1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ANTHONY LEE ALLEN, JR., No. 2:21-cv-0344 DB P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER AND FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 14 SACRAMENTO COUNTY, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a civil rights action pursuant to 42 18 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff claims that defendants exposed him to COVID-19 in violation of his 19 constitutional rights. Presently before the court is plaintiff’s motion for an extension of time 20 (ECF No. 42) and his fourth amended complaint (ECF No. 40) for screening. For the reasons set 21 forth below, the undersigned will recommend that the fourth amended complaint (“FAC”) be 22 dismissed without leave to amend. 23 MOTION FOR AN EXTENSION OF TIME 24 Plaintiff filed a request for a ninety-day extension of time and notice of change of address 25 dated October 5, 2023. (ECF No. 42.) At the time plaintiff’s motion was submitted there were 26 no pending deadlines in this action. Accordingly, the undersigned will deny the request for an 27 extension of time as moot. 28 //// 1 SCREENING 2 I. Legal Standards 3 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 4 governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 5 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims 6 that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be 7 granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 8 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) & (2). 9 A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 10 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227–28 (9th 11 Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an 12 indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 13 490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully 14 pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227. 15 Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “requires only ‘a short and plain 16 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the 17 defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atlantic 18 Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). 19 However, in order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must 20 contain more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain 21 factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 22 U.S. at 555. In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the 23 allegations of the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 24 738, 740 (1976), construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all 25 doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). 26 //// 27 //// 28 //// 1 The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides as follows: 2 Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation 3 of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, 4 or other proper proceeding for redress. 5 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the 6 actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See 7 Monell v. Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 8 (1976). “A person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the 9 meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts or 10 omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which 11 complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 12 Moreover, supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of 13 their employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant 14 holds a supervisorial position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional 15 violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); 16 Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations 17 concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See 18 Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 19 II. Allegations in the Complaint 20 Plaintiff alleges that the events giving rise to the claim occurred while he was confined at 21 Rio Consumnes Correctional Center (“RCCC”). (ECF No. 40 at 3.) He names (1) Vanessa 22 Vaden, watch commander at RCCC; (2) Scott Jones, Sacramento County Sheriff; (3) RCCC; (4) 23 Sacramento County; (5) the City of Elk Grove; and (6) the City of Sacramento as defendants. (Id. 24 at 1, 2.) 25 Plaintiff alleges that on an unspecified date staff at RCCC “deliberately weaponized 26 COVID-19 and placed infected inmates” into his housing unit “which had not yet been infected.” 27 (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff states he was infected with COVID -19. (Id.) He concludes that “Ms. Vaden 28 was in charge at the time of this incident” based on her position as watch commander. (Id.) 1 Plaintiff states “[t]his lawsuit is in reference to COVID-19 and that CDC 2 recommendations are not being met. Social distancing, mask uncleanly environment and the fact 3 that [he is] innocent until proven guilty.” (Id. at 4.) He states that he tested positive “due to the 4 negligence of the Sacramento Sheriff’s Dept, as well as the medical staff’s disregard for human 5 life, safety and well being.” (Id.) Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages. (Id. at 5.) 6 III. Failure to State a Claim 7 “Inmates who sue prison officials for injuries suffered while in custody may do so under 8 the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, or if not yet convicted, under 9 the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.” Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 10 1060, 1067-68 (9th Cir.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ANTHONY LEE ALLEN, JR., No. 2:21-cv-0344 DB P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER AND FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 14 SACRAMENTO COUNTY, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a civil rights action pursuant to 42 18 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff claims that defendants exposed him to COVID-19 in violation of his 19 constitutional rights. Presently before the court is plaintiff’s motion for an extension of time 20 (ECF No. 42) and his fourth amended complaint (ECF No. 40) for screening. For the reasons set 21 forth below, the undersigned will recommend that the fourth amended complaint (“FAC”) be 22 dismissed without leave to amend. 23 MOTION FOR AN EXTENSION OF TIME 24 Plaintiff filed a request for a ninety-day extension of time and notice of change of address 25 dated October 5, 2023. (ECF No. 42.) At the time plaintiff’s motion was submitted there were 26 no pending deadlines in this action. Accordingly, the undersigned will deny the request for an 27 extension of time as moot. 28 //// 1 SCREENING 2 I. Legal Standards 3 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 4 governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 5 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims 6 that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be 7 granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 8 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) & (2). 9 A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 10 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227–28 (9th 11 Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an 12 indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 13 490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully 14 pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227. 15 Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “requires only ‘a short and plain 16 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the 17 defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atlantic 18 Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). 19 However, in order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must 20 contain more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain 21 factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 22 U.S. at 555. In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the 23 allegations of the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 24 738, 740 (1976), construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all 25 doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). 26 //// 27 //// 28 //// 1 The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides as follows: 2 Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation 3 of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, 4 or other proper proceeding for redress. 5 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the 6 actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See 7 Monell v. Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 8 (1976). “A person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the 9 meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts or 10 omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which 11 complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 12 Moreover, supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of 13 their employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant 14 holds a supervisorial position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional 15 violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); 16 Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations 17 concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See 18 Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 19 II. Allegations in the Complaint 20 Plaintiff alleges that the events giving rise to the claim occurred while he was confined at 21 Rio Consumnes Correctional Center (“RCCC”). (ECF No. 40 at 3.) He names (1) Vanessa 22 Vaden, watch commander at RCCC; (2) Scott Jones, Sacramento County Sheriff; (3) RCCC; (4) 23 Sacramento County; (5) the City of Elk Grove; and (6) the City of Sacramento as defendants. (Id. 24 at 1, 2.) 25 Plaintiff alleges that on an unspecified date staff at RCCC “deliberately weaponized 26 COVID-19 and placed infected inmates” into his housing unit “which had not yet been infected.” 27 (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff states he was infected with COVID -19. (Id.) He concludes that “Ms. Vaden 28 was in charge at the time of this incident” based on her position as watch commander. (Id.) 1 Plaintiff states “[t]his lawsuit is in reference to COVID-19 and that CDC 2 recommendations are not being met. Social distancing, mask uncleanly environment and the fact 3 that [he is] innocent until proven guilty.” (Id. at 4.) He states that he tested positive “due to the 4 negligence of the Sacramento Sheriff’s Dept, as well as the medical staff’s disregard for human 5 life, safety and well being.” (Id.) Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages. (Id. at 5.) 6 III. Failure to State a Claim 7 “Inmates who sue prison officials for injuries suffered while in custody may do so under 8 the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, or if not yet convicted, under 9 the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.” Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 10 1060, 1067-68 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979)). “For a 11 particular governmental action to constitute punishment, (1) that action must cause the detainee to 12 suffer some harm or ‘disability,’ and (2) the purpose of the governmental action must be to punish 13 the detainee.” Demery v. Arpaio, 378 F.3d 1020, 1029 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Bell, 441 U.S. at 14 537). “[T]he plaintiff must ‘prove more than negligence but less than subjective intent— 15 something akin to reckless disregard.’” Gordon v. County of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1125 (9th 16 Cir. 2018) (quoting Castro, 833 F.3d at 1071). 17 A. Vaden 18 Plaintiff states that due to staff neglect he exposed to COVID-19 in violation of his right 19 to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. (ECF No. 40 at 3.) He further concludes that 20 defendant Vaden was responsible based on her position as watch commander. (Id.) However, he 21 has not stated any facts showing that Vaden was involved in placing infected inmates in 22 plaintiff’s housing unit such as directing staff to make a transfer, or that Vaden was aware of and 23 ignored signs inmates were infected. 24 As plaintiff was previously advised (ECF No. 11 at 5; ECF No. 38 at 4), to state a claim 25 under § 1983, he must establish a causal link between the actions of the defendants and the 26 deprivation of rights suffered by the plaintiff. Ortez v. Washington County, State of Oregon, 88 27 F.3d 804, 809 (9th Cir. 1996); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Plaintiff has 28 not stated any facts from which the undersigned could conclude that any named defendant 1 knowingly caused plaintiff to suffer harm. Thus, the complaint fails to state a cognizable claim 2 against Vaden. 3 B. Jones 4 The complaint does not contain allegations indicating what acts or omissions of defendant 5 Sheriff Scott Jones led to the alleged violation of plaintiff’s rights. He has indicated that he 6 contracted COVID-19 due to the negligence of the Sacramento Sheriff’s Department. (ECF No. 7 40 at 4.) Plaintiff was also previously advised (ECF No. 38 at 4), that he must allege facts 8 showing Jones performed some affirmative act or omission that caused or contributed to causing 9 a violation of plaintiff’s rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676; Johnson, 588 F.2d at 743. In the absence 10 of facts showing how Jones violated plaintiff’s rights the undersigned finds that the complaint 11 fails to state a cognizable claim against defendant Jones. 12 C. Municipal Defendants 13 The complaint does not contain any allegations identifying a policy or custom of 14 Sacramento County or the cities of Elk Grove or Sacramento that led to the alleged rights 15 violations. Plaintiff was previously advised (ECF No. 38 at 5) that in order to state a claim 16 against a municipality, such as Sacramento County, he must identify a policy or custom that 17 caused the violation of his constitutional rights. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narc. Intell. and 18 Coord Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 166 (1993); Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. Accordingly, the undersigned 19 finds the allegations in the complaint fail to state a claim against Sacramento County, Elk Grove, 20 or Sacramento. 21 D. RCCC 22 The complaint does not contain any facts indicating acts or omissions of RCCC that led to 23 the violation of his rights. As plaintiff was previously advised (ECF No. 11 at 5; ECF No. 38 at 24 4), in order to state a claim, plaintiff must provide allegations specifying the acts or omissions 25 that led to the violation of his rights. Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 555. In the absence of such facts, 26 the undersigned finds the complaint fails to state a cognizable claim against RCCC. 27 //// 28 //// 1 IV. No Leave to Amend 2 As set forth above, the allegations in the complaint are insufficient to state a potentially 3 cognizable claim against any defendant. The court will recommend that the fourth amended 4 complaint be dismissed without leave to amend because plaintiff was previously notified of the 5 deficiencies and has failed to correct them. A plaintiff’s “repeated failure to cure deficiencies” 6 constitutes “a strong indication that the [plaintiff] has no additional facts to plead” and “that any 7 attempt to amend would be futile[.]” See Zucco Partners, LLC v. Digimarc Corp., 552 F.3d 981, 8 1008 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted) (upholding dismissal of complaint with 9 prejudice when there were “three iterations of [the] allegations—none of which, according to [the 10 district] court, was sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss”); see also Simon v. Value 11 Behavioral Health, Inc., 208 F.3d 1073, 1084 (9th Cir. 2000) (affirming dismissal without leave 12 to amend where plaintiff failed to correct deficiencies in the complaint, where court had afforded 13 plaintiff opportunities to do so, and had discussed with plaintiff the substantive problems with his 14 claims), amended by 234 F.3d 428, overruled on other grounds by Odom v. Microsoft Corp., 486 15 F.3d 541, 551 (9th Cir. 2007); Plumeau v. Sch. Dist. 40 Cnty. of Yamhill, 130 F.3d 432, 439 (9th 16 Cir. 1997) (denial of leave to amend appropriate where further amendment would be futile). 17 CONCLUSION 18 For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 19 1. Plaintiff’s motion for an extension of time (ECF No. 42) is denied as moot; and 20 2. The Clerk of the Court shall randomly assign a district judge to this case. 21 IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the fourth amended complaint (ECF No. 40) be 22 dismissed without leave to amend. 23 These findings and recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge 24 assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty-one days 25 after being served with these findings and recommendations, plaintiff may file written objections 26 with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings 27 and Recommendations.” 28 //// 1 Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may result in 2 | waiver of the right to appeal the district court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 3 1991). 4 | Dated: December 12, 2023 5 6 7 | ONETED STATS ag JUDGE DB/DB Prisoner Inbox/Civil Rights/S/alle0344.scrn. 4AC 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28