PAEZ, Circuit Judge.
The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits punishment of pretrial detainees. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979). Applying this principle, the district court preliminarily enjoined the use of world-wide web cameras (“webcams”) in the Maricopa County Madison Street Jail. We must decide whether the district court abused its discretion • in granting the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
[1024]*1024I.
When Maricopa County Sheriff Joe Ar-paio announced the installation of webcams in the Madison Street Jail, he proclaimed “[w]e get people booked in for murder all the way down to prostitution.... When those johns are arrested, they can wave to their wives on the camera.” Sheriff Ar-paio also explained that his policy deterred crime and opened up the jails to public scrutiny: “The public has the right to know what’s going on in our jails.... And I believe that they act as a tool to deter crime. We hope that the only visit people make to our jail is a virtual visit.” In July 2000, four webcams began streaming live images of pretrial detainees to internet users around the world.
Sheriff Arpaio installed the webcams at the County’s Madison Street Jail, a facility used exclusively to house pretrial detainees. The four webcams were placed within areas of the jail that were not open to the public except through prearranged tours. They were installed in close proximity to closed-circuit security cameras that were monitored twenty-four hours a day by Sheriffs officers.
One camera was trained on the men’s holding cell. Web users could view only a portion of this holding cell, including the bunk bed area. Those detained in the men’s holding cell could therefore avoid being seen by moving to an area of the cell that was outside of the camera’s view.
A second camera captured images of the pre-intake área. Pretrial detainees could be viewed being photographed, fingerprinted, and booked. A third camera was focused on the intake search area. This webcam captured live images of pretrial detainees being subjected to patdown searches.
The location of the final camera is hotly contested by the parties. The plaintiffs contend that for at least six months, one webcam captured images of the toilet and surrounding area in the women’s holding cell. They also argue that the camera was only repositioned in response to this lawsuit, and that in the absence of an injunction, the Sheriff could simply move the camera back to its original location. Sheriff Arpaio, however, contends that his officers moved the camera within hours of learning that the images of the toilet area were being displayed over the internet. In any event, the camera was ultimately repositioned to capture images of the hallway outside of the holding cells.
In order to transport the images from the Madison Street Jail to web users’ computers, the images had to be streamed to a website. Although the Maricopa County Sheriffs website1 initially hosted the web-cam images, the number of visitors to the site quickly overwhelmed that website’s capacity. As a result, Sheriff Arpaio entered into an arrangement with a website called “Crime.com” to distribute the images to the public.
Finally, in order to view the webcam images, web users had to direct their web browsers to the Crime.com website and click on a series of links. The website informed visitors that “[i]f you find yourself sitting on this bunk, you probably have been arrested for drunk and disorderly behavior, drug possession, spousal abuse, or prostitution. Most people inside the Madison Street Jail are facing misdemean- or charges but Deputies see their fair share of murderers as well.” Visitors to the Crime.com’s Jail Cam Special Ops webpage found the following four links:
1. “crime.com’s Virtual Tour: You are busted! Enter the Madison Street Jail [1025]*1025as a detainee and see what it’s like to be booked, searched, and locked-up.”
2. “Meet Sheriff Joe: It’s his jail and he’s proud of it. Spend a day in the life of Sheriff Joe Arpaio on his own turf, where inmates wear pink underwear, eat green bologna and work on chain gangs.”
3. “Jail Cam: See the first live camera in a working jail. Watch what’s happening at Madison Street Jail NOW.”
4. “Shakedown: See the first shakedown in four years at the Madison Street Jail. Watch as SWAT teams raid male and female inmate holding cells in search of smuggled drugs and crude weapons.”
Visitors that chose the “Jail Cam” link were then directed to a web page where they could choose which of the four web-cams they wanted to view.
Within the first few days of operation, the Crime.com website recorded six million hits, with web users visiting from as far away as Sweden, Britain, and Germany. As was the case with the Maricopa County Sheriffs website, however, the Crime.com website was unable to accommodate the number of visitors interested in viewing the webcam images. But for reasons that are unclear from the record, the Crime, com website ceased operations after this suit was filed but before the district court granted the preliminary injunction.
This suit was brought by twenty-four former Madison Street Jail detainees who challenged the Sheriffs webcam policy in Arizona state court. The defendants, Sheriff Arpaio and the County of Marico-pa, removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of Arizona. After determining that there was still a live controversy, because Sheriff Arpaio was seeking a new host for the webcam images, the district court preliminarily enjoined the Sheriff from operating the web-cams because the Sheriffs policy unconstitutionally punished pretrial detainees in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Sheriff Arpaio filed this timely appeal. Although he concedes that there is a live controversy, he argues that the district court abused its discretion in granting preliminary injunctive relief.
II.
We first consider whether this case is moot. “[A] case is moot when the issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496, 89 S.Ct. 1944, 23 L.Ed.2d 491 (1969). Neither party contends on appeal that this case is moot, a factor that weighs in favor of our jurisdiction because a “party moving for dismissal on mootness grounds bears a heavy burden.” Coral Constr. Co. v. King County, 941 F.2d 910, 927-28 (9th Cir.1991). Nonetheless, we have an independent duty to consider sua sponte whether a case is moot, Dittman v. California, 191 F.3d 1020, 1025 (9th Cir. 1999), and we consider this issue de novo. Wade v. Kirkland, 118 F.3d 667, 669 (9th Cir.1997).
There are two significant events that might render this dispute moot — the termination of the Crime.com website and the release of the plaintiffs from the Madison Street Jail. We conclude, however, that this controversy is not moot and therefore we have jurisdiction to address the merits of Sheriff Arpaio’s appeal.
First, we agree with the parties that the termination of the Crime.com website does not render this case moot. Sheriff Arpaio intends to and likely will find another web host willing to display the live images of the Madison Street Jail. Although a suit for injunctive relief is nor[1026]*1026mally moot upon the termination of the conduct at issue, such a claim is not moot if there is a likelihood of recurrence. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Affordable Media, LLC, 179 F.3d 1228, 1238 (9th Cir.1999) (holding that injunctive relief does not become moot by defendants’ voluntary cessation of allegedly wrongful behavior unless it is “absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior cannot reasonably be expected to recur”) (quoting Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, 135 F.3d 1260, 1274 (9th Cir.1998)); Norman-Bloodsaw, 135 F.3d at 1274 (holding that defendants in suit for injunc-tive and declaratory relief must establish “either that their alleged behavior cannot be reasonably expected to recur, or that interim events have eradicated the effects of the alleged violation”).
True, in this case the immediate cause of the defendant’s cessation of the disputed activity was not in the short term voluntary, as it was not Sheriff Arpaio who discontinued the Crime.com website. Compare, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 528 U.S. 216, 222, 120 S.Ct. 722, 145 L.Ed.2d 650 (2000) (describing how the Federal Government voluntarily ceased its offending conduct and holding that the case was not moot); Norman-Bloodsaw, 135 F.3d at 1274 (holding that the voluntary cessation by United States Department of Energy of mandatory testing for syphilis and other private, medical conditions did not moot the plaintiffs’ claims). Nonetheless, as the voluntary cessation and capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review cases, discussed infra, both illustrate, a more general principle underlies the mootness determination. Once a defendant has engaged in conduct the plaintiff contends is unlawful and the courts have devoted resources to determining the dispute, there is Article III jurisdiction to decide the case as long as “the parties [do not] plainly lack a continuing interest... Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 192, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000).
In light of Sheriff Arpaio’s unequivocal representations, it is likely that the Sheriff will reactivate the webcams if the injunction is vacated. The Sheriff was actively searching for a new website host before the district court issued the preliminary injunction, and has stated that he plans to continue his search if the preliminary injunction is reversed. Because the Madison Street Jail images increased the popularity of the crime.com website, and because web technology advances rather than retreats, there is no basis for supposing that the Sheriff will not succeed in his search for a new host. It is also possible that the Sheriff could upgrade his own website to show the images. As the defendant intends to resume his behavior if he can and there has been no showing that recurrence is not technologically and otherwise feasible, it is reasonably likely that he will resume the contested web postings. As there is a sufficient likelihood that the Sheriffs use of webcams will recur, the temporary cessation caused by the demise of Crime.com does not render this case moot.
Second, the release of the plaintiffs from the Madison Street Jail and consequent inability to post their images on the web any longer does not render this case moot, because this controversy falls squarely within the capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review branch of the mootness doctrine. This branch applies when (1) the duration of the challenged action is too short to be litigated prior to cessation, and (2) there is a “reasonable expectation” that the same parties will be subjected to the same offending conduct. Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 17-18, 118 S.Ct. 978, 140 L.Ed.2d 43 (1998); Mitchell v. Dupnik, 75 [1027]*1027F.3d 517, 528 (9th Cir.1996). Because the Madison Street Jail is a pretrial detention center, “the length of detention in the county jail is short enough that any individual detainee’s claim would probably become moot before trial.” Oregon Advocacy Ctr. v. Mink, 322 F.3d 1101, 1117-18 (9th Cir.2003). As the Supreme Court has explained, “[pjretrial detention is by nature temporary, and it is most unlikely that any given individual could have his constitutional claim decided on appeal before he is either released or convicted.” Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111 n. 11, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975). In these circumstances, the plaintiffs readily satisfy the first prong of the capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review branch of the mootness doctrine.
To satisfy the second prong, the plaintiffs “must show either a ‘demonstrated probability’ or a ‘reasonable expectation’ that [they] would be transferred back to[the Madison Street Jail] or released and reincarcerated there.” Oliver v. Scott, 276 F.3d 736, 741 (5th Cir.2002) (quoting Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 482, 102 S.Ct. 1181, 71 L.Ed.2d 353 (1982)); see also Mitchell, 75 F.3d at 528. Our analysis of this second prong is guided by our decision in Mitchell. In Mitchell, the district court enjoined the challenged pretrial detention center policy even though the plaintiff had been convicted and transferred to state prison. Because the plaintiff was pursuing post-conviction relief that, if he were successful, would entitle him to a new trial, the district court held that the plaintiff had a reasonable expectation that he would return to the pretrial detention center. We reversed, noting that although these “circumstances arguably satisfied the exception’s second prong,” the plaintiff no longer had a reasonable expectation that he would be reincarcerated at the pretrial detention facility because the plaintiffs petitions for post-conviction relief had since been denied. 75 F.3d at 528.
In contrast, the record here contains compelling evidence that the plaintiffs likely will be reincarcerated at the Madison Street Jail. For example, plaintiff Benny Berryman was detained at the Madison Street Jail on twenty different occasions between February 1997 and June 2002. Eleven other named plaintiffs also have been detained at the Madison Street Jail on more than one occasion. Thus, this controversy also satisfies the eapable-of-repetition prong. Accordingly, the case is not moot and we have jurisdiction to decide the merits of Sheriff Arpaio’s challenge to the district court’s preliminary injunction order.
III.
In considering Sheriff Arpaio’s arguments, we begin with the proposition that our review of a district court order granting a preliminary injunction is “subject to limited review.” United States v. Peninsula Communications, Inc., 287 F.3d 832, 839 (9th Cir.2002). We can reverse the district court only if it abused its discretion. Gorbach v. Reno, 219 F.3d 1087, 1091 (9th Cir.2000) (en banc). The district court necessarily abuses its discretion if it relies on an erroneous legal standard or on clearly erroneous factual findings. Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1046 (9th Cir.1999). Accordingly, we review de novo any underlying issues of law. Does 1-5 v. Chandler, 83 F.3d 1150, 1152 (9th Cir.1996). However, “[w]e typically will not reach the merits of a case when reviewing a preliminary injunction. By this we mean we will not second guess whether the court correctly applied the law to the facts of the case, which may be largely undeveloped at the early stages of litigation.” Rucker v. Davis, 237 F.3d [1028]*10281113, 1118 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc) (internal citations omitted), rev’d on other grounds by Dept. of Hous. and Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 122 S.Ct. 1230, 152 L.Ed.2d 258 (2002).
Sheriff Arpaio’s challenges to the district court’s order boil down to two arguments: the district court misidentified the applicable law and the district court misapplied the law to the facts of this case. We consider these contentions separately.
A.
In evaluating the plaintiffs’ motion for injunctive relief, the district court applied the correct legal standard. As the district court recognized, the Supreme Court held in Bell v. Wolfish that “under the Due Process Clause, a detainee may not be punished prior to an adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law.” 441 U.S. at 535, 99 S.Ct. 1861. More specifically, the district court correctly identified and applied Bell’s test for identifying unconstitutional punishment at the pretrial stage of a criminal proceeding. That test asks whether there was an express intent to punish, or “whether an alternative purpose to which [the restriction] may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned [to it].” Id. at 538, 99 S.Ct. 1861 (quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69, 83 S.Ct. 554, 9 L.Ed.2d 644 (1963)). Sheriff Arpaio contends that this was an incorrect legal standard because the plaintiffs never raised a Bell challenge to the webcams. The plaintiffs’ district court filings reveal otherwise. For example, the plaintiffs’ fifth and eighth causes of action, as well as their motion for a preliminary injunction, alleged that the webcams violated their Fourteenth Amendment Substantive Due Process rights. In footnote 4 of their complaint, the plaintiffs specifically claimed that the webcams undermined their Fourteenth Amendment Substantive Due Process right to be free of punishment. And in their response to the defendants’ motion to dismiss, which was heard in conjunction with the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, the plaintiffs argued that “the Internet displays are punishment, the very thing that the state and federal constitutions prohibit governments from imposing upon unconvicted prisoners.”
Alternatively, Sheriff Arpaio argues that the four-part “reasonable relation” test of Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987),2 replaced the Bell punishment test. He concedes, however, that we have continued to apply Bell even after the Supreme Court’s decision in Turner. See Valdez v. Rosenbaum, 302 F.3d 1039, 1045-47 (9th Cir.2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1047, 123 S.Ct. 2110, 155 L.Ed.2d 1087 (2003). We are, of course, powerless to overrule the decision of a prior Ninth Circuit panel. See Bonin v. Vasquez, 999 F.2d 425, 428 (9th Cir. 1993). Moreover, Turner is inapposite for two reasons. First, Turner dealt with convicted prisoners, not pretrial detainees. Second, Turner involved an Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment challenge, not a claim brought under the Substantive Due Process Clause of the [1029]*1029Fourteenth Amendment.3 Both distinctions are critical because the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits all punishment of pretrial detainees, while the Eighth Amendment only prevents the imposition of cruel and unusual punishment on convicted prisoners. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 535 n. 16, 99 S.Ct. 1861.
Finally, Sheriff Arpaio suggests that the district court strictly scrutinized the webcam policy, even though Bell only permits courts to examine whether the policy is an excessive response to a legitimate purpose. The district court determined that improving jail security was not a legitimate alternative purpose for the webcams because they were placed nearby closed-circuit security cameras. Thus, it concluded that the webcams “amount to an exaggerated response to an already-fulfilled security need.” Sheriff Arpaio asserts that this amounts to strict scrutiny, but we disagree. In Bell, the Court held that the means employed cannot be “excessive in relation to the alternative purpose.” 441 U.S. at 538, 99 S.Ct. 1861. Although the district court used the term “exaggerated” rather than “excessive,” this hardly proves that it was employing strict scrutiny. And in light of the fact that closed-circuit security cameras already were stationed nearby and the web-cam images could be viewed by millions of people worldwide, the webcams were plainly an excessive response to Sheriff Arpaio’s interest in maintaining jail security. In sum, the Sheriff has failed to demonstrate that the district court applied an erroneous legal standard.
B.
Sheriff Arpaio also challenges the district court’s application of Bell to the facts of this case. This line of argument, however, ignores our standard of review for a preliminary injunction. As we have explained before, “[a]s long as the district court got the law right, it will not be reversed simply because the appellate court would have arrived at a different result if it had applied the law to the facts of the case.” A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1013 (9th Cir.2001) (quoting Gregorio T. v. Wilson, 59 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir.1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Additionally, we agree with the district court’s application of the law to the facts. As we noted earlier, Bell held that, “under the Due Process Clause, a detainee may not be punished prior to an adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law.” 441 U.S. at 535, 99 S.Ct. 1861. For a particular governmental action to constitute punishment, (1) that action must cause the detainee to suffer some harm or “disability,” and (2) the purpose of the governmental action must be to punish the detainee. Bell, 441 U.S. at 538, 99 S.Ct. 1861 (“A court must decide whether the disability is imposed for the purpose of punishment or whether it is but an incident of some other legitimate governmental purpose.”). Both requirements are met here.
Plaintiffs were certainly harmed by Sheriff Arpaio’s actions. Having every moment of one’s daily activities exposed to general and world-wide scrutiny would make anyone uncomfortable. Exposure to millions of complete strangers, not to mention friends, loved ones, co-workers and employers, as one is booked, fingerprinted, and generally processed as an arrestee, and as one sits, stands, or lies in a holding [1030]*1030cell, constitutes a level of humiliation that almost anyone would regard as profoundly undesirable and strive to avoid.
Nothing in Bell requires that, to be punishment, a harm must be independently cognizable as a separate constitutional violation (e.g., a deprivation of First Amendment rights, or a violation of a constitutional right to privacy). Rather, to constitute punishment, the harm or disability caused by the government’s action must either significantly exceed, or be independent of, the inherent discomforts of confinement. Bell, 441 U.S. at 537, 99 S.Ct. 1861(“Loss of freedom of choice and privacy are inherent incidents of confinement in such a facility. And the fact that such detention interferes with the detainee’s understandable desire to live as comfortably as possible and with as little restraint as possible during confinement does not convert the conditions or restrictions of detention into ‘punishment.’ ”).
In Bell, the Supreme Court determined that the practice of double-bunking pretrial detainees did not impose enough of a hardship to rise to the level of a constitutional violation. 441 U.S. at 543, 99 S.Ct. 1861. In that case, however, the Court’s premise was that any pretrial detention inherently involved some discomfort; a detainee’s sleeping conditions even when not double-bunked were far from ideal, and the additional discomfort of having to share the already close corners with another detainee was not sufficiently great to constitute punishment.
In the case at hand, however, the additional impact on pretrial detainees of webcam transmission is greater by several orders of magnitude than the intrusion inherent in incarceration. Being detained in a county jail necessarily involves being observed by the staff of the jail and the other detainees. The webcams increase exponentially the number of people observing detainees, and also alter drastically the classes of people who can watch the detainees. The discomfort to a detainee of having her children, for example, watch her while she is being detained is incalculably greater than having jail guards watch the same procedure.
Having determined that Sheriff Arpaio’s practice of streaming images of detainees on the web constitutes a harm, we now turn to whether this harm is imposed “for the purpose of punishment or whether it is but an incident of some other legitimate governmental purpose.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 538, 99 S.Ct. 1861. The webcams did not improve the security of the pretrial detention center when closed-circuit video cameras were already present. Indeed, because the webcams were placed so close to the closed-circuit cameras, they did not even serve to increase the area of the jail that was subject to video surveillance. And because the Sheriffs deputies were presumably already monitoring the images captured by the closed-circuit video cameras, there was no added benefit to publishing the images on the internet. An unruly detainee, willing to ignore the watchful eye of nearby prison guards, would not be deterred from engaging in disruptive behavior by the prospect of an unknown private citizen halfway around the world viewing his grainy image over the internet.
Nor do we find any merit to the two alternative purposes put forth by Sheriff Arpaio. First, he contends that the web-cams deter crime because the public, having viewed the process of fingerprinting, pat-down searches, and pretrial detention will decide that being arrested and confined in a pretrial detention center is a fate to be avoided. The Supreme Court, however, stated in Bell that “[r]etribution and deterrence are not legitimate nonpunitive governmental objectives” that can justify [1031]*1031adverse conditions of detention for pretrial detainees, 441 U.S. at 539 n. 20, 99 S.Ct. 1861, and has classified deterrence as one of “the traditional aims of punishment.” Id. at 538, 99 S.Ct. 1861 (quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69, 83 S.Ct. 554, 9 L.Ed.2d 644 (1963)). We also have recognized that deterrence does not qualify as a nonpunitive goal with regard to pretrial detainees. White v. Roper, 901 F.2d 1501, 1504-05 (9th Cir.1990). To be sure, as a general matter, deterrence of crime through a variety of means is a legitimate governmental objective.4 But, as the Supreme Court and this court have recognized, where an individual is incarcerated before trial but has not been convicted of any crime, imposing adverse conditions during his detention as a means of deterring crimes is not permissible. Such exploitation of pretrial detainees is not “appropriate to assure the detainees’ presence at trial [or] to maintain the security and order of the detention facility and otherwise manage the detention facility.” Halvorsen v. Baird, 146 F.3d 680, 689 (9th Cir.1998). Thus, Sheriff Arpaio cannot point to deterrence, general or specific, as a legitimate government interest that justifies the installation of web-cams in the Madison Street Jail.
Second, Sheriff Arpaio argues that the cameras are justified by the County’s interest in having its pretrial detention centers open to public scrutiny. We have given prison officials wide latitude in administering pretrial detention facilities, in guaranteeing detainees’ attendance at trial, and in promoting prison safety. Id. But we fail to see how turning pretrial detainees into the unwilling objects of the latest reality show serves any of these legitimate goals.5 As the Supreme Court [1032]*1032has recognized, “[i]nmates ... are not like animals in a zoo to be filmed and photographed at will by the public or by media reporters, however ‘educational’ the process may be for others.” Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 5 n. 2, 98 S.Ct. 2588, 57 L.Ed.2d 553 (1978) (plurality opinion).6 Also, the Supreme Court has held that the government’s otherwise legitimate interest in “informing the general public about the administration of criminal justice” does not justify the presence of reporters during the execution of search warrants at a suspect’s home. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 612, 119 S.Ct. 1692, 143 L.Ed.2d 818 (1999). Such press exposure impairs citizens’ Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable intrusions into their homes, held the Court, even when a search is warranted. Id. Here, similarly, the otherwise valid governmental interest in assuring accountability and public scrutiny cannot justify broad public exposure of pretrial detainees’ intimate circumstances, as none of the purposes justifying pretrial detention are served thereby. The Sheriffs policy is all the more troubling because displaying images of the County’s pretrial detainees to internet users from around the world is not rationally connected to goals associated with educating the citizenry of Maricopa County.
We also reject Sheriff Arpaio’s contention that the injunction violates his First Amendment rights. The webcam transmissions were not Sheriff Arpaio’s personal communications. The webcams were governmental property, installed on government-owned premises operated for a governmental purpose; the transmissions were originally over the Sheriff department’s official website. Absent his official position, Sheriff Arpaio could not have obtained or transmitted the images. The speech was therefore that of a governmental executive officer acting in Ms official, managerial capacity, and as such is governmental speech, not the personal speech of a government employee. Compare Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 383, 107 S.Ct. 2891, 97 L.Ed.2d 315 (1987) (holding the discharge of a public employee for her comment to a co-worker on a matter of public concern to be a violation of employee’s First Amendment rights); Givhan v. Western Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 415-16, 99 S.Ct. 693, 58 L.Ed.2d 619 (1979) (“Neither the [First] Amendment itself nor our decisions indicate that [freedom of speech] is lost to the public employee who arranges to communicate privately with his employer rather than to spread his views before the public.”). The district court correctly held that “the Bill of Rights protect the individual from the government, not the other way around.”
Sheriff Arpaio cites Downs v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1003, 1013 [1033]*1033(9th Cir.2000), for the notion that the government has First Amendment rights. But Downs simply held that when the government is the speaker, it does not violate the First Amendment rights of individuals by expressing a particular viewpoint. Id. Nowhere did Downs suggest that the government has a cognizable First Amendment right or interest.
In short, the webcams are not reasonably related to a non punitive purpose. Therefore, we agree with the district court’s determination that plaintiffs will likely prevail on their claim that placing webcams in a pretrial detention center violates the Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights of pretrial detainees by subjecting them to punishment. Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the preliminary injunction.
IV.
Sheriff Arpaio has failed to demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion in granting the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order.
AFFIRMED.