same underlying failure-to-protect claim and seeking to challenge the previous finding that 17 Plaintiff had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as to that claim, without any change 18 in facts. 19 Plaintiff timely filed a response to the Court’s Order to Show Cause. (ECF No. 6). 20 Plaintiff asserts that he filed the action in state court for breach of contract between the parties. 21 (Id. at 2, 5). Plaintiff argues that the parties entered into a stipulation regarding exhaustion in 22 Kings County Superior Court and that he sought to enforce that agreement in the same state 23 court. (Id. at 2, 4, 5). Plaintiff also argues that Defendants should be estopped from asserting 24 that Plaintiff had exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to the underlying claims 25 and succeeded in obtaining a judgment in their favor. (ECF No. 6 at 3, 4). Plaintiff asks the 26 Court to remand the case back to state Court that first decided the question of exhaustion of 27 administrative remedies. (Id. at 8). 28 1 III. ANALYSIS 2 A. Federal constitutional claim 3 i. Legal Standard 4 Under federal law, collateral estoppel “bars relitigation of issues adjudicated in an 5 earlier proceeding if three requirements are met: ‘(1) the issue necessarily decided at the 6 previous proceeding is identical to the one which is sought to be relitigated; (2) the first 7 proceeding ended with a final judgment on the merits; and (3) the party against whom collateral 8 estoppel is asserted was a party or in privity with a party at the first proceeding.’” Reyn’s Pasta 9 Bella, LLC v. Visa USA, Inc., 442 F.3d 741, 746 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Kourtis v. Cameron, 10 419 F.3d 989, 994 (9th Cir. 2005)). 11 Further, collateral estoppel can apply to a dismissal without prejudice if the 12 determination being according preclusive effect was essential to the judgment of dismissal. 13 Gallegos v. Reinstein, No. 12–16736, 560 F. App’x 669 (9th Cir. Mar. 4, 2014) (“Dismissal of 14 Gallegos’s claims related to a prior § 1983 action that the Arizona district court dismissed 15 without prejudice was proper under the doctrine of collateral estoppel because the issues raised 16 in these claims had been previously litigated, and were necessary to the prior judgment of 17 dismissal.”) (citing McQuillion v. Schwarzenegger, 369 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2004) and 18 Deutsch v. Flannery, 823 F.2d 1361, 1364 (9th Cir. 1987)) (“The litigation of an issue 19 presented and necessarily decided in a prior action between the same parties is foreclosed by 20 the doctrine of issue preclusion. It matters not that the prior action resulted in a dismissal 21 without prejudice, so long as the determination being accorded preclusive effect was essential 22 to the dismissal.”) (internal citations omitted). “[T]he principle is simply that later courts 23 should honor the first actual decision of a matter that has been actually litigated.” 18 C. Wright, 24 A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4416 (3d ed. 1998). Collateral 25 estoppel serves to “relieve parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve 26 judicial resources, and, by preventing inconsistent decisions, encourage reliance on 27 adjudication.” Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980). 28 ii. Plaintiff is barred by collateral estoppel from challenging 1 non-exhaustion ruling based on the same facts 2 All three elements of collateral estoppel are met here with respect to the issue of 3 exhaustion of administrative remedies for Plaintiff’s federal constitutional claim. 4 As to the first element, the issue of exhaustion decided in Foster I is identical to the one 5 that is sought to be relitigated here. The Court in Foster I dismissed Plaintiff’s earlier case 6 based on a legal determination that Plaintiff had failed to exhaust administrative remedies 7 before filing the lawsuit, regarding the same underlying incident. Additionally, the Court is 8 Foster I addressed Plaintiff’s argument that an earlier state court order had found otherwise. 9 Moreover, Plaintiff has not asserted any new facts regarding exhaustion. 10 Plaintiff attempts to distinguish between the instant case and Foster I case by arguing 11 that the parties entered into a stipulation agreement regarding exhaustion and that this 12 agreement was not addressed in Foster I order dismissing the case. (ECF No. 6 at 4). Plaintiff 13 states that this Stipulation Agreement is attached as Exhibit D to his objections to the 14 magistrate judge withdrawing his Findings and Recommendations in Foster I case. (Id. at 2). 15 However, Exhibit D to ECF No. 38 filed on October 8, 2020 in Foster I case, 1:18-cv-01511, 16 appears to be not a stipulation agreement but the July 9, 2020 state court decision dismissing 17 Plaintiff’s mandamus petition. 18 Contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, as illustrated supra with the block quote, this order 19 was explicitly addressed in Foster I. (ECF No. 1 at 39) (“Plaintiff has attached to his objections 20 an order wherein the state court did state in cursory fashion that Plaintiff had administratively 21 exhausted the inmate appeal at issue in this case.”) Plaintiff offers no new evidence that would 22 demonstrate he has exhausted administrative remedies since Foster I was decided and 23 Plaintiff’s arguments on exhaustion are the same ones that were or could have been litigated in 24 Foster I. Gallegos, 560 F. App’x at 669; Wright v. Carter, No. C07–5351FDB, 2007 WL 25 4562883, at *3–4 (W.D. Wash., Dec. 21, 2007) (adopting recommendation and dismissing case 26 on estoppel grounds where “[t]here has been no material change in the facts regarding 27 exhaustion since entry of judgment in Wright I”); Clark v. Mason, No. C04–1647C, 2005 WL 28 1 1189577, at *4–5 (W.D. Wash., May 19, 2005) (“[T]he doctrine of collateral estoppel should 2 preclude plaintiff from relitigating the issue of whether he had exhausted administrative 3 remedies for the claims asserted in Leeburg before he filed his complaint in that action. While 4 plaintiff asserts that defendants obtained dismissal in Leeburg through false testimony and 5 arguments, plaintiff had the opportunity in that case and on appeal to address those issues.”). 6 As to the second element, while Foster I ended in a dismissal without prejudice, the 7 determination made in Foster I—that Plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies 8 notwithstanding the state court litigation—was essential to the judgment of dismissal in 9 previous case. The judgment in Foster I was entered “in accordance with the court’s order filed 10 on 07/19/2021,” EFF No. 40, Foster I, and that order granted defendants’ motion for summary 11 judgment on the basis that Plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies available to him. 12 ECF No. 39, Foster I. The determination of non-exhaustion should therefore be accorded a 13 preclusive effect in this one. Deutsch, 823 F.2d at 1364, 1364 (“It matters not that the prior 14 action resulted in a dismissal without prejudice, so long as the determination being accorded 15 preclusive effect was essential to the dismissal.”) 16 Finally, as to the third element, both Foster I and this case were litigated against the 17 same defendants. 18 All three elements of collateral estoppel are met here, and Plaintiff is thus barred by 19 collateral estoppel from challenging non-exhaustion ruling in Foster I based on the same facts. 20 It follows then—because Foster I determination that Plaintiff has not exhausted his 21 administrative remedies with respect to the same grievances and the same defendants cannot be 22 relitigated in this action—that Plaintiff cannot proceed on his underlying constitutional claim 23 against defendants in this Court.1 Therefore, the Court will recommend that Plaintiff’s federal 24 constitutional claim be dismissed without prejudice. That, however, still leaves Plaintiff’s 25 breach of contract claim against defendants. 26 27 28 1 This Court takes no position as to whether Plaintiff may be able to proceed on this claim in state court after a remand. 1 B. Breach of contract claim 2 i. Legal Standard 3 This Court has federal question jurisdiction over “all civil actions arising under the 4 Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Determination of federal 5 question jurisdiction “is governed by the ‘well-pleaded complaint rule,’ which provides that 6 federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of plaintiff’s 7 properly pleaded complaint.” Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). Therefore, 8 plaintiff’s complaint must establish “either that (1) federal law creates the cause of action or 9 that (2) plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of 10 federal law.” Williston Basin Interstate Pipeline Co. v. An Exclusive Gas Storage Leasehold & 11 Easement, 524 F.3d 1090, 1100 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Barefield v. HSBC Holdings PLC, 12 2018 WL 3702307, at *4 (E.D. Cal. 2018). “[A]ny civil action brought in a State court of which 13 the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the 14 defendant.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Once a case has been properly removed, the district court has 15 jurisdiction over it on all grounds apparent from the complaint, not just those cited in the 16 removal notice. Williams v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 471 F.3d 975, 977 (9th Cir. 2006). 17 A district court “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction . . . [if] the district 18 court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); 19 see also Acri v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1001 n.3 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) 20 (explaining that a district court may decide sua sponte to decline to exercise supplemental 21 jurisdiction). 22 ii. Supplemental jurisdiction 23 The Court has recommended the dismissal of Plaintiff’s constitutional tort claim, which 24 was the basis for Court’s federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. (ECF No. 1 at 25 1). Because there are no federal claims remaining in this case, the question then becomes 26 whether the Court should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the breach of contract claim. 27 § 1367(c)(3). The Supreme Court has stated that “in the usual case in which all federal-law 28 claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be considered under the pendent 1 jurisdiction doctrine—judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity—will point toward 2 || declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.” Carnegie—Mellon Univ. 3 || v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988); see also United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 4 || U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (“Needless decisions of state law should be avoided both as a matter of 5 || comity and to promote justice between the parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed reading 6 || of applicable law.”); Ove v. Gwinn, 264 F.3d 817, 826 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing San Pedro Hotel 7 || Co., Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 159 F.3d 470, 478 (9th Cir. 1998)) (holding that a district court 8 not required to provide an explanation when declining jurisdiction under § 1367(c)). 9 || Notwithstanding the fact that this case has been pending before this Court since July 2023, the 10 || Court has not engaged substantively in the remaining claim. Thus, these considerations favor 11 ||remand of Plaintiff's breach of contract claim. 12 CONCLUSION 13 Based on the foregoing, the Court RECOMMENDS that: 14 1. Plaintiffs federal constitutional claim be dismissed as barred by collateral estoppel 15 because there has been no material change in the facts regarding exhaustion since 16 the entry of judgment in Foster v. Baker, No. 1:18-cv-01511-DAD-SAB (E.D. Cal. 17 Feb. 16, 2022); and 18 2. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), the Court decline supplemental jurisdiction over 19 Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim, and remand the remainder of this case to the 20 Kings County Superior Court. 21 IT IS SO ORDERED. 73 ll Dated: _ September 25, 2024 [Je Fey — 24 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 25 26 27 28 10