7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9
10 RICKY TYRONE FOSTER, Case No. 1:23-cv-01097-JLT-EPG (PC) 11 Plaintiff, ORDER FOR PLAINTIFF TO SHOW CAUSE 12 WHY CASE SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED v. AS BARRED BY COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL 13 CHRISTOPHER BAKER, et al., (ECF NO. 1) 14 Defendants. 15 16 Plaintiff Ricky Tyrone Foster is a state prisoner proceeding pro se in this civil rights 17 case filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 18 Plaintiff filed a complaint in Kings County Superior Court on April 28, 2023 claiming 19 that Defendants Baker and Navarro failed to protect Plaintiff against a retaliatory inmate assault 20 and that an earlier federal court decision that dismissed such claims for failure to exhaust 21 administrative remedies was incorrect. (ECF No. 1 at 5). After being served with the complaint, 22 Defendants Christopher Baker and J. Navarro removed the case to federal court. (Id. at 1). 23 Defendants requested that this Court screen the complaint. (Id. at 2). 24 Upon review of the complaint, it appears that Plaintiff improperly seeks to relitigate a 25 final order from an earlier case. Plaintiff previously filed a lawsuit in this District asserting the 26 same underlying failure to protect claims as this one. The previous court ultimately granted 27 summary judgment in favor of defendants, finding that Plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative 28 1 remedies before filing the lawsuit. In this action, Plaintiff directly challenges that earlier order. 2 However, the doctrine of collateral estoppel bars parties from relitigating issues already 3 decided by a court in a separate case, instead of challenging such orders by filing a motion for 4 reconsideration in the earlier case or appealing that order. 5 Accordingly, the Court will order Plaintiff to show cause why this case should not be 6 dismissed as barred by collateral estoppel. Plaintiff must file a response within thirty days. 7 If Plaintiff fails to file a response, this Court will recommend to an assigned district judge that 8 this case be dismissed. 9 I. PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT IS BARRED BY COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL 10 Under federal law, collateral estoppel “bars relitigation of issues adjudicated in an 11 earlier proceeding if three requirements are met: ‘(1) the issue necessarily decided at the 12 previous proceeding is identical to the one which is sought to be relitigated; (2) the first 13 proceeding ended with a final judgment on the merits; and (3) the party against whom collateral 14 estoppel is asserted was a party or in privity with a party at the first proceeding.’” Reyn’s Pasta 15 Bella, LLC v. Visa USA, Inc., 442 F.3d 741, 746 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Kourtis v. Cameron, 16 419 F.3d 989, 994 (9th Cir. 2005)). Further, collateral estoppel can apply to a dismissal without 17 prejudice if the determination being according preclusive effect was essential to the judgment 18 of dismissal. Gallegos v. Reinstein, No. 12–16736, 560 F. App’x 669 (9th Cir. Mar. 4, 2014) 19 (“Dismissal of Gallegos's claims related to a prior § 1983 action that the Arizona district court 20 dismissed without prejudice was proper under the doctrine of collateral estoppel because the 21 issues raised in these claims had been previously litigated, and were necessary to the prior 22 judgment of dismissal.”) (citing McQuillion v. Schwarzenegger, 369 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 23 2004) and Deutsch v. Flannery, 823 F.2d 1361, 1364 (9th Cir. 1987)) (“The litigation of an 24 issue presented and necessarily decided in a prior action between the same parties is foreclosed 25 by the doctrine of issue preclusion. It matters not that the prior action resulted in a dismissal 26 without prejudice, so long as the determination being accorded preclusive effect was essential 27 to the dismissal.”) (internal citations omitted). “[T]he principle is simply that later courts 28 should honor the first actual decision of a matter that has been actually litigated.” 18 C. Wright, 1 A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4416 (3d ed. 1998). Collateral 2 estoppel serves to “relieve parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve 3 judicial resources, and, by preventing inconsistent decisions, encourage reliance on 4 adjudication.” Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980). 5 Plaintiff’s complaint seeks to relitigate an order from a previous federal case, Foster v. 6 Baker, No. 1:18-cv-01511-DAD-SAB (E.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2022), which granted summary 7 judgment against Plaintiff on the ground that he failed to exhaust administrative remedies 8 regarding for his claim that correctional officers failed to protect him from an inmate assault. 9 Plaintiff’s complaint specifically describes and challenges this order on the basis that it 10 contradicted a different state court order: 11 On September 25, 2019, the Court of Appeal for the Fifth Appellate Dist, reversed the Kings County Superior Court ruling on defendant’s 12 demurrer, (Foster v. Baker, et al., Kings County Super. Ct. #18C-0240)) and on July 9, 2020, counsel for the defendant’s and plaintiff entered 13 into a written stipulation agreement that Plaintiff [had] EXHAUSTED 14 the administrative remedies with respect to Log # COR-17-04927 and Log # CAL-17-01322. . . . 15 The defendant’s counsel moved the state civil case to the Easter Dist 16 Federal Court’s and filed for SUMMARY JUDGMENT while claiming that, plaintiff failed to EXHAUST his administrative remedies with 17 respect to Log # COR-17-04927; and Log #CAL-17-01322 and 18 deliberately negated to dis the July 9, 2020 “STIPULATION AGREEMENT” as well as the Court of Appeals September 15, 2019, 19 REVERSAL which resulted in the District Court granting counsel motion for summary judgment. 20 (ECF No. 1 at 7). Plaintiff’s complaint also attaches a narrative alleging that prison officials C. 21 Baker, J. Navarro, and John Does 1 and 2 failed to protect Plaintiff from an assault by inmate 22 Abella out of retaliation against Plaintiff. (Id. 9–16). Plaintiff then alleges that Defense counsel 23 in the 2018 Foster case withheld their stipulation when bringing a motion for summary 24 judgment without alerting the court to the state-court stipulation. Plaintiff alleges this omission 25 violated the Model Rules of Professional conduct. (Id. at 17). 26 Plaintiff attaches the motion for summary judgment in the 2018 Foster case, the 27 Magistrate Judge’s findings and recommendations to grant Defendants’ motion for summary 28 1 judgment on the basis of failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and the District Judge’s 2 order adopting the Findings and Recommendations and dismissing the case without prejudice 3 due to plaintiff’s failure to exhaust all his available administrative remedies. (Id. 18–40). 4 Thus, it appears that Plaintiff’s complaint improperly seeks to relitigate a decision in a 5 separate case by filing this complaint, rather than by seeking reconsideration or appeal of that 6 prior order. Such an attempt to relitigate the issue in a separate case is barred by the doctrine of 7 collateral estoppel. The issue decided at the previous proceeding—i.e., whether Plaintiff 8 exhausted administrative remedies prior to filing the 2018 Foster case—is identical to what 9 Plaintiff seeks to litigate now. Indeed, Plaintiff is specifically identifying and challenging the 10 court’s previous order.
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7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9
10 RICKY TYRONE FOSTER, Case No. 1:23-cv-01097-JLT-EPG (PC) 11 Plaintiff, ORDER FOR PLAINTIFF TO SHOW CAUSE 12 WHY CASE SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED v. AS BARRED BY COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL 13 CHRISTOPHER BAKER, et al., (ECF NO. 1) 14 Defendants. 15 16 Plaintiff Ricky Tyrone Foster is a state prisoner proceeding pro se in this civil rights 17 case filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 18 Plaintiff filed a complaint in Kings County Superior Court on April 28, 2023 claiming 19 that Defendants Baker and Navarro failed to protect Plaintiff against a retaliatory inmate assault 20 and that an earlier federal court decision that dismissed such claims for failure to exhaust 21 administrative remedies was incorrect. (ECF No. 1 at 5). After being served with the complaint, 22 Defendants Christopher Baker and J. Navarro removed the case to federal court. (Id. at 1). 23 Defendants requested that this Court screen the complaint. (Id. at 2). 24 Upon review of the complaint, it appears that Plaintiff improperly seeks to relitigate a 25 final order from an earlier case. Plaintiff previously filed a lawsuit in this District asserting the 26 same underlying failure to protect claims as this one. The previous court ultimately granted 27 summary judgment in favor of defendants, finding that Plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative 28 1 remedies before filing the lawsuit. In this action, Plaintiff directly challenges that earlier order. 2 However, the doctrine of collateral estoppel bars parties from relitigating issues already 3 decided by a court in a separate case, instead of challenging such orders by filing a motion for 4 reconsideration in the earlier case or appealing that order. 5 Accordingly, the Court will order Plaintiff to show cause why this case should not be 6 dismissed as barred by collateral estoppel. Plaintiff must file a response within thirty days. 7 If Plaintiff fails to file a response, this Court will recommend to an assigned district judge that 8 this case be dismissed. 9 I. PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT IS BARRED BY COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL 10 Under federal law, collateral estoppel “bars relitigation of issues adjudicated in an 11 earlier proceeding if three requirements are met: ‘(1) the issue necessarily decided at the 12 previous proceeding is identical to the one which is sought to be relitigated; (2) the first 13 proceeding ended with a final judgment on the merits; and (3) the party against whom collateral 14 estoppel is asserted was a party or in privity with a party at the first proceeding.’” Reyn’s Pasta 15 Bella, LLC v. Visa USA, Inc., 442 F.3d 741, 746 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Kourtis v. Cameron, 16 419 F.3d 989, 994 (9th Cir. 2005)). Further, collateral estoppel can apply to a dismissal without 17 prejudice if the determination being according preclusive effect was essential to the judgment 18 of dismissal. Gallegos v. Reinstein, No. 12–16736, 560 F. App’x 669 (9th Cir. Mar. 4, 2014) 19 (“Dismissal of Gallegos's claims related to a prior § 1983 action that the Arizona district court 20 dismissed without prejudice was proper under the doctrine of collateral estoppel because the 21 issues raised in these claims had been previously litigated, and were necessary to the prior 22 judgment of dismissal.”) (citing McQuillion v. Schwarzenegger, 369 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 23 2004) and Deutsch v. Flannery, 823 F.2d 1361, 1364 (9th Cir. 1987)) (“The litigation of an 24 issue presented and necessarily decided in a prior action between the same parties is foreclosed 25 by the doctrine of issue preclusion. It matters not that the prior action resulted in a dismissal 26 without prejudice, so long as the determination being accorded preclusive effect was essential 27 to the dismissal.”) (internal citations omitted). “[T]he principle is simply that later courts 28 should honor the first actual decision of a matter that has been actually litigated.” 18 C. Wright, 1 A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4416 (3d ed. 1998). Collateral 2 estoppel serves to “relieve parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve 3 judicial resources, and, by preventing inconsistent decisions, encourage reliance on 4 adjudication.” Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980). 5 Plaintiff’s complaint seeks to relitigate an order from a previous federal case, Foster v. 6 Baker, No. 1:18-cv-01511-DAD-SAB (E.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2022), which granted summary 7 judgment against Plaintiff on the ground that he failed to exhaust administrative remedies 8 regarding for his claim that correctional officers failed to protect him from an inmate assault. 9 Plaintiff’s complaint specifically describes and challenges this order on the basis that it 10 contradicted a different state court order: 11 On September 25, 2019, the Court of Appeal for the Fifth Appellate Dist, reversed the Kings County Superior Court ruling on defendant’s 12 demurrer, (Foster v. Baker, et al., Kings County Super. Ct. #18C-0240)) and on July 9, 2020, counsel for the defendant’s and plaintiff entered 13 into a written stipulation agreement that Plaintiff [had] EXHAUSTED 14 the administrative remedies with respect to Log # COR-17-04927 and Log # CAL-17-01322. . . . 15 The defendant’s counsel moved the state civil case to the Easter Dist 16 Federal Court’s and filed for SUMMARY JUDGMENT while claiming that, plaintiff failed to EXHAUST his administrative remedies with 17 respect to Log # COR-17-04927; and Log #CAL-17-01322 and 18 deliberately negated to dis the July 9, 2020 “STIPULATION AGREEMENT” as well as the Court of Appeals September 15, 2019, 19 REVERSAL which resulted in the District Court granting counsel motion for summary judgment. 20 (ECF No. 1 at 7). Plaintiff’s complaint also attaches a narrative alleging that prison officials C. 21 Baker, J. Navarro, and John Does 1 and 2 failed to protect Plaintiff from an assault by inmate 22 Abella out of retaliation against Plaintiff. (Id. 9–16). Plaintiff then alleges that Defense counsel 23 in the 2018 Foster case withheld their stipulation when bringing a motion for summary 24 judgment without alerting the court to the state-court stipulation. Plaintiff alleges this omission 25 violated the Model Rules of Professional conduct. (Id. at 17). 26 Plaintiff attaches the motion for summary judgment in the 2018 Foster case, the 27 Magistrate Judge’s findings and recommendations to grant Defendants’ motion for summary 28 1 judgment on the basis of failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and the District Judge’s 2 order adopting the Findings and Recommendations and dismissing the case without prejudice 3 due to plaintiff’s failure to exhaust all his available administrative remedies. (Id. 18–40). 4 Thus, it appears that Plaintiff’s complaint improperly seeks to relitigate a decision in a 5 separate case by filing this complaint, rather than by seeking reconsideration or appeal of that 6 prior order. Such an attempt to relitigate the issue in a separate case is barred by the doctrine of 7 collateral estoppel. The issue decided at the previous proceeding—i.e., whether Plaintiff 8 exhausted administrative remedies prior to filing the 2018 Foster case—is identical to what 9 Plaintiff seeks to litigate now. Indeed, Plaintiff is specifically identifying and challenging the 10 court’s previous order. Moreover, the District Judge’s order explicitly addressed Plaintiff’s 11 argument regarding the state court decision on exhaustion and why it did not change the 12 outcome of the motion. (Id. at 39) (“[N]either that state court order nor plaintiff’s objections 13 rebut the Ninth Circuit authority which appears to control the resolution of the issue presented 14 here.”). Thus, the determination by the 2018 Foster court that Plaintiff failed to exhaust 15 administrative remedies notwithstanding the state court litigation was essential to the judgment 16 of dismissal in previous case, and should be accorded a preclusive effect in this one. Gallegos, 17 560 F. App’x at 669. Finally, the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted, i.e, 18 Plaintiff, was the same party in the first proceeding. 19 As Plaintiff appears to be attempting to relitigate an order in an earlier case, it appears 20 that this case is barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. See Wright v. Carter, No. C07- 21 5351FDB, 2007 WL 4562883, at *3–4 (W.D. Wash., Dec. 21, 2007) (adopting 22 recommendation and dismissing case on estoppel grounds where “[t]here has been no material 23 change in the facts regarding exhaustion since entry of judgment in Wright I”); Clark v. Mason, 24 No. C04-1647C, 2005 WL 1189577, at *4–5 (W.D. Wash., May 19, 2005) (“[T]he doctrine of 25 collateral estoppel should preclude plaintiff from relitigating the issue of whether he had 26 exhausted administrative remedies for the claims asserted in Leeburg before he filed his 27 complaint in that action. While plaintiff asserts that defendants obtained dismissal in Leeburg 28 1 || through false testimony and arguments, plaintiff had the opportunity in that case and on appeal 2 || to address those issues.”). 3 | IL. CONCLUSION AND ORDER 4 It appears from the face of the complaint that the claims in this case are barred by 5 || collateral estoppel. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff has thirty days from the date of 6 || this order to show cause why this case should not be dismissed as barred by collateral estoppel. 7 If Plaintiff fails to file a response, this Court will recommend to an assigned district 8 || judge that this case be dismissed. 9 10 IT IS SO ORDERED. ll! Dated: _ January 30, 2024 [sf ey — 12 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28